GUIDELINES FOR STRATEGIC DECISION MAKING AT HIGH-RISE FIRES
BY ELMER F. CHAPMAN
The following guidelines for making specific strategic fireground decisions apply directly to fire operations in unsprinklered high-rise office buildings. With appropriate modifications, they may be used for fires in high-rise structures of other occupancies.
Many of the problems encountered in high-rise fires, such as difficulties associated with accessibility, ventilation of smoke, and heat retention, are unique to this type of fire operation. Even relatively small fires in high-rise environments require firefighting resources significantly beyond those required at comparable occurrences in low-rise buildings. The services of more than 300 firefighters were used at some major high-rise fires. Using elevators to transport firefighters and their equipment assumes greater importance in a high-rise building fire when the fire is located in the upper stories. Also, in these fires, there is a delay before first water can be applied to the fire, ensuring that firefighters will be confronted by a fire that has grown to considerable proportions. These buildings generate and retain greater quantities of smoke and heat and are difficult to ventilate, making it more difficult to operate.
These fires place great strain on an incident command system. The necessary procedures for command, control, coordination, and the communications that must take place among all the elements involved in a high-rise fire operation are critical and must be developed, perfected, and practiced well in advance of an incident.
It is essential to discern the different and separate concepts of strategy, tactics, and logistics at the outset of a fire incident. This is especially crucial at fires in large, complex, high-rise buildings, where search, evacuation, and attack operations must be executed by well-thought-out plans coordinated by the various sector commanders. To accomplish the specific goals set by the incident commander, overall strategy must be identified and prioritized, and tactical objectives must be selected and assigned.
Considering the complexity and logistical difficulties associated with fires in the upper stories of high-rise buildings, strategies and tactics for this type of fire are very limited. Direct interior attack is the principal strategy. Operating a manual handline from a standpipe riser up a stairway in most cases is the only engine company tactic available.
STRATEGY DECISIONS
Selection and designation of stairs. Before any decisions are made, the following facts must be ascertained:
1. Where is the fire located (floor number and quadrant)?
2. How many stairways are available?
3. Where are they located (in relation to the fire)?
4. What type of stairs are available in the fire building–
(a) fire stairs,
(b) fire towers (smokeproof towers),
(c) pressurized stairs, or
(d) access stairs (convenience stairs)?
5. Which of the stairways contain standpipe hose outlets?
Selecting and designating the stairways to be used are extremely important early decisions that must be made and coordinated by the incident commander. All operating personnel should understand the reasoning the incident commander used in making these decisions.
Search and evacuation stairs
The first decision that must be made is which stairways will be used to
evacuate building occupants from all floors above the fire,
search for building occupants on all floors above the fire, and
gain access to the upper floors for examination for fire extension.
The following priorities should be followed when selecting the search and evacuation stairway.
1. Use a fire tower (smokeproof tower), if available, for search and evacuation. It is the safest stairway for evacuation because it is the least likely to be contaminated by smoke because of its ventilated vestibule. These stairways are least desirable for use as attack stairs because the vent provisions provided between the floor and the stairs will have a high negative pressure due to the stack effect. This condition will cause the fire, heat, and smoke on the fire floor to move toward this stairway with great force when the doors are opened to make an attack on the fire.
2. If a fire tower is not present in the building, use a pressurized stairway if one is available. If more than one pressurized stairway is available, use the one most remote from the fire for search and evacuation.
3. If no pressurized stairs are available, use the fire stairs most remote from the fire for search and evacuation.
Even if no evacuation of civilians is anticipated, designating and maintaining a search and evacuation stairway that is as free as possible from smoke contamination will provide access to the floors above the fire and permit the fire forces to do the following:
search for fire spread,
control and limit extension of the fire,
provide ventilation of the floor above the fire to avoid any buildup of gases from destructive distillation of the floor coverings and piloted ignition by a flame (such as a small flame extending through any opening in the floor slab), and
provide access for top ventilation.
Attack stairs
Select the attack stairways next. Choose the stairway containing a standpipe and providing the best approach to the fire.
Make all operating forces aware of which stairways have been designated as the search and evacuation and attack stairways. The forces must use them accordingly.
TACTICAL DECISIONS
These decisions involve the specific methods and procedures to be implemented and the deployment of forces as they become available.
Hoseline tactics and resource
requirements
Because of the extensive time lapse involved in responding to the location where water is to be applied to a high-rise fire, the preburn period may be in excess of 20 minutes. This extended preburn and the exponential rate of heat release from the fire necessitate that hose streams have a high delivery rate and extended reach. As much as 500 gpms–the full capacity of most standpipe risers–may be needed to arrest the rate of fire growth. The nozzle-hose combination recommended is a 118-inch controlling straight-bore nozzle on a stretch of 200 feet of 212-inch hose. This system, with 45-psi nozzle pressure, will deliver 250 gallons per minute and have an effective reach of 60 feet; 75 psi is needed at the standpipe hose outlet valve. This range is well within that of most nonremovable pressure-reducing valves (PRVs). Removable pressure-reducing devices should be removed so they do not interfere with the water delivery system. If the PRV is nonremovable, firefighters should have the tools and knowledge necessary to increase the water pressure, if necessary. When planning hose stretches, keep in mind that the maximum designed pressure available from any nonremovable PRV may be 100 psi.
An officer and four firefighters–all wearing SCBA–should stretch the first hoseline up the attack stairs.1 Four lengths of 212-inch hose should be used with the hose attached to the standpipe on the floor below the fire. Surplus hose can be stretched up the stairs to the floor above the fire. Caution: Ensure that the door to the fire floor is not opened when firefighters are working on the stairs above the fire floor.
