BY DWIGHT GOOD
On March 11, 2011, I overheard some of my classmates discussing a magnitude 9.0 earthquake and tsunami in Japan. I was attending a class at the National Fire Academy and had failed to catch the morning news. My son, a member of the U.S. Marines, was stationed on the island of Okinawa. At the earliest opportunity, I called him—10,000 miles and 12 times zones away. I woke him up. Less than 1,500 miles north of his base, nearly 30,000 people were reported dead or missing, with tens of thousands more injured. My son insisted that no one on the island even felt the earthquake.
Earthquakes pose a unique threat because they strike without warning and are capable of sudden, widespread devastation. Simply defined, an earthquake is the vibration caused by two types of shock waves (faster-moving “P” waves followed by slower-moving and far more powerful and damaging “S” waves) racing through the crust of the Earth after a sudden rupture of the crust along a fault.
USAR Response to Japan Earthquake and Tsunamis, Part 1 | Part 2
Recent seismic events across the United States indicate that none of our communities is immune from the threat of earthquakes. Although not all earthquakes cause the levels of devastation witnessed in Japan, that incident proved that even the most modern construction is susceptible to damage from earthquakes and secondary events.
As a result of stringent building codes, structural damage from the earthquake was fairly limited, but tsunami waves as high as 33 feet (and in the case of the port city of Ofunato, the tsunami waves came in at a documented height of 124 feet) devastated the northeastern Japanese coastline. This was one of the first times that a tsunami had impacted a modern, developed coastline. (The 2004 Sumatra tsunamis struck 12 nations including Sri Lanka, Indonesia, and others; and the 1964 Good Friday quake caused tsunami activity that struck Fairbanks and other parts of Alaska and Crescent City, California. Previous tsunamis struck coastal cities in Japan during this century.) The Japanese National Police Agency and Fire and Disaster Management Agency reported that nearly 12,000 residential structures were damaged or destroyed by the earthquake, and more than 75,000 additional structures were damaged or destroyed by the tsunami.1-2
Earthquakes occurring under the ocean floor and landslides or volcanic eruptions beneath the ocean have the potential to generate tsunami waves that can reach 600 miles per hour and 50 feet in height. Waves from the March earthquake in Japan caused one fatality and destroyed several residential structures in Jayapura, Indonesia, and caused one fatality near Crescent City, California, where several boats and docks were destroyed or damaged. Similar damage was reported in Santa Cruz, California; Brookings, Oregon; the Hawaiian Islands; the Galapagos Islands; and along the coasts of Peru and Chile. Tsunami waves also impacted the California coastline communities of San Luis Obispo, Pismo Beach, and Half Moon Bay.3-7
Several days later, my young Marine was shipped to mainland Japan to assist with recovery operations. He sent pictures of the devastation. A week into the incident, more than one million families were still without running water, nearly 250,000 families still had no electricity, and access to the most severely impacted regions was still difficult. All but two of the 300 fires reported in the aftermath had been extinguished. At least 2,126 roads, 56 bridges, and 26 railways had been destroyed or damaged, and damage to a nuclear power plant triggered the worst nuclear disaster in the past 25 years. Aftershocks included one of a magnitude of 7.0 and almost 50 magnitude 6.0 events.8-10 (2; 7,1)
FIREFIGHTERS’ PERSPECTIVE
I was hooked on the importance of knowing more about earthquakes, their effects, and how to respond to them in a safe and effective manner. I spent the next several months researching earthquakes from a firefighter’s perspective. Most of the incidents we handle grow over time, allowing us to muster resources to meet current and anticipated needs. In short, most of us have an institutionalized reaction time that keeps us ahead of the incident or allows us to catch it fairly quickly. However, an earthquake can cause dozens or hundreds (or thousands or more) major emergencies at the same time, each one at the level of what would normally require a multiple-alarm response, and resources are not nearly enough to send to each emergency scene even a single engine company response! In addition, it can get much worse from there, depending on a wide range of factors including the readiness of firefighters and fire/rescue agencies to respond in disaster/catastrophe conditions.
