BY SETH MAJOR
AT WEST METRO FIRE RESCUE in Lakewood, Colorado, we have an aggressive rapid intervention team (RIT) culture. We place a strong emphasis on RIT preparedness and proactivity. Our RIT culture is defined by an engaged and prepared response once assigned to the role.
Once designated as RIT, we understand critical tasks must be completed at the sound of the air brake. The crew will split up responsibilities, with members gathering our RIT complement of irons, RIT bag, search rope, and FAST bag (mechanical advantage rope bag).
On arrival at the structure, proactive RIT begins. A 360° RIT size-up of conditions is promptly conducted, either as a full crew or led by the officer, depending on building size and layout. Any unopened doors are unlocked (forced open, if need be, but then kept shut as to not disturb the fire behavior), and all windows are laddered for egress. Basement window well covers and security bars are removed (if present). Utilities are controlled to minimize electrical hazards.
After the initial assessment, the officer will update Command on any new hazardous conditions identified, such as a basement present, nearby power lines, or changes in fire behavior or the need to change tactics. The RIT then stages in a strategic location based on the building, which may involve setting up on corners of the building for larger structures.
Continual communication among the crew is emphasized, with crews verbally confirming tasks like attack line assignment (crew and members operating), placement (floor), and color of the hoseline they are operating on. We communicate search operations on floors (what crew is doing what and who is on that crew) and if a crew marries up (engine and medic) or splits (truck companies). This coordinated response helps enable a rapid and effective rescue should one become necessary. Our priority is maintaining crew safety through a proactive, prepared, and communicative RIT operation on all working structure fires.
Specialized RIT Instructor Cadre and Training
West Metro Fire Rescue’s specialized RIT instructor cadre is used to advance RIT preparedness across the department. Members are personally selected by current cadre leaders based on these qualifications:
- Extensive fireground experience.
- Real-world RIT/Mayday experience.
- Military or combat training.
- Additional RIT/firefighter survival training.
Administrative chiefs have empowered the cadre to influence applicable policies and procedures.
As the RIT instructors, we autonomously design all RIT training curricula from company-level to recruit classes. A core focus is a comprehensive “RIT Week” integrated into recruit academy instruction. During this period, recruits receive more than 50 hours of intensive, hands-on training using realistic, simulated Mayday scenarios to replicate stress.
Initially, skills like proper use of RIT bags and firefighter packaging/moving techniques are emphasized. Throughout the week, lessons center on firefighter safety and survival tactics such as rope bailouts, ladder bailouts, and basement removal methods. Recruits also learn and practice RIT communication and language. This includes calling a Mayday and specific language used in communicating moving a down firefighter.
Recruits practice well-established drills like the Denver, Pittsburgh, and Bowen scenarios. These focus on techniques for locating, packaging, and removing trapped (actual bodies, not dummies) firefighters. Recruits will learn based on statistics, not opinion. This translates into recruits learning about the inside-out model of firefighter rescue, a nearby operating crew making contact/packaging, as well as a full RIT deployment model.
As the culminating event, instructors implement what we call the “MOAD” or “mother of all drills.” Drawing from lessons learned in actual line-of-duty deaths, complex scenarios are constructed. Recruits problem-solve as fully assigned crews, cycling through repetitions until successful.
Through this realistic learning approach, the department aims to instill in recruit firefighters an ingrained appreciation for survival culture.
A Proactive RIT Ethos Leads to Real-Life Success on the Fireground
Leaders attribute their proactive RIT ethos to the serious approach taken in recruit training. By replicating Mayday stressors and integrating post-incident lessons, firefighters enter their roles well-prepared to safeguard one another.
The commitment to hands-on, conse- quences-based education has served to strengthen rapid intervention discipline departmentwide.
We believe that this builds a strong foundation and appreciation for RIT and firefighter survival culture. This foundation has served our organization well as people move through their careers at West Metro Fire Rescue. This foundation of the seriousness and importance of RIT/firefighter safety and survival has helped us maintain and grow our proactive and aggressive RIT culture.
Our Proactive RIT Culture and Harrowing Account on the Fireground
On the afternoon of June 22, 2023, I was riding my seat as the officer of Engine 3 (E-3). We were on a medical call when a structure fire dropped on the radio, and we were not assigned to the incident. E-3 on the B shift has a reputationand a crew-driven culture of being very aggressive. E-3 cleared the medical call and self-assigned to the structure fire.
We arrived on scene in about five minutes of responding to a multifamily structure fire that was on the border of Station 3 and Station 2. We were late to the party, but crews were already on the scene of a working fire and up to that point were unable to locate the fire. We saw hazy smoke throughout the entire A side.
