BY STEVE WINTERS AND RANDY STEWART
 The McNichols Sports Arena as it appeared to all arriving companies. |
It was 0900 hours on February 5, 2000. McNichols Sports Arena (located in Denver, Colorado) lay in ruins, presumably destroyed by some type of explosive device. What was once a venue that seated some 17,000 enthusiastic sports fans now consisted of a heap of twisted metal and concrete rubble. Scattered throughout this jungle of twisted steel and broken concrete slabs lay 35 to 40 potentially viable victims, many of them totally entombed by concrete slabs, some of which weighed several hundred tons. Other victims were only partially buried under loose debris. Still others remained totally unscathed, covered only by a fine layer of dust.
The devastation to the structure that was once McNichols Sports Arena is not unlike that seen in two other recent and tragic events-the bombings of the Alfred P. Murrah building in Oklahoma City and the World Trade Center in New York City. However, there were some major differences between the two bombings and the McNichols Sports Arena tragedy: McNichols Sports Arena was destroyed by a wrecking ball operated by a construction worker, not an explosive device planted by a fanatical terrorist, and the 35 to 40 victims buried among the rubble at McNichols Arena were not the innocent victims of a cowardly terrorist act but straw manikins firefighters strategically placed throughout the structure prior to its demolition. The incident was the largest mass-casualty training scenario in the history of the Denver metro area.
 The interior of the arena as viewed from one of the security access points. (Photos by Lt. Charlie Chase) |
As would be the case if the McNichols incident were not staged, the Denver Fire Department as well as four other fire protection agencies from the surrounding metro area “responded.” Other “players” included the Colorado branch of the Urban Search and Rescue team (USAR), members of the Federal Police Force, paramedics from Denver Health and Hospitals, structural engineers, and collapse rescue expert John O’Connell from Fire Department of New York (participating as an adviser/safety officer).
Additionally, as one might expect at a large-scale incident, all sectional roles as well as command staff positions were assigned within the incident management structure. In addition to emergency personnel executing the various roles required at a large-scale emergency incident, throngs of casual observers, dignitaries, and media personnel were present, attempting to access the incident scene. At any given time during the three days of the McNichols event, literally hundreds of people were moving in and out of the hazard area (hot zone), truly a safety officer’s nightmare.
Although much of the event had been scripted-in large part for purposes of resource management between and within all the participating agencies-the tracking of civilians (observers, dignitaries, and media) within the hot zone was but one of several missions that had not been previously considered or had been underestimated by the safety officers.
The McNichols event involved months of planning by many agencies led by the Denver Fire Department. The planning process included many issues that had to be considered in an attempt to predict problems that might arise during the event. Yet, as will be seen from the issues addressed here, unforeseen problems can arise during a real or simulated emergency even with significant preplanning.
This exercise in rescuing trapped victims, shoring unstable building components, clearing debris piles, and developing an effective and efficient command structure comprised of numerous agencies provided many lessons and an invaluable amount of experience that could have been attained only by operating at a real mass-casualty incident.
 Work in one area of operation can dramatically affect the safety of rescuers located in remote areas. The safety officer must monitor this potential. |
Because the McNichols event was preplanned, security measures had been preconsidered. The event area (encompassing approximately five acres) had been totally enclosed by an eight-foot-high chain-link fence. There was only one entry/exit point to this perimeter area. An additional chain-link fence was erected around the hot zone (encompassing the arena itself). The hot zone was accessible through this enclosure by way of two additional entry/exit points. An armed Federal Police Force detachment controlled all three access points. All emergency and civilian personnel were required to check in at the command post and pick up an authorization badge before being allowed into the incident area. This process was strictly adhered to and provided the first level of accountability-a must at any large-scale collapse scenario.
 Search dogs can be used for searches in areas where the safety of the rescuers is marginal (risk vs. benefit). |
Another option afforded participants in the McNichols event in comparison with a real collapse incident was that the structure was collapsed in a controlled fashion, one portion at a time. Moreover, the main structural supports were left intact, to prevent secondary-collapse situations. Although efforts were made to present as safe a “playing field” as possible for all the agencies participating, many safety issues and concerns remained. Not the least of these concerns was the unanticipated scope of duties the safety officer(s) must fulfill at a large-scale incident, be it a collapse scenario or some other type of emergency.