Size-Up
The United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) lists the critical response actions initially expected:
a) gain situational awareness;
b) assess the situation;
c) activate and mobilize resources, people, and capabilities; and
d) coordinate response actions.11
This is a standard part of fire department response to disasters of all kinds and especially for fire departments in earthquake-prone regions, where rapid damage assessment and response are practiced every year (or more often in the more progressive agencies). Most progressive fire agencies in quake zones have made this part of their DNA in terms of post-quake damage assessment and response.
Another DHS document emphasizes that the quality and rapidity of situational awareness have a substantial influence on our ability to anticipate incident needs; request appropriate resources; and provide timely, accurate, information to other interested parties.12 Essential elements of information include the following: boundaries of the disaster area; access points; jurisdictional boundaries; population impacts; hazard-specific information; seismic information; weather; demographics; predictive modeling; initial needs and damage assessments; status of communications, transportation, and emergency operations centers; and status of critical infrastructure, energy, and state and local operations. (12, B7-B13)
This is a very complex way to explain Lloyd Layman’s size-up: figure out how big the problem is and where it’s headed (facts and probabilities); identify your current resources, immediate and anticipated needs, and the availability of those additional resources (situation); and then develop a plan of attack (decisions, plans, and operations). The discipline of size-up every young firefighter studies today is based on Layman’s 1940 Fundamentals of Firefighting Tactics. His process still works in the 21st century.
A review of current disaster management literature indicates that we should use the initial damage assessment or windshield survey to develop situational awareness. With the information from these assessments, we can determine resource needs, prioritize mitigation efforts, and determine if an incident meets minimum thresholds for assistance from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). The first responder typically is responsible for conducting the initial damage assessments.13-14
With an understanding of Layman’s size-up, the issue is clear: This is the method intended for size-up of a large-scale disaster. As a bonus, we might find out fairly quickly if we can expect federal assistance. FEMA recognizes four degrees of damage to structures and infrastructure: destroyed, major damage, minor damage, and affected. Additional information should include the numbers of fatalities and injuries and the condition of roadways.
Data Collection
These data should be collected on a standardized form developed and distributed prior to the event; personnel who will be expected to use them should also be trained to conduct damage assessments and fill out the reporting form. (13, 14) As of this writing, I have been unable to find a damage assessment recording/reporting form endorsed by FEMA or included in the myriad of incident command system (ICS) documents available online. This is somewhat disturbing.
After the devastating 1755 Lisbon earthquake and tsunami, Catholic parishes in Portugal collected information on the damage and loss of life incurred. The information was then reported to the nation’s capital to be processed by central authorities. This was history’s first recorded damage assessment; scholars identified the event as the world’s first modern disaster.15
Several challenges could hamper the rapid completion of damage assessments:
- Access problems caused by debris, damaged roadways, and flooding.
- Visual reference points destroyed.
- Responders diverted to specific incidents.
Combined, these challenges practically ensure incomplete or duplicated damage assessments.16
The damage assessment process, considered by some to be a “neglected aspect of emergency management,” is time consuming.17 Some researchers identified some significant redundancy and repetition in the damage-assessment process, but justified much of it. (17) Some writers propose that volunteers be used to help with damage assessments;18 others say they should not.19 I believe that waiting for initial damage assessments from the field may inhibit the coordinated planning necessary for an effective response. Treating the information source as secondary, instead of primary, would allow emergency managers to expedite resource requests and begin developing operational objectives within an hour of the triggering event.
