
Bridge Collision Initiates Disaster Management
FEATURES
HAZARDOUS MATERIALS
Photo by James Collins
Saturday morning, January 19, 1985, began with a routine shift change and a vehicle checkout. All stations moved to a general location for an emergency medical technician (EMT) re-certification class. Twenty-five of the Benicia Fire Department’s 32 career firefighters and 5 volunteers were in attendance.
The main station was manned by a volunteer crew. At 11:52 a.m., an alarm was received for a vehicle accident at the bridge toll plaza with fire and injuries. The communications center dispatched one engine and a paramedic unit. Two city police units were also dispatched to the scene. At the toll plaza, the police units immediately radioed information that was relayed to the incoming fire units as updates.
On hearing the data, the captain of Engine-1 (responding) requested a second engine. Engine-3 was dispatched along with the State Office of Emergency Services-117 (OES-117) manned by volunteers. While en route, Engine-l’s captain received a report of a caustic chemical involved in the accident. He immediately requested a first-alarm assignment and two additional ambulances.
Unbeknown to responding crews, a southbound tractor truck with two double-insulated trailers, each carrying 27,000 pounds of molten sulfur, collided with a passenger car, setting up a tragic chain of events. The sulfur truck with double trailers hit the center divider wall, flipping its two trailer units over the center barrier. One unit immediately split open, spilling its entire contents. The second trailer landed on its side and ruptured in numerous places. The driver of this truck was pinned in the upside down tractor on the center barrier wall. The flying sulfur trailers, spilling their molten contents, came into contact with another tractor truck pulling an empty horse trailer, an El Camino pickup, and another passenger car. The two occupants of the El Camino were seriously burned by the hot spewing molten sulfur at 300°F splashing into the car’s interior.
Responding units experienced heavy traffic tie-ups getting to the scene and arrived at 11:59 a.m. Engine-l’s captain requested a second alarm immediately, two additional engines, more ambulances, and chief officers. An excellent size-up was made and the captain went into the department’s incident command system mode as the interim commander.
Engine-1 and Paramedic Unit-71 found themselves in a toxic vapor cloud. The crews were in selfcontained breathing apparatus (SCBA) and full protective clothing. Zero visibility kept them from seeing the tractor with double trailers on fire.
Engine-1’s engineer layed a supply line with a Carlin valve (automatic hydrant valve), made the hookup, donned SCBA, and stretched 150 feet of 1 3/4-inch preconnect and successfully attacked and darkened down the fire in the tractor used to pull the horse trailer. Engine-l’s 2 1/2-inch supply line was burned in half by sulfur running down the gutter near the hydrant.
Visibility remained at zero level and it was almost impossible to view the entire accident scene. We had a fog inversion with 100% humidity just above the bridge and the sulfur was reacting, giving off sulfur dioxide (SO2). The sulfur was also giving off hydrogen sulfide (H2S) gas as it burned.
Engine-3 was directed by the incident commander to proceed up the southbound lanes and set up a 1 3/4-inch foam eductor operation. This was effective and firefighters crossed over the center barrier and knocked down the fire in a trailer. They also controlled the fully involved El Camino before running out of water.
As the fire chief, I arrived on the scene and assumed the role of incident commander, established my command post upwind of the scene, and set up the vehicle’s command module.
I upgraded the incident to a general alarm, made a size-up, and asked that the city disaster plan be put into operation. This recalled all off-duty career and volunteer firefighters and alerted mutual aid for station coverage. The hazardous material-1 vehicle arrived on the scene and donned chemical protective suits (CPS) to conduct investigations and reconnaissance of the area for placards, shipping papers, or anything they could find to give us additional information.
OES-117 made its way up the northbound lanes near the ruptured double trailers. Experiencing heavy fire conditions, OES-117 used a preconnected 1 3/4-inch line with foam eductor. The hazardous materials team in CPS relieved this crew during air bottle changes. However, these crews had to retreat when truck tires began exploding.
The California Highway Patrol (CHP) units arrived. In accordance with state law, the CHP have scene management responsibilities for incidents involving bridges, freeways, and state highways. Acting as super coordinators, they give needed support and work out long-range logistics. They do not take over the incident commander’s role.
The paramedic unit rescued the most serious burn victim (who was burned over 58% of his body) with great difficulty, having to maneuver along an ice plant hillside. They were able to get the man into the paramedic vehicle. The burn victim was transferred to a private ambulance because we wanted the paramedic vehicle, hydraulic rescue tool, and air bags to remove the still-pinned driver on the center barrier.
One of the members of the paramedic crew, Firefighter Dave Botz, approached the overturned tractor and evaluated the situation. Botz, in full turnouts and SCBA, returned to the paramedic vehicle to obtain a resuscitator. He also requested the incident commander to provide protection lines and to move Paramedic Unit-71 into the southbound lanes.
