Print
Email
Save
BY MICHAEL S. TERWILLIGER
Firefighters die in the line of duty. Regrettably, even if it goes against the grain, I will say now that firefighters are always going to die in the line of duty. We honor their memory and try to develop systems to keep the living alive, and hopefully we will improve. We always talk about what we owe folks who die on the job, and that is what this article is about. We owe it to them to study the events that led to their death and to try to learn from them. You know, I don’t like that. We owe it to ourselves to learn from the events that led to their injury or death. This past summer, on September 12, 2004, Firefighter Eva Schike of the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (CDF) died at a wildfire. We owe it to her memory and ourselves to learn from the fire that took her life. This article is not intended to judge the actions of the firefighters involved or to assign any blame. God knows there is enough blaming going around-we don’t need to do it to each other. With that in mind, let’s take a look at the fire, the Tuolumne Fire (incident number CA-STF-2191), the strategy employed, and what options were available to the members of the crew as they developed and implemented their tactics.
THE FIRE
The following fire information was obtained from the California Department of Forestry Green Sheet and the U.S. Forestry Service 72-Hour report. The fire was located at the bottom of a major river drainage that has very steep sides and is about 2,000 feet deep at the area of origin. Reported at 1233 hours by a staffed fire lookout, the fire was burning in light, flashy surface fuels, predominantly oak leaf litter, light grass, and mixed brush. The fuel moisture content of the one-hour time lag fuels (those dead fuels less than a quarter of an inch in diameter) was between four and five percent. The temperature was 89°F to 94°F. Relative humidity was 18 to 24 percent, and the wind was predominantly steady upcanyon at about three to five miles per hour, as observed by various air attack assets (i.e., helicopters, air tankers, and air attack supervisors in observation planes). There were no critical weather patterns occurring (e.g., thunderstorms or frontal passages). A meandering river channel with numerous tributary canyons and ridges with slopes ranging from 80- to 120-percent grades characterized the river drainage. The fire had started at the river near a bridge and burned upslope. It had crossed a road approximately 260 feet above the river, burning up a north-facing slope.
 |
Helicopter 404 (H404) was dispatched at 1245 hours from a base 22 miles northwest from the fire and arrived at approximately 1305 hours. H404 is a UH-1H Super Huey, Type 2 helicopter with a crew of nine consisting of a pilot, two captains, and six firefighters. CDF Air Attack 404 (a plane), two air tankers, and the incident commander (IC) were already on-scene on the arrival of H404. The helicopter landed at the designated landing zone (LZ), a sandbar in the river about three-quarters of a mile downstream from the fire. It dropped off one captain and six firefighters; the pilot and one captain stayed with the ship. The helicopter then began making water drops on the right flank of the fire and ultimately was working a spot fire on the left flank. The crew walked along a road from the LZ to below the right flank of the fire, met with the IC, and received a briefing on fire conditions and the proposed strategy to anchor the right flank from the road down to the river. An anchor is an advantageous location from which to start constructing a fire line; it usually offers a barrier to fire spread. The crew continued up the road to the right flank and evaluated the situation and the proposed work assignment to anchor the right flank to the river (Figure 1).
 |
After discussing the assignment and safety issues, the crew members began constructing an indirect hand line (i.e., removing vegetation to mineral earth to stop a fire spread) downhill using a chainsaw and hand tools in the oak overstory with brush fuels, hoping to connect the road to the river with a downhill fire line construction. The hand line was between seven and 30 feet from the fire’s edge on the right flank. The tactic selected to establish the anchor at the river with indirect line was to take advantage of sparse fuels and natural barriers. Five back pumps, each containing five gallons of water, were staged on the edge of the road to support line construction if needed. The fire was backing into an upcanyon wind. The initial point of the hand line was approximately seven feet from the fire’s edge; as the hand line progressed, the distance from the edge of the fire widened to approximately 30 feet.