More than 80,000 man-hours were required to complete damage assessments on some 23,000 buildings after the Molise, Italy, earthquake, or roughly 3.5 man-hours per structure.20 Considering the time required to complete initial and secondary damage assessments, including travel time, recording, and tabulation, this is a plausible estimate. Traditional windshield surveys and structural triage would have made the process painstakingly inefficient after the Haitian earthquake: Using the estimate of 3.5 man-hours per structure, more than 1 million man-hours would have been needed.21
In the 2006 Southern California Golden Guardian Drill—a simulated response to a magnitude 7.9 earthquake—more than an hour passed before damage assessments were initiated. (16) More than a decade earlier, it was argued that damage assessment information should be reported within 20 minutes of an incident; yet, many engine companies took more than a hour to complete their assigned details.22
I found a multitude of problems with the method of collecting information about a large-scale disaster. First, the information is time-sensitive, and resources are likely to be spread very thin during the initial stages of an incident. It took more than an hour before the process was initiated during the 2006 Southern California Golden Guardian Drill. (16) The need for early situational awareness cannot be overstated: Although initial damage-assessment data are essential, they may not be the best source of early intelligence. The United States Geological Survey has two automated earthquake damage prediction systems in service: ShakeMap and PAGER; they both generate information about an earthquake within 30 minutes.23 In consideration of the need for factual data, however, I would not recommend relying solely on computer-generated predictions about the size and scope of an earthquake’s impacts. Returning to size-up, seeking information from multiple sources may be the best option.
Conducting initial damage assessments defies everything a firefighter has ever been taught. Firefighters are an action-oriented group, and this process requires observation and documentation. In structural firefighting, the initial search of a building is intended to be rapid and thorough. We train our people to search for victims and maybe for the seat of the fire; when they find one or both, they take action. Initial damage assessments need to be rapid but less thorough than a primary search. Any time that engine stops and engages with civilians or takes on a specific incident within the incident, we lose time and critical information. Without clear policy direction and some realistic training to support our expectations, we really shouldn’t expect anything close to the theoretical model to develop.
I do not discount the importance of initial damage assessments, but considering the time commitment necessary to complete them and the potential for distraction, we need to find or develop alternative ways of gathering early information.
Aerial reconnaissance may provide emergency managers with a rapid initial damage assessment and generally provides sharper resolution than satellite imagery24; both methods were used to produce detailed incident maps in the first 24 hours of the Christchurch, New Zealand, earthquake response.25 Aircraft were used to conduct initial damage assessments over large areas of San Luis Obispo County, California, (17) and satellite imagery was an invaluable asset after the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake.26 Using unstaffed aerial vehicles (UAV) has been advocated for reconnaissance.27 UAV would mitigate challenges including pilot fatigue, off-season aircraft availability, and nighttime flight restrictions.
Another method of gathering early information included a computer program designed to map the extent of wide-scale emergency incidents by analyzing 911 call volume and tracking caller locations.28 A people as sensors approach using open source streams of information to enhance the data collected from other sources has also been suggested.29 These principles were demonstrated in the applications of early intelligent computer-aided dispatch and emergency services operational data after the Christchurch, New Zealand, earthquake: Emergency managers used the information to identify call clusters and develop incident maps in the first four hours of the incident. (25) Disaster preparedness requires vigilance.
Preincident Planning/Ensuring Business Continuity
Preincident intelligence and planning are essential components of preparedness. National Fire Protection Association 1600®, Standard on Disaster/Emergency Management and Business Continuity Programs (2010 edition), recommends that disaster response plans address lines of authority, logistical support and resource requirements, and the health and safety of responders. Appropriate sections of the plan should be available to those assigned or responsible to fulfill them. Logistical and resource requirements may best be developed during the risk assessment process, which is also recommended in this standard. Risk assessments should identify potential hazards (e.g., natural and human-caused events) and consider the vulnerability of populations, assets, and the environment. The likely impacts of these hazards must be planned for giving consideration to health and safety of civilians and responders; critical infrastructure, assets, and facilities; environmental impacts; economic impacts; legal obligations and requirements; and the resources necessary to mitigate the particular issue (Sections 5.2, 5.4).30
The following resources, available from FEMA, can be used to satisfy these requirements.
