Below-Grade Fire Extinguishment and Victim Recovery
I was relieved as incident commander of the World Trade Center explosion by Chief of Department Anthony Fusco approximately 30 minutes into the incident. He directed me to assume command of the fire extinguishment operation. Until that point. I had been concerned mostly with operations in the Vista Hotel and the thousands of people self-evacuating out of this giant complex in almost total darkness; smoke conditions in the stair towers and on the floors; and our rescue effort. Now 1 took leave of the command post, accessed the B stairs in Tower l to the B-2 level, and prepared to coordinate the firefighting actions below ground.
The scene that greeted me can only be described as surrealistic. Heavy smoke poured out from a deep, wide crater and from burning debris and automobiles around it. I realized that the damage could only have been caused by a large explosive device. The thought of a second explosion crossed my mind but was quickly put aside by the urgency of the situation.
Fire extinguishment at the WTC explosion was critical to the safety of the building occupants. There almost certainly would have been more injuries and deaths in this incident had members not halted the generation of smoke from numerous below-grade fires. Rescue and removal operations in the towers would have been much more difficult, and the occupants would have been exposed to greater amounts of smoke for longer periods of time.
Handlines—all 2‘ j-inch lines, as per high-rise SOPs—were operated in the lower levels from the initial stages of the incident. Firefighters who manned these handlines did so under extremely dangerous conditions; the potential for secondary collapses or additional explosions was a constant threat.
(Photo by Arthur Knobloch.)
There were numerous fires on both the B-2 and B-3 levels. Members extinguished fires in offices, a cafeteria, locker rooms, work rooms, free-burning rubble, and at least SO burning automobiles; lines also provided protection to Firefighter Kevin Shea, who had fallen into a crater and was vulnerable to numerous fires burning around him. As they advanced, firefighters on the attack lines searched for, and in some cases removed, victims from cars and under rubble.
Size-up was hindered by poor visibility, the size of the crater and extent of the damage around it, and difficulty in communicating via portable radio. Lighting in the below-grade areas came from the fires themselves. Individual units on the B-2 level, in this very difficult environment, were unaware that there were other lines in operation near the crater. As the incident progressed, firefighters forced entry into automobiles and turned on their headlights for additional light. Fortunately, the area of the crater was so large that opposing streams were not a danger.
I made my way around the periphery of the crater and personally communicated with units operating on the fires. Through these conversations and visual observation, 1 determined that the fires were being controlled by the surrounding handline attack. I relayed progress reports to the command post primarily through runners, though I delivered a few messages personally so as to confer with Chief Fusco.
EXTINGUISHMENT SUMMARY
Only four hydrants were readily available to initial-operating units, and portions of the buildings’ standpipe I systems were damaged in the blast. Nevertheless, water supply was never a serious problem because local fire companies had an excellent knowledge of the area hydrant system through preplanning, experience, and training. This was a critical factor in ensuring a rapid, continuous water supply, which, in retrospect, was our only real defense against smoke generation and, therefore, smoke movement within the buildings. Automatic sprinkler systems in the area around the explosion were either destroyed or overwhelmed by the blast; we worked with a Fort Authority engineer to isolate damaged portions of both the sprinkler and standpipe systems so that undamaged sections would be functional if needed.
(Photo by FDNY Photo Unit.)
HANDLINES DEPLOYED IN FIRE EXTINGUISHMENT
Engine Company 10, observing smoke pushing from the Vista Hotel garage doors, entered the K-l stairs in the hotel and connected the first handline to a standpipe riser on the B-2 level. This did not produce a satisfactory stream—the standpipe was damaged and the resulting pressure inadequate. Assisted by members of Engine Company 5, this hoseline was connected to Engine 10’s apparatus in the street. Engine 10 operated this line for approximately two hours, extinguishing numerous car fires.
Engine Company 6, arriving very soon after Engine 10, immediately connected to a hydrant and stretched a handline down the B garage ramp to the B-2 level, where the members rescued several victims, extinguished numerous car fires, and operated on the fires in the crater. 7’heir water was supplemented from a manifold by Engine 5, whose crew members provided relief to Engine 6.
Engine Company 7 assisted Engine 6 with their stretch, then stretched a handline of their own and operated on the fires in the crater and the automobiles. They also pulled a victim out of the crater debris.
Engine Company 18 connected to a hydrant and supplied the standpipe system, partially operational, then stretched a handline off the standpipe on the east side of the crater. Engine Company 209 assisted in advancing this line and eventually relieved Engine 18. These units also removed a trapped civilian and assisted in the removal of Firefighter Shea.
