All-Service Emergency Teams— A Must in Industrial Protection

All-Service Emergency Teams— A Must in Industrial Protection

INDUSTRIAL FIRE PROTECTION

The paramount purpose of industrial emergency management is to protect all corporate assets from any possible hazards, not just fire. To do this most effectively and efficiently, a broad-based team effort is necessary.

By 10 a.m. the chemical tanker had unhooked and backed out of the fenced-in dock area. Eight-thousand five-hundred gallons of fresh product had been unloaded into the bunkered tanks. At 10:30 a.m., a flow valve was activated and a trestle line servicing a batch process operation located in a building several hundred yards away began to move the product into the process tanks. Unfortunately, the newly delivered chemical compound was contaminated. Ten minutes later, the resultant explosion and fire created a serious and extensive emergency with high exposure risk to life and property within the industrial site and — if mishandled by responding forces—the potential for even greater disaster.

This simplistic but true scenario, which industrial safety personnel know in a hundred variations, illustrates the dramatic need for an up-to-date, comprehensive, all-hazard approach to industrial emergency planning and management.

To understand what has been happening to the traditional industrial fire brigade, it is necessary, first, to recall the provisions that industries typically made in the past to help protect themselves. Those provisions, as industrial leaders now are beginning to realize, can no longer handle the broad spectrum of exposures that may endanger certain plants.

For decades, industrial managers have recognized the danger to their plants and people from fire and explosion, from industrial accidents, and from chemicals, radioactive materials and other environmental pollutants such as coal and grain dust. To provide protection, two separate approaches are traditional: individual experts (such as industrial hygienists, safety engineers, and health professionals) are employed and given relevant authority during an incident; and fire brigades (volunteer or career) are organized. A totally separate function, of course, is industrial security, and historical models have usually called for not only a distinct separation of “security” from “safety” functions, but the maintenance of a communication barrier between the two types of personnel.

Both industrial and public firefighters should be aware of the potential hazards and the resources necessary and available for the emergency when it strikes.

This characteristic points up the concept that more traditional organizational structures do not lend themselves to solving current problems. For example, the same chemical storage tanks that are a major concern of the plant fire brigade may be an attack target and thus the concern of the security personnel. In addition, environmental pollution, as well as health problems, may occur from these tanks, and thus involve a variety of other specialists and regulatory agencies.

We usually think of the difficulties that emerge during an incident that requires several different kinds of groups to cooperate closely. Even more important, however, is the cooperation that should exist in order to prevent something from happening in the first place. It is in this pre-response planning phase that the organizational barriers between the various and separate operating divisions are especially apparent and very unfortunate.

What is the purpose of modern industrial emergency management and the planning that must accompany it? Are there ways of organizing the groups to promote more efficient and effective solutions to the increasingly complex problem of creating a safe industrial site? Fortunately, modern corporate leaders have been willing to explore new solutions, and some effective designs are beginning to emerge. Emergency management for industry is very similar to emergency management for municipalities: its overriding goal is to protect lives and property.

Just as in the larger community, the assets of an industrial site are its people, its structures, facilities and equipment, its stored materials and products, and its operating capacity. The loss of any of these to a significant degree draws a very harsh bottom line and the loss of any life has especially serious consequences. And, as in any other community, the best and cheapest incident is the one that never occurs.

Obviously, then, the four basic phases of emergency management hold true for industry:

  • Mitigation works to avoid incidents and to lessen their severity;
  • Planning/preparation undergirds the ability of response forces to do an excellent job;
  • Response calls for the prompt and effective handling of any incident that does occur;
  • Recovery enables operations to resume immediately following incident termination.

The phases must be envisioned as a closed loop, with the recovery from an incident leading back to an improved environment, and thus an act of mitigation. This is especially true at an industrial site, since so much of what occurs every day carries the potential for the next incident. Since industries cannot function well (or at all) in temporary locations, the ability of an industrial site to recover immediately from any type of incident is critical, injury and loss of life, of course, compound the problem even more. It is bad enough to have any person injured or killed, but even the temporary loss of key personnel severely affects corporate ability to resume normal operations.

