CONFINED SPACE CLAIMS DENVER FIREFICHTER IN A TRAGIC BUILDING FIRE

CONFINED SPACE CLAIMS DENVER FIREFICHTER IN A TRAGIC BUILDING FIRE

On September 28, 1992, Engineer Mark Langvardt became the 50th Denver, Colorado, firefighter to die in the line of duty, the first in more than 17 years. This article is dedicated to Mark and his family. We hope that the lessons learned at this fire will help prevent future firefighter injuries and deaths throughout the fire service.

Note: The informational basis for this article is a report of the investigation and re-creation of fire department operations on that tragic day, conducted by the Safety and Training Division of the Denver Fire Department. The report clearly states that the investigation of operations was “intended to clarify the actions at the fire. It is not a criticpie. It is not a finger-pointing, second-guessing speculation. As in every fire and every emergency, there are lessons to be learned; 1625 S. Broadway is no exception.”

At 0203 hours on September 28, 1992, the Denver (CO) Fire Department Communications Center received a report of a fire at 1625 S. Broadway, a two-story commercial occupancy located in Denver’s South End. This area of the city’ is a mix of residential and commercial/retail buildings, with several pockets of light and heavy industrial occupancies.

I he first-due response consisted of two engine companies, a truck company, and a district chief (Chief 3), a typical response for this area of the city. First-arriving companies found heavy smoke showing but no visible fire. Supply lines were laid and 1 ⅛inch preconnects were pulled as engine crews prepared for quick initial attack. Truck company members split into two teams to perform forcibleentry, primary search, and ventilation.

THE FIRE BUILDING

The fire building, built in 1980, was a two-story (split-level) building of ordinary construction measuring approximately 50 feet wide by 60 feet deep. Exterior walls were concreteblock and interior walls consisted of wood studs and wallboard. The floor joists were laminated, tongue-andgroove wooden I-beams. The I-beams were 16 inches high; their vertical components (webs) were 3/8-inchthick plywood, and their horizontal elements (chords) were two-by-fours. Each I-beam spanned the entire width of the building. These structural elements were a significant factor in the fire, contributing to early structural collapse that led to entrapment of a firefighter and hampered efforts to rescue him.

The building’s drop ceilings—suspended metal frames with twoby four-foot tiles—on both floors were significant in fire growth. The drop ceilings created 24-inch-deep concealed voids below the floor and roof. Eight inches of dead space existed between the tiles and bottom chords. Extension of fire into these voids led to the destruction of the lightweight wood I-beams and subsequent collapse of sections of the structure.

The building was a split-level: Upon entering the front door one could take the half-stairway to the left to the lower level (which would appear as a garden level from the exterior) or take the half-stairway to the right to the upper level (which would appear to be the l 1/2-story level from the exterior). This design is unusual for commercial occupancies; typically it is found in smaller residential occupancies.

‘Hie building was used as sales offices for several small printing businesses. The upper level contained a compartmentized maze of numerous rooms, both large and small. The lower level had a similar floor plan with some larger storage rooms. Since it housed sales/business offices. Unbuilding contained minimal flammable liquid fuels. However, large quantities of paper were stored throughout the building, and numerous pieces of office equipment and furniture added to the fire load. The building did not have automatic sprinklers, nor did it have a fire detection system. There were metal security grates on all the windows except one.

FIRE OPERATIONS

The first-in companies encountered heavy heat and smoke conditions throughout the interior during the initial attack. Engine 16 stretched a handline to the upper floor, but extreme heat coming from below convinced the company officer to reposition on the lower floor.

Visibility on the lower floor was five feet. Members of Truck 16 who had forced entry located two rooms on the first floor, remote from each other, that were heavily involved with fire.

The attack team knocked down these fires while natural horizontal ventilation was performed on the lower and upper floors. Another fire was located and extinguished. El6’s officer knew that the multiple fire locations indicated the possibility of arson and of even more sets and instructed his team to use extreme caution. He radioed to Chief 3 that all visible fire on the lower floor had been knocked down. Tl6’s officer requested additional ventilation.