Eight firefighters (a double team) should be on all attack lines (they constitute the attack team). The second engine company available should be assigned to assist the first engine company in stretching the first attack line and placing it in operation. The second engine company should then be assigned to standby and monitor the operation of this line. This team should relieve personnel on this line when the SCBA of the attacking company becomes expended. Doing this will ensure that any advance made on the fire will be retained and that the advance will be continued. When an engine company leaves an attack line for any reason, another engine company from the staging area should be assigned to that attack line. Always maintain a double team on each attack line.
The next two companies should form an attack team and be assigned to stretch a second hoseline using the same attack stairs and operating in parallel with the first hoseline. This hose stretch may be made from the standpipe hose outlet on the fire floor. Once the door from the attack stairs is opened and the hoseline starts to advance on the fire floor, the fire will advance very rapidly toward the stairs (the stack effect) and confront the firefighters head-on. The force of this advance by the fire is a characteristic of the height of the building, the number (how low) of the fire floor, and the weather (how cold a day it is). This negative pressure could be as high as one inch of water pressure differential between the stairs and the fire floor, creating air movement as high as 50 miles per hour from the fire floor to the stairs. For this reason, hoselines with large flows and good reach, double-teamed, and operating in parallel are necessary at fires in high-rise buildings. Anything less could result in the hoseline crew`s being overwhelmed by the heat wave, resulting in serious injury to firefighters on the hoseline.
Additional engine companies can be used to stretch more lines using another attack stairway, if available. Additional engine companies must be marshaled at the staging area to provide relief for companies on the attack lines. For every company committed to the attack, an additional company should be held in reserve at the staging area.
Ladder company tactics
The first ladder company reaching the floor below the fire should determine the location and type of stairs and the location and extent of the fire on the fire floor and report this information to the incident commander.
The incident commander, after receiving this information and consulting the floor plans, designates the search and evacuation and the attack stairs and relays the decisions to the first ladder company reaching the floor below the fire for implementation.
Before opening the door to the fire floor, the ladder company should ensure that the attack stairs are clear of all building occupants and firefighters. The ladder company also should perform all necessary forcible entry and search the fire floor and the floor above to the degree possible without unnecessary risk to fire personnel. A search line should be used, even if it appears unnecessary, since conditions can change rapidly. The ladder company should open the ceilings on the fire floor to expose the plenum as the engine company advances on the fire. The ladder company chauffeur should conduct a preliminary inspection of the exterior of the fire building before entering it. The second ladder company to arrive should assist the first-arriving ladder company in all of the above duties. The third ladder company should be assigned to the floor above the fire to
remove all occupants from the floor above the fire;
remove all occupants from the attack stairs and direct them to the search and evacuation stairs, and keep the attack stairs free of all personnel;
advise the incident commander, the operations chief, and the attack teams immediately if any difficulty is encountered in clearing the attack stairs;
examine all stairs for occupants;
assist in the evacuation of all occupants;
determine smoke and heat conditions on the floor above the fire and in all stairways;
examine the floor above the fire for any fire extension;
report the results of all of the above to the incident commander; and
vent the floor above the fire to prevent any buildup of combustible gases only after consulting with the incident commander–and with his permission. Remember, these gases may be built up by the destructive distillation of the floor covering and could be ignited by a pilot flame. This can be prevented by ventilating or “flowing the floor.”
Additional ladder companies should be assigned to search and evacuate all floors above the fire, top ventilation, and positive-pressure ventilation of attack stairs and any other stairs deemed necessary.
LOGISTICS
Logistics determines who wins the fire suppression battle. Whether you win or lose depends on maintaining adequate resources of equipment and manpower to support the tactical operations defined above. Local fire departments that cannot supply the forces to support the above operations should not permit unsprinklered high-rise buildings to exist in their jurisdiction.
Logistics encompasses procuring the necessary support and services needed for successfully mitigating the incident, including the transporting of equipment and firefighters to the location of operations and establishing and staffing the command post and the communications network. The logistics involved in supporting fire suppression operations in high-rise buildings necessitates significantly greater resources than those needed for the actual tactical operations.
The extensive use of SCBA in high-rise building fires, for example, means that a sufficient supply must be available at all times and that no firefighter`s supply of air should be allowed to reach the dangerously low level. Also, since heat conditions in a high-rise building are extremely debilitating to working firefighters, they must be relieved at shorter intervals than might normally be expected. The additional personnel and resources needed to do this must be planned for. n
Endnote
1. Four firefighters are required for this operation regardless of company staffing. Staffing and operating manual hoselines are functions of the quantity of water to be delivered, not company staffing levels. One firefighter is needed for each 50 gpm to be delivered–one firefighter to operate the pumps and four firefighters to staff the hoseline. In this specific case, 250 gpm are to be delivered; thus, four firefighters are needed to staff the hoseline.
ELMER F. CHAPMAN, a 38-year veteran of the City of New York (NY) Fire Department, retired in 1984 as a deputy chief. He is an adjunct instructor at the National Fire Academy and the Nassau County (NY) Fire Academy and serves as liaison and consultant to FDNY in matters concerning codes and standards, smoke movement in high-rise buildings, HVAC systems, and elevators. He is a member of the advisory board for the Fire Science Institute of John Jay College, NFPA Smoke Control Committees 92A and 92B, Ashrae Committee 5.6 for Fire and Smoke Control, and NIST Task Group for Smoke Control Manual.