For industry, then, each of the four phases of emergency management has a special importance, and each must have more than simply corporate level commitment. A workable and acceptable structure and mechanism for strategies planning, directing, monitoring, redirecting, and communicating about each step must be agreed upon. Because ego, power, and “territory” or turf are involved, this typically becomes a sticky problem. Experience indicates that—just as in community master planning—certain variables will smooth the way:

  • Visible commitment and strong interest from corporate level executives and site general managers;
  • Careful explanation to (and education of) lower level managers, who must accept the common goals of corporate assets protection;
  • Sensitive emergency managers who are skilled in interpersonal relations and group dynamics and who can operate in a non-threatening way.

A “comprehensive, all-hazard” approach to the protection of corporate assets must involve a wide variety of managers and supervisors in the strategic planning activities. This involvement serves to educate them to the newer, broader view of emergency management and, at the same time, to get them involved in the change process that will impact their areas of responsibility. This meaningful involvement should help significantly in easing them into any new arrangements necessary to a response plan.

Since fire is not the only concern of an industrial emergency management team (as it might be for an industrial fire brigade), a necessary first step is to conduct a hazard analysis of the site and to decide what items fall into the “possible hazard” category and which fall into the “probable hazard” category. For example, while an airliner could crash anywhere, industrial sites located near airports stand a greater “probability” of that particular hazard.

One typical listing of “hazard” categories includes:

  • Natural disasters (floods, earthquakes, hurricanes, etc.),
  • Man-caused accidents (structural collapse, industrial accidents, etc.),
  • Chemical and radioactive accidents (BLEVEs, toxic clouds, etc.),
  • Attack incidents (bomb threats, shooting, hostage taking, etc.),
  • Energy failures (gasoline shortage, loss of electric power, etc.),
  • Worker disruption (demonstration, strike, mischief/sabotage, etc.),
  • Computer, document, and equipment disasters (breakdowns, loss of files, theft, etc.).

Each category listing should contain all known hazards, and a wide variety of managers should be asked to add to the lists and to estimate whether each listing is a possible or a probable hazard in their particular judgment. A master list is then compiled. That list in hand, top level management is able to design the basic organizational structure for plant safety, being sure that there are strong and clear lines between the security and the emergency group.

If the decision is to cluster comprehensive prevention, planning, emergency response, emergency medical, and the other non-security categories, then responsibility for them can be assigned to an “All-Service Team.” In this way, an integrated group of prevention and response specialists is matched against the probable hazards, maintaining close coordination with the security specialists.

The All-Service Team

Now we have one group with responsibility for mitigation, pre-incident emergency response, recovery planning and coordination, and for the strategic planning that forms their foundation. This span of responsibility calls for broad based coordination and implementation authority which typically come from the higher echelons in the organization. Both emergency management and security management need to come together at the highest possible level, typically reporting to someone who reports directly to the site general manager.

The all-service categories of responsibility begin with comprehensive prevention and plant protection programs. In addition to the usual inspections for fire safety, chemical storage, life safety, and related concerns, the comprehensive, all-hazards approach calls for at least four additional and major mitigation programs:

  • The investigation and analysis of all incidents, in any category;
  • The implementation of correct programs based in large measure on local incidents and case histories of incidents in similar locations, plus frequent local inspections or “audits”;
  • The development and use of emergency and disaster scenarios outlining recommended steps in mitigation, response, control, and recovery;
  • The development of widespread employee orientation, education, and training programs related to prevention, response and recovery.

The All-Service Team obviously needs expertise in comprehensive prevention activities, in hazard and risk analysis, in program planning and design, and in emergency response and control procedures. Ideally, they will function also as instructors in employee orientation and training. While each person on the team may not have the skill and talent needed for every one of these responsibilities, the team as a group of professionals needs them.

There is another way of considering the multiplicity of skills needed by the team, and that is to review the kinds of hazards to which they will respond. At the least, each shift of the team needs basic skills in firefighting, in dealing with hazardous materials, in rescue work and evacuation procedures, in emergency medical protocols, and in working with the types of equipment and facilities common to their industrial site. Depending upon the spectrum of assigned responsibilities, additional tasks could include anything from bomb searches to facilities recovery.

Three-tiered Response System

Several factors, certainly including Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) regulations, necessitate that the primary emergency response crew be full-time employees who are trained and regularly assigned to this work. The “tiered response system,” so familiar in municipal emergency medical service, works very’ well in an industrial setting.