At 0222 hours, Chief 3 specialcalled Rescue Company 1 to assist in positive-pressure ventilation/overhaul operations. It was unknown to Chief 3 and members operating on the lower floor that fire still controlled a large portion of the building on the upper floor as well as the floor and roof assemblies.

As companies from Station 16 were initiating their operations, E21’s crew stretched a line into the building from the rear to the upper floor to check for fire there. They encountered heavy smoke and heat. They searched for fire in the office spaces at the north (exposure #4) side of the building but found none. The crew retreated from the upper floor with the handline to replace spent air cylinders. At about this time, Chief 3 observed fire in the southwest corner of the upper floor.

With a fresh supply of air, E21 reentered the building to resume upper-floor operations. They were joined by members of Tl6 in a search of the south (exposure #2) side of the building. Smoke and heat conditions intensified significantly at this time. Members found a large body of fire at the southwest corner of the upper floor and began to work on it. Several communications between El6, Tl6, E21, and Chief 3 were attempted. Some got through; others did not.

(Photos courtesy of Denver Fire Department Safety and Training Division.)

At 0233 hours, the chief requested an additional engine and truck to fill out the assignment. Then he ordered R1 to stretch a handline to the upper floor to back up the attack crew working there, at the request of Tl6’s company officer. Additional units arrived at approximately 0240 hours. Chief 3 ordered the engine to stage south of the fire building and the truck crew to ventilate the roof.

The fire on the second floor was intense and stubborn, and progress was slow. Visibility was very poor. Members were already into their second and third air cylinders.

FIREFIGHTER DOWN

Engineer Mark langvardt, a 16-year veteran of the Denver Fire Department, had arrived with Tl6 at the outset of the operation and carried on truck company tasks. After forcing entry and searching the lower floor, he exited the building to open up several lower-floor windows, assisted by a member of E16. It was noted at this time that he was wearing full protective gear, including SCBA with facepiece on. After this exterior venting, he reentered the structure, joining members of E16 and his partner from Tl6, who were ascending the front stairs for the second reconnaissance of the upper floor.

It was about the time that firefighters located the upperfloor fire that Langvardt became separated from his partner and the other interior firefighting teams. In postincident interviews, many firefighters operating on the second floor that night believe that the separation distances were short, such as those that would be typical for one to accomplish quick search-and-vent duties. It is believed that langvardt may have thought that since the main body of fire on the first floor had been knocked down, companies were now in the overhaul stage of operations. (It is important to note that while operations at this fire were the subject of an intense investigation, many of the events leading to the death of Langvardt will always he subject to supposition.)

At approximately 0237 hours, Chief 3 observed what appeared to be a beam of light from a flashlight at a second-floor window, located just to the left above the building’s front entrance. Someone weakly broke a small hole in the window and stuck the flashlight out. Chief 3 yelled, “Do you need help?” There was no reply. The flashlight was lit momentarily and then disappeared from view.

Firefighters outside at the front of the building recognized this as a distress signal. Members of R1 grabbed hand tools and cutting tools and two portable ladders to make entry into the room through the front window The officer from Tl6, also outside when the flashlight lit, reentered the building to attempt to locate the firefighter from inside. Chief 3 requested a second alarm at approximately 0238 hours. Tib’s officer noted that the upper floor was far hotter and smokier than it had been just a few minutes before. He worked his way west through a reception room. As he exited the room, adjacent to the rescue room, the floor sloped severely—-it had collapsed. The interior route to the firefighter’s position was cut off by this partial collapse of the upper floor.

Other firefighters tried but could not reach the room from the interior. Members of E16 were moving their handline on the second floor to assist in the firefight when they received a communication that a firefighter was in trouble. They crawled as far as they could toward the room but were turned away by the intense heat and smoke rising from the hole being created by the slow collapse.