• The Community Hazards Emergency Response Capabilities Process (CHER-CAP) is a form of capabilities-based planning that allows emergency managers to develop or improve disaster response plans by assessing community hazards and response capabilities, exercising emergency plans, and engaging with key community members from the public and private sectors. The processes of identifying community-specific risks and hazards and exercising emergency plans may uncover shortfalls in existing emergency plans, highlight training needs, and engage the emergency response community in preparedness efforts. From an operational perspective, CHER-CAP may also identify communications problems and resource needs, improve response coordination, and clarify expectations on an agency and individual level. (14)
• The Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources (CIKR) charting process classifies these sites into three types: contents, occupancy, and purpose. Each performs a role or provides a service critical to society or the economy. All identified sites are then plotted on a map for emergency planning and emergency management purposes. Each site is assessed for hazards and vulnerabilities using the triggering events identified in the CHER-CAP process and then evaluated for potential cascade effects. Cascade effects are the worst-case secondary events possible if the triggering event occurs and is not mitigated quickly. Site-specific response plans may be developed from the information gathered during this process and incorporated into the CHER-CAP for ongoing improvement. Emergency managers may discover that current response capabilities do not meet the projected demands of one or more threats identified during the process. (14)
In communities that have invested in the CHER-CAP and CIKR charting or some similar process, emergency managers will have the benefit of significant preexisting intelligence about the affected areas and potential response needs. Information from initial damage assessments, CHER-CAP and CIKR charting, and other sources become critical components of situational awareness. Information developed during CHER-CAP and CIKR charting processes could be imbedded in a geographic information system (GIS) database and retrieved during an incident response. Similarly, the data could be overlaid on images from aerial or satellite reconnaissance to develop early incident maps.
Most American hospitals operate at around 95 percent of capacity, which makes planning for the care of large numbers of injured people very pertinent.31 The Afghani healthcare system collapsed after the Kashmir earthquake, which destroyed the region’s healthcare information management system and also damaged or destroyed 75 percent of the primary healthcare facilities, laboratories, and pharmaceuticals. This recent worst-case example further supports the need for contingency planning and identifying rapidly obtainable outside resources.32
Emergency plans must include measures to ensure the continuity of essential services. Identifying these resources during preincident planning is imperative. Emergency services agencies that invested the time in developing CIKR charts would have the benefit of detailed knowledge about these occupancies, their locations, and the specific needs or concerns unique to each. These essential services facilities should be given priority consideration when developing initial damage assessment route plans.
Secondary events may cause more damage than the initial earthquake and may extend well beyond what first responders anticipate. Our personnel must be familiar with the critical or target hazards in their immediate response areas and consider the potential impacts of secondary events prior to an earthquake response. Implementing the CHER-CAP and CIKR charting processes would ensure that detailed information about these facilities is available and that mitigation strategies are in place. Also, the information developed during these charting processes may provide guidance for the developing response routes. Structure fires, a dam failure, and a nuclear disaster complicated rescue and recovery efforts in Japan. Government and critical services facilities were flooded, and damage to a nuclear power plant triggered the worst nuclear disaster in the past 25 years. (17, 9, 10, 7)
On October 31, 2002, a magnitude 5.7 earthquake in Molise, Italy, caused damage over an 870-square-mile area, affecting 50 communities. Multiple area command centers were established to manage the disaster by province. (20) This may be the most effective way to manage resources during a large-scale disaster. This approach is similar to that used by forestry-based firefighting agencies during lightning storms.
COMMAND AND CONTROL
Managing Resources
Earthquake response and recovery “… sometimes requires a great deal of help from governments, organizations, and people outside the affected area.”33 Reports from recent earthquakes suggest that outside help may be available or even en route rapidly—with or without invitation. Firefighters returning to duty will double staffing levels in the first three to six hours and triple it within 24 hours of a major earthquake (27, 11). Volunteer responders have the ability to tie up Logistics with supplemental supplies,34 and nongovernment organizations (NGOs) typically plan for tasks they are capable of instead of considering the tasks that may actually be needed.35 The convergence of recalled personnel, spontaneous volunteers, and the potential transition from a local to a regional incident command structure present emergency managers with multiple challenges—among them, accountability, situational awareness, and control of assigned resources.
