By Brett Martinez

Over the past 40 years, the use of Special, Weapons And Tactics (SWAT) Teams has increased and for good reason.  Violent subjects have tried to out gun and out class patrol officers during the commission of crimes.  These units have been successful in limiting this type of threat.  They have many names such as Hostage Rescue Teams (HRT), Special Response Team (SRT), and Emergency Services Unit (ESU).  Hostage Negotiation Teams have also been very successful in limiting unnecessary violence through a variety of tactics and methods.  In more recent history, law enforcement have begun to train specialized units to deal with large-scale civil disorder.  These units have been relatively effective during recent political and social unrest.  In most cases, these assets are the best option for desperate situation.  So why would the fire service need to be involved with their operations?   The reason is that no matter how much these elite teams train and improve their operations to avoid violence and the creation of a fire situation, there will always be that unpredictable factor, the assailants, who will introduce fire whenever and wherever they choose.

In most cases, the combination of well-trained SWAT and Hostage Negotiation or riot personnel will be successful in resolving the situation without fire occurring.  Unfortunately on the occasions when dynamic entry (or assault) by SWAT personnel is the only option to subdue violent subjects, some of those entries have led to fire incidents with tragic results.  In some other violent scenarios, that this article will discuss, incendiaries are planned as part of the attack.  Rioters who use Molotov cocktails and other incendiary devices have been a historical threat to law enforcement during civil unrest.  It is these fire incidents that occur during SWAT team or large-scale civil unrest operations that will require fire department response.  When large groups become violent, one of the primary weapons used against government forces is fire.  Under these conditions, most law enforcement agencies are not capable of mitigating fire incidents and will require fire and EMS to respond.  When, why, and how we should interact with these elite law enforcement officers are the focus of this article.  This article will note the historical need for fire service response as a necessity during some of these events. 

When responders are unprepared, these incidents can end with more tragedy than necessary.  Some of the most famous are listed below but lesser known incidents can also end with specialized law enforcement teams and firefighters being injured or killed.  For many of us, the thought or current plan maybe to “let it burn until the shooting stops and then we will put the fire out.”  This sounds simple enough, and in some cases it may be the only option.  Unfortunately, in most of the incidents this meant that death came to the assailants, the hostages, or injury to the victims of the unrest.  To my knowledge, there are no local, state, or federal mandates that require we, as firefighters, conduct fire suppression operations in areas where acts of violence are currently being perpetrated nor are we under any commitment to conduct rescue efforts under ballistic or incendiary assault.  Furthermore, no one, including me, is suggesting that you as a firefighter attempt to conduct suppression operations under violent situations.  This is not to suggest that firefighters have not or will not act heroically under the discussed conditions.  One only need to watch the historic footage of the Columbine High School and Mumbai, India, attacks or read the reports of firefighters that were shot during the 1992 LA riots and you know that our brothers and sisters have stepped forward during these times of crisis.  There are never any good options when someone is being held hostage and never any guarantees that we will be able to save anyone in a fire.  This is especially true when those trapped are being held under threat of violence.  What I do recommend is that before you are placed in a situation that requires some decision and/or action you know some of the options and risks above those you normally encounter.  Understand that in almost all the events discussed (with the exception of civil unrest), you would probably be volunteering for this assignment.

Barricaded Subjects

The first type of incidents to be discussed covers the largest variety of offenders.  The barricaded subject scenarios could involve fortified drug labs and drug distribution centers and gang dens.  Barricades could also occur during criminal acts gone bad such as robberies, kidnappings, and domestic violence incidents.  Barricaded subjects could involve devout or extremist groups that are entrenched groups with bunker mentalities and prone to violence.  All of these scenarios could quickly turn into life-threatening situations for those involved.

Terrorist Assault

Unlike most protests or barricaded subject incidents, most terrorist assailants enter into their actions intent on doing violence.  These groups, whether homegrown anti-government or foreign based, have established methods for confronting and dealing with public safety agencies.   Most terror groups have made some effort to study the way agencies respond and how those agencies are required to mitigate civil unrest or assaults on fixed facilities followed by a siege (as what occurred in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia in 2002 and Mumbai, India in 2008).  The attackers enter with a primary goal of violence and in most cases fatalistic intent.  

