BURIED ALIVE, Part 1: size-up and initial operations
LARRY COLLINS
At 1550 hours on January 20, 1999, the City of Los Angeles Fire Department (LAFD) Operations Control Division (OCD) received a 911 call reporting that a worker was buried in a 25-foot-deep trench at a pipeline construction site in the northeast San Fernando Valley neighborhood of Pacoima. The first-alarm LAFD assignment included Task Force 98, Engine 77, Engine 81, USAR Task Force 88, Rescue Ambulance 98, and Battalion 12 Chief Daryl Arbuthnott, who became the incident commander and identified the rescue as “Pacoima Incident Command.”
The incident was just blocks away from the County of Los Angeles Fire Department (LACFD) Special Operations Division and Heliport, from which USAR-1, the LACFD`s central technical rescue company, operates. Recognizing this, Arbuthnott asked OCD to request the mutual-aid response of USAR-1 through the LACFD, anticipating the potential need for additional technical support and equipment. Thus began a multiagency rescue operation that lasted more than eight hours, requiring the work of nearly 200 firefighters, support personnel, and volunteers from two local pumping firms. This incident demonstrated the effectiveness of the LAFD`s newly instituted USAR Company/Task Force and reinforced the importance of multiagency cooperation and training, which, in this case, resulted in a seamless multiagency operation. I was on duty as the captain of USAR-1 that day.
THE ACCIDENT
Arturo Garcia, a construction worker, and several coworkers were installing a public works storm drain system at the site. According to their accounts, it was the end of the shift and Garcia was about to bid his colleagues goodbye for the day. Suddenly, without warning, the ground collapsed beneath their feet.1 Several of the workers escaped. One man and a female grading inspector managed to hook their arms over the lip of the suspended trench plate as the ground disappeared behind them.
Unfortunately, Garcia could not reach the plate before the bottom dropped out. He quickly sank into–and was engulfed by–the soil. The male colleague, now hanging in midair with one arm over the trench plate, extended his only free hand to Garcia in a last-ditch rescue attempt. Their hands locked momentarily, but the tremendous force of moving soil broke their grip and pulled Garcia down. Another worker tossed a manila rope at Garcia at the last instant as he disappeared. Clinging to the rope with one hand and pulling his hard hat down over his face with the other hand, Garcia slipped beneath the surface.
The workers were standing on what they thought was solid ground on the outside (north) perimeter of three main large trench plates supporting the walls of a 30-foot-deep excavation. A fourth trench plate was suspended by chain from a crane boom hanging over an area that had been excavated just outside the perimeter of the main trench plates. The rest of the area outside the plates had been filled and compacted after excavation and was paved with blacktop. It had rained in Los Angeles the previous day.
Apparently, a large void space–possibly caused by the rain`s compacting or washing away loose soil and leaving a narrow “bridge” beneath the blacktop–gave way. The effect was like that of a sinkhole collapsing. The ground was dropping beneath their feet, and the workers also began to sink feet-first into the fast-subsiding soil. The whole thing happened in a matter of seconds.
Garcia`s desperate attempt to create an air pocket with his hard hat is a technique he and his coworkers learned during Cal-OSHA-required safety training. However, the force of the moving soil shoved the hat upward. Garcia`s entire body sank into the soil. He was pulled laterally and downward below the trench plate suspended on a chain beneath a crane. That plate extended six feet beneath the ground, just outside the perimeter of the three main trench plates. When everything stopped moving, Garcia`s head was eight feet belowgrade and two feet below the hanging trench plate. The hard hat was back on his head, tilted forward to create a sort of brim over his forehead.
In retrospect, this was the proverbial “good news/bad news” story. First, the good news: Garcia remained upright with his face positioned several inches from one of the large steel I-beams that held the middle trench plate in place. Had his body been left in a lateral position–as often happens to victims in trench collapses–it is likely that the tonnage pressing on his horizontally oriented body would have prevented respiratory expansion of his chest, or the soil might have packed his mouth and nose. In either case, he would have suffered mechanical asphyxiation. It is a common way to die when a trench fails, but it didn`t happen to Garcia. There was more good news: Even without the hard hat over his face, an inexplicable void space was created directly in front of Garcia`s face, which allowed him to survive his live burial (and subsequent reburials).