The convergence of volunteers and equipment at a major disaster often becomes a management problem in itself, and cases reviewed for this project indicate the speed at which unsolicited help can arrive. These large spontaneous responses, often accompanied by deliveries of supplies, may complicate response efforts already underway. Donated goods may be inappropriate or delivered in large caches that monopolize Logistics. Similarly, volunteers may arrive unprepared and increase the demand for scarce resources including food, drinking water, shelter, transportation, and communications equipment. However, turning these resources away, letting them sit idle, or allowing them to spoil will adversely impact public relations, and allowing volunteers to act independently leads to confusion and frustration for all involved. The simplest solution may be to include participating NGOs in the unified command structure, delegate the management of spontaneous volunteers and donations to these groups, use media outlets to provide contact information for those who wish to help, and identify real needs for those who wish to donate.36 (34, 67; 35)
We have to develop our playbook, distribute it to everyone on our team, and practice often enough to make sure everybody knows what they are supposed to do. A coordinated response depends on participants fulfilling predetermined roles, responsibilities, and reporting protocols with information flowing through preestablished chains. Appropriate sections of the emergency plan should be available to those assigned or responsible to fulfil them. In the absence of clear policy reinforced by training, responders are likely to freelance.37 (30; 11, 35)
Agencies that previously adopted policies providing direction to recalled personnel will benefit from the reduction in demands on available communications capacity during a large-scale incident response. Failing to develop an organized structure for the command and control of resources on a large and complex incident could have disastrous consequences. Operational challenges ranging from problems with accountability for resources to uncoordinated or even conflicting courses of action could result. The transition to command under an incident management team takes time under the best of conditions; under the worst, it could require the withdrawal and reorganization of resources. (14)
Communication
Telephone service may not be reliable after a major earthquake because of the reliance on local network connections and electrical power.38 “Communications is [a critical aspect] of command and control … [that Emergency response agencies] should integrate in exercises to help identify shortfalls.” (34, 67) After the San Francisco earthquake, “… There was no organization, no communication.”39 Although one would hope that a century of experience since that incident would yield different results, I have found there is still much room for improvement.
Questions about what kind of data should be collected, by whom, and how they should be consolidated were raised after the Bam, Iran, earthquake. Obstacles to data integration, data sharing, communications, and interoperability were complicated by political and social differences after the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake.40-41 (26, 14)
After the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake, better coordination among organizations could have prevented organizations from wasting valuable time and duplicating data. Information that could have supported other organizations in solving a problem was not used. (26) These observations demonstrate the need for an organizational structure with a defined chain of command, unified objectives, and complementary strategies.
Between 20,000 and 30,000 911 reports are generated daily from cellular telephones in California. (28) The sudden spike in call volume triggered by an earthquake, combined with the potential loss of network capacity, makes it likely that “attempts to report via 911 will almost universally be unsuccessful” after a magnitude 7.8 earthquake in Southern California. (27, 10-11) Also, emergency services agencies that normally rely on cellular telephone communications to augment communications during large incident responses will experience the same effects. I am unaware of a priority signal for cellular telephone traffic, and limited system capacity will be universally frustrating.