SAFETY CONCERNS
Since we had no prior experience in the safety officer position at a large-scale collapse incident, we assumed that that position did not extend much beyond ensuring that all personnel were equipped with gloves, a helmet, and safety glasses. Although meant as a tongue-in-cheek assertion, it was, nonetheless, evident-at least initially-that we were unprepared as safety officers to deal with the McNichols event efficiently and effectively. It is as difficult to prepare for every eventuality for a training exercise as for a genuine emergency. This was the case for the McNichols event. Although the exercise can be considered a success by any definition, in hindsight several concerns arose from the safety officer’s perspective. Some of these issues, listed below, had not been previously considered or were not sufficiently prepared for:
- Number of safety officers. There were not enough safety officers on the scene at any given time. Initial plans called for one safety officer to monitor the entire scene (all sectors). Some individual rescue group members were to act as internal safety officers within their own groups. However, rescue groups were not mandated to supply these internal safety officers; therefore, some chose not to operate in this capacity.
Problems arose immediately with regard to the insufficient number of safety officers. Anyone who has operated at an emergency incident knows that for every action taken, there is typically some type of positive or negative reaction. The magnitude of this reaction can be compounded while operating at a collapse incident. Although parts of the structure may no longer be standing, many of those parts can remain connected by mechanical means or by friction. Manipulating a sagging beam, for instance, can cause movement within the structure and in debris two, three, or more floors away vertically as well as at great distances horizontally. The forceful removal of ductwork in one sector can cause a shift of debris in another sector. The cutting and subsequent dropping of multiton concrete slabs will undoubtedly have consequences for any victims and emergency personnel below. The point is, actions taken in one area can have disastrous effects in areas totally remote from that area. One safety officer on the scene at any given time was not enough to adequately monitor these various simultaneously occurring operations.
- Nonemergency personnel (civilian) tracking mechanism. The need for an adequate number of safety officers is inextricably tied to the requisite to establish a system or mechanism for tracking the movement of civilians in and out of the hot zone, the actual encounter with numerous civilians (media, dignitaries, and other civilian officials) moving in and out of the hot zone-an issue the safety officers had not considered initially. Therefore, an effective detailed course of action had not been formulated to address it. Another element that complicated this matter was the size of the hot zone.
- Personal accountability reports. Another concern arose after the first attempts at obtaining an accurate personal accountability report (PAR). When called for by the incident commander, rescue group supervisors, one-by-one, acknowledged that members of their respective groups were accounted for. However, when some of these group supervisors were queried face-to-face about the names and specific operating areas of individuals assigned to them, several could not provide this information in an accurate and timely manner.
- Safety officer communications. At any emergency incident, effective communications are always a necessity. During large-scale emergency incidents, the communications factor becomes even more integral to mitigating the incident in a safe and successful manner. The McNichols event was no exception. In general, a solid communications plan that facilitated accountability and safety as well as operational, logistical, and planning functions had been preconceived and implemented during the event. Nonetheless, communications issues still arose. After the inadequacies of having only one safety officer on scene had been addressed by implementing multiple safety officers, for example, not all these safety officers were assigned to the same radio channel. This situation, while not insurmountable, added to the responsibilities of the coordinating (lead) safety officer. When the IC or the operations section chief called for a PAR, for example, the coordinating safety officer had to contact the other safety officers by way of two different radio channels (the event tactical channel and a separate channel assigned to the other safety officers). After the coordinating safety officer affirmed that the other safety officers were accounted for, he would then return to the tactical channel to report to the operations section chief. This system created an extra step for the coordinating safety officer.
