Collapse at 3999 Sunswept Drive

Collapse at 3999 Sunswept Drive

THE NORTHRIDGE EARTHQUAKE

Photo by Joel P. Lugovere/los Angeles Times.

The 6.7 wake-up call that was the Northridge Earthquake collapsed hundreds of structures in the city of Los Angeles. One such collapse occurred in a single-family dwelling at 3999 Sunswept Drive in the Studio City section of the San Fernando Valley. It was a luxurious four-story, woodframe-and-stucco, 9,000-square-foot structure with a Spanish tile roof and an elevator and was built into the steep hillside overlooking Ventura Boulevard and the valley. The house had been occupied for only three years.

At the moment of impact, the house was transformed into an indistinguishable pile of debris, pulling away from the slope of the hill in a “fanned-out pancake” collapse. Only its driveway and small “front yard” remained intact. The owner and his wife were in the master bedroom on the top floor: their mothers were in separate bedrooms on the second floor.

When the shaking began. Michael and Lola Minkow jumped from their bed and tried to get to a safe location. The next thing they knew, they were looking into the night sky and heard neighbors yelling that they would bring a ladder to rescue them. Michael couldn’t understand how a ladder w’ould help, since their bedroom was so high. Neither of them realized that they had fallen some 90 feet into the canyon below. When the ladder was lowered to them from the top of the debris pile, they realized that the situation was much more serious than they had thought.

Amazingly, Michael was virtually uninjured. and Lola suffered only a broken ankle, caused by a falling beam. The neighbors assisted them out of the rubble and took them to a nearby home.

Rose Minkow. Michael’s mother, was in her bedroom in the southwest section of the second floor; and Lola’s mother, Beatrice Baitman, was asleep in her room in the northeast comer of the same floor. Neither had made it out of the collapse rubble.

INITIAL RESPONSE

Captain Jack Cobum and the members of Engine 97 evacuated their quarters and reported their status to the battalion commander. They initiated their district drivethrough as per LAFD’s earthquake emergency plan. Shortly after 0500 hours, they were dispatched to a “reported injury” in the 4000 block of Sunswept Drive, a narrow, winding, residential street in the Hollywood Hills. When they arrived on scene, they were amazed at the sight of the fallen house. They treated Lola Minkow’s broken ankle, and she was taken to a local hospital by friends.

Armed with flashlights in the total darkness (power was out in the entire area), the firefighters searched the collapsed structure for the two missing women. Visibility was severely limited, and they had received no response to their calls. They reported the incident to Valley Command and at 0616 hours left the scene and proceeded to complete their district drive-through.

About 15 minutes later, Engine 78 arrived at the incident as part of its drivethrough (Sunswept Drive is actually in Fire Station 78’s district) and found a number of L.A. Police Department officers, friends, neighbors, and media people at the site. Engine 78 joined the search as the sun came up; and through searching and hailing, they were able to locate Rose Minkow.

Rose Minkow was pinned to her bed by the floor above her, trapped by the floor membrane above and floor joists on both sides. Members heard her muffled screams for help and, using axes, power saws, and raw muscle, cut through and removed the debris to reach her. Engine 97 returned to the scene at approximately 0720 hours and assisted in the rescue. Once extricated, she was packaged onto a stretcher with full Cspine precautions and taken up the embankment to the street. There, it was determined that she had received only minor abrasions; she was treated and released.

THE SECOND VICTIM

Baitman, the other missing woman, wasn’t as fortunate; she still could not be located. The commanding officer at the scene requested, through Valley Command, additional resources. With the fire department’s primary USAR team occupied at the Northridge Meadows Apartments collapse, a secondary team of off-duty USAR members was assembled. They activated a reserve vehicle, loaded it with equipment, and arrived at the Sunswept Drive collapse at approximately 1000 hours. Engine 247 arrived at about the same time.

Prior to operations, the search team members gathered information that would help in finding the victim, such as the following:

• building construction,
• building floor plan,
• possible location of the victim.
• items in the victim’s room, and
• the victim’s behavioral patterns. They also considered the following saf factors that could influence the operation:
• terrain,
• status of utilities,
• stability of debris,
• weight of material above them,
• resources available, and
• continuing aftershocks.