Communications is a critical aspect of command and control. (34, 67) Under the best of conditions, the New Zealand Ministry of Civil Defense & Emergency Management found that its communications systems were inadequate for the volume of telephone, fax, data, and cell phone traffic generated during a nationwide earthquake response simulation. (25) This case supports the assertion that communications systems must be tested to ensure adequate capacity and interoperability. (34)
Tsunami
Earthquakes occurring under the ocean floor have the potential to cause tsunami: a threat to some of our most densely populated coastal regions. Emergency managers operating in potential inundation zones must consider this risk after a triggering event. Because waves can travel as quickly as a commercial jet, seismic events close to shore could produce such events within seconds. (21, 3, 5, 6)
In some places, tsunami waves reached 60 feet in height following the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and 10 feet in height after the 2005 Indian Ocean earthquake. The latter incident effectively cleared off 42 of the Maldives’ 202 inhabited islands and impacted about 30 percent of Thailand’s hotel industry. Indicative of the potential for close-succession secondary events, the tsunami that struck American Samoa occurred about 20 minutes after the initiating earthquake.42-45 (26, 14)
Of all the secondary events identified in this report, tsunami are responsible for the greatest amount of destruction and loss of human life. The severity of risk cannot be underestimated. Japan has substantial experience with earthquakes and tsunami, and its building construction and tsunami countermeasures are perhaps the most advanced anywhere in the world. The losses incurred in Japan after the earthquake are telling.
Tsunami waves reached as high as 33 feet after the earthquake in Japan. Although 12,000 residential structures were damaged or destroyed by the earthquake, the majority—more than 75,000—were damaged or destroyed by the tsunami. Impacts on infrastructure were substantial: Communications systems were destroyed in nine prefectures, government buildings were flooded, and flooding at a nuclear power plant triggered the worst nuclear disaster in the past 25 years. Tsunami waves from this event also impacted the coastlines of Indonesia, the Hawaiian and Galapagos islands, the western continental United States, and South America. (8, 1, 23, 9, 2,10, 7)
NFPA 1600 recommends that disaster response planning include considerations for the health and safety of civilians and responders. Aftershocks pose a significant threat to previously damaged structures, (23) and aftershocks and secondary structural collapses presented responders with ongoing challenges in Haiti. (21) In some cases, secondary damage assessments are required, in part, because of aftershocks. (17) The threats and implications of tsunami, aftershocks, and other events cannot be underestimated.
Table 1 lists the incidents I have reviewed for lessons learned and common themes. In the 15 earthquakes listed, a total of 223,152 fatalities and 10,003,971 injuries were reported, yielding an average ratio of 4.5 injuries for every confirmed fatality. Additionally, fatalities tend to be clustered. This information may prove useful to emergency managers and also be used to illustrate the importance of including location information in initial damage assessment reports. The locations of fatalities and injuries identified during the initial damage assessment phase may indicate where triage and morgue services will be most effective.
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It is my intent to spark some discussion on this type of response in the emergency services. For some of us, it may be time to dust off the playbook. For others, it may be time to start writing. The Public Entity Risk Institute noted that public expectations for disaster response in the United States may be unrealistic. Unfortunately, public perception is our reality. People call us for results—not excuses. We must be prepared.
Endnotes
1. Daniell, James. Translated by James Daniell. Prod. earthquake-report.com. March 17, 2011.
2. Mahoney, M. The Japan Earthquake and Tsunami and What They Mean for the U.S. National Earthquake Hazard Reduction Program, Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2011, 5.
3. Bernard, E. “The Tsunami Story.” National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration. http://www.tsunami.noaa.gov/tsunami_story.html (accessed April 26, 2011).
4. CAL FIRE. “California Tsunami Incident Information.” California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection. March 13, 2011. http://bof.fire.ca.gov/incidents_details_info?incident_id=481 (accessed July 13, 2011).
5. Field, CH and Milner, KR. “Forecasting California’s Earthquakes – What Can We Expect in the Next 30 Years?” United States Geological Survey. (PH Stauffer and JR Hendley II, eds). 2008. http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2008/3027/ (accessed April 28, 2011).
6. Shedlock, K and Pakiser, L. “Earthquakes, Introduction.” United State Geological Survey. October 23, 1997. Retrieved April 24, 2011, United States Geological Survey. United States Geological Survey: http://pubs.usgs.gov/gip/earthq1/intro.html.
7. United States Geological Survey. (2011). Magnitude 9.0 – Near the East Coast of Honshu, Japan. Retrieved August 25, 2011, from USGS: http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/equinthenews/2011/usc0001xgp/#summary.
