BY ANTHONY AVILLO
As incident commander (IC), you are responsible for the entire fireground, not just what you see at the front of the building. This one-sided view can be an extreme handicap to the chief officer who allows it to hamstring him. If you have positioned your command post (CP) where you can see two sides of the fire building, you have doubled your individual portfolio of the fireground experience. This is not always possible because of conditions created by setbacks; landscaping; and, of course, the attached building.
How can you see the whole fireground when you are shackled to the CP? Well, there are those chief officers who like to take laps around the building to stay on top of the operation. More than likely, they will just get tired and eventually will have a panoramic view when the building has been reduced to ashes. Other ICs like to stick their noses inside for a bird’s eye view of the operation. This won’t help the command effort either. First of all, the firefighters and officers don’t want you inside micromanaging. Second, you just can’t see anything inside anyway. Simply stated, the IC must stay put at the CP and use other tools to find out information from inside and around the fireground.
The unseen areas that cannot be observed directly from the CP will create problems for command because no definite confident action can be taken concerning them without information. Obvious-ly, Side A will not usually present the same problem because the IC positioned at a proper CP should be able to see, evaluate, and take action on what is directly in front of him. This should not be terribly difficult. It is the areas out of view of the CP that will create the bulk of the fireground problem and require obtaining critical information as early and as often in the incident as possible.
These areas include the rear, the sides, the roof, the interior, and the exposures. The acronym FLEAS outlines the important information to obtain concerning the above areas: Fire conditions, Life hazard profile, Exposure profile, Access profile, and Structural concerns.
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- Fire conditions: They may be quite different from what is visible on Side A (photo 1).
- Life hazard profile: How many people need rescue, and where are they? They’re usually found at windows or on fire escapes.
- Exposure profile: What and how close are they? Debris can act like a fuse to rear exposures (photo 2).
- Access profile: Ideally, how many members can get to the rear? What is the safest, most effective path of least resistance? What are the obstacles?
- Structural concerns: What is the condition of the rear? That part of the building will often be less well maintained than the front.
- Fire conditions: Are there any autoexposure possibilities, such as combustible siding? This material can act like a vertical fuse.
- Life hazard profile: Where and how many are there? Check windows, fire escapes, and other locations.
- Exposure profile: How close are ex-posures, and do they have windows that can invite fire? Exposures may have to be addressed right away.
- Access profile: What are the laddering possibilities? Look for the presence of ex-tension cords between buildings where electricity is being “shared” illegally, deb-ris in alleys, alley width, and other considerations.
- Structural concerns: Sidewalls are often less well maintained than the front walls. Sidewalls may indicate the building’s true construction type. Although the brick front of the building (side A) may seem to indicate ordinary construction, it may be only a veneer. Sides B, C, and D may have the original siding indicative of wood-frame construction.
The Sides
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The Roof
- Fire conditions: Observe during roof walk-around, and check enclosed shaft conditions.
- Life hazard profile: Where and how many are there? Look for victims at bulkheads, at windows, or on fire escapes in shafts. The roof is often the first place from which this will be seen, especially at attached buildings.
- Exposure profile: Are there taller buildings adjacent? Do they have combustible walls and windows facing the roof of the fire building? Is there combustible roofing material on the exposure? Combustible walls will create additional protection problems for the IC.
- Access profile: Are neighboring buildings/exposures attached or unattached? Do power lines inhibit aerial access? Are there two ways to exit?
- Structural concerns: What’s the roof construction type (e.g., truss, rain roof, etc.)? Look for heavy roof objects (e.g., air-conditioning units), deteriorated parapets, and roof vent holes from previous fires (photos 3, 4).
(3) Not only is the chimney deteriorated, but the patchwork on this roof suggests previous fire operations. Command must know about roof areas that may be structurally compromised. (Photo by author.) |
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- Fire conditions: What they are and what we are doing about them impact all other areas of concern. Putting out the fire eliminates all other problems.
- Life hazard profile: What’s the primary search report? What are protect-in-place options? What is the tenability of egress paths?
- Exposure profile: What are paths of least resistance, and what is being done to get resources there before the fire?
- Access profile: What are the barriers and obstacles to the seat of the fire? This will be a major factor in our ability to stop the fire where it began or watch it affect all other areas of concern.
- Structural concerns: What are the building’s construction type and inherent limitations with regard to assault by fire?
- Fire conditions: Has fire spread to exposures yet? How do you keep that from happening?
