PREINCIDENT PLANNING AND FIREFIGHTER SAFETY: A SUCCESS STORY

PREINCIDENT PLANNING AND FIREFIGHTER SAFETY: A SUCCESS STORY

BY JERRY KNAPP

The importance of prefire planning has been stated many times in fire service literature. A fire in Rock Hill, Missouri, underscores in graphic detail how preplanning can be successfully integrated within fire department systems and methodologies to increase firefighter safety.

THE INCIDENT

On September 14, 1996, a police officer saw fire and smoke coming from the roof of Garavelli`s restaurant. The fire department was called to respond at 0453 hours.

Garavelli`s restaurant is at the end unit of a six-occupancy strip mall. The building was constructed of masonry block exterior walls with a flat, built-up roof over lightweight bar-joist trusses. Heavy HVAC equipment was placed on the roof over the kitchen area. The restaurant spanned an area approximately 150 feet wide by 100 feet deep. A kitchen and dining room occupied slightly more than half the space; the other half contained a second dining area. An entry/waiting area approximately 20 feet by 50 feet was constructed of 2 x 6 wood frame with a 2 x 6 wood-joist roof. It was not connected to the bar-joist roof assembly surrounding it. The restaurant was not equipped with an automatic sprinkler system.

The first alarm consisted of one pumper each from Rock Hill, Brentwood, Glendale, and Maplewood, plus quints from Kirkwood and Webster Groves–all small career departments that routinely respond together through automatic mutual aid.

En route, the Rock Hill company officer, Assistant Chief Robert Link, began the first step of an evaluation sequence (see “Four Step Incident Evaluation” below): He used information on a prefire plan from the department`s Emergency Information Management System. The preplan made him aware of the bar-joist trusses (and heavy equipment on the roof) and that the self-contained entry/waiting area provided a low collapse risk zone

Link conducted his size-up and reported that fire and smoke were visible from the roof area. The second-in pumper arrived, and a three-firefighter attack crew was formed. Link assumed the position of interior attack team officer, passing command to the second-in chief, consistent with department protocol and as regularly practiced by fire departments within the St. Louis County mutual-aid network.

At this time, the fire appeared to have self-vented through the roof in the kitchen area. No fire was visible through unventilated windows.

The Attack

The attack crew entered the building through the front door with a 134-inch attack line capable of flowing 220 gpm from a low-pressure combination nozzle (with a 212-inch high-flow head). Link positioned the crew approximately five feet into the restaurant`s entry/waiting area (the low-risk zone). Link conducted an interior evaluation. Smoke was banked to the floor–in the kitchen area–inconsistent with a self-vented fire. He believed the fire was attacking the steel bar joist roof supports over the kitchen. Based on these observations, he ordered the line from the low-risk zone into service, using a straight stream aimed at the underside of the roof area.

Approximately one minute later, a 20-foot x 30-foot section of roof collapsed 15 feet in front of the attack crew. Members extinguished the body of fire from the safe position of the entry area until it was determined safe for them to move in for final extinguishment.

CAUSE OF THE FIRE

The fire was caused by electrical arcing in a metal conduit on the surface of the roof covering. Melted roofing cropped down into the cockloft area and then ignited wood paneling behind the serving line. This was the fire observed during the interior size-up. Until the roof collapsed, the fire had not vented through the roof. The lack of ventilation caused smoke to bank to the floor inside.

THE ROCK HILL PROGRAM

Rock Hill has a solid training program in place, an incident command system that is used all the time, a thorough prefire planning program, a four-step system of scene evaluation, and written operational documents that provide guidance for department members and officers. Let`s look at these elements.

Training

Officer-level training is mandated for all department members, including the fire chief. An organized yearly company train- ing plan includes prefire planning drills on Wednesday afternoons. The “Our Way” course covers the department`s operational documents. The practice and repetition resulting from constantly following “Our Way” procedures on all alarms help prepare members for the Big One. Incentives are paid yearly, in December, to firefighters who attain a degree in fire technology. “Firefighter Day” presents a private with the opportunity to perform the duties of the company officer for the day, under the supervision of the company officer.

Incident Command System

Because Rock Hill does not have a battalion chief responding with the crew, the company officer has the option of passing command to the second-arriving engine company. This is done on a regular basis on first alarms. It enables one person to see the big picture, make decisions, and coordinate operations.

Prefire Planning

All of the 221 individual businesses in Rock Hill are preplanned. This information is computerized using the department`s Kriswell Emergency Information Management System computer software.

The preplan is basic, providing life hazards, building construction features, floor plans, information on hazardous materials including quantities and locations, water supply, and response guidelines. A printer in the engine house provides a hard copy for the crew as the dispatch is made. Critical facts and hazards are known before the pumper leaves the engine house.

Four-Step Incident Evaluation

Rock Hill uses a four-step incident evaluation. The first step is conducted en route using the prefire information. This information is available from the dispatcher via the engine house printer or from the on-board laptop computer. On arrival, a windshield size-up is transmitted; it also announces the passing of command and the request to switch to the fireground frequency. The third step is a fire building walk-around during which several questions, such as the following, are posed: Are persons inside? Where is the fire located? What is the stage of the fire? How much involvement is there? Can up-front ventilation be used? The answers to these questions dictate whether an exterior or interior operation will be used. The last step is the interior evaluation, which is ongoing and includes adjustments to the attack plan.

Operational Method Documents (SOPs)

Rock Hill has detailed operational method documents for general guidance and mandatory safety requirements. One critical safety requirement is that if fire is attacking truss supporting members, the crew must attack the fire from a low-risk location. In the case of this restaurant fire, “Interior” knew from the preplan that the building had a bar joist truss and from the interior evaluation that fire was attacking the bar joist; therefore, the crew was stopped before it entered the collapse zone.

LESSONS LEARNED

Collecting prefire data, managing that information, training, and making that information available to firefighters as they respond are critical to low-risk operations.

Establishing command immediately according to a plan provides a coordinated and well-managed operation.

Department operational safety guidelines or procedures that have been practiced and are adhered to by all personnel have a direct positive effect on the life safety of firefighters. Using them on every alarm prepares responders for the times when their use is critical. Policies and guidance documents are just paper unless fire officers and firefighters understand them, believe in them, and use them.

Adequate radio equipment, computer hardware, and software to support ICS must be available.

Immediate evaluation by the interior sector officer before a crew advances past the low-risk zone keeps firefighters away from high-hazard areas.

Sufficient personnel and apparatus must be available on the first alarm to perform simultaneous tasks–ventilation, water supply, stretch attack lines, search and rescue, rapid intervention teams, and so on. In this case, the first alarm consisted of four engine companies and two aerial units. Additional alarms in Rock Hill consist of the same number of units.

There is an old expression: “Proper preplanning prevents poor performance.” For firefighters, proper prefire planning can prevent injured and dead firefighters. If you had a similar situation in your jurisdiction and one of your personnel were killed by a roof collapse, would you be prepared to tell that person`s loved ones that you did not know that the steel bar joist trusses were there? What would you answer when the media say, “That building has been there for 25 years. You have been the fire chief for the past 10 years. How could you not have known?” n




(Top) The front of the restaurant. The doorway behind the PPV was the point of entry used by the attack crew. The crew went in, turned left, went through another door, and stayed along the windows/wall for about five feet. They set up for fire attack in the area just about in front of the red real estate box. [Photos courtesy of City of Rock Hill (MO) Fire-EMS Department.] (Middle) A view of the roof area from Side 3. Note the collapse area and the heavy equipment on the roof. (Bottom) A view from Side 4 inside showing the collapse over the serving line.

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