CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY DISASTER

CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY DISASTER

BY MARK H. MEAKER

Five people were killed and another 26 injured on December 11, 1997, in a massive fog-related multivehicle accident and fire on California`s Interstate 5 in the community of Elk Grove, about 10 miles south of Sacramento, the state`s capital city. Thirty-six vehicles were involved in the accident, including nine “big rigs,” one of which was a double-trailer tank truck. Nineteen of the 36 vehicles, including the tank truck and five other tractor-trailer rigs, burned in the fire.

More than 140 firefighters from eight area fire agencies responded, as well as the California Highway Patrol (CHP) and a variety of other allied agencies. Many of the responding firefighters last fall had participated in a large-scale multicasualty incident (MCI) training exercise sponsored by the Elk Grove Community Services District Fire Department (EGCSDFD) that eerily simulated conditions similar to those that occurred in the Elk Grove incident.

Although still under investigation by the CHP`s Multi-discipline Accident Investigation Team (MAIT), Captain Dave Ritter, commander of the CHP`s South Sacramento office, stated preliminarily that heavy fog and high vehicle speeds were believed to be significant factors in the accident.

INITIAL REPORT

A civilian called in the initial report of the accident by cellular phone at approximately 0710 hours to the CHP`s San Joaquin County dispatch center. The CHP immediately forwarded the call to the Sacramento Regional Fire/EMS Communications Center, which handles fire and EMS dispatching for nearly all fire agencies in Sacramento County.

The initial assignment was dispatched as a routine vehicle accident on “I-5 at the Hood-Franklin Road overpass” and consisted of an engine company, an extrication squad, and a medic unit (fire department ambulance). Shortly after the dispatch, the first-in unit, Engine 72 (E72), responding from a full-paid rural station located about a mile from the overpass, reported “a large column of black smoke rising through the fog bank to the south of the overpass.” E72 is a 1,500-gpm class A pumper that has a 2,000-gallon booster tank.

After gaining access to southbound I-5, E72 encountered heavy traffic en route to the accident scene, which was approximately one mile south of the overpass. The first-in company officer, Acting Captain Kris Hubbard, reported “at least five big rigs” and an unknown number of passenger vehicles were involved in the accident and on fire. He requested two additional ambulances and another engine company. He also declared the incident to be an MCI, assumed command under the incident command system (ICS), and requested and was assigned a tactical radio channel.

While en route to the scene, I monitored the size-up. After conferring by radio with the IC as to the size of the fire problem, I requested two water tenders and additional chief officers for overhead/command support.

EARLY OPERATIONS

Taking into account the limited resources available pending the arrival of additional help, Hubbard assigned his paramedic engineer to charge his 134-inch attack line and then to begin triaging the many injured victims. The firefighter placed the attack line between the main body of fire (18 of the 19 vehicles that ultimately burned were involved in fire at this time) and the numerous injured persons lying or walking on the grassy medium strip that separates the northbound and southbound lanes of I-5.

Hubbard continued sizing up the accident scene and determined that a double-trailer tanker truck involved in the accident was suffering fire impingement. After first securing the safety of the victims from the fire, Hubbard`s firefighter was then assigned to direct the attack line stream onto the side of the tanker to prevent a potential explosion.

On hearing Hubbard`s report of the involved tanker, I requested that the communications center dispatch the hazardous materials team from the City of Sacramento and a heavy foam unit from the Sacramento County Fire Protection District.

Several minutes after his initial arrival report, Hubbard requested an additional eight ground ambulances through the communications center, having received an initial triage report from his paramedic indicating that at least two dozen or more persons had been injured. Elk Grove Emergency Medical Services Chief John Michelini, who had responded as a result of the fire chief`s request for additional overhead support staff, reacted to Hubbard`s size-up by also requesting that all available medivac helicopters in the region be launched. (How close the helicopters would be able to get to the site was contingent on the prevailing fog conditions. When the medivac units arrived, however, they were able to come within a one-quarter-mile radius. The number of media helicopters in the area and the size and movement of the fire had altered the air movement, changing the fog condition.)

Other medical overhead support staff who responded included the EMS officers of the Sacramento City Fire Department and the Sacramento County Fire Protection District, by special request of Michelini, and Dr. Stephen Tharrett, medical director for the County of Sacramento. The communications center automatically notifies Dr. Tharrett of all MCIs, as required in the countywide MCI protocol.

Approximately 30 minutes into the incident, I arrived on-scene and assumed command, after first receiving a face-to-face transfer of command briefing from the on-scene officer. By now, two additional engine companies, three ambulances, and an extrication squad were on-scene. A simultaneous effort was underway to treat the already triaged patients in a designated treatment area to the south of the accident while firefighting crews attempted to continue cooling the exposed tanker.

