Camaraderie and Organizational Dysfunction
BY ALAN J. FREEDMAN
It is a troubling fact that in spite of many managerial and technological improvements, firefighter injury and death rates remain high. Many theories have been presented to explain this problem. Among them is that the same camaraderie that protects firefighters and allows them to get the job done no matter how hostile the conditions is actually a double-edged sword.
Many firefighters equate their workplace with home/family–that is, a place where they feel they can be themselves with people on whom they know they can depend. However, this apparently ideal work environment can have a negative side as well.
Denial and dysfunction, the negative aspects of camaraderie, can pervade a fire department just as they do a family unit. In reality, there are dysfunctional departments just as there are dysfunctional families. Moreover, certain types of behaviors that may exist in some fire department work environments may actually be negating technological advances that should be improving firefighter safety.
Note that negative forces can be at work within a department even when positive aspects are evident. As an example, some of the negative behaviors discussed below have occurred in departments that appear to be reasonably progressive when viewed from the outside. Many members of their staffs work hard and contribute to the community while on- or off-duty. Some members volunteer at homeless shelters and hospitals, coach youth athletic leagues, or serve as scout leaders. In one department, coworkers came to the aid of a fellow firefighter whose underinsured home was destroyed by fire. His fellow firefighters rebuilt the house for him and saved him from financial ruin. In another instance, a coworker put his house up as collateral for bail when a fellow firefighter was wrongly accused of a crime. Just as a family, these fire department families stood by the family member and did what they could to help.
SIGNS OF DANGER
Dysfunctional fire department families display a number of identifiable characteristics. They include, but are not limited to, the following: inappropriate personal behavior, a lack of policies or failure to enforce existing policies, managerial indifference or neglect, a lack of discipline, nepotism, and failure to address actions/situations that can be potentially harmful to individual department members and to the department as a whole. Some of these signs of dysfunction are discussed below. If you recognize any of them in your department, take heed. Maybe you will be the individual who will have to take the lead in effecting the changes that can help your department to avert a disaster, increase members` health and safety, and improve morale.
Statistics on substance abuse vary widely. One study estimates that at least 20 percent of adults who visit a physician have had an alcohol problem at one time.1 In one department, 37 percent of a sample of members were problem drinkers, active alcoholics, or recovering alcoholics. This statistic is a startling 80 percent higher than the estimates for the general adult population.
–One night a group of off-duty firefighters from a department was caught allegedly using a ladder to enter a closed social club to obtain alcohol. Reportedly, no criminal or department charges were filed, and the escapade is jokingly referred to as “beergate.”
Tolerance of on-duty substance abuse can contribute to on- and off-duty problems. Just as a family unit must take disciplinary action when one of its young members drinks too much–such as grounding or taking away the car for a specified period–fire departments must ask the hard questions when their members indulge in alcohol (substance) use: Is the unofficial postfire beer policy appropriate? Could a firefighter who has had only a few beers and seems perfectly normal, especially to others who have also been drinking, exhibit poor judgment at the wrong moment, perhaps while driving a fire truck or advancing a hoseline? Experiments have demonstrated that alcohol intoxication could alter a person`s performance up to 18 hours after ingestion of the alcohol.2 One veteran firefighter reflectively recalled that he had decided to stop drinking at work when he passed out behind the wheel after driving a truck to the scene and stopping it.
Firefighters are forced into retirement when they become physically impaired by occupational injuries and disease because they could endanger themselves and others if allowed on the fireground. It could be argued that substance abuse makes active fire department members psychologically impaired as well as physically impaired. Do they present a danger to themselves and others?
–In one department, a company officer reported to the chief that another officer was habitually reporting to work in a condition that endangered his crew and the public. The chief`s reply was, “Maybe he`ll stop.”
–In another case, when firefighters complained to the chief about officers` drinking on duty, they were transferred to other stations.
This failure to confront firefighters who are excessive drinkers may be viewed by some as doing “the family” thing, but is that the best way to treat a member of any family? This approach may actually be harmful to the family members by depriving them of the opportunity to overcome the problem (not to mention that they and others could be killed, hurt, or subjected to legal action). One firefighter with a dependency disorder, for example, who was arrested for allegedly assaulting a neighbor while under the influence was subsequently arrested on another charge and reportedly ordered into a rehab program by the court. Coworkers are amazed at the turnaround of this individual. He is now a model citizen, has been reunited with his family, and is free from all on- and off-duty substance abuse.