The involved structure was an eight-unit apartment building with both garden and grade- level units. It was built in 1957 using legacy construction and dimensional lumber. It is U-shaped, with the front/A side facing south. The A side of the building had four apartment entrances, with three at grade level and the fourth entrance at the A/D corner on the garden level. There were four entrance doors on the B side, two on the garden level and two above those. The basement and storage areas were essentially under the footprint of the center section of the building, extending slightly under the eastern/D leg of the “U.” The structure was approximately 8,200 square feet, with 4,100 square feet per level, of which the basement accounted for approximately 1,700 square feet of the below-grade square footage. The south/A side of the basement was composed of chicken wire storage units, with a center hallway, and on the north/C side of the basement were three framed-in and drywalled storage rooms and the boiler room (Figure 1).
Figure 1. Approximate location of the hoseline and crew members at the time of the Mayday. Note multiple loops of excess hose in the storage room.
(Figure 1 courtesy of author.)
At this point, the fire crews already on scene were unable to locate the fire on the first floor of any of the apartment units and believed the fire to potentially be in the basement.
Once arriving on scene, we were ordered to report to the A side with tools and equipment. We brought a set of irons, for my firefighter and engineer, and I carried a halligan married to a Lockwood hook. As I approached the chief (Command), I was approached by a bystander who was a resident who told me that the boiler room was in the basement. He told me that if I went straight through one of the open apartments and turned left, I would find the door to the basement that led to the boiler room. I passed thisinformation along to Command, who ordered my crew and I to recon and try to find it. My crew and I went to the C side of the structure to recon and locate the fire and went straight through one of the apartments to the C side of the structure.
At first, we simply were trying to locate the door that led to the basement. We were working with E-16’s crew and our safety and medical officer, with a driver (SAM-1). SAM-1, in our system, is a lieutenant/paramedic who operates as a safety officer on working fires, with afirefighter driver. We were able to locate a door to the basement storage area of the apartment and were met with high heat, turbulent smoke, and zero visibility. Crews made an initial attempt to push a line into the basement but were pushed back by the heat (push #1).
We remained on the C side of the structure throughout the entire incident, helping attempt to locate the fire. At this time, I was working with the E-1 captain and we discussed doing what we call an “exterior offensive attack” (transitional attack), to try and cool the basement space. Crews used 2V2-inch hoselines in through the window wells (photo 1). We were able to make minor progress and did not see much of a change to conditions (photos 2 and 3).
At this time, we had another discussion of using cellar nozzles (distributor nozzles) from the top down to again cool the space to make it possible to push into the basement and extinguish the fire. One of the truck companies on scene cut three holes in parts of the first floor throughout the structure and was able to drop in cellar nozzles to begin flowing. This did seem to help make conditions better, as we were seeing a change in the conditions/conversion of the smoke. With the minor changes made to the environment in the basement, we were assigned to make the basement with a 13A-inch, preconnected hoselinewith members of E-1 and M-1 for another attempt to make the basement (push #2). By the time I made it to the top of the stairs, I was again met with moderate heat and zero visibility. Members who had made the base of the stairs were met with high heat and zero visibility, and I advised the crew to back out.
About 40 minutes into the call, we were engaged in a firefight that we were not winning. Command called for a second alarm. At this point, we made the decision to put together a crew of seven members total to make a final push (push #3). The members were from all different rigs: two members from M-1, two members from E-1, the firefighter driver of SAM-1, and two members from E-3 (myself included as the officer). Members from E-1 and M-1 had already been in the basement, noting that they had already been in the environment and knew the layout.
This is when things went south. We pushed into the basement, and we were able to make it with zero visibility and moderate heat. I was almost on the very end of the hoseline with my senior firefighter and the firefighter from E-1. We were met in the basement with zero visibility and found that, due to the amount of water that had been previously flowing into the basement, I had water above the top of my boots. This made it difficult to move through the basement.
At this time, there were cellar nozzles flowing, causing our face-to-face communication to be almost nonexistent. We pushed the line through the basement, believing that we were moving toward the seat of the fire, but we ran into a dead end once we hit a boiler room.
While all of this was going on, crews from the outside had been pushing hose down into the basement. The three members in the front had found the dead end and began to move back through the space to find another area to attack the fire.