- Life hazard profile: Is evacuation or protect-in-place the most effective option?
- Exposure profile: Can the fire spread beyond the immediate exposures? Note the locations of shafts or unexpected poke-throughs and renovations that invite rapid fire spread. Are there cocklofts and basements common to a whole row?
- Access profile: Anticipate access problems, especially in at-tached structures. Don’t wait to find these problems; assign someone to get into exposures early.
- Structural concerns: Are there construction limitations?
The Exposures
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Wow! This is a lot of ground to cover. How does the IC stay on top of this to keep one step ahead of the operation? The answer: delegation and decentralization.
DELEGATION AND DECENTRALIZATION
Delegation is the art of getting something accomplished through others. When areas of concern are delegated to subordinate officers, either company or chief officers, command strength is significantly increased. Delegation by decentralization involves sharing the fireground with others. The best way to do this is to assign those areas where problems exist to a supervisory officer. ICs who do not work well with others often struggle on the fireground. How many times do we see a picture of a major fire operation with its conga line of white helmets at the front of the building?
This is unacceptable. Management by committee is not conducive to good fireground operations. Break up the opinion brigade and you will get more accomplished faster and, most importantly, more safely.
Chief officers not assigned as the IC or operations chief belong where they can assist in the command effort. The aforementioned areas not visible to the CP are the main focus for assignments of these chiefs. I took an excellent National Fire Academy course a few years ago (taught by Philadelphia Deputy Chief Jim Smith and haz-mat expert Dave Lesak) called “Command and Control of Major Fireground Emergencies.” The concepts taught in the class helped me tremendously and enabled me to take the incident command system to the street. They discussed a concept “Create the Monster, Feed the Monster.” Basically, this means that anywhere a problem exists (a monster), a division supervisor must be assigned to control it. Once the monster is created, it must be fed. To survive to the point where the monster becomes an asset to the fireground organization, it must be fed resources in the form of personnel and equipment.
It is important to announce the division supervisor assignment by radio: “Dispatch from Central Avenue Command: Be advised, Battalion 2 will be Interior Division supervisor. Battalion 1 will be Bravo Division supervisor. Ladder 3 officer is Roof Division supervisor.” This informs personnel that someone is in charge of a given area, providing further organization and safety.
Let’s apply this to an example. Suppose there is a working fire on the top floor of a multiple dwelling of wood-frame construction (photo 5). The fire building is attached on both sides. There are at least four areas of management that must be addressed, none of which you can accurately see from the vantage point of the CP: the interior of the fire building (assign an Interior Division supervisor), both attached exposures (assign a Bravo and Delta Division supervisor), and the roof (assign a Roof Division supervisor). If you feel uncomfortable about the rear, about which the Roof Division can report on initially, assign a Charlie Division supervisor. Your span of control here would be four or five to one, depending on whether you decide to assign a division to the rear. This keeps the span of control at an acceptable level. You have created your “monsters” and are now in a position to feed them as required.
I have found that using the task force concept to “feed the monster” works best. Assigning two engine companies and a support company, such as a ladder or rescue company, to each “monster” will allow the division supervisor to get things done more safely and in a more organized manner. At least it is a start. You can always add or subtract companies based on the division progress reports. If this requires additional alarms, get them moving early. Don’t wait until you have no one standing at the CP and a division supervisor is screaming for resources to order them. By then, it will be too late.
Speaking of personnel standing by at the CP, it is in your (and the troops’ as well as the fire building’s) best interest to maintain a tactical reserve at all times, especially when the fire is escalating. Unexpected tasks that pop up as well as relief requirements demand this. If there is no one on the bench when the first string is spent, the game will be forfeited. The rule of thumb I use is that if the fire is still escalating and I do not have at least two companies standing at the CP uncommitted, I strike an additional alarm. Unneeded companies can always be placed back in service.
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Following this concept of decentralization, delegation, and replenishment of companies through tactical reserve not only allows the IC to break down the fireground into manageable parts, decentralizing command, but also provides for personnel accountability. Giving personnel assignments (i.e., places they are supposed to be where they are told what to do) virtually eliminates freelancing. Another advantage of decentralization is that radio traffic is reduced. As the companies operating in the assigned divisions should be able to communicate face-to-face with the division supervisor, less company-level chatter exists with the division supervisor handling the bulk of the radio communication.