School Attack

These types of incidents have involved groups but most of the time involve a lone gunman.  As with most of the other events discussed, school sieges can occur in any community and seem to be one of the most current threats.  In most cases, the school siege will involve hostages and victims under assault with ballistic as primary weapons and incendiary devices as a secondary weapon.  As with terrorist attacks, the primary goal in these attacks is to create carnage on a massive scale with suicide at the hand of the assault team.

Civil Unrest/Riots

These events could involve organized and unorganized persons during and after sporting events, anti-government rallies, social unrest, spring break, and rock concerts.  Riots and arson sprees are some of the greatest unknowns when it comes to the threat involved.  The event is very fluid and will escalate in size without warning and could then potentially subside or deescalate as fast as it started.  It can last for minutes, hours, or days, depending on multiple factors.  This will make it extremely difficult for the fire and law enforcement services to create a unified command on the go.  It would be best to have developed plans, deployment methods, and multiple staging areas prior to known events. 

As most fire and police personnel are familiar with the threat from radioactive events, we can employ the same terms for dealing with a ballistic event—specifically, the idea of Time, Distance, Shielding.

The first term to discuss is the idea of Time to develop a plan. Who should be part of the design plan?  To help with all these potential threats it is best to have some preplanning.  Plans will vary with jurisdictions and threats, but it would be best to consider high-profile responses for fire and EMS that would require them to wear all PPE that is well marked to identify personnel.  This should be contrast with low-profile response where no marked vehicles and/or uniforms with identifiers or personnel names would be used for very specific events. Establish Joint Hazard Assessment Teams (or JHATs) of EMS, fire, and law enforcement personnel to help address these issues.  For fire and EMS personnel, the JHAT can be developed from specialized technical rescue response team members and/or Tactical Medics that are familiar with some law enforcement operations and responding with law enforcement.  On the law enforcement side, these personnel should be senior SWAT and/or civil unrest specialists.  The JHAT should analyze historic events that involve ballistic and incendiary attacks and then game out or conduct tabletop sessions on known threats within their jurisdiction to aid in the development of methods and procedures.  Local emergency management personnel should be able to assist with threat assessment.

When considering Distance and Shielding during potential ballistic and/or incendiary threats, the JHAT should first be employed to develop the procedures and techniques necessary.  Examples would include when EMS maybe required to conduct scoop and scoot operations under the protection of law enforcement armored personnel to remove injured personnel and victims from active ballistic threats.  EMS practitioners must also identify when these techniques are allowed under SOG and EMS protocols.  Items to consider are concepts and conditions for responding with emergency lights on and off to avoid attracting crowds or escalating conditions.  Personnel should also develop techniques to know how to identify belligerent persons and/or crowds escalation toward violence.   In addition, JHATs should consider standards such as NFPA 1500 6-7 documents for fire and EMS personnel related to response to violent situations.  During ballistic and incendiary threats, where should the fire suppression teams be located? Who should make up the fire suppression team? Should the use of the buddy system or two in two out be mandated?  Could fire suppression equipment be modified or incorporated into law enforcement armored vehicles as well as provide “just in time training” for SWAT personnel on how to operate the equipment, or will it be necessary to have JHAT personnel operate the equipment?  The JHAT should also consider who are best suited for dealing with extricating protesters and victims from locking devices (such as protestors at civil disobedience acts and sit-ins).  Other concepts to consider are decon of all public safety personnel and participants for widescale use of pepper spray and projectiles filled with biohazard fluids.  Finally, ICS and unified command procedures must be a part of all command training and mitigation to create scene stabilization. 