8. ALERT . “Tohoku Earthquake.” ALERT Worldwide. March 21, 2011. Retrieved July 13, 2011, http://alert.air-worldwide.com/EventSummary.aspx?e=549&tp=65&c=1.
9. International Oceanographic Commission and United National Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization. Bulletin No. 4. March 19, 2011.
10. Nomiyama, C and Takada, K. “Japan Nuclear Plant Crisis: Plutonium Found in Soil.” The Vancouver Sun. March 29, 2011. Retrieved August 25, 2011. http://www.vancouversun.com/news/Japan+nuclear+plant+crisis+Plutonium+found+soil/4515691/story.html?id=4515691.
11. United States Department of Homeland Security. “National Response Framework.” Washington, D.C., September 10, 2007, 31-33.
12. U.S. Department of Homeland Security. California Catastrophic Incident Base Plan: Concept of Operations. Federal Emergency Management Agency, California Office of Emergency Services, 2008, B-1.
13. Fairfax County Fire and Rescue Department. “Damage Assessment Plan.” In Emergency Operations Plans, by Fairfax County (VA) Fire and Rescue Department, 2004, 30.
14. Federal Emergency Management Agency. Executive Analysis of Fire Service Operations in Emergency Management. Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2011.
15. de Almeida, A. “The 1755 Lisbon Earthquake and the Genesis of the Risk Management Concept.” Edited by L. Oliveira, C. Azevedo, J., & Ribeiro, A Mendes-Victor. 250th Anniversary of the Lisbon Earthquake International Conference. Lisbon, Portugal: Springer, 2005, 147-165.
16. Watson, M. Investigating the Perceived Effectiveness of the Rialto Fire Department’s Earthquake Response Plan for the City of Rialto, California. Applied Research Project, Rialto Fire Department, Emmitsburg, MD: National Fire Academy, 2007.
17. McEntire, D and Cope, J. “Damage Assessment after the Paso Robles (San Simeon, California) Earthquake: Lessons for Emergency Management.” Quick Response Research, National Hazards Center, University of Colorado, 2004, 2.
18. Meheux, K, Dominey-Howes, D, & Lloyd, K. “Operational Challenges to Community Participation in Post-Disaster Damage Assessments: Observations from Fiji.” Oct. 2010; Disasters 34(4): 1102-1119.
19. Hard, D. Developing a Rapid Damage Assessment Procedure for Klamath County Fire District No. 1. Applied Research Project, Klamath County Fire District 1, Emmitsburg, MD: National Fire Academy, 2007.
20. Bazzuro, P. and Maffei, J. “The 2002 Molise, Italy, Earthquake.” Earthquake Spectra, 2004. 20(1):S1-S20.
21. Collins, L. “California Task Force Rescues.” Fire Engineering. September 2010. www.fireengineering.com/index/articles/display/6560573525/articles/fire-engineering/volume-163/Issue-9/Special-Coverage-US-Response-to-Hait-Earthquake/California-Task-Force-Rescues.html (accessed March 31, 2011).
22. Ganz, R. Analyzing the Effectiveness of Rapid Damage Assessment Procedures and Forms That Are Currently Utilized by the Redmond (WA) Fire Department. Emmitsburg, MD: National Fire Academy, 1998.
23. Folger, P. Earthquakes: Risk, Detection, Warning, and Research. CRS Report for Congress, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2011.
24. Ur, K, Shad, R. “Disaster Management and GIS.” 2006 International Conference on Advances in Space Technologies. Islamabad, 2006, 6-10.
25. Hough, E. “Christchurch Quake Response.” Crisis Response Journal, 2010.
26. ESRI. GIS and Emergency Management in Indian Ocean Earthquake/Tsunami Disaster. White paper, Redlands, CA: ESRI, 2006.
27. Scawthorn, C. The ShakeOut Scenario Supplemental Study: Fire Following Earthquake. SPA Risk, LLC, Pasadena, CA: United States Geological Survey, 2008, 17.