Some departments appear to be facing up to problems other departments choose to ignore. In the instances listed below, department leaders have taken a course of action that is unpleasant but necessary to protect the public and other members of the department.
–Earlier this year, television and newspaper reports from a large city told of disciplinary action that had been taken against fire department members as a result of a videotape that allegedly showed on-duty department members participating in a beer party.
–In another city, a fire officer is reported to have been reduced in rank for responding to a fire late and intoxicated. He allegedly rejected an opportunity to voluntarily enter an employee assistance program.
–A member of another department was reportedly dismissed after allegedly being charged with off-duty DUI (driving under the influence) charges for the second time.
If these rules aren`t enforced consistently throughout the departments involved, members who are disciplined merely become scapegoats.
In some departments, an unwillingness to confront abuses comes about because a sizeable number of department members are related by blood or marriage to present or former department members or to employees working in other municipal departments or in the community`s school system.
Training can be the victim in a dysfunctional department. In one department, there are more reports of drills than actual drills. Some company officers hold daily drills, others merely file forms. There are no lesson plans, and there is no quality control.
In one department, the training division distributed a pump operator`s guide that contained an error that, if followed, would have placed residents and firefighters at risk in a structure fire. The guide stated that companies using 200 feet of preconnected 134-inch hose with adjustable-gallonage combination nozzles (100 psi nozzle pressure) should use an engine pressure of 150 psi to deliver 200 gpm. A company officer noticed the mistake and sent a communication requesting that the guide be reviewed for accuracy. The company officer was called to the chief`s office and verbally reprimanded for making the request. The guide was never corrected. Letting this error stand not only raised safety concerns but also sustained an improper use of handlines that caused to go to waste thousands of dollars the department had spent to upgrade to 134-inch line.3
–A chief officer noticed that a company was using a 212- 2 112-inch reducer attached to a 112-inch gated wye to connect to a standpipe to feed a 112-inch line with a combination nozzle. Although the department had replaced all other 112-inch lines with 134-inch lines, the 112-inch line was still being used for standpipe applications. The deputy chief mistakenly believed that the discharge from each hoseline would be reduced by half, from approximately 100 gpm to 50 gpm, if two lines were operated off the wye. Acting on the recommendation of the deputy chief, the department purchased 212- 2 212-inch gated wyes to “solve the problem.”
That same department adamantly opposed using 212-inch standpipe line. The company officer, therefore, had suggested replacing the inadequate 112-inch line with 134-inch line or two-inch line with low-pressure nozzles to increase the discharge potential. The recommendation was ignored. Several years later, an assistant training officer (company-level rank) made the same recommendations. It was adopted. All companies now use 134-inch line; most use low-pressure (75 psi) break-apart combination or smooth-bore nozzles for standpipe hose. The original suggestion was disregarded simply because it was proposed by a company officer.
–When one department was given a donation of water rescue suits, it arranged for a training drill in a pond that was characterized as an “open sewer.” A firefighter expressed concern about unnecessarily exposing personnel to polluted water. The training officer ignored the firefighter and refused to change the location for the drill. The firefighter notified local health department officials, who ordered the drill cancelled because of the high level of bacteria in the pond. Shortly thereafter, the firefighter was involuntarily assigned to another station.
Many departments have faced or are facing a “financial crisis.” Yet, look at how some of these departments waste money. In one department, while firefighters were being laid off, the head of the training division was frequently leaving work early to play golf, visit a pub, or go home while being paid to be at work.
One department`s state-mandated emergency plan assigns responsibilities to retired or deceased individuals. No active or retired officer was ever made aware of the responsibilities the plan assigns to the officers.
Appearances can be deceiving sometimes. One department supposedly operates with an incident command system and has been introducing SOPs at a rate that would give the casual observer the impression that SOPs are used. A company officer, however, reported that the only order given at a recent “taxpayer” fire to which five companies responded on the initial alarm was, “We`ve got to get the roof open.” This order was given repeatedly during the early stages of the incident. No additional orders or assignments were given, no rapid intervention team was assigned, and no sectors were established. Eventually, a second alarm was ordered, and the fire was extinguished. Although this department theoretically has a system in place, incident commanders have been known to stray from SOP guidelines.