Immediately after the transfer briefing, I requested two additional water tenders and eight additional engine companies for staffing and water supply support. I also requested and was assigned two additional tactical radio channels; it became obvious that one tactical channel was insufficient for an operation of this magnitude. All Sacramento County fire agencies operate under a single 800-megahertz radio system and have more than 20 tactical channels available for use if needed.

THE MEDICAL GROUP

When Michelini arrived, he was assigned as medical group supervisor. He continued organizing the medical group initially established by the first responders. Managers for triage, treatment, and ground ambulance staging areas were assigned, and a patient transportation supervisor was appointed. Under the county`s MCI protocol, the patient transportation supervisor is responsible for contacting the county`s Disaster Control Facility (DCF), located at the region`s main trauma center (the University of California, Davis Medical Center) to determine the appropriate transport destination for each of the ambulances.

The purpose of the DCF is to avoid transferring the disaster from the accident scene to the emergency room by coordinating the assignment of patients being transported so that no single facility is overwhelmed.

In all, 11 ground ambulances and four medivac helicopters transported 23 patients to five area hospitals. Nineteen of the 23 patients were off-scene within 65 minutes of the first engine`s arrival. The remaining four patients were “walking wounded” who initially declined treatment but later requested transportation when they calmed down and realized they were in need of further medical attention.

As medivac helicopters began to arrive, the need for an air operations coordinator quickly became apparent. In one incident, a media helicopter suddenly turned under a medivac helicopter that was on final approach to the helispot. The medical helicopter avoided a catastrophic collision by breaking off and reshooting its final approach.

When I was made aware of this incident, I assigned Elk Grove`s training chief, Battalion Chief Michael Ridley, to coordinate all air operations. Using radio communications with the medical helicopters and the CHP`s helicopter for communications to the media helicopters, Ridley was able to control the air space around the accident scene to ensure safe operations for the incident`s duration.

In the aftermath of the incident, Elk Grove officials have met with state and local officials familiar with air operations and developed several strategies to reduce the potential for such incidents in the future. They include using a CHP helicopter or a California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (CDF) air attack supervisor on mutual aid to coordinate all air operations.

Another strategy suggested by the Sacramento International Airport Fire Department was to request that the Federal Aviation Agency declare an emergency in the area, thereby restricting all flights within a predetermined distance of the scene to medivac, fire suppression, and law enforcement aircraft.

OPERATIONS SECTOR

Assistant Chief Rick Holmes arrived and was assigned as operations chief. He was given the following prioritized basic strategic objectives:

1. Continue to stabilize the tanker with cooling streams while aggressively supporting the Medical Group operation and determine the extent of hazardous materials involvement (if any).

2. Cut off the lateral spread of the fire to uninvolved big rigs and other vehicles to the north and south of the main fire area.

3. Move in and knock down the main body of fire once the heavy foam unit and water tenders were on-scene.

The operations chief organized his effort under five basic functional groups: medical, fire attack, extrication, search, and haz mat. Two engine companies and an extrication squad were assigned to the Extrication Group. Only one live victim, an immediate (critical) patient, needed extrication. However, the Extrication Group remained active for more than 16 hours assisting the coroner`s staff in removing the fatalities.

HAZ MAT

Division Chief Jan Dunbar of the Sacramento City Fire Department Hazardous Materials Team was assigned as leader of the Haz Mat Group. An internationally recognized expert in hazardous materials, Dunbar had been instrumental in establishing Sacramento`s haz mat team more than a decade ago. The team consists of three haz mat companies and a decontamination unit.

Dunbar and his group mounted a major effort to determine the contents of the tank truck and the other involved cargo trucks. Fortunately for civilians and responders alike, the tank truck was determined to be empty, and none of the other big rigs carried hazardous materials.

The Haz Mat Group used information provided by some of the vehicle operators, Department of Transportation vehicle placards, and shipping papers (where accessible) to tentatively determine the contents. Firefighters in full turnouts and self-contained breathing apparatus then verified the contents by searching those vehicles not completely consumed by the fire.

Once the contents of the trucks had been determined, Dunbar focused on the challenging tasks of extinguishing the large amount of burning diesel and gasoline fuels and containing about 1,000 gallons of diesel that flowed into a nearby creek. The haz mat team and representatives of Sacramento County`s Hazardous Materials Division contained the creek spill. The Fire Attack Group quickly extinguished the main body of the fire once Foam 62, the heavy foam unit, arrived on-scene. The unit is a large, self-contained, foam trailer towed by a 1,250-gpm specially equipped class A pumper and carries approximately 900 gallons of AFFF-ATC foam.