Meanwhile, firefighters from R1 placed ladders on each side of die window, removed die metal window grate, and broke the window. Dense smoke poured out of the window opening-smoke sti thick diat rescuers on the ladders could not see each other from across the 20-inch-wide window.

CONFINED-SPACE RESCUE ATTEMPT

Two firefighters dove headfirst, one after the other, through the very narrow window into the room. The drop from the sill to the floor was 42 inches. They landed on Langvardt. The victim was facedown, wedged in a fetal position with his head (helmet in place) pressed against the interior portion of the front wall.

The rescuers found themselves in a confined space: The room, measuring six feet wide by 11 feet deep, was filled with file cabinets and business equipment. The aisle created by this storage was only 28 inches wide. The two rescuers could barely fit in die space together, and they could barely reach into dieir pockets for small hand tools. There was room for only one firefighter to bend over the victim and try to get leverage to lift him. ITic standard-size door to the room was blocked with equipment, and the only way in or out was a small bi-fold door; this path of egress was blocked by the floor collapse.

Smoke in the room was so dense that the rescuers could not evaluate Langvardt’s condition. It was apparent, however, that he was unconscious. They tried to raise Langvardt up to the window. They could not. They did not know what kind of room they were in because of the smoke. All they knew was that they could hardly move in this extremely tight space, their brother was down, and they could not raise him up and out of the window.

The advancing fire was threatening the rescuers’ position. Several handlines were deployed to push the fire away from the room and the front of the building. All handlines operating from the rear of the building were shut down to prevent pushing fire toward the rescue operation.

Numerous attempts were made by rotating rescue teams to remove the trapped firefighter out of the window. All were unsuccessful. Some firefighters thought that Langvardt might have been stuck or pinned down. This was not the case. Rescuers could not raise langvardt up and out of the window because of the narrow space and the distance to the sill. They were able to raise him about a foot —that was all. One firefighter said afterward that it was like Langvardt “was tied to a thousand pounds of concrete.” Another said that it was like Langvardt “was part of the room.”

Some firefighters continued to try to reach the victim from the interior. Finally, with the southwest roof of the building in a state of imminent collapse, all firefighters were pulled out of the interior, with the exception of those operating in the rescue room and foyer/stairwell involved in keeping fire away from the rescue effort.

Access to the victim finally was achieved by breaching through the interior foyer wall. (Breaching the exterior wall was considered but was ruled out as a possibility because of the victim’s position, the need to deploy protecting hose streams from this location, the thickness of the masonry wall, and the need to maintain the only means of access and egress for rescuers.) This breaching operation was very difficult because heavy heat and dense smoke had penetrated the stairwell. Working on ground ladders, firefighters used power saws and other cutting tools to breach the wall. Even then, storage shelves, equipment, and stored materials that lined the wall had to be removed from the exterior.

Langvardt was removed from the room at approximately 0330 hours, after a 55-minute rescue operation. He was immediately transported to a hospital by awaiting paramedics, where he was pronounced dead. The cause of death was carbon monoxide poisoning.

The fire was extinguished from defensive positions with a third-alarm assignment called approximately one hour into the operation. Eight enginecompanies, six truck companies, one rescue company, one air supply/lighting unit, four district chiefs, and numerous support personnel operated at the peak of the incident.

INVESTIGATION

An investigation by the Denver FireDepartment Fire Investigation Bureau and the Denver Police Department eletermined that numerous flammable liquid fires had been set at 1625 S. Broadway. Three suspects are in custody on suspicion of burglary-, arson, anel murder.

Immediately following the incident, the Safety and Training Division of the Denver Fire Department performed a separate investigation of the events that led to Langvardt’s death and the rescue attempt. The Safety and Training Division’s investigation included interviewing more than 50 firefighters, company officers, and chief officers who worked at this incident. A complete re-creation of the rescue operation was conducted at the fire building. The same room was used and set up with the exact office equipment and furnishings in their exact locations on the night of the fire. A firefighter of a size similar to Langvardt’s was chosen as the “victim.” Firefighters involved in the recreation were in complete turnout gear, including SCBA with the facepieces blacked out. Every attempt was made to make the re-creation as realistic as possible. Only the heat, smoke, noise, and emotion of the event could not be reproduced.