The accountability system in one department consists of two riding lists–one is kept on the apparatus and the other is carried in the company officer`s pocket. A company officer estimates that even this very basic system is complied with less than 50 percent of the time. Contrast this with the system used in other departments, such as the Toledo (OH) Fire Department.4 A system in which the incident commander knows where each company is and an intervention team is established early in the incident increases fireground safety. The incident commander should be managing fireground operations.
One department alleges that it “investigates” all injuries to firefighters so that the number of injuries can be reduced. Yet, no public report was made on a building fire in which seven firefighters were injured when a partial interior collapse occurred. The systemic and command deficiencies that should have been identified in such a report ideally should have prompted changes in policies and operational procedures directed at correcting such deficiencies.
Minor injuries, however, generate investigations and a great deal of paperwork. A common conclusion of these reports, referred to by firefighters as “blame squad reports,” is that the firefighter, not the department, was responsible for causing the injury. It is widely believed that the objective here is to make it unpleasant enough for anyone contemplating reporting an injury that the individual will choose not to report it. Not reporting injuries gives the impression that injuries have declined.
One evaluation filed by the safety officer when a company officer reported a no-lost-time injury appears to have been completed by a person with pre-junior high school writing ability.
The safety officer was appointed to that position in spite of the fact that he had been a factor in a firefighter`s becoming seriously injured. The firefighter was tillering an open tiller seat ladder truck when the officer later appointed to the position of safety officer prematurely closed the overhead door on the firefighter as the truck was leaving the station to respond to an emergency.
This same safety officer, while he was a company officer, was also well known for reporting to work barely able to walk and talk, as if he had been drinking. The suitability of this person for the safety officer position should be contrasted with the requirements presented in “The Role of the Safety Officer” by Murrey E. Loflin, Fire Engineering, April 1993.
Some things that are allowed to go on in some departments might be categorized as “hard to believe.”
–It was visually evident at a multiple-alarm fire that an aerial ladder was seriously twisted. The crew was later instructed to use the aerial only in case of an emergency. This was not an attempt at humor. Several years later, after a well-publicized fire at a place of worship, it was reported in a newspaper that the aerial ladder had been damaged and would have to be replaced.
–Although this department has a mandatory mask rule, SCBA is not worn during overhaul or at automobile, dumpster, or other outside fires. One former safety committee member characterized the committee`s function during his tenure as “begging management to do its job.” One could easily conclude, he said, that management was being paid to waste money and impede progress.
The chief in one department often expresses concern over the high rate of absenteeism. Yet, when a firefighter involved in a promotional dispute with the department attempted to return to work after recovering from an on-the-job injury that had caused him to be absent for an extended period, he was prevented from doing so for another five weeks–in spite of the fact that an orthopedic specialist had cleared him to return to duty.
Promotions and Lasting Repercussions
Favoritism and the “pal/family” factor in department promotions can negatively affect the caliber of department leadership for years, as is evident from what has taken place in the following department.
It is generally thought that the fire service promotes the most qualified and competent individuals. However, some examples to the contrary exist. One department that is supposed to comply with state civil service laws has a history of alleged noncompliance with regard to filling promotional vacancies from a state-certified list of candidates. These firefighters had participated in the competitive examination process and were required to serve a specific time in a grade before being allowed to take an examination for the next higher grade. This department had used senior firefighters to fill long- and short-term officer vacancies, which resulted in serious implications for the firefighters involved, the department, and the community.
The illegal promotional policies were tolerated for many years, but four members finally challenged the actions, resulting in two separate lawsuits.
Three fire lieutenants who had lacked only seven weeks of the one year in grade required before sitting for a captain`s exam had been denied for more than a year the opportunity to serve as “acting” or “temporary” lieutenant. The department then illegally used individuals who had failed or not taken the examination to fill these positions before these three firefighters were permanently promoted to lieutenant.
The three firefighters prepared a letter to send to the state requesting that they be granted a waiver to take the exam that they would have been eligible to take had their department complied with the law. They showed the letter to the then chief as a professional courtesy. He told them not to send the letter and threatened them with reprisal if they did. They did not send the letter, and they had to wait three more years before another captain`s exam was held.