As Botz returned to the overturned truck, he slipped on the molten sulfur and fell. The hot chemical saturated the rear of Botz’s turnouts, igniting his coat and trousers and melting his boots. Botz was able to get up unaided and ran out of the fire area. He jumped over the central barrier and removed his burning turnouts. The turnouts were Nomex (R)III and withstood this severe test. Botz then put his SCBA back on and returned to the pinned victim without the protection of his turnout gear.
Using the protection of the center barrier, Botz tried unsuccessfully to pull the driver out, but the man’s legs were pinned under the dash and debris. Tires were exploding and huge fireballs were erupting. Botz tried once more to free the victim and had to withdraw. We were unable to rescue the man from the tractor. Botz will be cited for a medal of valor for his heroic and unselfish efforts in attempting the rescue of the driver under most difficult extremes.
We reverse layed a 4-inch line from a 16-unit manifold back to a hydrant above the toll administration building. This action supplied additional lines to the fire scene.
EVACUATION
Approximately a half mile area downwind from the incident was evacuated. A firefighter in SCBA used a public address system and ordered the dockworkers out of the area. CHP Helicopter-32 was above the atmospheric inversion and gave feedback to the incident commander.
A hazardous materials crew was sent back into the area three times. The third time with instructions to gather any information that they could find. They found a burnt driver’s log and an NCR book of blank shipping papers. This information was found 1 hour and 31 minutes after the initial dispatch. With the papers, we contacted the home office of the chemical truck. They ascertained that the truck was hauling sulfur. It was later reported as molten sulfur. Approximately 85 firefighters were on the scene at this time.
The department tied in with its computer and modem to Hazardline (see FIRE ENGINEERING, December 1983) and received a printout with information on the chemical substance and potential medical problems. Three copies were made and sent to two hospitals and the incident command site.
One of the major problems was the sulfur attaching to a person’s sweat, causing a burning irritation. All of the initial responders, eight firefighters, experienced this sensation. Two were inside the area and removed their masks to talk to victims. All were transported to area hospitals. Only one firefighter remained overnight for a high carbon monoxide blood gas level.
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We received instructions on how to stop the flow of sulfur out of the one intact tank by applying water, and this basically worked. Control was accomplished within two hours.
POST INCIDENT OPERATIONS
The emergency operations slowed down. We had over 10 television stations from the San Francisco and Sacramento areas. The CHP and the fire department’s public information office split their efforts in half. The CHP brought in its mobile command post and the major accident investigation team (MAIT). They conducted a very methodical step-by-step accident analysis.
Photo by Wittie Youies
Not until 11:30 p.m. was any vehicle touched or moved by wreckers. A heavy-duty crane was brought in by Exxon to pick up the tractor and remove the dead driver. The split sulfur trailer-1 was loaded onto a 40-foot flatbed unit. Some members of the Exxon fire brigade operated the crane while other brigade members and the Benicia Fire Department did the rigging. A private cleanup crew, I.T., provided an end-yard hauler for the tanks still intact. All these recovery operations were done in full turnouts, SCBA, and with charged safety foam lines.
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) arrived on Sunday morning with a team of four investigators and convened the next day. My public information officer was assigned to them as a liaison and aide. Investigations were conducted for five days. The firefighters who initially responded were questioned in a group about the operation, their injuries, and what they saw at the scene. All the newspaper articles, slides, and related documents were gathered, as well as the communication center’s tapes, logs, and our incident report.
PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED
There were numerous problems encountered at this incident, some of which hold out valuable lessons for bettering procedures in case (heaven forbid) a similar event should occur:
- Data overload. From initial inception, radio traffic was high, some of it non-essential, caused by move-up units. Station tones and group tones covered essential communications to the hazardous materials crew surveying the area.
- Responders without identification. Several of the people who responded to the scene were without proper uniforms and without identification cards. Many I knew by previous hazardous material incidents. This caused penetration of the command post by unknowns and “crazies.” Security measures are a must at these extensive operations.
- Firefighter injuries. One entire shift, nine people, was transported to the hospital. Most of them experienced skin irritation of the neck, probably caused by S02 and H2S exposure. Sulfur dioxide especially will attach to sweat and cause a skin reaction. Our department has a mandatory SCBA policy that was established in 1982. Some breakdowns of this policy occurred during victim rescue, ambulance loading, and when vehicles were approaching the scene. Seven firefighters reported dry throats.
- Communications. This was the first time that our new joint communications center was tested under a maximum type operation. Two dispatchers (one fire and the other police) were on duty. Once a rhythm was established with the incident commander, dispatch operations functioned quite well. We all agree that we should have put the emergency traffic procedures into effect as soon as the incident went to a general alarm. There was also a definite need for a mobile radio telephone in the incident commander’s command vehicle.