Numerous attempts were made to lift and pull the “victim” out of the narrow window—all were unsuccessful. The problem was one of physics, litngvardt was 6’1” tall, weighed 190 pounds, and had on hill turnout gear and SCBA. I le was also drenched with water from streams that kept the fire away from the room (the only room in the building not completely destroyed by fire). Within the confined space of the equipment-filled room, even the strongest firefighters could not gain the leverage necessary to lift the victim up more than four feet to the window.

LESSONS LEARNED AND REINFORCED

• Experience shows that the incident command system is an invaluable tool that increases span of control, communication, operational ef-
• fectiveness, and safety on the fireground. Chief officers must realize the value of this tool, implement the system, maintain control, and expand the system to meet the demands of the incident—designating sector officers, safety officers, a logistics officer, a communications officer, etc., as appropriate. Members, in turn, must be well-trained and well-practiced in carrying out their specific functions within the framework of the ICS. Effective implementation of the ICS requires discipline and patience on the part of all members.
• Communication is a critical component of effective fireground command. The investigation of the operations at this incident indicated that communications problems existed from the outset and continued for most of the duration of the incident. Specific two-way communications from a stationary incident commander to interior operating officers, sector officers, and any other ICS positions must be accomplished and completed. Communications between firefighters and company officers by visual and audible means also must exist at the intercompany level. Good communication is the foundation of a fireground accountability/safety system.
• The incident commander must not become directly involved in a rescue operation. This is much easier said than done. When one of your firefighters becomes a victim, the entire operation then becomes an extremely difficult and emotional event for any incident commander and for all fire personnel involved. However, discipline and organization within the framework of the ICS are absolutely essential during such emotional operations.
• The incident commander, assisted by communications from company/operations officers, must formulate contingency plans for all operations, but particularly for difficult rescue operations. Possible outcomes of a specific plan must be anticipated and
• addressed accordingly and well in advance. Needed resources must be brought in immediately.
• For many firefighters not directly involved in the rescue operation, it may have appeared unusual that Langvardt could not be rescued from the window. It was difficult for many firefighters to understand that a “normal” firefighting operation had changed to a confined-space rescue operation. Many possibilities exist in every jurisdiction for this to occur. Preplan and train for this possibility.
• Staging (Level II) is a mandatory component of every working fire operation. When the first-due companies are committed, backup resources must be immediately available in staging. The reflex time involved in requesting help after you need it can be substantial. Call for help early and often. You can always send it back.
• The fact that Langvardt was by himself when he became trapped emphasizes the importance of working in pairs, especially when using SCBA in a smoke-filled atmosphere. However, it may point to a much more significant problem: The Denver Fire Department, like many city fire departments, has suffered from severe budget cuts over the past several years. (Losing six fire companies in the past five years alone, with another truck company scheduled to close under this year’s budget, makes every firefighter’s job more difficult, especially when overall call volume is increasing.) Operating alone certainly is not any firefighter’s first choice, but without the support of the necessary additional staffing it sometimes becomes inevitable to achieve and complete our main purpose—lifesaving—as well as to accomplish the essential truck company operations that all too often are incomplete.

It is important to note that Langvardt definitely was working with a partner and several other members up until the point of his becoming trapped. Think back to your own personal experiences. In the real world, a couple of turns in dense smoke and heat, a flashover occurs, a floor collapses, etc.: You don’t have to he very far from your partner to get into trouble.