The bad news was that Garcia was buried alive in an extremely precarious position eight feet below the surface. He was in an unstable collapse zone that offered very limited shoring opportunities and restricted access for rescuers and tools. He was tightly packed in soil that would take hours to remove from around his body, and he was slipping farther into the earth as the soil continued to pull him down. The rescue scene was complicated by overhead high-voltage power lines and a major rail system a mere 100 feet away. Darkness was approaching, and rain was on the way.
RESPONSE
Ironically, USAR-1 Firefighter/Specialist Brian LeFave and I, working in our administrative office, heard the sirens of LAFD Task Force 98 as it responded past the LACFD Special Operations Division on the way to the incident at 1552 hours. We assumed it was en route to a medical response or a structure fire in the area. But approximately three minutes later, the alert tone sounded, and we learned we were being dispatched to respond with Task Force 98 to a reported trench rescue just three blocks away from our quarters. LACFD Technical Operations Battalion Chief James Powers and Battalion 4 Chief David Carolan were also dispatched as agency representatives.
The battalion chiefs assigned to LAFD Battalion 12 and the personnel assigned to Task Force 98 are well acquainted with LACFD USAR-1 personnel, equipment, and capabilities–the result of years of local training sessions, familiarization drills, and the fact that local LAFD units use the LACFD Special Operations Heliport as a landing site for transferring trauma patients from LAFD rescue ambulances to LAFD helicopters. As a result of this close working relationship, USAR-1 has responded as a mutual-aid unit to several LAFD extrication and trench rescue incidents in the northeast San Fernando Valley in recent years. In turn, USAR-1 personnel regularly respond with LAFD USAR Task Forces and Heavy Rescue 56 to difficult or lengthy technical rescue operations with special equipment.
ARRIVAL
On my arrival at the scene, I was met by LAFD Engine 98`s Captain William Stires, who led me to the edge of the excavation to help Task Force 98 Commander Michael Sauber size up the rescue situation and make recommendations regarding tactics and strategy. I was informed that LAFD USAR Task Force 88 and Heavy Rescue 56 were just minutes away. This was good news, because it meant a ready supply of personnel trained and equipped to perform OSHA-compliant trench and confined space rescue-related tasks, establish high-angle rope systems, and supervise or perform other technical operations that required immediate attention.
Sauber was directing operations on the excavation`s perimeter. Under his direction, LAFD personnel were already working to get an air line to the victim.2 We determined that the following tasks had to be accomplished as quickly as possible:
protect the edge of the collapse with plywood sheeting to prevent “point loading” of the excavation walls by personnel,
shore the collapse zone before committing personnel to potential cave-in conditions, and
acquire materials to install the edge protection and shoring.
(Initially, plywood carried on USAR-1 and USAR-88, augmented by plywood, timbers, and screw jacks in USAR trailers from both departments, would be used. In the meantime, personnel were assigned to search for local sources of materials.)
At my request, Carolan called for two LACFD USAR trailers to provide materials needed to implement the tactics. In response, LACFD Command and Control personnel dispatched three USAR trailers, since one of the trailers might not be available for immediate response.
OBSERVING THE VICTIM
I then rejoined Stires. He had climbed out across the steel I-beams supporting the three main trench plates separating the excavation (approximately 30 feet deep, 40 feet across, and 60 feet long) from the collapse zone in which the victim was buried. Stires and Task Force 98 Firefighter Steve Berkery were perched immediately above Garcia, who at that time was located eight feet belowgrade. They were in a position to observe and communicate with Garcia, and they had already lowered the air hose into the dirt that had covered Garcia`s face. Their intent was to saturate the soil with fresh air in case Garcia was actually breathing and somehow filtering air from the dirt around his mouth and nose.
Stires and Berkery remained at their post for the duration of the operation. They constantly observed Garcia`s condition, communicated with him, and offered valuable recommendations about tactics and strategy. Their position, for which we penned the unofficial term “patient attendants,” was crucial as the incident wore on. Their observations helped guide operational decisions for the next eight hours.
My first sight of Garcia led me to believe that this would likely be a body recovery operation. The only thing visible was the top of his yellow hard hat and one hand, which was raised above his head. The hand was clamped around the manila rope tossed to him as he was sinking. The free end of the rope was draped over the trench plate and was now held by an LAFD firefighter.