After line construction started, the firing operation began at the edge of the road, working downslope following the hand line. At approximately 1345 hours, an abrupt wind shift occurred. The 90°F to 120°F wind shift changed the fire spread from a cross slope, or upcanyon, wind to an upslope wind pushing the flank to an upslope running head fire (generally the leading edge of a wildfire that is spreading the fastest and with the most intensity, driven by wind, topography, fuel, or a combination of all three). The wind event triggering the flare-up lasted less than two minutes and the actual flare-up lasted approximately 30 seconds; then the fire behavior returned to a backing fire influenced by an upcanyon wind. During this event, H404 was working spot fires on another portion of the fire.
When the wind shifted, crew members headed to their respective safety zones. Four, including the captain, went downhill to the river; three went uphill toward the road. The four who went to the river reached their safety zone. Of the three who went uphill, two made it to the road, and one did not. The firefighter who did not was last seen by the two survivors approximately five feet from the road behind them but was not seen as the fire burned up to the road. After the accountability process determined that a firefighter was missing, members of the crew, the helicopter, and personnel from an engine company that had arrived on the road at the right flank began a search. Schike was found approximately one hundred feet below the road in the newly burned area.
The information above is a synopsis of the full report but paints the picture of the event before, during, and after. Let’s take a look at some of the activities that were employed to see what we could learn.
STRATEGY
To first look over various aspects of this event, it is worth discussing the strategy employed at the time of the burnover. The IC had placed himself on the road, which was 260 feet above the river, above the origin of the fire, just down the road from the right flank. The fire had crossed the road and was burning up-canyon and upslope. It is important to remember that wind and slope have the same effect on a fire and each will try to overpower the other (photo 1). In this case, the slope was steep and, therefore, the fire was burning upslope and up-canyon; the influence of the wind and slope caused it to vector across the slope. The strategy at that time was to develop an anchor point and work the right flank. It does no good to start working the right flank above the road until the fire below the road is contained. Otherwise, the fire below the road will work slowly downcanyon and below your line established above the road and have the potential to spot across the road and nullify your efforts above the road. It would also place personnel on the line above the road in danger. If there were adequate resources, it would be possible to work downslope and upslope simultaneously as long as you are sure you can hold the fire below the road. The other value to this strategy is you have to drive through the fire to the left flank; controlling the right flank would make that possible and safer for incoming resources. I would imagine the road was the escape route; you must maintain that escape route before you proceed, just as we maintain stairwells as we advance upward in structure fires. There also needs to be room on the road to place resources, facing out and still allowing traffic flow.
LCES
Most fatal and near-fatal reports on wildfire seek to determine if the 10 Standard Orders and the 18 Situations That Shout Watch Out were considered during the actual event. LCES (Lookouts, Communications, Escape Routes, Safety Zones) is a simple way to remember the most important of the 10 Standard Orders.
When you are involved in downhill line construction with active fire below you, it is imperative that you have an experienced person assigned as a lookout full time.
With communications, across the canyon, if feasible, is probably the best. All members of the crew need to be on the same frequency, and the crew leader must be in communication with the supervisor-in this case, the IC.
The report mentioned the crew discussed escape routes and used them. Of course, you need a safe place to go to when you reach the end of the escape route-the safety zone. Unfortunately, one person died while trying to use the escape route, which leads me to this point: You must be aware of the escape route as it relates to other factors that can minimize that route’s effectiveness. Some of these factors are steepness of slope if you must travel uphill, the type of footing, and the number and type of obstacles that must be negotiated. Consider the distance of the escape route compared with the anticipated rate of fire spread and intensity. The farther you cut line, the farther away the safety zone is unless you make another. Finally, take into account crew fatigue. Hot days, steep slopes, time on the job, and closeness to the fire all work to drain the physical capabilities of even highly trained and fit firefighters.
AIR ASSETS
This fire was typical in that there were air tankers, helicopters, and air attack supervisors. In many cases, firefighters tend to expect the air attack supervisor to fill the role of the lookout. This is not possible and should not be considered.