• A two-engine, one-truck response to a commercial building fire of this size makes for an ineffective, inefficient, and unsafe scenario (a two-andone assignment is marginal at best for the average dwelling fire, especially with today’s minimum staffing). An initial response of three engines, two trucks, and one rescue is an absolute must for such commercial occupancies (typical response for inner-city neighborhoods in Denver). Response levels should be based on occupancy size as well as geographic location. It’s better to have them and not need them than to need them and not have them. The Denver Fire Department currently is reviewing its response assignments to buildings of this size located outside the inner city.
• As the budget axe continues to swing, incident commanders and company officers at every incident must remember to utilize all available resources, even if it means calling the entire department or mutual aid. We must either use them or lose them.
• The use of a “firefighter support team” or “rapid intervention team” should be seriously considered. This is typically a full crew of firefighters (four to five) from one or more companies who stand by at or near the command post to be utilized as a safety team and only as a safety team. Keep in mind that additional resources still must be in staging for all extended operations. The Denver Fire Department is reviewing the possible use of such a concept.
• At operations in which structural integrity of the building becomes an issue, a safety officer must assess conditions and report to the 1C so that an alternate strategy can be implemented.
• Don’t let your guard down even when the fire is reported to be knocked down. Always suspect more than one fire (numerous sets at arson fires) and always initiate an aggressive operation to check for extension and confine the fire (i.e., aggressive truck company operations). This operation must be initiated early. The IC must provide the additional resources to accomplish these tasks if they are to be completed safely.
• When the first-alarm companies are on their second and third air cylinder changes, it has gotten well past the time for needed rest and rehab operations. Even the very best conditioned and most experienced firefighters cannot work safely for such an extended period of time.
• Over the past several years, fire departments across the nation have diversified their services to the community. This is good, unless we end up sacrificing our ability to provide the most essential services. We must remember, stick with, and train for our primary mission, fire suppression. Although fire suppression may not represent the greatest percentage of most fire departments’ total call volume, it is by far our most hazardous function. It is also the only function that no other city agency performs. Our number one training objective must always be fire suppression. There may be fewer fires today due to built-in fire protection and detection systems and greater public education; however, we all know that statistics don’t tell the full story. The fires we fight today burn faster; involve more toxic fuels; and occur in newer, more cheaply and dangerously constructed occupancies.
• Know your buildings—preplan. The wooden I-beam floor and ceiling assembly is another lightweight construction that can fail early under fire conditions. This construction must be a part of size-up and factored into incident decisions. (See sidebar.) The need for commercial occupancy preplanning was also underscored by the building’s drop ceiling, which created a large void by which the fire could spread and burn undetected for a considerable period of time, attacking the lightweight I-beam joists.
• The value of automatic sprinklers is well-documented. Remember, however. that without a full system, fire can enter voids such as drop ceilings,destroy the integrity of structural components, and injure or kill firefighters. Efforts to educate the public and lobby for automatic sprinklers should concentrate on full sprinklerization.
• 1 3/4-inch handlines are very valuable tools for smaller fires, specifically residential fires. However, in a commercial building of this size, the selection of 2 1/2-inch handlines should be considered if early control is to be achieved.
• Portable radios should be issued to all firefighters on the fireground; all should be trained in their use.
• Engineer Langvardt was found without a forcible entry tool. Because he was involved in the initial forcible entry operations, it is believed that he also went in with a tool. It is unknown what happened to the tool. However, the point to remember is this: Your forcible entry tool is also a forcible exit tool. The room in which Langvardt became trapped was essentially a jail cell, due to the metal security grate covering the exterior window. Most of these security grates can be removed from the interior with a good tool. However, they are much more easily removed from the outside.
• Ventilation is an integral component of successful firefighting operations. Horizontal ventilation must be coordinated with fire attack. Vertical ventilation must be addressed and accomplished early in the firefight.
• Metal security grates have been an urban problem for years. When firefighters are operating inside a building with these grates, the grates must be removed —if necessary, one or more additional companies must be used for this purpose. If not, we are asking the interior firefighters to operate without a secondary means of egress—for all intents and purposes, to operate inside a jail.

Mark Langvardt’s death is a dreadful memory for Denver firefighters and the very worst of tragedies for his family. The number one lesson learned is that firefighters must understand that our job is becoming more difficult and dangerous every day.