Furthermore, it must be stressed that division supervisors must be wearing the same level of PPE as all members assigned to their area of responsibility are wearing (photo 6). The IC must insist on and enforce this, and it should be seconded by the safety officer, who should also be in full PPE. Division commanders and safety officers not in full PPE set the worst examples and invite subordinates to violate safety requirements.
Note that whether your fireground is unhampered by freelancing is directly proportional to the amount of training and discipline your assigned personnel display. Even the best action plans and strategies will be useless if personnel are not disciplined enough to operate in their assigned areas until relieved or reassigned by a chief officer. This begins with the soft environment in the fire station and on the training ground.
Chief officers must instill this discipline in their subordinates well before an incident occurs. It is critical that the department support this discipline with a zero tolerance attitude toward freelancing. This means that the chief officer and the department should ensure their subordinates are aware of how they are expected to conduct themselves on the fireground regarding assignments. If this is not done beforehand, personnel cannot be expected to know their roles. Personnel on the fireground belong only in one of three spots: operating in an assigned area, in rehab, or staged in a designated staging area or at the CP. If they are anywhere else, they are freelancing.
The following Task Assignment Model illustrates the concept:
Step 1: Companies report to the CP as a unit.
Step 2: Companies are assigned to an operational area, reporting to a division supervisor.
Step 3: Companies operate only in their assigned division.
Step 4: When relieved, companies report as a unit back to the CP.
Step 5: If reassigned, they go back to Step 2.
Step 6: If sent to rehab, when complete, they go back to Step 1.
The key to operational control is that all assignments and reassignments go through the CP. Companies should never take it upon themselves to reassign or leave an assigned operational area without orders. Freelancing is always a mistake and should never be tolerated.
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USING THE SAFETY OFFICER EFFECTIVELY
Proper use of the safety officer can also assist the IC in running a controlled, safe, and informed fireground. The safety officer, like the subordinate chief officer, is another position that should not be shackled to the CP. This person should be assigned as the eyes and ears of the IC. Orders and directives that come from the safety officer carry the weight of the IC, and personnel should be directed to follow them as such. The safety officer should be mobile, going where the problem areas are and furnishing reports back to command, either face-to-face or by radio. This concept, which I refer to as “roving recon,” puts an arm of the IC where it is needed most at all times. Basically, the safety officer becomes another division supervisor, one with the flexibility to check on all areas of the fireground as the need arises.
In North Hudson (NJ).Regional Fire and Rescue, I have the luxury of a dedicated safety officer on duty at all times. Once on-scene, he reports to the CP to let me know he is there and then, unless I have something specific for him to do, immediately does a 360º tour of the fireground. After reporting back for a face-to-face report, or if something critical arises, by radio, he begins to move to the areas of most concern to liaison with the division supervisor if one is assigned at that time or with the company officer assigned to that area. He provides support from the safety point of view and advises as required. His reports back to the CP are issued at regular intervals and are a vital part of command operational evaluation.
DIVISION PROGRESS REPORT
The division supervisors who have been assigned to those unseen areas around the fireground as a result of “creating the monster” must be supported by command to operate effectively (i.e., feeding the monster). The IC, however, is not a mind reader or soothsayer about those areas he can’t see. Support comes only because the division supervisors have reported to command on those issues that are vital to the battle. Command needs to know not only how the action plan and strategy are working, but also how the troops are faring in the field. To this end, the division supervisors must report to command the Division Progress Report and, following the acronym CAR, furnish command with at least the following to receive proper support:
- Conditions: What is going on in my division?
- Actions: What am I doing about it?
- Resources: What do I need to maintain my position and complete my assignment? This includes relief of personnel.
Division progress reports must be furnished at regular intervals. If they are not, command must be nosy and request division progress reports whenever he needs to know how things are going.
Note that the CAR approach to reporting also applies to the company progress report. There will be times (most of the time, for that matter) when division supervision is not necessary because of the incident’s magnitude. Most incidents are small; nevertheless, the person in charge of operations in a given area, whether it’s a division supervisor in charge of five companies or a company officer in charge of his firefighters, is responsible for reporting conditions, actions, and resource requests to command. Again, disciplined officers will always make the IC’s job easier.
COMMAND PROGRESS REPORT
The division progress report is vital for several reasons. First and foremost, it allows command to evaluate the current strategy and action plan. Second, it furnishes command with a means to inventory what has been accomplished so far; what still needs to be done; and maybe, if things are not going according to plan, what may not get done. Finally, the division progress report equips command with the information required to furnish dispatch with the command progress report.