Garcia was truly buried alive, entombed in soil that had settled almost uniformly across the collapse zone. There were no visible means of an air pocket that might protect his airway. I didn`t see Garcia make any movements. The likelihood that dirt had compacted directly around his face and possibly into his mouth and nose, the forces to which his chest and torso might be subjected, and the time that had elapsed since he became trapped made it appear that there was no way he could have survived this degree of engulfment in running soil.
I was surprised, therefore, when Stires reported that the victim was alive. “We`re talking to him,” he said as he nodded to Berkery, who was giving instructions to Garcia. As Berkery spoke to him, Garcia responded by moving his fingers in acknowledgement. During the next few minutes, Berkery explained to Garcia the hand codes they would use to give and receive information: One raised finger would mean “yes” or “good”; two raised fingers would indicate “no” or “bad.” Garcia obviously understood what he was being told, and he was able to follow commands. (We soon discovered that his primary language was Spanish, but he also understood and spoke enough English to allow us to effectively communicate with him.)
Every move had to be considered. The slightest error could disrupt the delicate balance of the conditions that were providing Garcia with breathing air beneath the soil. Moving without anticipating the potential consequences could collapse whatever air pocket might exist around Garcia`s mouth and nose or set off a secondary collapse, possibly endangering Garcia and the primary rescuer. Moving too slowly might cause Garcia`s oxygen to be depleted before we were able to uncover his face, or he might die of mechanical asphyxiation if his chest could not be unburied to permit respiratory expansion with each breath.
INITIAL ACTION PLAN
The potential for secondary collapse was extremely high. Stress cracks were visible in various places along the excavation walls, and dirt was sloughing in spontaneously. After a brief discussion at the command post (during which LAFD USAR Task Force 88 arrived), it was agreed that the following tasks had to be done without delay:
Expedite the shoring operation to provide a “safe zone” for the victim and rescuer(s).
Expedite the installation of edge protection to prevent “point loading” of the excavation walls.
Shut down local traffic and heavy equipment; vibrations could contribute to a secondary collapse.
Get at least one primary rescuer3 into the hole to begin using a dirt vacuum and other tools to uncover Garcia`s face and secure his airway. The primary rescuer had to be kept suspended in the air at all times because of the possibility that another cavern might open up and engulf the rescuer, just as it had Garcia. In addition, at least one backup rescuer had to be provided for every primary rescuer.4 That meant extending a crane boom or a heavy-duty rated aerial ladder over the collapse zone and rigging it with rope systems to raise and lower the rescuer(s) and victim in a highly controlled manner.
Each of these initial actions needed to be accomplished simultaneously, to uncover Garcia`s face before he ran out of air while maintaining reasonable safety for the primary rescuer(s). These tasks would be personnel-intensive, but equally important was the need for personnel with the training and experience to do it right the first time5 and the ability to double check each other`s work to prevent an accident. And it all had to be done now.
LAFD USAR Task Force 88 Captains Steve Vizcaino (assigned as the initial rescue group supervisor), Steve Resnick (assigned as entry attendant), and I (assigned as entry team manager) began supervising and expediting these tasks with assistance from Sauber and Stires. Truck 88`s Captain Rick Cotteral was designated as the USAR safety officer.
The uniformity of the soil that covered Garcia seemed unusual. Many times, the direction from which a collapse originated would be indicated by the soil`s being piled higher on the opposite side, where it came to rest after flowing across a space and finding its particular “angle of repose.” Knowing which excavation wall had collapsed would help to guide us in determining how to shore the collapse zone and where to insert rescuers to approach from the point of least danger. But in this case, we observed no such signs. It was only later that it became generally understood that this collapse originated beneath the victim`s feet–in other words, the bottom fell out, literally. This probably helps explain the uniformity of the soil we observed.
It was clear that the first on-scene LAFD firefighters had done all that could be done for Garcia up to that point in time. The entire first-alarm LAFD assignment was now on-scene, and Arbuthnott had added several other resources (including Haz Mat Task Force 39) to the incident. LACFD`s Powers and Carolan were also at the scene. Working as a team, progress was being made on those tasks that had to be completed before the first primary rescuer could enter the hole to begin uncovering Garcia. Despite all odds, Garcia was still alive and talking. The temptation was to rush things, but there was no quick fix for this rescue. The operation proceeded in an expeditious, yet controlled, manner so that Garcia`s precarious situation would not be worsened.