With the support of two water tenders, each with more than 4,000 gallons of water, Foam 62 used approximately 300 gallons of foam to completely knock down and contain the remaining fire by approximately 0835 hours, about an hour and 25 minutes after the arrival of the first-in unit.

In total, the fire and medical response to the incident included 17 engines, one ladder truck, 11 ambulances, three medivac helicopters, four water tenders, one heavy foam unit, two mobile lighting units, two air compressor units, 12 chief officers, and four other specialized pieces of equipment. Fire agencies that participated included Elk Grove, Sacramento City, Sacramento County, American River, Courtland, Wilton, Galt, and Walnut Grove. Additionally, the California State Office of Emergency Services (OES) Fire and Rescue Division sent an assistant chief for overhead support.

DEMOBILIZATION

As the incident began to deescalate, I conferred with Holmes concerning a demobilization plan. We agreed to appoint Battalion Chief Ken Poole, of the American River Fire Protection District, demobilization group supervisor. He had responded under the countywide automatic-aid agreement. His assignment was to organize and catalog a systematic release of all apparatus and personnel from the scene.

Part of the Demobilization Group`s responsibility was to assess all personnel being released and refer companies to Elk Grove`s administrative offices so that personnel could be processed through a critical incident stress defusing process. The Elk Grove Fire Department has a Critical Incident Stress Management Team (CISM) and participates with other countywide CISM teams.

However, the majority of the department`s CISM personnel were involved in the incident. As a result, CISM personnel from the American River Fire District and other allied agencies defused Elk Grove`s personnel under the agencies` mutual-aid agreements.

The CISM personnel also defused other allied agency`s responders including environmental cleanup personnel and tow truck operators who were forced by the magnitude of the vehicle entrapment problems to be active participants with the coroner`s deputies and firefighters in the body-removal process. Chaplains from the fire service and law enforcement also assisted in debriefing the emergency responders and family members of the accident victims.

UNIFIED COMMAND STRUCTURE

Early in the incident, I had formed a unified command structure with the CHP`s on-scene commander, Captain Ritter, as is required under the state`s Standardized Emergency Management System (or SEMS) law. This law, passed by the California state legislature after the Oakland Fire Storm in October 1991, mandates that all agencies operating on a substantial incident cooperate under a single unified command structure.

Ritter was the overall scene manager, as stipulated by state law, while I remained as the IC in charge of all participating fire service assets. Ritter and I communicated routinely throughout the incident, coordinating the efforts of fire and law enforcement as well as the other responding agencies.

To facilitate the unified command process, a single command post was established approximately 200 yards south of the incident, and a CHP liaison officer, equipped with a law enforcement radio, was assigned as an assistant to the fire operations chief.

One of the first actions of the unified command structure was to designate a public information officer (PIO) from the CHP to handle all media relations. The PIO was quickly given a detailed briefing by the scene manager and the fire department IC on the status of the emergency. The PIO was effective at containing the news media to a central area and providing them with accurate and timely details of the operation.

In addition, the PIO did an outstanding job organizing and facilitating a comprehensive on-scene news conference at 1100 hours, nearly four hours after the initial report of the accident. Ritter, Dunbar, and I gave detailed opening statements; an in-depth question and answer period followed.

The news conference was scheduled after responders had sufficient time to completely stabilize the emergency and for participants in the press conference to ensure that the information released at the conference was accurate. It provided the news media with sufficient time to make their noon broadcast deadlines. The news media appreciated the efforts made to facilitate their reporting needs. The early establishment of an effective and accommodating PIO enabled the media to get their story without disrupting emergency operations.

Another major function of the unified command structure was the inclusion of all nonemergency responders within the command/information loop. Agencies such as Cal-Trans (the California State Transportation Department), the county Hazardous Materials Division of the Environmental Management Department, the Salvation Army, and the law enforcement and fire service chaplaincies were all briefed on the unified command structure. They were also given briefings every couple of hours throughout the duration of the incident, which was more than 24 hours.

POSTINCIDENT ANALYSIS

In the fire service postincident analysis (PIA), the following actions were cited for having been handled well.

A concise and detailed initial size-up by the first-arriving captain drew a clear picture for all the responders and the command staff.

The magnitude of the incident was realized early and resulted in an immediate declaration of an MCI and the early call for many additional resources (ambulances, helicopters, engines, water tenders, foam, haz mat, and so on).

Effective strategy and tactics were chosen and followed.

An effective unified command structure involving all on-scene agencies was established early and maintained throughout the incident.

A strong Medical Group organization provided for triage, treatment, and transportation functions as well as the coordination of patient distribution among hospitals through a patient transportation supervisor.

There were no interpersonal/interagency conflicts.

There was no parochialism. Personnel from other agencies were fully integrated into Elk Grove`s command structure.

Effective media facilitation ensured the media`s cooperation.