Weighing the viability of the victim a evaluating the risk/benefit ratio of worki on this precarious collapse, the team focused on finding the trapped woman as quickly as possible.

(Photos above by Richard Warford; the rest by Glenn P. Corbett.)

The ICS was immediately put into effect, and a separate tactical radio frequency was designated, as was a safety officer to monitor conditions. Firefighters verified that the gas line to what used to be the house was shut off. The police department maintained security and moved civilian onlookers and media to a safe location.

During the early hours of Monday, January 17. the full impact of the earthquake was not yet known and the rescue of Salvador Pefta at the Northridge Fashion Center parking structure was still underway, as were rescue operations at the Northridge Meadows Apartments, an incident that ultimately would claim 16 lives. The single remaining victim at the Sunswept collapse was a 69-year-old, 200-pound, diabetic woman. She was known to sleep soundly through the night; and due to her age. weight, and medical condition, it was not likely that she would have jumped out of bed when the shaking began.

EXTENDED OPERATION

After more than eight hours of intensive searching, there was no indication that Baitman had survived. As time went on, the probability of finding her alive sharply decreased, and it became increasingly clear that this would be an extended body recovery operation. The remains of the home rested precariously on the side of the 70degree hill; part of the heavy, tile roof was dangerously wedged against a neighbor’s pool house, above the rescuers. Two cars and the concrete slab from the garage floor were on the high side of the slope, also above the rescuers. The remainder of the unstable debris pile was totally disconnected and could slide with any one of the frequent aftershocks.

By the end of the day. it was determined that the search would not be continued after dark; the pile was too unstable, and appropriate equipment was not yet available. Small portable lights could not be positioned on the severe slope of the hill to light the area adequately. It was hoped that earthquake-related activity throughout the city would be less on Tuesday and that additional personnel and equipment could be brought in to continue the effort to find the body of Beatrice Baitman. Police officers remained on scene to provide security.

Early Tuesday morning, approximately 10 USAR team members were on the scene. Heavy Rescue 56. a large, wrecker-type vehicle with two 20-ton booms, was used to pull the two vehicles out of the rubble and to move large, heavy pieces of the debris to provide access and safety for rescuers. Removal of the vehicles was a feat in itself due to numerous obstructions, the angle of lift, the limitations of the wrecker, and the narrow road.

Because of the weight, the angle, and the severe aftershocks, the pile had shifted almost 30 feet overnight. Search and rescue personnel crawled deep into holes, called for the victim, and used electronic listening devices-but to no avail. Dogs from the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department were also used to search the structure. The dogs gave only weak and vague alerts in an area on the northeast section of the pile but not at any one specific point.

As dark grew near, it was determined that the debris was still too unsafe to continue operations into the night. Most of the rescue team spent the night at the Disaster Preparedness Section offices located adjacent to the Valley Command Post. After having a warm meal, they held a plans meeting to determine the strategy for Wednesday’s operations. Members then used portable cots to get some badly needed rest; for some, it was the first sleep since the earthquake had occurred. Again, police officers maintained security throughout the night.

Recovery operations commenced early on Wednesday, January 19, with Battalion Chief Richard Warford as the incident commander and Captain Craig Morrison as the search leader. Heavy Rescue 56 was placed at the bottom of the hill on Ventura Boulevard, to the rear of the structure. The heavy, steel cables from Heavy Rescue 56 were stretched up the embankment about 200 feet, and team members used chain to attach the cables to large, structural sections that were then pulled out of the way. The construction background and mechanical aptitude of the members paid off. because all portions of the building that were relocated fell exactly where predicted.

Search dogs again were used to aid in the search, but they did not alert in the same place as the previous day. The rubble pile had been reduced by the rescuers and had shifted another six feet during the night- perhaps the air currents through the debris had changed.

At approximately 1200 hours, Light Force 88 was brought in to assist the USAR team and worked throughout the day clearing the area where the victim’s bedroom was thought to be. By late in the day, no furniture, bedding, or carpeting from the missing woman’s room had yet been found.

The decision was made to continue operations into the night, at least until midnight. when the situation would be reevaluated. The site was much more stable, and the entire scene was illuminated by a large, commercial lighting unit that had been brought to the site. A second USAR team and task force and Rescue Ambulance 26 were requested for relief at 1800 hours.