As preparations to insert the first primary rescuer were nearing completion, Arbuthnott called for a “quick” briefing at the command post to clarify the overall incident action plan (including several “last-ditch” alternatives). At that time, a Metro Rail commuter train roared by on the tracks that ran just 100 yards from the rescue site. The ground vibrated noticeably. Shutting down the Metro Link system was obviously the first thing that had to be done. Within moments, OCD had requested that the Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA) Operations Center shut down the system in Pacoima; MTA complied immediately. Within 20 minutes, two trains had come to a stop short of the incident. This line was shut down for the duration of the incident; hundreds of commuters had to be bused to their destinations. There was one close call, however. One train failed to stop for LAFD firefighters waving flares two miles down the tracks from the rescue site. The firefighters gave chase in a battalion chief`s vehicle, radioing to the IC that a train was heading toward our location, where the two stopped trains were stationary, still loaded with now-stranded passengers. If the moving train could not be stopped from hitting the stationary trains, there would be no time to evacuate these passengers. Finally, the firefighters radioed that they had managed to halt the errant train.
INCIDENT ACTION PLAN
Our attention returned to the incident action plan, which was based on a more thorough assessment of the situation and previous experience with similar types of incidents. The following long-term strategy plan was adopted:
Complete installing the edge protection around the perimeter of the collapse zone, using plywood sheeting and timbers.
Install the initial shoring to create a safe zone for the victim and the primary rescuer(s).
Have Truck 39`s crew extend its heavy-duty aerial ladder over the hole to a point directly over the victim and rig it for a “suspended rescuer” operation. This would enable the first rescuer to be placed into the hole so he could begin uncovering Garcia. Because of the time-critical nature of this task, Truck 39`s crew used the same system it normally uses for rescue litter operations (a single-line system using the dynamic rope that the LAFD is gradually phasing out in favor of 12-inch static kernmantle). Had more time been available, it would have been preferable to establish a two-line system using static kernmantle rope with 2:1, 3:1, or 4:1 mechanical advantage. It might also have been advantageous to suspend a “ladder-rig” system beneath the aerial ladder. But there simply weren`t enough USAR-trained personnel and time available to employ these more elaborate systems.
Establish two compressed air lines to supply one dirt vacuum and one air knife concurrently. Two separate air compressors would be needed to supply a sufficient volume of air for both tools. USAR-1`s compressor was the only compressed air source at the scene for the first hour, so a single line was initially used to supply one tool at a time.
Insert a primary rescuer into the hole to begin uncovering Garcia while ensuring the constant readiness of at least one backup rescuer to provide rapid intervention at all times.
Ensure a constant supply of USAR-trained personnel to act as backup and primary rescuers for long-term operations.
Protect Garcia from the effects of secondary collapses during the extrication: Choices included placing a supplied air breathing apparatus (SABA) umbilical air mask on Garcia as his face was uncovered, maintaining a helmet on his head, and placing an appropriately sized tube or barrel over him to keep dirt off him should a slough-in occur.6
Begin at Garcia`s head and work down to his feet. Uncover him inch by inch with the dirt vacuum(s) and air knife (knives). Attach vertical extraction devices to a suspended rope system from Truck 39 as certain parts of his body become exposed–for example, appropriate rescue straps when the wrists or chest is exposed, possibly a rescue harness when the pelvis is exposed, and a confined space vertical raising harness to provide C-spine immobilization if time and space permit). Then, using the rope system and harness(s), Garcia would be raised out of the hole at the moment he is sufficiently freed of dirt and other material to help ensure that he is not subjected to unnecessary injury.
This approach was time consuming, but we have found that it is sometimes faster than attempting to remove enough dirt to take a victim out of collapsed trenches and excavations laterally (which many consider to be the more conventional method). Generally speaking, vertical extraction requires less overall dirt removal and allows rescuers to pull the victim straight into the air the instant he is sufficiently free of engulfing material. There may, of course, be complications related to establishing high-angle rescue operations at a trench/excavation collapse, but those complications can be resolved by personnel trained in high-angle rescue and appropriate equipment.
