BY JERRY KNAPP
AUGUST 2011 AND OCTOBER 2012 WERE BOTH DANGERous months for firefighters in the northeast United States. August 2011 brought Hurricane Irene and October 2012 brought Superstorm Sandy and its well-documented devastation. Below are some of the lessons learned from these storms and a few other significant and dangerous storms to which the local fire departments and hazardous material teams responded. These experiences offer you and your department insight into how to improve your often overlooked major storm response preplanning and operations.
Because of the larger call volume during storm response operations, firefighters may operate differently. Usually, when committed to a scene, we stay until we complete the task and make the scene safe for the long term. But during a large-scale storm response, the call volume is so great that we often can only mitigate the immediate life hazard and then must move on to the next call. Additionally, because the severe weather has affected large geographic areas, mutual aid is often not available. Essentially, you are on your own for several days or at least for the storm’s duration and have to make the best of it.
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| (1) Although reported to be on fire, this shed was actually only illuminated by the arcing of the high-voltage transmission line going to ground. (Photos by author unless otherwise noted.) |
In essence and on a large scale, what we learned was simple: Big storms can and will damage infrastructure, buildings, and the environment beyond the level we normally experience. The damage potential makes it important that we plan for such emergencies.
Look around your response area and imagine how enormous amounts of wind, rain, flooding, lightning, snow, ice, or a combination of them can cause partial or complete failure; collapse; and flooding of critical infrastructure such as roads, bridges, and buildings. Essentially, facilities that normally are not damaged and infrastructure you have never had to respond to are now failing, and they are your problem. Identify at-risk populations such as those in retirement communities, hospitals, and nursing homes. Locate the gas and electric transmission lines. Once you have identified the potential problem areas, work on planning responses and improving responder and community safety, mitigation, and recovery.
ELECTRIC TRANSMISSION LINES
High winds and rain from tropical storms or hurricanes wreak havoc on the overhead electric distribution system in residential areas. Trees and tree limbs often fall on and bring down wires; poles; and primary, secondary, and house service lines. We are all too familiar with responding to calls reporting wires down or wires arcing in a tree. On arrival, the fire department typically establishes a perimeter and waits for the utility company to arrive. Often these wires are in contact with the ground and are arcing with the spectacular light show and that deep buzzing sound of high voltage on the loose.
During Hurricane Sandy, the West Haverstraw (NY) Fire Department (WHFD) was dispatched for one of many “wires down” calls at the height of the storm that was unique. When the assistant chief arrived, the 911 callers said that wires were arcing in a wooded area behind the house under the electric transmission lines. En route, the assistant chief said he could clearly see the sky lit up from the lines’ arcing, but on arrival it had stopped. Responders were especially cautious because of the high voltage transmission lines carry.
During this call, the storm was at its fiercest, with heavy rain and steady winds at 50 miles per hour (mph) with frequent gusts to more than 70 mph. Responding units saw a spectacular light show in all directions from arcing primary wires that were almost simultaneously brought down by peak wind gusts in or beyond the four corners of our response area. The reflection of these arcing 4,000- to 13,000-volt primaries off low-hanging clouds was visible several miles away, resulting in an eerie atmosphere and mindset for members. It seemed we were surrounded and possibly overwhelmed and didn’t know what was coming next. We are accustomed to facing one significant emergency, but with several dangerous, live events all around us, it seemed much more dangerous.
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| (2) The large scorch mark on the A-D corner of the home. |
By the time units arrived, the scene did not present any significant hazard or indication that anything was wrong. The single-family home’s owners who reported the alarm advised us that the transmission lines had arced in the rear of the house. It was still unclear what had happened. We assumed there was some problem with the transmission line, but it was clearly beyond our level of expertise to do much more. We advised dispatch of the situation and prepared to leave for another call when dispatch reported a structure fire at the same address.
We could see some fire activity toward the rear of the house. WHFD Assistant Chief Robert LaGrow attempted a 360° survey using an access road on the D side of the reported address and could see what appeared to be a shed on fire. However, the fire was short-lived and appeared to go out.
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| (3) Firefighters noticed a section of gypsum board was blown apart in the basement. Note the charred yellow wiring (arrow) and the scorched gypsum board near the window frame and the scorched glass (arrow). |
LaGrow reported, “I did not want to risk firefighters for a shed fire, especially if a high-voltage transmission line was down in the area. We held all units in place for a few minutes to attempt to get a better idea of what was actually going on. We could no longer see any active fire or smoke. Neighbors were reporting nothing unusual, so we stood fast.” Trees were snapping off explosively in the wooded area on the opposite (upwind) side of the street from the address. This presented an additional danger during size-up.