Despite the overall success of the incident, the PIA identified several areas, including the following, in which improvements could be made for the future.

More tactical channels were needed earlier in the incident.

Assistants to the IC and other command positions within the ICS should have been assigned earlier to facilitate radio communications and record keeping.

The initial treatment area was too close to the fire area for comfort. The reason for this was that victims, before we arrived, had settled themselves in an area they perceived to be a safe distance from the danger. In reality, they were still too close to the hazards. To correct the situation, we moved them off-scene faster than we could relocate them.

Prior to the formation of a formal staging area, some incoming companies did not “stage out” until directed in, as they were asked to do.

Better control of the air space was needed as soon as the medivac helicopters began arriving.

It was fortunate that this MCI incident and fire occurred after more than a decade of concerted efforts by fire service leaders within Sacramento County to pursue, wherever possible, functional consolidations where political reorganization was not feasible. Most participants in the incident agree that those efforts paid off and resulted in an operation free of interagency parochialism and interpersonal conflicts.

The ICS structure involved assigning officers from various agencies according to their expertise and/or arrival sequence, regardless of their organizational affiliation.

The ability of the Sacramento area fire services to immediately integrate command staff and line personnel into a cohesive command structure, using a common dispatch center and communications system as well as the same MCI protocol and ICS, made it possible to mount a response and operation larger and more effective than what could have been sustained by any one agency, regardless of size.

Specific factors that contributed to the effectiveness of the operation included the following:

The professionalism and training of all responding personnel (fire, law, and other allied agencies).

A centralized, single dispatch center and communications system for nearly all fire agencies within the County of Sacramento.

The countywide complete boundary drop for dispatching facilitated the sharing of all fire and EMS resources by all fire agencies.

The county`s fire services` coordinated and seamless emergency medical first responder and patient transportation system.

The fire service`s long history of developing and using the ICS and the state`s SEMS law resulted in an effective unified command structure for the incident.

A long history of continuous joint training exercises between the various fire agencies in the county facilitated working together in this incident.

In the fall of 1997, the EGCSDFD hosted numerous southern county fire agencies in a series of multiagency drills involving a large-scale vehicle accident and fire MCI. Many firefighters specifically credited that training for instilling in them the confidence they displayed in this incident.

In a report to the respective political bodies, it was emphasized that a massive, coordinated response was made possible by moving toward a single dispatch center, common communications and operating protocols and procedures, a complete political boundary drop for dispatching purposes, and extensive interagency training activities.

The California Highway Patrol later presented the Elk Grove Community Services District Fire Department with its “Excellence In Service” award for “the exceptional manner in which U the department performed.” In accepting the award on behalf of all the Sacramento area fire agencies that participated in the incident, Elk Grove attributed the successful outcome to “a total team approach.” n

Twenty-seven passenger vehicles and pickups and 10 big rigs (including a double tanker truck) were involved in the deadly accident and fire on California`s Interstate 5, in the community of Elk Grove, 10 miles south of Sacramento, California. Nineteen vehicles burned. Foam was used to knock down the main body of fire, which was caused by the large amount of gasoline and diesel involved. (Photo by Joshua Rubenstein, Elk Grove Fire Department.)

A light pickup is barely recognizable crushed between the back of one big rig and the front of another. (Photo by Joshua Rubenstein, Elk Grove Fire Department.)

Firefighters and paramedics work on multiple patients within the treatment area as ambulances stand by for transport in the background. Nineteen patients were transported off-scene within 65 minutes of the first engine`s arrival. (Photo by Gary Harsh.)

Firefighters in full protective clothing and breathing apparatus advance a 134-inch attack line in an attempt to cut off the lateral spread of the fire to exposed trucks. (Photo by Gary Harsh.)

n MARK H. MEAKER, a 27-year veteran of the fire service, has been chief of the Elk Grove (CA) Community Services District Fire Department since 1977. Previously, he served in the Arcade (CA) Fire District, the Citrus Heights (CA) Fire District, and the Sacramento County (CA) Fire Protection District (successor to Citrus Heights), where he was instrumental in developing its ambulance program for large-scale emergency operations and its policies and procedures system. He has an associate`s degree in fire technology, a bachelor`s degree in journalism, and a master`s degree in public administration and has been an instructor in the Certified Chief Officer program.

The elk grove community

service district Fire Department (EGCSDFD)

The EGCSDFD operates four full-paid fire stations, protects approximately 65,000 residents, and covers approximately 131 square miles. Elk Grove is one of the fastest growing communities in Northern California and encompasses suburban, rural, urban, commercial, and industrial areas. The district`s population is expected to increase to about 162,000 by the year 2010, and its master plan calls for the doubling of the number of staffed stations by the year 2007.