Another communications issue arose when inexperienced apprentice emergency service personnel (safety cadets) were used to conduct tours through the hot zone. Since these cadets had very little experience with radio operations and communications, it was sometimes very difficult to contact these tour groups by radio. On several occasions, it was necessary for the safety officer(s) to search for these groups after they failed to respond by radio. In most cases, the lack of the tour group leaders’ response was attributed to their unfamiliarity with radio operations. Although not a crisis situation, having to search for these tour groups after they failed to respond detracted from the core objectives of the safety officers: monitoring and ensuring the incident’s operational safety.
- Any large-scale emergency event, whether a training exercise or a real incident, requires multiple safety officers. It was clear from the start of the McNichols event that one safety officer on the scene at any given time was woefully inadequate. Emergency scenes are dynamic environments. They are constantly changing by their very nature. This change is being effected by personnel operating at the scene as well as by the integrity of the structure, resources, weather conditions, and other incident-related factors. Actions personnel take at an emergency incident are obviously intended to bring that incident to a safe and effective conclusion. However, in some instances-as can be seen from the many tragic line-of-duty firefighter deaths-those actions may have the opposite effect of creating further problems and concerns for all involved. That’s the reason multiple safety officers are needed at larger incidents, especially collapse scenarios. One safety officer cannot effectively monitor structural conditions and coordinate multiple operational actions that will typically be occurring simultaneously at large-scale incidents. Furthermore, it is advisable to support the “safety system” by requiring each group/sector to assign one of its members as an “internal safety officer” for its group/sector.
- Granted, most authentic large-scale incidents-be it a collapse or other emergency-will not have large numbers of civilians touring the hot zone while the incident is unfolding. Nevertheless, a tracking mechanism must be in place to accommodate the civilian contingent (media, dignitaries, city officials, and so on) who will undoubtedly be present. Ideally, this system or mechanism should involve several groups usually present at a large-scale incident: the public information officer (PIO), security personnel, safety officer(s), and the incident commander. Although we had anticipated a large contingent of civilian personnel at the McNichols event, it was not until the third and final day of the exercise that our mechanism had been honed into a relatively efficient system.
LESSONS LEARNED AND REINFORCED
The process began at the command post. Civilians wishing to tour the hot zone first checked in with the planning section and received an entry badge that would allow them past the security checkpoints. All emergency personnel entering the hot zone had to follow this same procedure. After a member of the planning section logged in the civilian at the command post, a member from the PIO staff would receive the civilian contingent. The PIO member would then compile a list of the civilians’ names and organizations and the total number of people in each tour group and inform the IC of this information. Initially, a safety cadet escorted each tour group into the hot zone. As already discussed, we ran into accountability and communication problems with these inexperienced personnel. To alleviate these problems, only experienced fire personnel were allowed to escort tour groups.
Also, a set tour route was established. Prior to entry into the hot zone, the tour group leader would inform a PIO staff member stationed at the hot zone entry/exit point of the number of people in the tour group. The PIO member would then radio this information to the safety officers operating in the hot zone. The lead, or coordinating, safety officer then documented this information along with the time of entry. Several checkpoints were established within the hot zone: The tour group leader was to inform the safety officers that they had reached that area. Again, the coordinating safety officer documented this information and the time of the report. This process continued for each checkpoint. On leaving the hot zone, the tour group leader checked out with the PIO member stationed at the entry/exit point. The PIO member radioed this information to the safety officers. Once more, the coordinating safety officer documented this information along with the time of exit and radioed the IC to advise that the tour group was clear of the hot zone.
With this system in place, it was very easy to track the location of each civilian in the hot zone. Moreover, it provided a proactive mechanism of accountability. If a tour group was delayed in reporting between checkpoints, it sent up “a red flag signal” to the safety officer(s), who then sent out personnel to check on the tour group’s welfare. Although the system may seem cumbersome, and redundant in some cases, we found it to be an integral part of incident safety when civilians were allowed into hazardous areas.