In another surprising turn, the occupants reported smoke in their home. As firefighters moved toward the home, an alert firefighter noticed the large scorch mark on the front of the home. The firefighter radioed and shouted to the others to use extreme caution because the metal chain-link fence might be energized. At this point, it was still unclear what had actually caused any of this, but unquestionably this was not a routine call and was getting more bizarre and dangerous by the minute.
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| (4) A view of the D side of the A-D corner. The intensity of the energy caused burn-through on the aluminum downspout and (5) blew out masonry from the foundation wall inside of which was the breaker panel. |
Firefighters entered the home. Chief Ray Redmond of the neighboring Thiells Fire District was in charge since LaGrow had to respond to another alarm. On entering the home, occupants told them that some type of explosion had occurred in the basement. There was a light haze of smoke but no sign of active fire.
However, a look in the basement revealed that a significant surge of electricity had apparently blown off a section of gypsum board. Electric service to the house had been intermittent during the storm, which was not unusual considering the damage to the surrounding electric distribution system. Electric service to this home was not completely out yet.
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| (6) The surge arced to the aluminum trim on the eaves of the house (arrow). |
An examination of this area and the basement area near the electric panel revealed that a very high-voltage surge had caused the damage. The next step was to determine the origin of this enormous amount of electric current.
Because of the severe weather, it was too dangerous to walk around the wooded area near where the transmission line was believed to be down. Two firefighters walked through the house and carefully out onto the back deck to determine what caused the damage to the fence and house. Because of the darkness, the heavy rain and wind, and lack of lighting, this proved fruitless. The intermittent electric service was now completely out for what appeared to be the long term, adding further complications. We assumed that the total outage resulted from the down primary wires, but we were uncertain about whether something more local was causing the intermittent electric service.
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| (7) The connection between the temporary fence and the fence around the house. |
The family was well prepared for the storm and wanted to remain in the house. WHFD Fire Inspector Fred Viohl ordered them to vacate the house until the cause of electric surge and damage could be determined. The homeowner opened the main electric breaker to protect his home and vacated the premises for the night. The fire department notified the surrounding homeowners in the area that there may be a transmission line down. Personnel warned them not to walk into the vicinity or allow children out there to play or explore the storm damage the following morning. No attempt to close off the area could be made since the area was wooded and the high winds and heavy rain were still raging.
At the multiagency planning meeting the following morning, we prioritized areas to follow up to determine whether they were safe or if responders needed to take further actions to keep the public safe. The home above was among the first sites on the list. When we had requested assistance from the utility company the previous night, dispatch informed us that the utility had taken all its crews off the roads because conditions were too dangerous. Even if utility crews had still been out, all contact with the utility was only through dispatch, which responded simply, “You are on the list.”
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| (8) The current destroyed the aluminum fence connectors. |
In the light of day, with clear skies and without driving rain, gusting winds, and fear of falling trees crushing us, we were able to reconstruct the events of the night before. As we worked backward from the home, it was clear that a large surge of electricity had somehow passed through the home, evidenced by the large scorch marks on the outside of the house.
As we followed the chain-link fence around the side and rear of the home, we noticed the cast aluminum connector from the top rail to the terminal gate post had been destroyed by the surge of electricity. The destruction of top rail connectors was repeated until the fence reached a corner post and connected to a temporary chain-link fence that ran back toward the transmission line right-of-way. This indicated that the entire temporary and the permanent fence had been energized at one point during the incident.
A large tree on the edge of the transmission line right-of-way was felled by high winds. While falling, it made contact with the transmission line and the chain-link fence, creating a circuit. Current flowed from the transmission line, through the tree and chain-link fence, to the house.
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| (9) Note that the tree fell toward transmission lines. |
According to WHFD Firefighter John Segelbacher, an electrical engineer, “It is likely that current flowed toward the house because the ground for the [house’s] electrical system was the path of least resistance. Essentially, the electricity chose to go that way as opposed to following a path along the rear section of the fence, which was a lesser quality ground.”
According to Segalbacher, the aluminum connectors were destroyed when they became the de facto fuses in the fence’s makeshift electrical system. Cast aluminum had a greater resistance than the fence’s metal top rail and so melted. Apparently, the electricity jumped the newly created gap and continued its instantaneous march to ground.