The JHAT should also look at terminology for communications rather than invent new terms and phrases for these types of events.  JHATs should encourage all personnel to employ terms understood by both law enforcement and fire service professionals.  This is also a key reason for having the fire officer in charge present at the police command post specifically due to the terminology or nomenclature issue.  The term “get the truck” or bring in the “bus” for the fire department is not always the same for the police.  In some jurisdictions, “the truck” could refer to the armored vehicle for law enforcement and ladder apparatus in the fire service.  The term “bus” could refer to various vehicles such as; an ambulance, troop transport, and/or prisoner transport.  It should become clear how not understanding each profession’s terms could cause errors. 

Radio and wireless traffic protocols must be determined before the incident to limit critical information from falling into the wrong hands, which could potential jeopardize all involved.  No matter if it is law enforcement, fire service, or EMS, trust has consistently been the term used when discussing this topic.  It should be the primary function of the JHAT to develop proper communication discipline as well as concepts and procedures to ensure trust among all the services.

JHATS and Unified Command  

When the event moves from a ballistic incident to a fire incident, the transition may not be immediate. Establishing the cold, warm, and hot zones (as discussed by Paul A. Atwater) is recommended during all active ballistic threats even if the shooting stops. SWAT personnel may need to confirm that all the shooters have been secured and that secondary devices are rendered safe.¹ All this may take some time to accomplish. Therefore, having the JHAT communicate with the fire and police officers in charge at the Unified Command will allow the fire department to continuously evaluate the fire condition as well as be ready to move in the moment the condition allows.  The JHAT should also give options to Unified Command and contingency plans in case fire breaks out.  Law enforcement command will also need to know what fire suppression systems are available, their capabilities, and deployment requirements.  

During any ballistic event that turns into a fire event, there are critical moments of transition—or, more specifically, the when and how.  This is key to why the fire officer in charge must be intergraded into the overall command whenever there is the potential threat of fire.  Issues related to shielding and specifically the number of personnel in the warm and hot threat zones (good and bad guys), type of construction, any known barriers or blocked entry points (windows and doors) are all vital information or intelligence that must be shared with the assault team, the fire suppression, and EMS entry team. Specific threats such as ballistic (bullets and shrapnel from explosives), incendiary, and chemical (tear gas) are also critical.  If all ballistic threats have been neutralized, the transition must be definitive and disseminated so that all fire and law enforcement know the operations have moved to another priority.  The same is true for the third transition from the fire event back to the law enforcement functions.  JHATS would assist with all these transitions since this event is still a crime scene that will require the preservation of evidence for further investigation and prosecution.  Some critical issues that will need to be addressed when transitioning from a fire to a law enforcement incident include identifying the victims from the perpetrators as well as weapons used and unused, booby traps (secondary devices), and most importantly who caused the fire.   

Protection Against Ballistic Threats

No matter whether the event is a hostage/barricade or violent civil unrest, the threat from ballistic objects must always be factored into the response planning.  The ballistic threat can come in many forms.  Examples would include bullets from firearms, shrapnel from detonations, and deflagrations.  Other objects to consider are bottles (empty and filled with varying products), rocks, arrows, darts, and other hard material that could cause severe lacerations and blunt trauma. Do not underestimate the ballistic threat.  Information on specific threats at any incident should be identified as soon as possible.  This is one more reason why JHAT should analyze these threats before incidents occur.  When they do occur the unified command will need to share the threat intelligence with the JHATs to develop the best options.  As mentioned earlier, to help determine the protection requirements from these threats we will continue to apply the concepts of Time, Distance and Shielding used for radiological protection.  Distance is the first and best tactic.  Maximizing our distance will remove us from most threats; this would be referred to as staging in the cold zone.  This is why most fire and EMS personnel stand by in quarters as opposed to set up in the threat or warm and hot zones during actions of violence.  This will not always be an option and in those situations when supply lines are required to be in place the development of staging area should be established outside or beyond the ballistic threats in a cold zone but also to rapidly go into action.²