Two of these men finished first and second on the captain`s exam. Three years later, after having been promoted to captain, they sat for the deputy chief exam. They had expected the exam to be held the previous year, but their department did not file a request with the state that it be included. Again, these men finished first and second.
The previous deputy chief eligibility list was now beyond the former two-year statutory limit. One individual contacted the state and requested that the list be revoked. This request cited criteria consistent with those released by the state for revocation of lists. The then administrator rejected the request but stated that he would consider a request for revocation if it were made by local officials. He allegedly told the chief that the department could fill the vacancy from the new or the old list.
Only one name remained on the old eligibility list–an individual who had taken and failed the prior deputy chief exam and who had elected not to take the new exam. To promote this man, local officials submitted to the state a fraudulent document certifying that a retirement had taken place and a permanent vacancy existed. In fact, the man who had supposedly retired was still working. Although the scores from the new exam had been posted, the department was trying to “clean out” the old list before the new list became active–in spite of the fact that the new list contained the names of individuals who had scored as many as 15 percentage points higher than the only person remaining on the old list.
The community`s then chief operating officer and the local personnel director, the son of a firefighter and the brother of a police officer, signed the fraudulent document. The state was notified that the document was fraudulent, but the list was not revoked, making it possible to promote 57 percent of the command staff from a single list. This was the only time in the department`s history that a promotion had been made from a list that had been active for longer than two years. The state did not seek indictments against the two local bureaucrats who had signed the fraudulent document. One politically well-connected firefighter has allegedly boasted to a number of people that he used his influence to get the man on the old list promoted. What, if any, influence he may have had is not clear.
The prior deputy chief exams had been held two years apart, but this exam was held three years after the previous exam. Current policy dictates that exams be held every two years. This promotion was appealed to the state civil service commission, where the then chairman of that board expressed the opinion that the promotion from the old list was “wholly inconsistent with the basic merit principle.” This case is now before the courts.
This struggle to be promoted should be contrasted with the path taken by the current chief of the same department. He was the lowest-scoring firefighter to be promoted to lieutenant from a list that was about to expire. He was tied with three other candidates for the last position but prevailed in a decision made by the former chief. After that former chief had threatened the three aforementioned lieutenants not to take the captain`s exam, the current chief took it. Two new captain positions were created, and a higher-scoring candidate was passed over, resulting in the promotion of the current chief to captain. When the former chief retired, the current chief applied for that noncivil service position and was elevated to the position he now holds. He never served as a deputy chief, although he did pass the exam for deputy chief, making him the first person ever to be promoted from captain to chief.
It is suspected that he was selected because a number of allegedly seemingly more qualified individuals did not seek the job. It is unclear what position the chief or many others would be holding had the promotional system not been so “idiosyncratic.” What is known is that the man involved in the court action involving the deputy chief position has never scored below 90 percent on an examination–he had on average scored six percentage points higher on each exam than the chief–whereas the current chief has never scored as high as 90 percent on any of the civil service promotional exams he had taken.
The second court case involves three firefighters who had served as acting lieutenants, one for almost four years. Although these individuals were on a state-certified eligibility list, they were not promoted because the department had contended that no vacancies existed. One vacancy the department felt did not exist was the position of an officer who, according to court documents, had been absent for four years and had put in for retirement. This case, too, was appealed to the state civil service board. The commission found that the use of acting appointments “has unduly restricted the selection and advancement of personnel through the ranks on the basis of their relative ability, knowledge, and skills; has in some instances prevented employees from receiving equitable and adequate compensation; and has unfortunately given the impression that U is not committed to assuring that its employees are protected against coercion for political purposes and protected from arbitrary and capricious actions.”
This case will also be resolved in court. The department, by manipulating the timing of exams and promotions, has given some individuals multiple chances to compete for promotion and has denied opportunities to other seemingly more qualified individuals.