Lessons Learned
–Think big for big storms. Unusual conditions lead to unusual problems. Fire departments frequently respond to “wires down” calls, usually on residential streets and only involving primary or secondary wires. Big storms threaten the whole infrastructure, including transmission lines. Build a plan before the storm that includes response to storm damage involving all possible electrical system components (e.g., transmission lines, substations, and so forth).
–Hazard size. Consider the scope of the hazard a down transmission line or an electrical substation fire presents. No action or a less aggressive action may be the right action. Planning responses and prioritizing dangers based on call information may be required. For example, do you respond first to the “wires down” call or to the burning electrical substation if your resources are stretched thin? Can you turn the “wires down” call over to the police or public works department for a short time?
–Preplan with your utility. As a result of Hurricane Sandy, most local municipalities in our county are requesting at least one three- to four-member electric utility crew be positioned in or near their area before and for the duration of the storm. This will allow for immediate response to down wires and for making the area safe. Highway crews can then clear the road of down trees and other obstructions to make the area accessible to police, fire, and emergency medical personnel. Note that the utility crew must have the tools, equipment, and authority to shut off electric service to areas where wires are down and present a hazard.
–Do not leave the scene of down wires unprotected. During Hurricane Irene in 2011, a local fire department responded to a “wires down” call. The firefighters and the utility company allegedly responded and determined that there was no hazard and left. After the storm, a child came in contact with the wire and was electrocuted along with a good Samaritan who tried to assist. As you may imagine, there are several major lawsuits in progress.
As a result of October 2012’s Hurricane Sandy, which occurred just before Halloween, another local department served by the same utility responded to a “wires down” call in a residential area. Using an electrical detector, an alert code enforcement official found energized primary wires on a lawn in the area. Undoubtedly, local families would be trick-or-treating there a few hours after dark. This down wire was “on the list” for the utility company to respond to-it had just not gotten to it yet.
HIGH WATER HAZARDS
Some of Hurricane Sandy’s devastation in October 2012 was the result of a storm surge. The tidal Hudson River is the eastern boundary of Rockland County, which is about 30 miles north upriver from New York Harbor. Sandy caused extremely high tides that flooded river communities on both sides of the river with record high water levels. A storm surge resulted from the combined effect of nearly hurricane-force winds pushing ocean water onto the sea coast and then up the river. Heavy rains in the Hudson Highlands’ huge inland drainage area on both sides of the river added enormous amounts of water, flooding numerous Hudson tributaries. The flooding of riverfront communities initiated two unique responses of the Rockland County Hazardous Materials Team (RCHMT).
The Rockland County emergency operations center received a call from the United States Coast Guard reporting that four propane tanks were seen, apparently washed up by storm surge on the Hudson shore in Nyack. Since the Coast Guard was fully engaged with emergencies in and around New York Harbor, officials requested our assistance in evaluating and mitigating the hazard. Members of the RCHMT were dispatched to the scene at 0840 hours on November 1.
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| (10) This tree made the initial contact between the transmission line and the fence. |
On arrival, we found four propane tanks had washed ashore along a half-mile section of the river bank, about 300 yards north of the Tappan Zee Bridge and occupied housing areas. The local fire department was aware of them but could do little at the height of the storm with fierce winds and rain. Now clearing skies allowed us to further evaluate, determine the hazard if any, and plan for removal.
Scratched paint; minor dents; and, most importantly, damaged and leaking valves indicated that the tanks had been banged around in the rough storm waters. All the tanks had relatively minor leaks. Two combustible gas indicator readings showed zero readings at 10 feet from all the tanks. Clearing skies and light but steady winds helped prevent the accumulation of flammable concentrations. All the tanks were outside in wide open areas.
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| (11) One of the propane tanks; the Tappan Zee Bridge is in the background. |
The tanks’ data plates indicated that they were manufactured in 1984. We tried to track the owners of the tanks using the serial number, but the firm was out of business. The problem was ours to manage.
In coordination with the Nyack fire and police chiefs, we decided to continually monitor the air around the tanks until a spill contractor could remove them. As a precaution, we requested contractors working on the nearby Tappan Zee Bridge to halt welding and cutting operations, but we allowed traffic on nearby roads and ordered no evacuations. Air monitoring continued to report zero combustible gas readings at five and 10 feet from all the tanks.