Augment the aforementioned compressed air system from USAR-1 with at least two additional air lines, to have another dirt vacuum and another air knife ready for immediate use and to prevent any delay in extracting dirt from around Garcia if the existing tools, air lines, or air compressor fail.
Request through Los Angeles City or County public works or other sources the response of at least two commercial-grade dirt vacuums, to amplify dirt-removal capabilities in the hole, and provide a police escort for these apparatus if possible.7
Request sufficient numbers of USAR-trained personnel to manage the myriad technical operations that might be required to extract Garcia and to provide reasonable safety and rapid intervention capabilities. This eventually included LAFD USAR Task Force 27 and other LAFD personnel; LAC Captains Mike Layhee, John Boyle, and Rory Rehbeck; and Firefighter/Specialist Ysidro Miranda.
Assign personnel to begin hand-digging part of the western wall perched precariously above the collapse zone to reduce the potential of that wall`s collapsing on the victim and rescuers.
This hand-digging task was begun but was later suspended because of concerns about the safety of personnel who would have to be committed to a potential danger zone during the digging operation.
At various times, it was suggested that this task could be accomplished by using a mechanical backhoe that was at the site. However, this option was deemed to be too dangerous because vibrations or a “wrong” move by the backhoe operator could cause further collapse.
Conditions in the collapse zone were simply too precarious to allow mechanical digging devices like backhoes and scoop shovels to operate in proximity to the victim and rescuers. Generally, emergency trench rescue authorities strongly discourage using backhoes to dig in proximity to buried rescuers because of accidental “digging” of the victim (or parts of him) and the severing of unseen gas, water, petroleum, or other pipelines that may have been buried in the collapse, which could cause the victim to drown in uncontrollable releases of water, petroleum, or other pipeline products.
Continue to supplement the initial shoring by developing a shoring plan that would maintain the integrity of the excavation walls when burrowing deeper into the ground–an inherently and exponentially more dangerous situation for the rescuers being sent into the hole, not to mention the victim.
We knew from experience that we would be lucky to avoid some large secondary collapses during this operation. Essentially, it would be a race against time: Could we burrow deep enough into the ground, remove enough dirt to extract this victim fast enough, and stabilize the collapse zone walls before one or more of the walls caved in? One of the most important components of this operation was to provide sufficient shoring to keep the walls from collapsing.
With this in mind, Layhee (the LAC USAR coordinator highly experienced in shoring operations and a lead shoring instructor for the LACFD) was assigned as the shoring officer and paired with an LAFD member. Boyle (the LACFD`s swiftwater rescue coordinator and a USAR shoring instructor) was to direct the shoring and cutting teams. Throughout the remainder of the incident, Layhee and Vizcaino recommended procedures for stabilizing the collapse zone walls, and Boyle and the LAFD shoring/cutting teams were responsible for implementing the plans.
Provide sufficient lighting to illuminate the work space within the hole and to cover the overall incident scene since operations inevitably would extend into the night.
ALTERNATE PLANS
The operational plan included preparations to implement backup alternative plans should conditions deteriorate and necessitate a change in strategy. (The consensus was to stay with the primary rescue plan as the hours dragged on–even though it was time-consuming–until some drastic change of conditions forced a revision in strategy.)
These alternate plans and preparations included the following:
An alternative operation to breach the center trench plate
Under the direction of LAFD captains, three 24-foot ladders were placed in the open pit/excavation (opposite the trench walls from the collapse zone). The first ladder was positioned to allow firefighters to descend from the south aspect of the pit. The second and third ladders were positioned against the center trench plate and to either side of the victim, to breach the plate and reach Garcia from “the open pit side” of the plate.
With arc-air units, oxyacetylene torches, or other appropriate cutting devices (which had to be hauled up the ladders and suspended to reach the upper third of the plate), the center trench plate would be breached with one or more “door-shaped” holes, creating one or more “breach holes” that could be opened incrementally if rescuers or the victim were buried by a secondary collapse so that the only chance for survival would be through a last-ditch effort to reach them from the opposite side of the trench plate.
