By JIM TIDWELL

On February 20, 2003, in West Warwick, Rhode Island, the fourth deadliest nightclub fire in United States history occurred in The Station nightclub. More than two-thirds of the 462 people in attendance were either killed or injured (100 dead, 230 injured). A live band that was using fireworks as part of its act ignited foam insulation that had been installed around and over the stage. The fire department was notified about 40 seconds after the fire was ignited and arrived on scene in less than five minutes. In that short time frame, fire had engulfed the club, and fire was showing through the roof. The damage was done.

Before the fire had cooled, the investigations began. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) as well as state and local agencies conducted in-depth analyses of the fire, the evacuation, and the processes that may have failed to protect the concertgoers that night. This article will review some of the lessons learned from this event and the ensuing investigations. We'll also explore actions that have been taken since the fire to avoid such a disaster in the future.

How could this many people die in a building this small (less than 4,500 square feet) where the longest distance to an exit was less than 60 feet? Was there a delay in notifying the crowd of the fire or a delay in the crowd's reaction? Were there problems with the egress system that prevented escape? Did the materials that ignited burn so quickly that people didn't have time to exit the building? As with most disasters, there is no single answer. Rather, there was a series of breakdowns that resulted in this tragic loss of lives.

In response to these issues, NIST conducted an in-depth investigation including two real scale mockup fire experiments of the platform area, which was about 20 percent of the total area of the building. According to NIST, there were three overarching reasons for the large loss of life, which follow (with each cause's code issues).

1. Hazardous mix of building contents. This fire's ignition resulted from pyrotechnics being used in close proximity to polyurethane foam, which was attached to the walls and ceiling around the stage. It is widely believed that this foam was purchased by one of the building owners more than two years before the fire to be used around the stage as sound-deadening material. The purchasing documents indicate that the foam was not treated with any fire retardant; whether treated foam would have changed the outcome is debatable. The fire consumed the foam quickly, generating large quantities of dense black smoke. As the foam burned, it spread fire to the wood-frame structure; it became a "typical" building fire. The speed at which the fire burned was a significant factor in the large loss of life and can be primarily attributed to the pyrotechnics and the polyurethane foam.

The code issues. The use of untreated polyurethane foam was and continues to be a violation of NFPA and International Code Council (ICC) model codes as well as the regulations in use in Rhode Island at the time of the fire. The pyrotechnics used that night were not permitted by the local fire department or the fire marshal's office; this, too, was counter to model codes and the state regulations. Had the club adhered to the codes in effect at the time of the fire, neither the pyrotechnics nor the polyurethane foam would have been used. Without these factors, the fire would not have occurred.

The fact that the code was violated for more than two years indicates an overall lack of enforcement, which isn't unique to one jurisdiction; it's an issue in many communities around the United States. For regulations to be effective, there must be a viable enforcement program in place. This includes adequate staffing, training, and support. Adopting the latest model codes is a good start, but without well-trained staff in sufficient numbers to conduct regular inspections, the codes become just another book on the shelf. Without support from elected and appointed leaders in the community, the inspector becomes a hollow voice.

Displaying 1/3 Page 1, 2, 3 Next>
View Article as Single page