Working through our emergency operations center and with the support of the state Department of Environmental Conservation, we found, assigned, and funded a contractor. He subsequently hired a propane company to remove the tanks, which were trucked and offloaded at the propane company’s yard without incident. It is unknown where the tanks drifted from.
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| (12) A Rockland hazmat technician checks for flammable concentrations of propane using a combustible gas indicator. |
Lessons Learned
–Estimating and understanding the hazard when no obvious one is apparent is difficult. These tanks were from an unknown source, were obviously damaged, and were near populated areas. The valves were damaged and had minor leaks. The condition of the side of the tank lying on the ground could not be assessed. Overestimating the hazard creates undue strain on already exhausted responders and residents. Underestimating the hazard could result in a deadly catastrophe if the tanks were to fail during movement and transport. In this case, the operation was a success.
–Contractors may not respond immediately. In the aftermath of a devastating event, contractors are often overtaxed attempting to restore services and cannot be counted on for immediate response. When they can, fire departments must ensure contractors follow the safest course of action. Often, contractors will have several hazmat mitigation jobs lined up but limited staff and equipment; they may take the quickest rather than the safest action.
–Bystanders may not understand the hazard, so safety perimeters are required. People were walking and biking along nearby roadways and would stop to see what was going on. Some were observing storm damage; others were walking to work, exercising, or otherwise following their normal course of the day. Invariably, they would come up to the edge of the sea wall and gawk at the leaking tank.
UNKNOWN HAZMAT
The riverfront village of Piermont, New York, was also severely flooded by the record high tides, damaging basements, businesses, shops, and garages. As recovery began, homeowners, renters, and business operators cleaned out their storage areas and found all types of hazardous materials (e.g., pesticides, herbicides, paint, flammable liquids, gasoline, oil). During the recovery operation planning meetings, it was decided that homeowners would place unwanted hazmats at the curb and a contractor hired by the village would safely dispose of them. The contractor was not scheduled to pick up for several days, and lots of interesting containers were placed at the curb.
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| (13) The normal level for the creek is about 30 feet below the grassy area shown. Bystanders became a problem all along the banks. The culvert under Route 9W is farther to the left. |
The RCHMT received a call reporting two 55-gallon drums containing unknown substances were at the curb at each of two locations. Both drums were about one-third full and had no markings. We questioned the occupants of the closest homes and businesses. The more we questioned, the less they knew. Apparently they were concerned that they would be responsible to pay for our services and that of a waste contractor. We assured them that this was not the case, but no useful information was forthcoming.
We followed our procedures for testing unknowns with no positive hits for any classes or specific chemical hazards. After careful testing and rigorous adherence to standard procedures, it was clear the drums contained river water. Yes, the drums washed up with the tide, probably part of a homemade dock demolished somewhere on the river by the storm. A resident cleaning up simply stood the drums up and put them at the curb with other labeled and more significant hazards.
The lesson learned is that dealing with known and unknown hazmats will be a concern during recovery and cleanup operations.
GAS TRANSMISSION LINES
In August 2011, Hurricane Irene brought torrential rains (eight inches in a few hours) and severe and widespread damage to the northeast United States. Small streams turned into raging rivers, causing massive amounts of erosion along the stream banks. In West Haverstraw, severe erosion exposed four electrical conduits and two natural gas transmission lines that crossed under a small stream and left them dangerously suspended and unsupported above the creek. Our department had not been aware of the presence of these pipes. As a result of the erosion, both pipes lost any structural support and were held suspended by only the strength of their welded sections and the pipe wall. Our response area in the vicinity of the pipes is bordered by high density housing on two sides, a major highway (U.S. Route 9W), and a shopping center.
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| (14) Before the storm, these pipelines had been completely buried and ran under the stream bed. Because of the erosion of the stream bed and its banks, they were unsupported and under significant stress. At left, the oil-filled conduits for the electric transmission lines. At right is the 24-inch gas transmission line. |
The village’s emergency coordinator went to the site to inspect a culvert that passed under Route 9W and discovered a small section of a pipe was becoming exposed at 1030 hours. By 1100 hours, large amounts of stream embankment sections had been and still were being eroded and falling into the creek, each with a spectacular thunderous roar and subsequent crash and splash into the rushing water. Compounding the problem was that large debris-mostly trees-was falling into the creek upstream and slamming against the suspended pipes. The stream bank continued to erode as we watched, exposing more and more pipe and subsequently putting additional stress on the pipes.