- Contaminated turnouts. We had great difficulty finding an industrial cleaning service that would take the exposed turnouts. They were treated as if they had the plague. We did not have plastic bags on hand to place all the turnouts into and did not have the turnouts marked with personnel identification inside. The reflective tape on the coats and pants took the most damage. Turnouts were replaced overnight and shipped to Benicia from Los Angeles suppliers.
- Protection of large diameter hose. Because of limited road access in the area, we experienced problems with non-fire vehicles driving over our 4-inch hose lay. Low-profile side step ambulances are a definite problem. My personnel used cribbing to make temporary hose bridges. We previously resisted purchasing large hose bridge because of size. Now we have two sets.
- Manpower. The initial responders were overwhelmed. Engine-l’s crew consisted of two people. The captain became the incident commander and the engineer attacked the fire by himself. Again, this points up the inherent problems and dangers of working with two-man crews. Crew supervision breaks down, SCBA policy deviations occur, the ability to master tasks in sequential order, and the ability to place a high-volume water attack into operation is questionable.
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- Limited access. The freeway’s center barrier had screening that caused limited access with no designated cross-throughs at the toll plaza. Although we had an underpass to the toll plaza, we were unable to use it early in the episode because there was blazing sulfur running down the gutter into a storm drain.
- Turnout coat and helmet identification. In this type of event, you need to know who is in your working environment. We intend to stencil the names on the backs of turnout coats at the bottom with three-inch letters for a better identification.
- Air refill. Our mobile air compressor was trailerized, and we filled over 200 SCBA cylinders during the entire operation. The compressor will now be placed on a reserve engine for a more positive response.
- Need for emergency medical services (EMS) coordinator. When dealing with these types of incidents with multi-ambulance response (we had nine at the scene), one person should be designated and identified to the incident commander as the person responsible for triage, sorting, dispatching, and record keeping.
- EMS personnel without safety gear. Eight ambulance personnel were treated for smoke inhalation, and one was treated for chemical burns to his hands from sulfur while treating a seriously burned victim. Once again, this proves that ambulance personnel must have some type of protective clothing such as rubber gloves to handle chemical burns. (Surgical gloves won’t cut it.) There must also be closer coordination with the ambulance company management and a better awareness by their attendants for dangers of hazardous materials.
- Hazardline accessed by an
- IBM-PC and a Hayes modem. We are linked to the Occupational Health Service in Maryland with the Hazardline data base. When our incident occurred, the computer was down in Maryland for maintenance. Once back on-line, two hours into our incident, we input the chemical name and received back 12 pages of information on our IBM-PC. We made three printouts, two went immediately to the Kaiser and Vallejo General Hospital emergency rooms where my firefighters and other victims were transported for treatment. The third copy was sent to the incident commander. This is a valuable and needed asset.
- Skin irritations. Initial responders did not have the time to duct tape their protective gear due to the rescues. They received exposures to ears, neck, and throat areas. We will remedy this with the purchase of Nomex or polybenzimidazale racing hoods. A standard operating procedure will be established for the mandatory wearing of these hoods during hazardous material and structural fires.
- Fogging of SCBA facepieces. Working under high energy and in a chemically contaminated atmosphere caused the mask to fog over more than usual. We will explore nose cups for the chemical protective suits and start applying an anti-fogger material to the mask facepiece at the mobile air compressor when a bottle change occurs.
- Product identification. This was the most frustrating problem for me as the incident commander. We looked for placards, anything to help us identify the product. It took 1 hour and 31 minutes to find some documents that had been ejected from the truck’s cab. I even asked my communications center to get the Coast Guard office in Washington, D.C., to run an OHMTADS (oil and hazardous material technical assistance data systems) search for a possible chemical match on the unknown product.
Sulfur from Refining
Sulfur is one of several non-hydrocarbon materials found in crude oil. The crude oil processed at Exxon’s Benicia Refinery normally has a sulfur content of around 1.0 weight percent. As crude oil is processed, most of this sulfur is removed from the oil to meet product quality and environmental standards and permit efficient refinery operations. This sulfur is sold to other companies as a by-product and is used primarily by those companies in the manufacture of sulfuric acid. Exxon USA’s Benicia Refinery is typical of other industry refineries in its recovery and sale of sulfur.
The sulfur is removed from various refinery streams by first treating the oil with hydrogen to convert the sulfur in the oil to hydrogen sulfide. The hydrogen sulfide is then converted to sulfur in a sulfur recovery unit that produces a liquid sulfur product at 300°F and very high purity (99.5% or greater). The sulfur is maintained as a liquid by keeping it above its freezing point (245°F). Storage temperature is normally maintained between 280° and 300°F. As a liquid, it is easy to pump, store, and transport.
At the Benicia Refinery, the sulfur is stored in a tank. Customers pick up the sulfur almost exclusively by truck, which is typical for both the refining and sulfur industries. Sulfur trucks normally haul around 27 tons of sulfur per load.