Engine Company 205 stretched from the standpipe on the B-3 level (south side of the crater). This handline was stretched and filled in with the assistance of engine companies 204, 202, and 55. It was used to extinguish fires and protect Firefighter Shea during his removal.
Engine Company 47 stretched and operated a line from Engine 7 down the Vista fire stairs to the B-2 level on the crater’s southwest side.
Engine Company 230 proceeded down the B stair in Tower 1 to the B-2 level. They stretched a line from the standpipe to the “building service area” and extinguished fires in an office and locker room area. This is the area from which four of the six fatalities were recovered.
Engine Company 255 stretched and manned a line off a standpipe in the Vista Hotel and operated on the southwest side of the crater.
Engine Company 54 stretched off the standpipe in the K-l stairs at the B3 level and operated on the west side of the crater.
Fourteen engine companies operated nine handlines to extinguish all below-grade fires in approximately one hour. The below-grade fires were declared under control at 1:48 p.m.
VICTIM RECOVERY
As the incident progressed, I was directed to coordinate the victim recovery operation in addition to fire extinguishment.
Two fatalities (numbers two and three; the first fatality already had been located early in the incident by FDNY) were recovered from the building service area of Tower 1 during the initial search and extinguishment operations. This area is adjacent to where the explosives were detonated, separated by a concrete block wall. Once fires in this area were extinguished, we called for a FA supervisor to identify the bodies. He positively identified them, and they were moved to a temporary morgue set up in the Vista Hotel.
The FA supervisor reported that three additional employees were thought to be in the general vicinity of the building service area at the time of the explosion. He provided us with names, descriptions, and last known locations, and we initiated a systematic search. Under the supervision of a battalion chief, units searched the rubble, starting from the area immediately surrounding the crater. It was a herculean task, considering that the rubble, piled two to three feet high, was a mass of broken concrete, twisted steel beams, mangled piping, and smashed wall board, lockers, and office furniture. A six-foot-wide strip around the crater was cleared by hand I and searched, then the debris was moved back into this area and the search perimeter extended another six feet, and so on. Rotation and relief were imperative for this heavy manual | work.
(Photo by FDNY Photo Unit.)
Two fatalities, numbers four and I five, were recovered by the fire department using this method. Another victim would be found approximately | two weeks later; meanwhile, the | search through the rubble had to continue until the entire area had been combed —there was always the possibility that a person not yet reported missing was visiting or passing i through the area.
LESSONS LEARNED AND REINFORCED
- The extinguishment of the fires on the B levels had a tremendous impact on the outcome of the incident. The fire extinguishment diminished the quantity of smoke generated and, as a result, diminished the amount of smoke traveling into the buildings above. Without this relatively quick knockdown, the injury and death statistics would have been much different.
Officers easily can be overwhelmed ! by the magnitude of the evacuation i effort at large-scale incidents, but always must remember a basic rule of firefighting: Timely handlines operat| ed aggressively from the interior between the life hazard and the fire often are the best protection against the effects of fire.
- Local fire units’ knowledge of hydrant locations, building layout, and fixed systems is an invaluable asset in high-rise/industrial incidents. Time spent during building and hydrant inspections and local familiarization drills saves valuable time and effort when an incident occurs.
- When normal foreground communication methods are ineffective, we must improvise by using relays, runners, cellular phones, etc.
- When operating at a large-scale operation, members, including incident/sector commanders, may not always be aware of the location of every unit. It is important that each phase of the operation be under the control of chief officers who can network with the incident/sector commander for a more complete picture. Be sure to call enough chiefs to the scene.
- As soon as possible, ascertain the number of people thought to be in the fire and/or explosion area from supervisors. coworkers, or security personnel. Information including the names, descriptions, and last know n locations can assist in pinpointing and organizing a systematic search. It will help speed up operations and, in turn, increase the chances of victim survival.
- Risk analysis is ongoing throughout any incident, but once fire is extinguished and those reported missing are accounted for, it becomes especially important to remove personnel on a timely basis if there is any doubt as to the stabilitv of the involved areas.
- Use large handlines for large bodies of fire. The maneuverability of smaller handlines was sacrificed for the quick knockdown capability of larger lines. This requires a manpower-intensive effort. Relief, rotation, and crew augmentation must be considered—and practiced—by officers.
- When explosions take out a portion of a standpipe system, it often is possible to isolate the damaged section through the use of riser isolation valves and/or sectional control valves. Preplan these operations so you know the valves’ locations and the areas they control, and drill local units in their use.