Telephone contact with the manager of the local electric generating station confirmed the pipes were high-pressure natural gas transmission lines. The pipes (one 24-inch diameter, 850 psi; one 16-inch diameter, 250 psi) supplied the nearby Bowline Power Generating Station (electric), located along the Hudson River. Usually a calm, steady-flowing stream, the creek drains a large area of the Hudson Highlands above the river. But because of the enormous rainfall from the storm, it was now a raging river, rapidly eroding banks as the water continued to rise. Further exacerbating the erosion and flooding were a lack of stream bank and channel maintenance, old and new debris, and damage from previous storms.
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| (15) The 16-inch gas line. |
Bowline is only a peak power generating station and is often offline, so we did not know at this point (about 1100 hours) whether the gas lines were pressurized. Additional information from the plant manager revealed that he was having his own flooding problems at the plant, but he put us in contact with the subcontractor that owned and operated the pipelines.
The subcontractor agreed to meet us at the site. We briefed him on the situation and then took him to an area where he could see the pipes. It was about 1145 hours. After observing the pipes, the raging river, and the debris that continued to crash into the pipes, he calmly said that it was not a problem. The pipes were very strong, welded steel pipe, and they would hold. His facial expression and body language said just the opposite. He confirmed the size and pressure in the gas mains and that they were in fact pressurized to, at, or near the stated pressures.
Additionally, he told us that about 20 feet downstream were buried four 345,000-volt electric transmission lines (which followed the same path as the gas pipes) running two miles from the plant to a local substation. The water was exposing them as well as we evaluated conditions at the scene. Because of the high voltage, these lines were enclosed in mineral oil-filled metal conduits to keep them cool for their approximately two-mile length. The good news was that the plant was offline and the lines were not energized. We considered the possible consequences of the oil spill and disregarded it as an issue because of the severity of the gas pipeline problem. It was the least of our worries at this point, and we could do nothing about it.
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| (16) The complex, made up of several individual and some interconnected buildings, is a classic example of heavy timber frame mill buildings found in many older northeastern United States industrial towns. This group grew up near and was built over a small stream that supplied water to a factory’s dye tanks. Upstream, three small reservoirs with dams and spillways, fed by a large watershed, were built to ensure a constant water supply for the booming dye works, which closed around 1960. (Photo by Tom Bierds.) |
Our immediate and obvious solution was to see if we could isolate the gas in the pipes so if they did fail catastrophically, they would release only a minimal amount of gas. The pipeline owner’s representative confirmed that there were isolation valves, but they were four miles away. Obviously, the amount of gas contained at these pressures in these large pipes and in very close proximity to occupied areas was causing us great concern for the life safety of nearby residents.
We requested the RCHMT to the scene to help us assess the hazard using its plume modeling software to outline the hazard area if one or both of the pipes burst and the release ignited. According to Dan Greeley, the hazmat team chief, “Due to constantly shifting winds, constantly changing wind velocity, and the location of the pipes in a deep valley, we determined that the modeling prediction would not be reliable enough as a decision tool.”
As clearing skies and warm sunshine replaced the severe weather, onlookers came out to see the storm damage; they became an immediate problem. Many of these unsuspecting people walked to the edge of the severely eroded stream banks to take photos or otherwise gawk at the raging waters. One slip, and the river would take a victim into the box culvert under Route 9W and to his death. Local police continued to maintain site security well into the night.
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| (17) The heavy timber trusses supporting the roof collapsed when the water forced out the rear wall (arrow). (Photo by Tom Bierds.) |
Further discussion with the pipeline representative revealed that it would take about eight hours to shut the valves off and blow down the gas through the exhaust stack of the power plant. The plant was on the Hudson River shore, so blowing gas out the 400-foot stack would not be a safety problem, especially since the wind now shifted from out of the east to out of the west. Westerly winds would dissipate the gas as it crossed the river, which is three miles wide at Haverstraw Bay, providing ample area to disperse the gas mixture and render it nonhazardous. However, safety procedures required notifying a number of agencies and localities in the area and across the river of the intended release. This would take time. The pipeline owner representative stated they would start work on isolating and then bleeding off the gas in the pipes.