The next method for minimizing the threat is by limiting our time and exposure to any threat.  Time in the threat area can be limited once again by working through unified command; specifically developing methods to distract or move attention to other areas can help limit exposure time.  These methods can include a variety of techniques but must be coordinated with all public safety personnel operating on scene.  When it is absolutely necessary to operate in the threat zone, the next option is to limit the threat with shielding, which could include a variety of methods and tactics.   Identifying the best place to hunker down or be shielded until fire and EMS operations are required will be the function of the JHAT.  Shielding could include multiple options such as large structures, armored vehicles, and ballistic shields. Regardless of the method, the objects employed must be substantial and be capable of withstanding the known ballistic threat.  When operations such as rescue or fire suppression are attempted while under ballistic attack, the concepts of cover and concealment are what come to mind. Concealment hides you but will not protect you from ballistic and flammable liquids.  Examples would include foliage, benches, and smoke.  Cover (hard cover) will provide some protection from most ballistic and some flammable weapons.  Examples of this would include defensive fire suppression operation only with portable monitors or mounting water deck guns from shielded positions such as on armed vehicles.  Once again, unified command must be in place to work with JHATs through all the options for dealing with this situation, which could include the JHAT performing these operations or conducting “Just in time training” to specialized law enforcement and fire personnel on how to operate large-stream devices from shielded and/or covered positions while directed to the target by personnel in concealed positions.

Additional Considerations for JHATs

–Legal authorization to leave a fire apparatus and equipment unattended (abandon at the scene).

–Authorization to leave victims unattended in warm and hot zones as well as protocols to scoop and scoot operations. 

–When can fire and EMS personnel defend themselves, particularly during civil unrest, riots, and large-scale violent conflicts?³ 

–What will a local and/or state of emergency allow for?

–How best to identify victims vs. perpetrators?

–Best methods and terms to communicate via wireless text and/or verbally.

–How to request Intel from local police about current protestors and demonstrators as well as intelligence about the group’s methods and tactics, potential improvised weapons, and methods of communication.

Endnotes:

1. Paul A. Atwater has studied this issue extensively and written articles as well as thesis on the subject of force protection for fire service personnel.

2.  As seen in Waco, Texas in 1993 and Mumbai, India in 2008.

3. See NFPA 1500 standards in sections 6-7 specifically Civil Unrest/Terrorism.

REFERENCES

Fire/EMS Response to Civil Unrest, Violent Protest Situations.  Firefighters Support Foundation Inc. 

www.ffsupport.org 

Field force command and planning – center for domestic preparedness

Field force extrication tactics course – center for domestic preparedness

Planning guidance: “Report of the Joint Fire/Police Report on Civil Unrest,” Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), available at www.usfa.dhs.gov/downloads/pdf/publications/fa-142.pdf/

The Firefighters Support Foundation (FSF) has released the following free video programs, on this topic:

 Active Shooter Response: The Rapid Treatment Model.

• Lone Wolf/Active Shooter: Attack on Texas Public Safety Building
• Responding to Active Shooter Incidents
• FIRE DEPARTMENT RESPONSE TO “ACTIVE SHOOTER” INCIDENTS
• Mass-Shooting Incidents: Planning and Response
• EMS Triage: Sorting Through the Maze
• Response Priorities for Mass Violence Incidents
• SCHOOL VIOLENCE : PREPARING TODAY FOR A BAD DAY TOMORROW

These are 30-minute video programs and accompanying PowerPoint presentations.  Also see “Fire Engineering news@firee-media.com” for access to these products.

 The following are some historical sieges and civil unrest that have ended in flames and/or fire personnel being attacked:

 1974 – City of Los Angles, CA

The first deployment of SWAT was against the Symbionese Liberation Army. More than 400 LAPD officers along with the FBI, California Highway Patrol, and Los Angeles Fire Department surrounded the neighborhood. After several attempts to allow the terrorist to surrender, a member of S.W.A.T. fired tear gas projectiles into the house, which was answered by heavy bursts of automatic gunfire, and the battle began.  The shootout lasted for hours when the structure the terrorist were held up in caught fire and burned.  The bodies of five of the terrorist were recovered after extinguishment.