Throughout the entire operation, friends, neighbors, family members, and media people stood by awaiting the end of the ordeal. Almost everyone had resolved themselves to the inevitable, but there could be no closure to the incident until Beatrice Baitman was found. Just as the additional resources arrived, rescuers cleared an area below the fallen garage floor. The furniture and bedding found there were identified as the victim’s. Additional debris was removed, and Baitman was located, lying in her bed under the covers. From her injuries, it was apparent that she had died immediately when the house collapsed on and around her. She had suffered severe crush injuries, particularly in the area of the head, which had taken the impact of a fallen beam. The family was notified immediately; the coroner was called; the body was removed; and the lights were turned off.

By 2100 hours, the site that had been so active for three days was now dark, quiet, and empty.

Baitman’s death was one of 57 deaths directly attributed to the Northridge Earthquake, many of which were caused by fatal crush injuries from structural elements. Hundreds of rescue hours had gone into the search for and recovery of her body from the unstructured remains of this million-do 11 ar house. It had taken the Minkows four years to build their dream house and Mother Nature 30 seconds to tear it down.

LESSONS LEARNED AND REINFORCED

• Search and rescue operations in collapse structures are dangerous at best. Earthquake aftershocks increase the hazard potential already associated with collapse pile instability. Member safety requires a painstaking, detail-oriented effort on the part of officers and firefighters alike.

Risk-benefit analysis is ongoing at such an event. Weighing the safety of firefighters against the likelihood of a successful rescue is a very difficult process. A difficult decision may have to be made, with a multitude of factors and aspects of the specific operation considered. The uniqueness of each collapse event makes the decision even more difficult-there is no “universal formula” for the risk analysis.

The officers in charge of the 3999 Sunswept Drive collapse made the very difficult-and very painful-decision to discontinue operations on the night of January 17. It was felt that the extent of the collapse, the risk of secondary collapse due to pile shifting/aftershocks, the physical condition and original location of the victim, the risk from working in near darkness, the automobiles and sections of roof perched precariously above the rescuers, the angle of the hill, the lack of resources available, and the firefighters’ fatigue outweighed the potential for finding the victim alive within a reasonable amount of time.

Whether it is a “popular” decision or not, the fire officer must be guided first and foremost by responsibility for the safety of the crew. Fortunately at this incident, no firefighters were injured. The potential for a mass-casualty incident that included rescue workers certainly existed.

• Drawings prepared by occupants may be helpful when a pancake collapse fans out. but they may not specifically pinpoint a vie tint’s location. Slides due to aftershocks can make it even more difficult to predict the exact location of the occupant’s room. The victim’s body was recovered from an area about 15 feet from where rescuers thought it might be after more than two days of searching. Furnishings and decor (carpets, wallpaper. wall color, furniture, etc.) are important clues to locating a buried victim.
• Some areas of the collapse may be especially dangerous due to the size or weight of pieces of rubble or parts of the structure that may be unstable. Large tow trucks with heavy-duty cables, cranes, or other heavy equipment may be used to move heavy rubble or whole floors, but use extreme caution to ensure that bodies are not “buttered” across a slab. Selected debris removal is done where it is confirmed that there arc no victims, to facilitate access to other areas. General debris removal is done when it is a virtual certainty that any remaining victims are dead and all other options have been exhausted.
• A separate location should be established for the deposit of debris from the collapsed structure so that the search area is kept clear and rubble has to be handled only once. Often, a bucket-brigade approach to passing debris out of the work area works well.
• For safety and organization, a collapse site must be cleared of all nonessential personnel. The work area should be divided geographically to prevent redundant search operations or confusion by rescue workers; as specific areas are cleared, it should be
• noted on a written site plan or map.
• During major disasters it is important to be self-sufficient, as resources may be few and far between. Fuel for hand tools and food for rescuers, for example, are critical for sustained operations.
• While it is prudent to utilize all resources available to you at a collapse rescue operation, you also must recognize the limits of those tools. Rescue dogs may be useful to your operation, but wind currents and vapor travel in void spaces can lead to less-than-accurate results.