Planning
By about 1200 hours, we had assembled a command team that included county hazmat team leaders, the village engineer, the mayor, public works leaders, and the police chief. We immediately formed a unified command structure that included the fire and police departments, emergency management, the town supervisor, the mayor, fire and building inspectors, and so forth. Realizing that we could not manage the incident from creekside, we established a command post at the local firehouse. Using maps of the scene, unified command agreed on an initial 500-foot radius evacuation zone. Working quickly, we assigned sectors and sector officers from the WHFD to immediately evacuate residents in the designated area. Logistics quickly produced a handout flyer for firefighters and police to distribute while advising residents of the hazard and evacuation locations. Because of the flooding of homes elsewhere, the Rockland County Office of Fire and Emergency Services had already opened a mass care shelter at the North Rockland High School in Theills, three miles from the pipeline site, so we were able to send our evacuees there. This relieved us of a huge burden for which we were completely unprepared to handle, especially in such a short time. The improved weather made the evacuation easier to execute but harder to explain. By 1330 hours, joint fire and police teams were evacuating residents. Police units were assigned to fire units to assist with unruly persons or those who could not grasp the severity of the situation.
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| (18) The truss collapse sent the second-floor art gallery and its contents into the waters raging through the first floor and ultimately downstream to the Hudson River. (Photo by Frank Vitale.) |
At 1400 hours, a reinspection of the pipes showed more extensive erosion, leaving about 100 feet of the pipes suspended above the creek. Entire trees with six- to 18-inch-diameter trunks were smashing into the pipes. We maintained contact with the gas supplier representative, the power plant manager, and the gas supplier supervisor, discussing whether to increase the size of the evacuation. At this point, we were sending about 500 residents to the shelter with an anticipated return home at about 2100 hours.
At this hourlong on-site meeting, we evaluated the condition of the pipe and finalized the steps required for the power plant and the gas supplier to isolate and vent the trapped gas. The first purge of the 16-inch line started at 1555 hours; both lines were purged, and residents were allowed to return to their homes at 2100 hours to a rousing cheer at the shelter. No natural gas was released during the operation except for the planned venting through the power plant.
Lessons Learned
–Identify critical and dangerous infrastructure in your area. These gas pipes are buried, so “out of sight, out of mind.” Emergency planners, firefighters, and others must identify these usually benign structures and anticipate how severe flooding, winds, and so forth would affect them.
–Use political leaders as planning and response team members. Traditionally, the fire service tries to avoid interacting with politicians and the press. During planning and response operations, they can be very valuable assets. First, they provide the horsepower to obtain the immediate and total support of local resources (e.g., staff engineers, inspectors). Additionally, political leaders gain immediate attention from the press, which can help get the word out regarding evacuations, areas residents should avoid, and so forth. Local leaders can be a valuable tool for explaining the importance of the situation to often unsuspecting and angry evacuees.
–Preplan shelter sites. Sheltering large numbers of people for an extended period can be challenging at best. Preplanning who will run your shelter, where it will be, and other logistical details will lift a huge burden during major storm events.
–Evacuation notice. The WHFD had never faced a mass evacuation like this. Having a prepared generic evacuation notice that just needed slight modification before copying and distribution would have saved time.
–Interactive and hard-copy maps. The value of both hard-copy and electronic maps cannot be overemphasized. Hard-copy maps from our fire and building inspectors helped in planning the initial evacuations. Electronic maps and data available through county planning departments are also a valuable tool.
–Unified command. Although we had no formal unified command plan, the process worked well, albeit on the fly. We have since developed a formalized unified command plan for future large-scale emergencies.
BUILDING COLLAPSE AND ETHANOL SPILL
During Hurricane Irene in August 2011, the WHFD faced two unique and dangerous situations at the same facility on the same day: a building collapse at 0903 hours and an ethanol spill at 1955 hours. Both had the potential for serious loss of firefighters’ lives. Proper management and slow deliberate and conservative actions resulted in no firefighter injuries or deaths.
Garnerville, a hamlet within the village of West Haverstraw, developed around a group of heavy timber mill buildings. The mostly two-story buildings housed a famous cloth dye factory from 1880 until 1940.
After the collapse of the dye business by 1960, the heavy timber mill complex was modified and housed a variety of small businesses. In recent years, the new owners have developed it into an arts, sculpting, painting, and other creative workshop and media center. This venture has had some success. To stay financially afloat, the complex subdivided the large areas into small manufacturing, studio, gallery and wood, metal, and furniture shop areas.