Cutting and opening the plate incrementally and digging toward the victim from the opposite side could be successful, especially if the plate were cut in such a way so that dirt could be removed at or above the level of the victim`s head and work could continue downward without causing an avalanche of soil. This might have allowed us to slowly uncover the victim from both sides of the plate and possibly remove him through the plate and into the large open pit for final vertical extraction using rope systems. This approach was used on other occasions when the walls of buildings have constituted one side of a collapse/entrapment situation and the walls were breached to gain quicker access to victims. However, this approach seemed to carry a significant risk of causing a larger, uncontrollable movement of material, which could have had serious negative effects on the victim and rescuers.
Open entire breach holes
We agreed that if “incremental” breaching of the plate and dirt removal proved too time-consuming, preventing us from reaching the victim or rescuers in time, we would retain the potentially more dangerous option of opening the entire breach holes at once without regard for incremental breaching.
This alternate strategy was based on my initial thought that by opening the full dimensions of the proposed door-shaped breach holes, tons of dirt might pour through them into the open excavation, leaving the victim and rescuer(s) literally suspended in midair by the rope systems to which they were attached.
However, it became apparent on second appraisal that this alternate, last-ditch strategy had at least four potential flaws:
First, as Vizcaino later pointed out, the trench plates inherently create concentric “waves” of pressure through the soil, which is exactly what they (and other types of trench and excavation shoring) are designed to do. It is one of the basic principles of trench shoring. So, Vizcaino pointed out that even after cutting large door-shaped breach holes in the plate, these concentric “pressure waves” might continue to hold most of the soil in place, even where bare soil was visible through the newly opened breach holes.
If the soil did suddenly rush through the newly opened breach holes, we would face another potential problem: Because of the funnel-like shape of the pit in which the victim and the rescuer were trapped on the inside perimeter of the trench plates, the sudden evacuation of tons of soil downward and through the breach holes might squeeze them within the material and actually snap the rope on which they were suspended, pulling them farther beneath the soil. Or, if the moving soil pulled them directly through the breach holes, they would be reburied in the open excavation by a continuing avalanche of dirt. This disastrous consequence would necessitate an entirely new search and extraction operation, possibly under worse conditions.
We were concerned about the trench plates` potential loss of integrity resulting from the breaching operation. Would the plates fail because of their sudden inability to withstand the forces imposed by the existing collapse situation, and would that in turn lead to further collapse of the excavation walls? (Later, a structural engineer assured us that the holes we were considering would not be large enough to cause a significant loss of stability.)
We were also concerned that the firefighters assigned to perform the actual cutting operations might be struck by the metal “doors” as a result of the sudden release of tons of dirt through them. Although not likely, we had to consider as we selected our options that tons of dirt could explosively burst through the plate, swinging the “hinged” steel breach hole doors against the firefighters, as the cutting operation neared completion.
Limit initial cuts
It was determined that it would be prudent to limit the initial cuts to 75 percent of the intended dimensions of the breach hole “doors,” to maintain maximum integrity of the trench plate. Only if life-threatening events made it necessary to open the breach hole(s) would final cuts be made. We did not specify the size of the hole(s), only that the final opening(s) be sufficiently large to accommodate our access to Garcia from the opposite side of the trench plate. The actual size and shape of the hole(s) were left to the discretion of Vizcaino and the LAFD breaching teams under his direction.
The breaching operation, conducted by personnel from LAFD Heavy Rescue 56 using exothermic cutting torches, commenced within the first 30 minutes of the incident. However, they encountered problems almost immediately.
Because of the tightly packed soil on the opposite side (collapse side) of the center trench plate, there was no room for relief of the slag that resulted from the exothermic torch`s cutting tip. Therefore, the cutting operation began to bog down. Heavy Rescue 56 personnel went through nearly two dozen exothermic rods during this operation.
Several times, the cutting operations were delayed because of various complications and safety concerns related to atmospheric monitoring.8
Ultimately, it was decided that the breaching operation would be curtailed and kept as an alternative.