28. Jasso, H, Fountain, T, Baru, C, Hodgkiss, W, Reich, D, and Warner, K. “Prediction of 9-1-1 Call Volumes for Emergency Event Detection.” The Proceedings of the 8th Annual International Digital Government Research Conference. Philadelphia, PA: Digital Government Research Center, 2007. 148-154.
29. Laituri, M and Kodrich, K. “On Line Disaster Response Community: People as Sensors of High Magnitude Disasters Using Internet GPS.” Sensors, May 6, 2008,3037-3055.
30. National Fire Protection Association. NFPA 1600: Standard on Disaster/Emergency Management and Business Continuity Programs. Quincy, MA: National Fire Protection Association, 2010.
31. Levitt, S and Dubner, S. Super Freakonomics. New York: Harper, 2009.
32. Durrani, A, Elnashai, A, Hashash, Y, Kim, S, and Masud, A. “The Kashmir Earthquake of October 8, 2005: A Quick Look Report.” University of Illinois at Urbana-Champlain. Urbana-Champlain, IL: Mid-America Earthquake Center, 2008.
33. Public Entity Risk Institute. Emergency Management: the American Experience, 1900-2005. Vol. 1. (C Rubin, ed). Fairfax, VA: Public Entity Risk Management, 137.
34. Benivenga, Matt. “Disaster Response: Improving Effectiveness.” Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 2007, 77.
35. Kent, R and Ratcliffe, J. Responding to Catastrophes: U.S. Innovation in a Vulnerable World. Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2008.
36. Points of Light Foundation & Volunteer Center National Network, United Postal Service, Federal Emergency Management Agency. Preventing a Disaster Within the Disaster: The Effective Use and Management of Unaffiliated Volunteers. Washington, D.C.: Points of Light Foundation & Volunteer Center National Network, 2002.
37. Wood, Steve. Earthquake Infrastructure and Facility Windshield Rapid Assessment for the Brea Fire Department. Applied Research Project, Brea Fire Department, Emmitsburg, MD: National Fire Academy, 2010.
38. Reilly, C. Preparing the City of Alameda, California, Fire Department for the Next Big Earthquake. Applied Research Project, City of Alameda Fire Department, National Fire Academy, Emmitsburg, PA: National Fire Academy, 2003.
39. London, J. “The Story of an Eyewitness.” May 5, 1906. http://london.sonoma.edu/Writings/Journalism/sfearthquake.html (accessed April 28, 2011).
40. Action Aid International. The Evoloving UN Cluster Approach in the Aftermath of the Pakistan Earthquake: an NGO Perspective. Bangalore: Books for Change, 2006.
41. Calvi-Parisetti, P., PhD. “Workshop of Lessons Learned on the National and International Response to the Bam Earthquake.” Kerman, Iran: United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2004.
42. Asian Development Bank. An Initial Assessment of the Impact of the Earthquake and Tsunami of December 26, 2004 on South and Southeast Asia. Manila, Philippines: Asian Development Bank, 2005.
43. BAPPENAS, Provincial and Local Governments of D.I. Yogyakarta, the Provincial and Local Governments of Central Java, and International Partners. Preliminary Damage and Loss Assessment: Yogyakarta and Central Java Natural Disaster. Jakarta: The Consultative Group on Indonesia, 2006.
44. United States Geological Survey. Magnitude 8.6 – Northern Sumatra, Indonesia. March 28, 2005. http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/eqinthenews/2005/usweax/ (accessed April 16, 2011).
45. Magnitude 6.3 – Java, Indonesia. May 26, 2006. http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/eqinthenews/2006/usneb6/ (accessed April 16, 2011).
DWIGHT GOOD began his fire service career as a volunteer firefighter for the Mariposa County (CA) Fire Department. He is a captain for Cal Fire in the Madera, Mariposa, Merced Ranger Unit. He has a bachelor’s degree from Empire State College and a master’s degree in science from Grand Canyon University.