It is important to note that as they were opening and closing the line, we were feeling the heat die down and then rebound back. Later, we found out that where we were standing (myself and two other members) was directly under the basement windows. This caused us to be directly in the flow path. I was using a thermal imaging camera (TIC) and, because of the water flowing from our nozzle as well as the water flowing from the cellar nozzles, I was getting a buildup of condensation on my mask, the screen on the TIC, as well as on the lens of the TIC. I was continuously wiping all three to use the TIC. Because of this problem, I was only able to get about 10 seconds of vision before the condensation buildup made it impossible.
At this point, I updated Command that we had zero visibility with heat building up. I radioed Command, stating that I was going to pull the crew out. Command confirmed that we were backing out. At this time, I heard a firefighter yell, “How the hell do we get out of here?” I then radioed Command and said we were disoriented in the basement. I should have called a Mayday at this time but did not.
As we were attempting to get out of the basement, heat was building up. As I was using my TIC, I saw a member climbing through drywall studs. At this point, I called a Mayday.
Then, Command copied the Mayday and assigned the RIT (T-8) to assist in getting us out of the basement. Prior to the third push, the RIT staged at the only ingress, ready to work. As we were working in the basement and giving updates, the officer on T-2 felt something was going poorly and began to move his crew to the entrance point. Both of the officers on T-8 and T-2 were RIT cadre members.
While trying to get out of the basement, we were on the hoseline, but outside crews had been pushing hose into the basement, causing a tangled mess. I told one of the firefighters to find a coupling and read it (smooth bump-bump, to the pump). However, the mental and physiological response from the stress caused me to not think clearly: There was no coupling to read.
The thought that was going through my head was that I was responsible for six other members in that basement.
I did not listen to the radio (audio exclusion) and was only focused on getting out of the basement with every member of the crew intact.
As the members in the basement were spread all over, we began to make it out. Members of the RIT had headed down the basement stairs and began guiding members out. I found myself with one other member in a corner of the basement, in 1½ feet of water, bumping into the concrete foundation. Finally, for what felt like 10 minutes, although it had only been about 90 seconds, I heard a voice saying: “This way. Come this way,” and I was guided out.
Once I made it to the base of the stairs, I used my TIC and scanned the basement looking for other members. No one was found and I was guided out of the dark and into the daylight at the top of the stairs. Once everyone was out, Command cleared the Mayday and took a “tactical pause” before re-engaging.
At this point, I felt more exhausted than I have ever felt before in my life. I was both physically and mentally drained and wanted nothing more than to get my gear off as soon as possible. The C division command chief took us out of service and told us to report back to the firehouse.
As I made my way back to E-3, I began to become emotional. Once I found E-3 and began removing my gear, I realized that my engineer had tears in his eyes (he was not down there with us; he remained on the exterior of the C side) as he told me to “never scare him like that again.” As we worked through this emotional state, I wanted to find everyone who was down there with me. I found them chatting in front of E-1; I ensured everyone was safe and OK. We then headed back to the firehouse, where a different chief met me at my door. He asked me if I was OK and then told me to find him when I was ready.
The chief did an amazing job of getting pieces of the story and asked both me and my firefighters if we wanted to stay and keep working our shift or go home. I wanted nothing more than to go home and hug my wife and daughter. We were both sent home on leave.
Lessons Learned
The importance of this account is that it helped me so much to have the organization and chiefs support my mental health. I felt the burden of leadership, being responsible for the six other members in the basement, and it felt heavy. I also felt very odd for being the lead RIT instructor who had called a Mayday.
Afterward, West Metro put together a group to investigate what happened. The report was very detailed and done well. It outlined the building itself and the entire fireground operation, including the Mayday.
Weeks afterward, I felt that I was proud of the RIT culture that we have built at West Metro. This call specifically proves that the system works as it should. It was defining to me that all the training we put into RIT and firefighter survival was worth it. I believe that the refined RIT and firefighter safety culture at West Metro is what made the positive outcome of this call.
Afterward, I was surprised at the show of brotherhood and sisterhood I received. At first, I felt dumb for calling a Mayday, but then I received nothing but positive support from the people who work for West Metro-phone calls, texts, messages, and emails. The support came from every rank: from probationary firefighter to the chief level. This is the kind culture that we need more of in the fire service!
SETH MAJOR is an 18-year veteran of the fire service. He is a lieutenant assigned to Engine 3 with West Metro Fire Rescue in Lakewood, Colorado. Major is a lead RIT instructor at West Metro Fire and an adjunct instructor for recruit academies. He teaches at conferences around the country including FDIC, the Orlando Fire Conference, Lake Effect, and the Mile High Conference. He is also a founding member of “True Grit Training” in Denver and president of the 5280 F.O.O.L.S.