Hurricane Irene dropped eight inches of rain in a short time over our entire town and the large upstream watershed. The huge and sudden flow of water flooded the factory complex. Although the buildings had a 17-foot clearance from the stream level to the lowest floor, storm surge capacity was exceeded despite the existence of these buildings for almost 200 years. Numerous dams overflowed upstream, requiring nearby homes to evacuate. Since the complex is open 24 hours a day, and despite the warning of management to evacuate because of possible flooding, it was a good possibility that people were in the endangered buildings.
According WHFD Chief George Zayas, “Although folks were not supposed to be in there, I decided to conduct a quick search of the buildings before the water got dangerously high. We focused on the buildings most heavily used and in the most danger from the flooding. I told my firefighters to get in, do a quick search, call out to see if anyone was inside, and then make a hasty retreat. Don’t take any unnecessary chances. While we were standing outside the building, supervising the search operation, the asphalt under our feet actually rose up. The water was rising quickly, and the surging water had forced its way under the pavement. I called for an immediate withdrawal of our members. As we conducted our personnel accountability report, one building began a progressive collapse of the roof running about 150 feet. The outer masonry wall remained standing, but we could hear the progressive collapse of the lower floors when the heavy wood roof and trusses impacted them.”
The utility company was called to the scene about 30 minutes before the collapse because we anticipated the ground-mounted electric transformers would be submerged as the water rose. Frankly, we did not know what to expect when that happened, but it turned out to be a nonevent. After the collapse, we also requested the gas representatives to respond to the scene. We learned something very interesting then as well. The gas technician did not have the authority to shut off gas main service. He was authorized to shut off service to individual buildings but not a main line or service with multiple customers. Luckily, no fires or explosions resulted.
The Rockland County Regional Technical Rescue Team was called to the scene to assist in lifesaving operations. However, because of the high water still flowing through the complex, the unstable floors above the streambed, and the very low likelihood of anyone inside surviving the collapse, a search operation was not initiated. Additionally, no one was reported missing by other occupants of the building or management staff since occupants had been advised to evacuate the building the day before the storm.
The decision not to conduct a search of the building ran against the grain of some firefighters. In the interest of responder safety and the very low probability of substantial gain, it was the correct one. Time proved this option was correct since no one was in the building during the collapse.
Later, around 1930 hours, the WHFD was called back to the exact location by a frantic business owner. A small flavored-vodka bottling firm occupied a building that had flooded and was near the collapsed building. On our arrival (we were just returning from the final stages of the high-pressure gas line incident discussed above), the business owner was pleading with us to do something to save his business. He claimed that 3,000 gallons of ethanol had just spilled in his rental space.
From our hazmat experience, we know to ask what seem to be obvious questions but often reveal critical answers. We asked how he knew 3,000 gallons of ethanol were spilled in a flood-damaged building. He responded that he was in there cleaning up so he could resume production. How was the ethanol stored and how did it spill? Incredibly, despite management directives that tenants should not return until their safety and building stability could be ensured, he answered that he had been inside removing debris left over by the flood waters and the ethanol totes (metal-framed containers holding several hundred gallons each) had been shifted by the flood waters. He reported that they fell over, spilling about 3,000 gallons of flammable raw material that he was going to turn into flavored vodka. It was later determined that approximately 1,000 gallons were lost.
He further explained how flammable it was and that his facility had numerous explosionproof electrical systems, spill containment, and so forth and that even with these safety measures it would certainly explode if we did not do something quickly. He forcefully pleaded with us to do something immediately. Fire department officers were considering how to get inside and reduce the hazard. We had for a short time considered a possible application of foam, but there was no safe place or manner to apply it, and there would be very little gain if we did.
When questioned, the vodka manufacturer really did not expect that the ethanol was still on the floor of his facility. We reasoned that, based on the building’s condition (it suffered severe flooding from the fast-moving, three- to four-foot stream for several hours) that the product had long since drained away through existing or newly created openings into the raging waters below. Additionally, the manufacturer had said that the angle of the floor had contributed to the collapse of the stack of totes. Although not the best environmental outcome, it did minimize the fire/explosion hazard and it was impossible to even attempt to contain anything in the raging stream.
By now the mayor, the police chief, and the fire inspector had joined us at the command post in the parking lot far across the street from the involved building. It was around 2100 hours. We were cold and wet and had been on the go at a breakneck pace since about 0530 hours, and our patience was a bit thin. I blurted out something to the effect that senseless acts, such as reentering a flood-damaged building, will result in responders risking their lives to save yours and are, well … not desirable. Actually my statement was not that politically correct but certainly made the point at the command post.