Begin digging at the spoil pile
Another alternative was to begin digging at the spoil pile of dirt that apparently “ran” beneath the center trench plate during the collapse. This soil pile was located in the open pit on the opposite side of the collapse, where a gap apparently existed between the trench plate and the solid wall of soil. It appeared that the subsiding soil that trapped Garcia had “run” down through the hourglass-shaped opening between the plate and the solid earth and self-evacuated into the open pit through the gap at the bottom of the plate. Therefore, removing the soil from the pile would likely cause additional soil to evacuate from behind the trench plate.
If the soil pile could be reduced by hand in a controlled manner, the theory went, it might be possible to allow the dirt to be evacuated from around Garcia`s body, leaving him suspended in midair by the rope system to which he would be attached.
The problem was that we could not predict exactly what effect removing the soil would have on Garcia`s predicament.
We were also concerned that removing dirt from the spoil pile could cause a massive, uncontrollable movement of material that could further trap (and possibly injure or kill) Garcia and rescuers who might be in the hole. For this reason, this plan was designated as an alternative. At one point, this option was tried in small increments by assigning several firefighters to begin digging at the spoil pile. Unfortunately, this caused the soil to subside even further, taking Garcia, who was by then secured to the rope system via wrist straps, down with it. This had the effect of burying Garcia once again. This digging operation was immediately halted, but now our victim–and the entire soil layer in which he was trapped–had sunk several feet lower into the ground. It became clear that our concerns about the potential adverse reactions to digging at the soil pile were justified. It took nearly 28 minutes to uncover Garcia`s face after this “adverse event.”9
Rig a trench plate beneath a crane (“last-ditch effort”)
The final, and most dangerous, alternate plan we devised was characterized as a “last-ditch effort.” It would be used only if an “adverse event” occurred and there was no other way to keep the victim (and rescuers) alive. One or more of the trench plates would be rigged beneath a crane that was standing, at our request, specifically for this purpose. On our direction, the crane would then pull one of the outside plates (leaving the central plate) to “dump” the soil away from one side of Garcia. The soil would pour into the large open pit. Vizcaino, as part of his efforts to keep all options open and timely, arranged for the middle plate to be prerigged so that if we decided to pull the plate, it would take less than a minute to connect it to the crane`s hoist chain.
The primary rescuer would be removed from the hole, and the crane`s operator would be able to commence lifting immediately thereafter. The potential dangers of such a strategy included crushing the victim in soil as it was compressed and moved downward through the funnel-shaped void, snapping the ropes to which the victim was attached. In this case, it is probable that the victim would be lost within an avalanche of soil. If the rope(s) held without snapping, the victim could be seriously injured or killed as the rope held him in place while tons of soil rushed past. The victim could also be pinched or crushed against the plate as it was raised.
Although we held this option in reserve for a situation in which every other option had been exhausted, and in which survival seemed to depend on a high-risk action of this magnitude, we actually came within moments of implementing it when Garcia had slipped beneath the surface for 28 minutes when the soil subsided during the digging operations.
The conclusion of this rescue operation will in Part 2.
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The accident site. The main trench plate (right side of photo) separates the collapse zone from the open excavation. The suspended trench plate on the left (the direction from which rescuers entered) separates the victim from the “main” collapse zone. The red rope in the foreground is attached to the black garden hose that is pumping fresh breathing air from an SCBA bottle into the soil. Only the victim`s yellow hard hat and his left arm (extended above his head and clinging to a manila rope) are visible. The white cylindrical object is the extension tube for LAFD 88`s dirt vacuum, being used by the primary rescuer, who is suspended in midair in the main collapse zone to uncover the back of the victim`s head. Just to the right of the main trench plate is LAFD Firefighter Steve Berkery`s turnout coat. He was positioned on a horizontal I-beam throughout the rescue. (Photo by author.)
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(1) A Los Angeles City firefighter passes an air hose down to the victim while rescuers discuss access to him. (Photos by Joseph Ortiz.)
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(2) Firefighter/Specialist Brian LeFave is hoisted as he prepares to be lowered head first
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(3) between the trench plates.
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(4) Los Angeles City firefighters place ladders in the open trench. Firefighters then scaled the ladders and cut breach holes in the main trench plate with an exothermic rescue torch
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(5)(6) Rescuers assess the shoring operation while the backhoe operator stands by. The backhoe was not used because of concern of a secondary collapse.