- The PAR is a valuable tool at any emergency incident, but especially so at large-scale events. When faced with an emergency scene covering a large area with multiple crews working in multiple locations, the IC needs a device for periodically checking on the well-being of every member operating at that scene. The PAR, of course, is the tool of choice for this task. During the McNichols event, PARs were taken on numerous occasions. Thankfully, all personnel were accounted for. However, as previously noted, face-to-face queries of individual rescue group supervisors indicated that some could not reveal in a timely manner the names and work locations of the members assigned to them. These rescue group supervisors eventually were able to supply this information. However, had the incident taken a turn for the worse-had a secondary collapse occurred, for example-any delay in obtaining the names and locations of operating personnel could have meant the difference between life and death if those members had become trapped or injured. This concern applies not only to collapse scenarios but to all emergency incidents. At each level of the incident management system, the IC, branch director, section chief, group/sector supervisor, and company officer must be able to rapidly locate and identify the personnel assigned to them if the system is to work as intended.
- Effective communications are synonymous with incident safety. Moreover, as with most elements of an emergency incident, the larger the event, the more critical each of those elements becomes in bringing that event to a safe and effective conclusion. Although a generally effective communications plan had been implemented during the event, the perspective of the safety officers was that they should have been assigned to a single radio channel, one separate and distinct from the tactical channel. This would have allowed free communication among all of the safety officers without interfering with tactical communications and would have expedited the PAR process. In addition, it is imperative that the safety officer(s) have the ability to monitor the tactical channel (this will typically require two radios). Further, any personnel assigned a radio must thoroughly understand how to operate it.
- The involvement and participation of “subject matter experts” in the McNichols event was invaluable and, in retrospect, a virtual necessity for ensuring, to the extent possible, safe completion of the event. The safe and successful mitigation of any emergency event, regardless of size or complexity, requires a team effort. Certain individuals (subject matter experts), however, can make the difference between a successful and a disastrous event. The type of incident will obviously dictate the type of subject matter expert(s) needed. During the McNichols event, for example, we used the expertise of structural engineers, heavy equipment operators, and O’Connell, to name a few. Among other things, these experts were engaged in advising, evaluating, and monitoring many of the event’s facets. From a safety perspective especially, the value of input from subject matter experts cannot be underestimated at complex incidents.
Though the position of safety officer is but one tool in the IC’s toolbox, it can be a vital one. Depending on the size, complexity, and hazards of the emergency incident, the position of safety officer may or may not be filled. When the position is filled, however, the safety officer bears the critical responsibility to ensure, to the extent possible, the safety of all personnel operating at the emergency scene. In many cases, this charge is easier said than done. It involves multiple considerations. During the McNichols event, for example, the safety officers not only had to monitor individual tactical operations taking place over large areas but also the well-being of civilians touring the hot zone and the stability of the structure as a whole as well as the stability of the individual structural elements within.
As might be expected, this effort necessitates determined coordination among many individuals staffing various positions in the incident management system. Even though the types of considerations and concerns of the safety officer will change with the incident, there are constants in the world of the safety officer. The safety officer must attempt to view any emergency incident as the sum of its parts-that is, the safety officer does not have the luxury of concentrating on only one area of the incident; he must consider it in its entirety. If an incident is of the scope that necessitates more than one safety officer, the officers must work as a unit to be effective. We were fortunate that we had the opportunity to practice some of the skills required of the safety officer in the comfort of an “exercise environment.” Not all jurisdictions will be as fortunate. To overcome this potential shortfall, all jurisdictions should have as a part of their SOPs a comprehensive plan that defines the role and fundamental procedures of the safety officer at large-scale incidents.
STEVE WINTERS is a 17-year-plus veteran of the Denver (CO) Fire Department, where he is a captain. For the past 21/2 years, he has been assigned to the Safety and Training Division and is responsible for research and development of personal protective equipment and many of the tools and equipment used on Denver apparatus. He was formerly assigned as an officer on Tower One, part of the confined space, high-angle rescue, and collapse team unit. He is an instructor for the Rocky Mountain Fire Academy.
RANDY STEWART is a captain in the Denver (CO) Fire Department, where he has served for about 11 years and is responsible for thermal imaging camera evaluation and training. He is an instructor at the Rocky Mountain Fire Academy.