LESSONS LEARNED
As with any emergency incident, especially one of this magnitude, a critique should be held as soon as possible to evaluate actions taken, both positive and negative, while the event is still fresh in everyone’s mind. We learned a number of valuable lessons through the power of 20-20 hindsight:
- The issuing of VAS-2 Loudmouth throat microphones to all company commanders proved valuable. Prior to this incident, only the members of the hazardous materials unit had such equipment. The problems we encountered with communications to the incident command from operational and staff personnel using SCBA should be resolved.
- Created a list of locations of industrial cleaning services for contaminated protective equipment. Also, there is a definite need for a supply of backup protective equipment to be readily available and plastic bags to be on hand for gathering clothing and equipment that is or suspected to be contaminated.
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Photo courtesy of California Highway Patrol
Photo by Willie Youles
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- A mobile radio telephone should be installed in fire command post vehicles to facilitate communications with allied agencies, CHEMTREC, the National Response Center, communications center, etc.
- We had a psychological counselor report to the emergency scene. This proved very valuable in stemming the possible stress buildup in responding firefighters.
- Prepare your public information office to be able to handle a large volume of phone calls after a major incident. Our personnel were required to remain on duty for 24 hours after the incident to handle statements to various federal, state, and fire related agencies.
- Assign an aide to the incident commander. His function is to record all data and details as they develop, handle the command module worksheet, and assist the incident commander as a runner.
- Tape off the command post area to keep out non-essential personnel. Pre-plan a command post setup with law enforcement officials.
- Set up an ambulance staging point early and prepare for medical triage.
- Pre-plan and train with ambulance companies, emphasizing the dangers of chemical spills.
- The freeway’s center divider with screening offered many challenges. Cross vehicle access at the toll plaza was difficult. Look for cross access or consider possibly removing the barriers early.
- Discourage using individual call setters of individual fire officers, e.g., 30A7. This became confusing to central communications. Radio traffic should continue to be identified by engine or equipment number, e.g., Engine-3, Truck-1.
- Institute emergency radio traffic procedures early. Insist that only essential radio traffic be transmitted.
- Shift changes in the communications center should not be permitted to take place until an incident of this nature has been dedared under control. An understanding and rhythm develops between the dispatcher and the incident commander and it should not be broken.
- We dispatched a firefighter to act as a liaison at the communication center office. He was able to fill in the gaps associated with necessary but hastily transmitted messages.
- Make plans for rehabilitation of personnel early.
- We were greatly assisted by the amateur radio clubs who were able to use public telephone patching access through repeaters at the command post.
- At different intervals (as the situation allows) bring key staff personnel for a “How goes it?” meeting. Use the interior of the command post vehicle(s) if available.
- Arrange public information meetings at a place remote from the command post to brief the media on the status of the incident with as accurate information as possible. Also, set the perimeters, firmly, for the media. Define the locations where they can and cannot go. This is especially important if there are deaths and injuries and/or incidents involving chemicals and health and safety hazards.
- Keep the National Response Center in Washington, D.C., and the State Office of Emergency Services updated on the incident condition, its escalation, and post incident control.
- Establish (pre-plan) a policy for duct taping protective clothing at the scene.
- Assign a person as a “handler” to assist anyone who is suiting up into chemical protective suits. The handlers must be able to comprehend when a person is in trouble or under stress in the suit. The handler must be intimately familiar with the suits and how they are donned and removed.
- Pre-stage some sandbags at fire headquarters (or some convenient central location). We continue to have problems getting the city’s Street Division to deliver sand, essential for diking chemical runoff to prevent it from entering into waterways and sewers. Street workers are not equipped with SCBA and may not be able to deliver a sand truck to a chemical incident.
- Train firefighters to change SCBA air bottles on their backs without taking off the harnesses.
- First responders, especially police and, in this case, toll plaza workers, must be briefed in advance as to the seriousness of chemical emergencies. They should be trained not to enter into chemical vapor clouds, to approach the incident from the leeward side, and to stage a command post upwind of the incident as soon as possible.
- The sulfur truck was not required to be placarded by the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 49. Chief officers should have available a CFR 49 in command vehicles and fully understand its workings.
As with any emergency incident, especially one of this magnitude, a number of valuable lessons were learned—not the least of which is the importance of a viable disaster management pre-plan.
SUMMARY
This incident points up issues that the fire service must contend with when responding to hazardous material incidents. I am concerned that molten sulfur, a by-product of any refinery that has crude oil, is not required to be placarded in transport. CFR 49 requires only that it be identified when transported by water (barge). Even if placarded, paper placards would have been burnt off the trailers.
All things being equal, I feel that my personnel and the mutual aid responders performed well under the extreme problems that we encountered. My hope is that some lesson learned from this incident will be gained by the fire service and allied responders.