The dynamics in this departmental scenario illustrate the analogies drawn between organizational and familial dysfunction. The three lieutenants who were threatened and illegally denied the opportunity to take the captain`s exam were “bullied into following the U rules, reasonable or not.”5 In a dysfunctional family, “rules are unclear, inconsistent, and rigid.”6
In both cases, the individuals involved initially resisted the temptation to notify the newspapers about what was transpiring. Could this have been a codependent attempt to protect the authority figure or organization? Many coworkers have criticized these firefighters` decision to fight a long, expensive battle with a community that employs its own in-house legal staff. Like members of a dysfunctional family who make the Division of Social Services aware of the situation, it took a lot of push for these men to make the decision to notify the state. They have violated the “what goes on here stays here” rule. Ironically, the taxpayers are funding the defense of a system that has allowed unqualified people to act as officers. They are paying to defend a system that has deprived them of the opportunity to have the most qualified people serve in positions of authority.
Would a department be subjected to mediocrity and abdication of responsibility if it adheres to a fair promotional system? Selecting and developing officers are crucial functions in a fire department and greatly affect its professionalism, effectiveness, and success.7 It is quite different at the department discussed above. One officer in that department recalled the day when the chief realized who the acting officer of a company was. The chief ordered the most junior member of the company to “assume command if anything happens.” The same department is now challenging in court a law that requires that temporary officers be certified by the state as having met basic criteria of competency.
Fire departments can benefit greatly by using a self-assessment program.8,9 Unfortunately, however, departments most in need of such a program are incapable of conducting an honest self-assessment. In a dysfunctional family, “the chief enabler`s duty is to make everything seem normal to the outside world.”10 A peer review board would be suspect at best.
Numerous photos of fire scenes from around the country depict other examples of managerial dysfunction. Firefighters should not be placed at risk attempting to save what has already been lost. Why do so many fire departments, most with designated safety training officers, continue to use firefighters on an aerial ladder to control the direction of a ladder pipe stream? This task can be accomplished much more safely by using guide ropes from the ground.
Firefighters place themselves at risk of serious injury by failing to properly buckle and tighten the waist strap of their SCBAs. Why is this simple but important step ignored in so many jurisdictions?
Unprofessional, risky behaviors and practices may not always result in line-of-duty deaths on the fireground. They, however, may be evident in firefighters` contracting occupation-related diseases such as coronary artery disease and cancer, as well as less lethal afflictions such as hearing loss. Departments that employ programs that exist on paper only can`t prevent such tragedies.
The question is, Are departments like those described above typical or anomalies? Look around your department. The first step in solving any problem is to recognize that a problem exists. Is your department reflected in any of those above? Incompetence breeds corruption, and corruption breeds incompetence. Denial and dysfunction make both thrive. Taking that first step to address dysfunction in a department might be taking that first step toward reducing firefighter deaths and injuries. n
Endnotes
1. Cleary, P. D. and others, “Prevalence and Recognition of Alcohol Abuse in Primary Care Population,” American Journal of Medicine, 1988; 85:466-471. http://www. niaaa.hih.gov. Publication No. 08 (1990) Apr. 2, 1998.
2. Wilkenberg and others, as cited by R. O`Brien and M. Chavetz, M.D. The Encyclopedia of Alcoholism. New York, N.Y.: Facts on File Publications, 1982.
3. For additional information, see “Preselecting Pump Discharge Pressures for Preconnected Handlines,” Douglas Leihbacher, Fire Engineering, April 1997.
4. Coleman, John, “Using Mission Statements in the Fire Service: Do You Know What Your Companies Are Doing?” Fire Engineering, Aug. 1997, and “Accountability and the Incident Management System,” Fire Engineering, Dec. 1997.
5. Mooney, A.J., MD, and others. The Recovery Book. New York: Workman Publishing, 1992, 377-378.
6. Black, C. Double Duty. New York: Ballentine Books, 1990, 7-8.
7. One type of system is described by D. Matty in “Fire Officer Training Program,” Fire Engineering, Feb. 1998, 14-18.
8. Brugman, R. and R. Coleman, “Self-Assessment: Safeguarding the Future; The Commission on Fire Accreditation International: A Look to the Future,” Fire Engineering, Mar. 1997, 83-94.
9. Brooks, P., “Self-Assessment: Your Best Defense, “Fire Engineering, Mar. 1997, 94-100.
10. Wright, B. and D. George Wright. Dare to Confront. New York: Master Media, 1990, 139.
n ALAN J. FREEDMAN, a former fire officer, has worked in fire suppression for 18 years and consults on fire protection issues. He has a bachelor`s degree in fire science and a managing fire services certificate from the ICMA Training Institute.