Endnotes
1. Concurrently, a large volume of “running” soil escaped beneath the middle trench plate, the bottom edge of which was not “square” with the bottom of the excavation. However, the volume of dirt we observed didn`t appear to account for the amount of earth that must have disappeared in the original collapse. The question was, Where did all that dirt go? The next question was, Could another larger “cavern” collapse and swallow up more ground?
2. Some LAFD truck companies carry garden hoses that can be attached to SCBA bottles by way of a standard regulator, to provide air to victims in these situations.
3. The normal practice is to pair up two rescuers as a primary rescue team. However, because of the conditions of this incident, there was room for only one rescuer at a time.
4. This is required by OSHA`s two-in/two-out rule for confined space rescue.
5. The need for well-trained, highly experienced, properly supervised USAR companies/task forces cannot be overstressed in a situation like this. These members` abilities to evaluate the situation; determine the best course of action; and implement a series of simultaneous, technically challenging rescue strategies in a timely manner–with strong assurance that the tactics are not only appropriate but also completed properly–are mainly the results of USAR company experience, training, and planning.
6. Because of the space limitations imposed by the free-hanging trench plate suspended directly over the victim, which prevented us from gaining direct access to Garcia`s upper body for several hours, it was eventually determined that placing a tube or barrel over Garcia was unfeasible. Also, it would have made it even more difficult to pull dirt away from his body. However, we were able to place a SABA umbilical air mask on Garcia after exposing his head. Other options were considered and rejected for this incident; they will be considered for future rescues of this nature.
7. This request was transmitted to OCD. The request was being acted on when two private vendors called the LAFD to offer their dirt vacuum trucks. Both graciously dispatched their equipment and operators to assist for the duration of the rescue operation. The commercial-grade dirt vacuums easily cut the extrication time in half.
8. LAFD commanders were informed that this excavation was also the site of a former refuse dump, which caused them to increase the atmospheric monitoring before “lighting” the exothermic torches.
9. “Adverse event” refers to a situation that goes wrong and further complicates complex fireground and rescue operations.
Media Coverage at the Incident Site
The Pacoima incident inspired news media coverage that rivaled a prototypical L.A. freeway chase. The entire operation was aired live by television news organizations that deployed an army of cameramen and reporters on the ground, backed up by an armada of television news helicopters hovering over the site with zoom cameras capable of spotting a fly on one`s nose from 1,000 feet in the air. The news helicopters elevated the ambient noise level at the scene. Radio and voice communications were impaired at times by the increasingly loud drone of engines as helicopters inched closer for a better shot of the action below. To their credit, the news copters complied with LAFD commanders` requests to put more distance between them and the rescue site.
It was yet another reminder that modern fire service operations are increasingly under the scrutiny of the public, especially at unusual emergencies. The public–and a battery of personal injury attorneys–may be viewing every move firefighters make (including personnel standing by in staging or resting in rehab areas).
In one respect, the increasingly bright news media spotlight is a positive development, for it helps the public to understand that the fire department`s mission extends far beyond the traditional fireground and EMS operations and that the typical firefighter requires increasingly sophisticated training and equipment to do his job. But intense media coverage could also prove to be a rude awakening if mistakes are made, if applicable regulations are ignored, or if a viable victim succumbs during attempts to rescue him.
Strong representation by a seasoned (and well-informed) public information officer (PIO) is crucial. In the case of the Pacoima incident, the LAFD`s PIOs (headed by Captain Steven Ruda) performed a valuable service by explaining the rescue process to news media hungry for information to pass along to the viewing public.
LARRY COLLINS is a 19-year member of the County of Los Angeles Fire Department (LACFD); a paramedic; and one of three captains assigned to USAR-1, the LACFD`s central urban search and rescue company, responsible for supervising, instructing, and performing technical rescue operations across Los Angeles County. Collins served as a member of FEMA`s USAR Incident Support Team at the Oklahoma City Bombing and as assistant leader of the LACFD FEMA USAR Task Force (CATF-2) at the Northridge Meadows Apartment collapse. A former chairperson of the LACFD Water Rescue Committee and member of the Los Angeles County Multi-Agency Swiftwater Working Group, he is a current member of the LACFD Anti-Terrorism Work Group, the USAR Committee, and various other advisory groups and committees. He lectures, instructs, and writes regularly on these topics.