The air attack supervisor, from an airplane above the fire, directs air resources and ensures that their activities complement those of the ground crew, an assignment that requires tremendous focus. Second, supervisors are linked to the IC or operations to constantly evaluate the effectiveness of the strategy, suggest changes, and give those folks on the ground a bird’s-eye view of the overall problem. H404 delivered this particular helitack crew to the fire and had the ability to drop water from a bucket or tank under the ship. My preference in the past has been to assign a helicopter to a helitack crew to support the crew with water drops if it is involved in line construction with open flame. It simply makes the crew more effective as the water drops take the Btus out of the fire on which they are working (photo 2).
 |
Most helitack personnel will secretly tell you that they consider the helicopter a last-ditch escape route and a dedicated eye in the sky above them, keeping an eye out for them. As an IC, I always defer to the helitack crew captain as to what the crew’s comfort level is concerning the use of the helicopter when I ask the crew to complete a direct fire line on open fire. If the helicopter is needed on another target, I don’t commit the crew unless the members are confident to do so, and I will tell you now to expect the captain to demand that the ship stay with the crew.
TACTICS
Tactics are employed to complement the strategy used. In this case, the strategy initially was to anchor the fire from the road downslope to the river, approximately 260 feet. The tactic was to use a combination of direct and indirect hand line construction from the road to the river. There are numerous aspects of this activity you should understand as follows:
Downhill line construction. Before you start any downhill line construction, you must ask the following questions: Has the fire been scouted? Will the wind be in my favor the whole time, or change? Is the topography free of chutes that will channel and increase fire spread upslope? (Chimneys or chutes act just like the stovepipe on a wood stove. While air is sucked in on the bottom, heated air and gases go up the chute, increasing the rate of spread and intensity.) Can I create and maintain adequate escape routes and safety zones? Can I manually create an anchor point with firing tools? Where will I place a lookout? Do I have adequate communications for the task? What additional resources are coming? Am I ready to brief my staff? Do I have time?
As company and chief officers, we are risk managers, and downhill line construction with open flame is very high risk indeed. One of the mental checkpoints I have is very simple: Is there a way I can have the crew go to the bottom of the fire and start at the anchor point and work up? I do not know if this was feasible on this fire, but it is almost always safer to start at the natural anchor point and work up if at all possible. If you are doing your job correctly, this will ensure that there is no fire below you, and if the wind does change, it will only affect the fire above you, and you can watch it spread away from you instead of at you. I like to call that “watching the big dog eat”-it’s better than running for your life, no matter how you slice it.
Direct vs. indirect hand lines. This information is mostly my opinion, based on experience. If you are going to cut a hand line to stop a fire, you can do it two ways.
The first way is to go direct by getting right next to the fire and extinguishing it as you go. This is feasible in a low-intensity fire, in which the fuel bed is such that the Btus generated do not bother you when working up on it, or the fire’s intensity can be reduced by applying moisture from a helicopter, an air tanker, or a hoseline. This is definitely the safest way to cut downhill on open line because it usually offers you an escape route by just stepping into the burn. Stepping into the burn (if available) is the best escape route you can have. When using the burn as an escape route, always be aware of unburned fuels below you that might generate enough radiant heat to injure you while still in the burn. Also, consider the burn-out time of heavy fuels in the burn. Heavy fuels (such as slash and timber litter) can burn for many hours after a fire passes, making conditions untenable for humans.
The second way is to cut an indirect hand line. When you start your line seven feet from the fire and extend it to 30 feet from the fire, you are creating an indirect hand line. This is usually done because the fire is generating intense Btus that hurt, and you step back to give yourself some relief. It is a common tactic, but therein lies some hazards. There will be unburned fuel between you and the fire, and that can be dangerous.
When you cut a hand line on an open fire line, you will find yourself in one of three zones. The first, as listed above, is a direct hand line on the fire’s edge. Generally, your escape route is in the burn because you have put it out at that point. If the fire does change because of external influences, you will generally not be affected because you can get in the burn before fire line intensities preclude that route.