May 13, 1985 – Philadelphia, PA

After a week of growing tension between the city and the domestic terror group known as “MOVE” in a downtown portion of Philadelphia, a 90-minute shootout started.  This was followed by a 24-hour siege involving continued gun battles, which led to a Pennsylvania State Police helicopter dropping a bomb on the house occupied by the armed terror group.  The bomb started a fire on the roof that eventually spread to more than 50 other structures in the neighborhood.   The only known survivors from within the house were a woman and a child.  NY TIMES May 13, 1985.

April 19, 1993 – Waco, TX 

After a 51-day standoff by cult members at the Branch Davidian compound, the FBI launched an assault and initiated a tear gas attack in an attempt to force the cult members out of their compound. During the attack, a fire engulfed the compound and 76 men, women, and children died, including their leader David Koresh. (Wikipedia)

April 20, 1999 – Littleton, CO

Columbine High School massacre. Two students, Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold, embarked on a massacre, killing 12 students and a teacher, as well as wounding 23 others, before committing suicide.  The assailants had planted multiple incendiary devices throughout the school, which they attempted to detonate. It is the fifth-deadliest school shooting in United States history, after the 2012 Sandy Hook Elementary Attack, the 1927 Bath School disaster, 2007 Virginia Tech massacre, and the 1966 University of Texas massacre, and the deadliest for an American high school. (Wikipedia)

April 7, 2001 – Cincinnati, Ohio
Racial tensions led to several days of violence. The results were scores of injuries, numerous vehicle, trash and structure arson fires, widespread damage, and 800 arrests for looting and rioting. Several fire stations and fire apparatus were damaged.

April 20, 2003 – Durham, New Hampshire
An estimated 4,000 people rioted downtown after the UNH Men’s Hockey team lost in the national championship game. More than 80 people were arrested. Beer bottles, full beer cans, and rocks struck firefighters.

June 16, 2003 – Benton Harbor, Michigan
Firefighters were pelted by rocks and bottles as they responded to dozens of structure and vehicle arson fires during a riot. Three firefighters were injured and two apparatus damaged.

September 1, 2004 – Beslon, Russia

School attack by Chechen Terrorist  lasted three days and involved the capture of over 1,100 people as hostages (including 777 children), ending with the death of over 380 people. The crisis began when a group of armed Islamic separatist militants assaulted the school, taking control of the building and the occupants.  On the third day of the standoff, Russian security forces entered the building with the use of tanks, incendiary rockets, and other heavy weapons.  At least 334 hostages were killed as a result of the crisis, including 186 children, with a significant number of people injured and reported missing. (Wikipedia)

November 26, 2008 – Mumbai, India

Two hotels, the Taj Mahal Palace & Tower and the Oberoi Trident, were among the four locations targeted by an Islamic terrorist. Six explosions were reported at the Taj hotel – one in the lobby, two in the elevators, and three in the restaurant – and one at the Oberoi Trident.  At the Taj Mahal, firefighters rescued 200 hostages from windows using ladders during the first night. The terrorist attacked multiple targets over several days and ended the attacks when Indian SWAT personnel fought their way into the hotels while under ballistic and incendiary attack.  Firefighters once again conducted rescue and fire suppression operation simultaneously during the SWAT assault. (Wikipedia)

BIO

BRETT M. MARTINEZ, has been a fire marshal in Suffolk County (NY) since 1990.  He has been with the fire service since 1983 as a member of the Hauppauge (NY) Fire Department.  He has an associate’s degree in fire science from Suffolk County Community College and has been an instructor for the Fire Department Instructors Conference since 2002.  He is a State of New York-certified Level II Fire Investigator, Level I Instructor, Peace Officer and ATF-certified Accelerant Detection Canine Handler since 1991. He is a National Incident Management System (NIMS) qualified Plans Section chief and has written numerous Incident Action Plans (IAPs) for both man-made and natural disasters.  He has written articles for Fire Engineering since 2002 and is the author of Multiple Fire Setters: The Process of Tracking and Identification (Fire Engineering, 2002).