Cost effectiveness dictates that the usual number of full-time emergency response personnel at an industrial plant will be smaller than could conceivably be needed, even with outside response forces on the way. Additionally, it is often impossible to staff a full-time team of professionals with each type of talent necessary to provide in-depth coverage for every identified possible hazard. So, staffing is usually built around the “probables,” and internal and specialized response (the first tier of emergency response) is counted on for the “possibles.”

One organizational model has back-up teams of employees who join one of several in-plant volunteer brigades. A large plant may have back-up teams or brigades for such areas as chemical emergencies, first aid, fire, search and evacuation, and facilities restoration. These teams are called out only when additional or specialized help is needed by the full-time response group, and they constitute the second tier of emergency response.

The third tier of emergency response forces is exceedingly important and must be summoned without delay or hesitation. This, of course, is the group of emergency departments outside the industrial plant that are charged with the responsibility and, in some cases, authority to protect the industrial lives and property.

While there are arguments offered in favor of the industrial specialists handling their own incidents, open communication, joint inspections, preplanning and training, as well as demonstrated mutual respect with local fire companies will dissolve most difficulties. Usually, in-plant response groups arrive at the scene quickly, with technical knowledge and specialized equipment. Outside response forces cannot arrive as quickly, but do have the strength of numbers, of training and experience, and of heavy equipment. In the tiered response system, the forces compliment each other.

Proper equipment, training and informational manual

In-plant, all-service response teams cannot carry out their functions without proper equipment, adequate protective clothing and self-contained breathing apparatus, extinguishing and vapor suppression agents, and specialized tools. A vehicle especially designed for the site’s needs and assigned to the full-time team may well be necessary. It is often unrealistic to suppose that outside forces can respond with all of the equipment necessary for specialized applications (an adequate number of acid-gas suits, for example, or complete sets of non-sparking tools).

To provide adequate, rapid intervention at a complex industrial site requires a corporate investment larger than the percentage of taxes allocated to the local fire department. In some instances, it may be possible for the specialized equipment to be made available for off-site emergencies, thus providing a cooperative mutual aid. Occasionally, an industry will purchase the specialized equipment and donate it to the local department. Often, the industry will carry the cost of specialized training for members of the local fire department to become familiar with potential on-site problems.

Pre-planning and cooperation are necessary in unknown complex industrial areas. The emergency situation is no time to begin learning the structural layout.

Joint inspections and training with local, outside fire forces must include familiarization with the industrial site, with access routes, with alarm procedures, and certainly with special problems and applications. These provisions are as necessary for local police and ambulance crews as they are for local fire departments. Joint operating agreements and protocols must be worked out beforehand and distributed on a need-to-know basis.

The industrial emergency management group shall use an emergency procedures manual as its operating guide. These manuals, sometimes called emergency planning and control handbooks, need to be developed locally and made site specific. Typically, they cover all four phases of emergency management, plus present details of the industrial security control or emergency operations center.

The guides may be a combination of emergency/disaster plans plus a compendium of operating procedures and protocols for all personnel who could have an assignment at an industrial incident. In some cases, only sections of the manual are distributed to certain categories of managers and other employees, depending upon their need to know and their assigned role. This manual must dovetail exactly with the site’s security manual, and also with the protocols of the outside response forces. The age-old question of “who is in charge?” for example, is worked out in the manual, not at an incident.

Just as municipalities are moving toward integrated emergency management so are industries. The proliferation of chemicals and hazardous materials in general; the necessity to keep research, development, and production going; the significant focus on worker health and environmental pollution; and the increase in acts of terrorism are all forcing the private sector to develop quickly the ability to help themselves. In many cases, they have the resources to make significant gains (computerized resource inventories and response procedures, for example) and can set the way for a more efficient and cost-effective public protection system.

Already we are seeing mutual aid groupings of industries, with close affiliation of public departments, the U.S. Coast Guard, and other organizations. CHEMTREC has been operating helpfully for years. Excellent strides have been made in the industrial brigade concept, but more are needed.

Through the careful application of what we already know about the essentials of comprehensive emergency management (mitigation, preparation, response, and recovery) the chemical disaster described in the first paragraph of this article can be averted. American industries can set the way.

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