The second zone is far enough from the fire that it will allow you the time to recognize the change in burning conditions, enabling you to escape before the fire can get to you. You may find yourself many hundreds of yards from the fire or even farther, to allow you the time to get the line done before the arrival of the fire. It will allow you time to burn it out, and it will give you time to leave should it become untenable.
The third zone can be the kill zone, somewhere between direct attack and long-distance indirect attack. When the fire escalates or changes direction, you are too far from it to step into the burn before the intensities preclude that escape. You have also not given yourself the spacing required for enough time to execute your escape in a timely fashion because the fire is on you too fast. In this situation, the fire escalates quickly and precludes the use of any escape route at your disposal because it is on you before you reach the safety zone. It is usually representative of firefighters literally running for their lives-never a good scenario.
Firing operations. One of the tactics employed on this fire was backfiring or, in this case, attempting to burn out the unburned fuels between the constructed fire line and the open fire line. This is a common tactic. When you burn out fuel in this fashion, it is good to do it from the top down for a simple reason. If you light from the bottom, the fire will run up the hill past you. Lighting downhill allows you to control the pace of the fire. There are many things to consider when lighting fire. You should not do it if you are not experienced, you should inform other resources on the fire before doing it, and you should do it only if you have the time. Most importantly, realize that your backfire will burn at least as well as the main fire. Backfiring is considered a “sexy” form of firefighting but, in many cases, when you have more fire than you can handle, it is not always a good idea to light more. Sometimes it is good to sit down and eat a sandwich; in many instances, the fire will settle down.
Another important aspect of applying fire is the effect it can have on the main fire. When you light grass on fire at an anchor point at the junction of a hand line and a road under normal summer conditions, the small backfire will create significant thermal activity. By doing this, it will be drawing in air at its base as it drives the heat up, and that mixing of air can pull the main fire to it rather aggressively. Always be cognizant of the effect your backfire will have on the main fire, regardless of how small it is. The closer you are, the more immediate the effect, which is only increased if you are above the main fire on a steep slope.
RISK VS. GAIN
I believe it was George Patton who said, “Take calculated risks; that is quite different from being rash.” I mentioned before that we are risk managers. When we get involved in fire-control operations, we may get caught up in our desire to put out the fire and forget to do a little risk assessment: Is the risk I am going to take to complete this operation worth the gain? Sometimes it is really obvious. There are three people hanging out the window, the smoke is ugly behind them, and we need to get going on a high-risk rescue. We are willing to increase our risk because the gains are substantial.
At wildfires, it is not that clearcut. Some-times you need to ask the next question, If I don’t do what I want to do right now, will it make a difference in the overall outcome? That is based on experience obviously, but it is a valid question. You might remember that the report on this burnover mentioned the arrival of an engine company on the road where the hand line and the road intersected, which immediately started to help search for Schike. I also mentioned that a preferable way to cut line on open fire is with the addition of water to allow a direct attack. This leads me to timing. When we do our risk vs. gain assessment, consider the available resources coming in. Remember, considering incoming and available resources is on your downhill line construction checklist. If an engine is a few minutes out, wait until it arrives and deploys a hoselay with that hand crew before they bail off the edge. You will need the water sooner or later to mop up, and it will ultimately create what you do desperately need anyhow-a bulletproof anchor point for the whole operational period.
I really hate some terms we use to rationalize death-things like “He was doing what he loved at the time.” I guess it is true because every firefighter I know who has died in the line of duty was probably doing what he or she loved at the time: living. When we are really fighting fire, we are really living. All that said, deep in my heart I still wonder just when we are going to quit killing firefighters for buildings already lost, people already dead, and wildland fuels that are going to burn anyhow. In memory of Schike and all the others who have fallen, train, learn, pay attention, share ideas, and-most of all-think when you are on the job. Really think about what you are doing, and if you can’t come up with the right answer 100 percent of the time, stop and reassess. The fire will be there doing its thing whether you live or not, and the life you save might be your own. ■
