BY DENNIS L. RUBIN
On Sunday, May 8, 2015, my pager went off at 0834 hours with a dispatch from the Brown County (WI) Communications Center for a building fire. By the time the dispatcher was making the second announcement, I had begun my response. The initial dispatch information was sparse because the 911 caller reported what was visible from a backyard on the eastern shore of the Fox River, which was across the river from the fire. The caller had no way to determine the address or name of the building that was on fire; he was just describing its location relative to many nearby landmarks. Many other callers reported this building fire, a clue to the incident’s size, scope, and severity.
Response
The responding first-in engine company declared a working fire as it left quarters, another indicator of a major event. The fire building was in the line of sight of the De Pere (WI) Fire Rescue Department Engine 111’s crew from the front ramp at Fire Station 1. As I responded, I could see a large column of heavy black smoke from a few miles away from the college campus. It turned out to be a deeply seated fire in an enclosed storage area connected to St. Norbert College’s Ray Van Den Heuvel Family Campus Center (photo 1). Realizing that our on-duty staff was only six members, I called for help.
 |
| (1) Photos by Firefighter Dan Hermans. |
The department’s initial response staffing is very lean: On-duty personnel range between six and nine members. Two career command officers are assigned to day work and are dispatched when available. Our initial response falls far short of the 17 firefighters required to arrive within eight minutes of dispatch, according to National Fire Protection Association 1710, Standard for the Organization and Deployment of Fire Suppression Operations, Emergency Medical Operations, and Special Operations to the Public by Career Fire Departments.
To overcome this shortfall, within four minutes of the initial alarm, I requested Mutual Aid Box Alarm System (MABAS) Box Alarm Card 1-11 to the first-alarm level. Within a few seconds, Assistant Chief Al Matzke corrected my gaffe to strike MABAS Box Alarm Card 1-21 (for responses west of the Fox River). Soon, four more engines, one ladder company, and five additional command officers were dispatched to provide the NFPA 1710-mandated minimum staffing for a structural fire response. Also, one engine and one chief officer were dispatched to fill in at De Pere’s Fire Station 1 to cover for our companies, which would be busy for the next five to six hours.
Fire Development
This building fire was a noteworthy operation for several reasons. First, the fire loss was more than $800,000, the largest ever for De Pere. The department does not usually require outside fire response resources inside our community. Also, a motion-activated security camera recorded the fire’s development prior to our arrival-we almost never have that information.
The fire developed as follows: At 5:58 a.m., intermittent puffs of white smoke were seen through the security camera on the east side of the building. The wind may have pushed the smoke out of the storage space intermittently into the common area, which activated the security camera. About an hour later, white smoke was pouring out of the fire area continuously. The camera recorded without a break from this time on. The smoke progressed from white to dark gray and almost black by 8:29 a.m. Forty seconds later, the smoke was entirely black and increased in pressure and volume. A significant portion of the stored items were igniting at this time, and the fire continued to develop.
At 8:30:41 a.m., the first 911 caller reported the fire to the Brown County Communications Center. This alarm had been delayed for two hours, 32 minutes, and 41 seconds, during which time there was significant fire extension. The heat was so intense that the concrete spalled (i.e., exploded as the trapped moisture was turned into steam within the cured concrete), causing significant structural damage to the patio area-all before our arrival. De Pere Engine 111 was on scene at 8:39:25 a.m. and declared a “working fire.” At 9 a.m., command declared the fire “under control” and the loss stopped at 9:25 a.m.
The Operation
On arrival, the initial incident commander, Acting Captain Rick De Weert, provided an initial report that included the correct street address, the type of building construction, and the height of the structure. He described the fire conditions present and noted that the fire’s location was in an open-air storage area under a concrete deck outside of the building proper. The initial action plan (IAP) assigned the resources that were on location (two engines, one ambulance) to water supply and fire attack. There was no need for additional resources at the time because a MABAS first-box alarm level request was already ordered. I established command as the initial report was transmitted.
Fireground Safety Concerns
De Weert was now free to join his company’s fire attack group as it advanced a hoseline into the hazard zone to extinguish the fire under a very large concrete deck area. As the group moved into the combustion zone with a 1¾-inch handline, the fire was readily knocked down (photos 2, 3). Very early in this event, De Weert reported to command that the concrete pad of the overhead deck had spalled and was in a very unsafe condition. Personnel were ordered to leave the fire area in case of further collapse of the overhead deck. The hoseline was repositioned to a safe location to keep the now smoldering material in check (photo 4). De Weert was reassigned as the safety officer and was directed to complete a 360° walk-around and report all pertinent details to command. By this time, I had viewed sides A, B, and D with the fire attack group working on side C.
Liaison and Information Officer
Assistant Chief Al Matzke arrived and assumed the liaison and information officer roles. This alarm required significant coordination to line up the external resources to properly extinguish the fire. Coordinating with St. Norbert College administration, security, and facilities management was just the beginning.
We called the local utility within the first few minutes of the operation; it arrived about 15 minutes later. Matzke directed the utility to control the occupancy’s natural gas and electric service. Matzke alerted and worked with the De Pere Public Health Department for guidance concerning the now-contaminated food-handling and preparation area inside the restaurant, one of the structure’s occupancies. The final liaison issue he addressed was working with a construction and reclamation contractor. The collapsing concrete deck area needed to be shored as soon as possible to prevent further damage and render it safe for overhaul and the fire investigation.