A command progress report, which is radioed to dispatch, is a current summary of fireground activities thus far in the operation and must be a routine part of the command process. A command progress report should also be given when significant changes, such as collapse or sudden fire extension, occur on the fireground. A progress report should also be transmitted when additional alarms are requested. Issuing progress reports forces the IC to look at the building and take an inventory of operations completed, in progress, and still required. Basically, it keeps the IC’s head in the game. This report, given every 15 minutes or as required by conditions, covers the areas outlined in the acronym CABS:
- Conditions: What is going on now?
- Actions taken: What is being done about it?
- Benchmarks completed: Primary search, roof ventilation, and so on.
- Status of operations: Where are we in the operation? An operational status report requires a declaration of one of the following: fire doubtful, probable will hold, conditions unchanged, conditions improving, under control, or extinguished.
Fire doubtful. This indicates that a fluid and still developing situation exists. It is understood that the situation remains doubtful until change is reported in subsequent progress reports by the transmission of “Probable will hold” or “Under control.”
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Sample report: “Dispatch from Central Avenue Command, Progress Report #1. Have heavy fire on the second floor, side Charlie. Three lines are stretched, two operating, primary search is negative. Natural openings on roof are vented at this time. Checking for extension in cockloft as well as in exposure Bravo. Fire is doubtful at this time. Additional reports to follow.”
Probable will hold. Indicates that in the IC’s judgment there are sufficient apparatus, equipment, and personnel on hand to contain the fire or emergency and prevent further extension or escalation. However, if an unknown, unusual, or unpredictable condition develops, additional help may be required, but the fire or emergency will not develop to critical or uncontrollable proportions.
Sample report: “Dispatch from Central Avenue Command, Progress Report #__. Companies are making headway on fire. Smoke conditions and division reports are indicating a darkening fire. Have three lines stretched into building and one in each exposure. All are charged. Roof ventilation has been completed. Exposures being checked, extension negative at this time. Fire status changed to probable will hold.”
Conditions unchanged. Indicates that conditions are the same as in the previous report and the fire force has made little or no progress in the extinguishment of the fire. This term is not used in preliminary and early progress reports while the fire situation is still developing and being defined. This report is accompanied by a general description of current operations.
Sample Report: “Dispatch from Central Ave- nue Command. Progress Report #__. Condi-tions remain unchanged. Companies are still operating in an offensive mode in previously reported locations and the attack is continuing.”
Conditions improving. Fire forces are making headway, but final extinguishment has not yet been achieved. A description of the areas where fire has been contained accompanies this report.
Sample report: “Dispatch from Central Avenue Command. Progress Report #__. Conditions improving. Visible fire has been knocked down on the third floor. Interior attack continuing on the fourth floor.”
Under control. Indicates that at this time, in the judgment of the IC, final extinguishment of the fire or the control of the emergency will be accomplished by apparatus, equipment, and personnel on the scene.
Proper strategic operations occur as a combined result of awareness and information. Awareness of fire spread related to building construction (based on your own knowledge) combined with information from strategically important areas of the fireground (via delegation and decentralization) allow for a well-informed and safe fireground.
If you analyze a fireground gone wrong, the problem will usually originate at an area that was unobserved from the CP. Most of the problems the IC will encounter will originate in areas he cannot see. It is, however, imperative that the IC know as much as possible about these areas so something can be done about them. Little problems left unattended become big problems later. Eventually all problems, attended to or not (the building, the exposures, the block), will go away. If the IC is aware of them when they are still small, he can take action to mitigate them.
ANTHONY AVILLO, a 19-year veteran of the fire service, is a deputy chief with North Hudson (NJ) Regional Fire and Rescue, assigned as commander of the First Platoon. He is an instructor at the Bergen County (NJ) Fire Academy and holds a New Jersey State Certification as a level II instructor and arson investigator. Avillo is a partner in Study Group, Inc., which assists firefighters and officers prepare for firefighter entry, company, and chief officer-level examinations. Avillo has taught as a Hands-On Training instructor and lecturer at FDIC and FDIC West. He co-developed the course “Fireground Officer Development” and has taught it at seminars and academies across the United States. He is the author of Fireground Strategies (Fire Engineering, 2002) and Fireground Strategies Workbook (Fire Engineering, 2003).