Hindsight is 20/20, but as it was happening, it was hard for our emergency responder brains to believe that people had actually reentered this flood-damaged and potentially unsafe building for any reason. Earlier in the day, while water levels were rising, Zayas and the county technical rescue team decided that they would not even attempt a search operation because the still-raging water under and around the buildings made it too dangerous. But this occupant had risked his life for his business. At this time, no search operations were even considered because the amount of damage the flood may have done was still unknown. Electric service was off for most of the town, throwing the entire complex into complete darkness. As emergency responders, we must remember the importance of these homegrown businesses to the owners who often have worked hard, sacrificed, and risked everything to make them successful.
The WHFD fire inspector was the next voice of reason at the command post. He immediately invoked his authority to declare the entire complex off limits. The police chief supported our position; he stated that he would leave a patrol on the scene and arrest any violators of the no-trespass order. The mayor fully supported the joint decision and operation.
Although this sounds like, and was, a logical outcome, the WHFD had never been faced with a situation like this. We have had our share of commercial/industrial building fires, but to be taxed with multiple potentially catastrophic incidents back-to-back as a result of a tropical storm was new for us. Typically, after a large fire, mutual-aid units would be the first to be relieved, and often a fire watch would be posted for the next day or until hot spots were fully extinguished. Essentially, we always had time to play out the incident to a completely safe conclusion. However, because of the call volume, we only did what was necessary and moved on to the next crisis. Additionally, to be faced with what we believed were uncharacteristic and senseless unsafe civilian behaviors was also a new facet to consider in our next major response.
Lessons Learned
–Use the expertise and legal authority of your fire and building inspectors to cordon off unsafe property. Often we get so caught up in the response mentality-no one can do anything but the fire department-that we forget the practical power these officials have and how useful they can be during the crisis.
–The Rockland Regional Technical Rescue Team responded after the collapse and, if it were practical and safe, would have conducted a void search. However, it is important to note that if you depend on specialty assets that have significant travel distance, they may not be able to arrive at your scene for several days. In this case, our state technical rescue team was at least a day away.
–Warn occupants of buildings/occupancies that may be severely impacted by the storm’s effects (e.g., wind, flooding, collapse, loss of utilities). Meet occupants before the storm, and advise them of the dangers you foresee and your planned actions based on your department’s capabilities. For example, if occupants of an apartment building in a flood zone think you will rescue them from high and swift waters and your department does not have those capabilities, make this clear in advance. Stress the need for pre-emergency evacuation. This provides fair warning for occupants and prevents firefighters from conducting high-risk operations in severe conditions for which they are not trained or equipped.
–People do unbelievable things. It never entered our minds that occupants would even consider reentering these severely damaged buildings or civilians would bring their children to the edge of 60-foot-high, freshly eroded river banks with raging water directly below.
–Work with your utilities to prepare before a big storm strikes. Learn what their procedures are and what their first-arriving technicians will and will not do. Learn how long their response times will be, and establish solid working relationships with them.
Fire department operations during major storms and severe weather require different approaches than day-to-day responses. Storm response often involves dangerous infrastructure that must be identified in advance and careful planning to mitigate these incidents. Strongly consider planning for extended operations without mutual aid, since nearby units will be as overtaxed as you are. As reported in an after-action report from Hurricane Sandy, “We must plan for the unthinkable.”
Author’s note: Thanks to the following for their help in preparing this article: Mayor John Ramundo, Police Chief Charles Miller, Fire Chief George Zayas, Fire Chief Robert LaGrow, Fire Chief Ray Redmond, Hazmat Chief Dan Greeley, Fire Inspector Fred Viohl, Firefighter John Segelbacher, and Assistant Chief Tom Bierds.
● JERRY KNAPP is a 37-year veteran firefighter/EMT with the West Haverstraw (NY) Fire Department; a training officer at the Rockland County Fire Training Center in Pomona, New York; and an adjunct professor in the Rockland Community College Fire Technology Program. He is a battalion chief with the Rockland County Hazardous Materials Team and a former nationally certified paramedic. He has a degree in fire protection and wrote the “Fire Attack” chapter in Fire Engineering’s Handbook for Firefighter I and II and numerous articles in fire service trade journals.
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