A major fire is an unusual event in De Pere, so the media was on location in force. The command staff officer provided initial and updated media reports as well as on-demand interviews, helping our media partners to meet their various broadcast deadlines. Matzke set up a media viewing area that allowed the media personnel direct visual access but kept them out of harm’s way. Several media personnel stopped by the command post to thank the chief for allowing great access to “action shots.” Two command officers should have handled these jobs, but no other chiefs were available.
Apparatus Placement
As soon as our mutual-aid partners arrived, I established Division 1, using Engine 1811 as the resource, and Chief 1801 (Tom Guns) as the division supervisor. Division 1 was assigned to move a 1¾-inch attack line into position inside the building. Its tactical objectives were to confirm that the building was evacuated, check for fire extension, and report on interior smoke conditions. The lack of building access for fire apparatus presented a significant barrier to completing this tactic.
For many of the buildings on campus, there is no fire apparatus access. The fire building had limited road frontage, and only the B side allowed vehicle access. The college boasts that its campus is very “walkable,” and its landscaping limits vehicle traffic as much as possible. As a result, apparatus could not take positions close to the building on sides A, C, and D (Figure 1). The handlines required to cover the interior exposures had to be stretched from about 300 feet away from fire apparatus, which took a few minutes. Because of the terrain and limited apparatus positioning, Division 1’s efforts were slowed down considerably.
Effectively cutting off any fire extension to the upper floors would involve critical factors such as hoseline movement/placement and air flow path control. To confine the fire to its area of origin, time was of the essence. The time/temperature curve is in a dramatic spike upward (i.e., the fire is continuing to build) until the fuel is used up, the air is low, or manual firefighting operations effectively apply water to cool the burning material below its ignition temperature-or a combination of all three tactics. The delay in getting into a strategic position inside this large structure was of great concern at the command post. Only a thin metal garage roll-up door stopped the fire from advancing into this huge, combustible building (photo 5).
Sprinkler Support
Fortunately, the campus center was equipped with automatic fire sprinklers, which did not activate because there was no fire extension into the building proper. Once notified that the building was equipped with fire sprinklers, Command requested De Pere’s Engine 111 to support the sprinkler siamese connection and locate and control the building utilities. Ashwaubenon Ladder 311 was assigned air monitoring and smoke removal under Lawrence Volunteer Fire Department Assistant Chief Drew Spielman, supervisor of the air monitoring and vent group that reported to command on atmospheric conditions.
Air Monitoring and Restoration
The next tactical benchmarks were to conserve property so that the building could be ready for reoccupancy as soon as possible and achieve the stop-the-loss benchmark. Each floor of this large building had to be checked and monitored to determine the atmospheric conditions. Once it was confirmed that no harmful contaminants were detected, the building was cleared to occupy, allowing the waiting contracted cleanup crews to enter and start the building recovery process.
With the fire overhauled (the fire completely extinguished and the building confirmed to be stable to allow entry), the department began its origin-and-cause investigation. Before terminating command and releasing the operating companies back into service, Chief Matzke and I met with the college’s president and board of directors to provide a detailed explanation of what had occurred and what to expect in the recovery process. A security camera had recorded the fire’s development, and this information proved helpful in determining what happened before and after our arrival. Although the cause of the fire was said to be “undetermined,” most likely it resulted from smoking materials improperly discarded onto a quantity of combustible materials.
Lessons Learned
- The available career staffing was inadequate and had to be augmented early in the response, and the initial response needed more operational and command staff officers; an operations chief would have helped.
- The incident management system worked well, but it needed minor adjustments: We needed an additional operations section chief and an additional tactical radio channel. When MABAS was called, a staging area manager should have been designated.
- Unified command with St. Norbert College worked very well.
- Firefighter accountability was handled at the command post.
- Hazardous areas were kept off limits to nonresponders.
- Firefighter rehabilitation was well managed and organized.
- The campus layout caused significant apparatus placement issues. Apparatus responding to staging were unclear about the location, which was identified as Gallagher’s Pizza instead of 330 Reid Street.
- Covering all seven tactical sides is a must at every fire.
- The fire department connection was supported late in this incident.
- The 360° walk-around was performed late.
- There was some confusion in moving the attack hoseline inside the building.
- Cold smoke issues were identified late in this alarm.
- The radio channels were busy.
The firefighters did an excellent job of stopping the fire when they found it and limiting the damage. Had the fire traveled into this massive four-story structure, the loss would have been staggering. No deaths or injuries occurred.
Not often does a fire department have access to a building fire’s preburn phase data, as we did through the security camera recording. We shared this information in the after-action report and the accompanying classroom briefing to help the department to continuously improve.
The MABAS worked very well. It brought the right resources at the right time to help De Pere mount an NFPA 1710-compliant fire attack. MABAS is a relativity new addition for northeast Wisconsin and greatly enhances everyone’s ability to request mutual aid in a consistent fashion.
Our cooperation and coordination with the St. Norbert College public safety staff and executives improved. The agencies meet every two months to discuss current activities and future joint possibilities.
DENNIS L. RUBIN is chief of the De Pere (WI) Fire Rescue Department and a principal partner in the fire protection consulting firm D. L. Rubin & Associates. He is a 35-year veteran of the fire service.
Fire Dynamics: There Is No Such Thing as Extreme Fire Behavior
Firefighter Safety: Understanding and Avoiding a Flashover
The 360-Degree Size-Up
Fire Engineering Archives
