Photographs by Keith D. Cullorn
Fighting $25-Million Brush Fire
A $25 million brush fire that destroyed 234 homes and threatened Santa Barbara, Calif., was brought under control by a vast assemblage of mutual aid companies.
The fire was in the foothills of Montecito, an exclusive hillside village next to Santa Barbara City in the County of Santa Barbara. The average price of houses in the fire area is $90,000. Many houses have wood shingle or shake roofs and are nestled in wooded and brushy narrow canyons.
A major brush fire had not struck the area in several years. Some of the brush had not burned since 1964. Some had never burned within anyone’s memory.
Low manning of companies
Protecting this high risk area was the Montecito Fire Department consisting of two stations, four engines, a brush truck and 24 men. The six men on duty the evening of July 26, 1977, manned two engines. Montecito and surrounding departments of Santa Barbara County (13 stations, 46 men on duty), Santa Barbara City (six stations, 30 men on duty) and the United States Forest Service (one station, 26 men on duty) were on the alert because of the high temperature, low humidity and hot down-canyon sundowner compressive winds—a formula for disaster.
Due to recent manning and budgetary cuts in the Montecito, Santa Barbara City, and Santa Barbara County Fire Departments, engine companies with two or three men reflected the normal manning levels.
As a standard procedure, a red flag fire alert (special patrols and media notification of public of the fire danger) was in effect due to severe fire conditions, and all agencies were patrolling brush areas.
Fire reported
At 7:37 p.m., a brush fire was reported to the Montecito Fire Department. Station 2 responded with two men to Mountain Drive and Coyote Road in three minutes. They found a 1/2 to 3/4 -acre fire, flame height 30 feet, fed by down-canyon winds creating a whirlpool effect.
The second engine company, Engine 7 from Santa Barbara City, arrived at 7:44 p.m. County Engine 15 arrived at 7:49, and Santa Barbara City requested a second alarm at 7:45. The county dispatched a two-piece company, a dozer and two hand crews. The Forest Service dispatched a full brush response and aircraft.
At 7:59, the county battalion chief on the scene requested a third alarm for structural protection.
Response from all surrounding incounty departments, including the Forest Service, was rapid. The fire attack was well executed. Cooperation between agencies was in the best tradition of the fire service, but it wasn’t enough. The crews were outrun by the severe winds.
Command post set up
The fire chiefs of the four local agencies—Chief Peterson of Santa Barbara City, Chief Graham of Montecito, Ranger Bungarz of the Forest Service, Chief Patterson of Santa Barbara County—met at 9 p.m. at the command post of Westmont College, a private college which was opened up for the fire fighters. The fire was transferred from city fire chief to county chief to facilitate multiagency coordination. This team effort was smooth and effective in large part due to recent multiagency exercises where participation was organized and well supported by the Santa Barbara County Fire Chiefs Association. The strategy decided upon was structure protection plus keeping the fire out of the city and the forest.
At 8:52 p.m., the first request for out-of-county mutual aid went out for 15 engines from the Office of Emergency Services through the statewide mutual aid plan. At 9:01 p.m., 10 more engines were requested. At 9:38 p.m., five engines were requested from the California Department of Forestry. And so it went. The requests for help were answered by fire agencies from San Diego to Lancaster to Monterey. Ventura County, Santa Barbara County’s neighbor, sent eight engines and three OES pumpers. The first out-of-county mutual aid companies arrived at midnight on July 27. The weather at 1 a.m. was 90°, 9 percent humidity and 40-mph winds.
Most of the homes were destroyed in 4 1/2 hours, by midnight. The fire was fast, the roads narrow, the canyons steep, and most roofs were wood. The manning, by ISO and other traditional standards, was low. Water pressure was also because residents used garden hoses below the fire area and temporary water system pumps failed during an electrical power interruption. It was, unfortunately a familiar California brush fire scenario!
Communications van used
The County Fire Department and the USFS activated the county department’s communications van and planning and logistics sections. The USFS took over the service function because of its ability to mobilize to handle large groups of people quickly. On July 27, 1200 persons were fed and housed.
Incoming units were assigned to strike teams with strike team leaders. This operation was successful and allowed proper management of approximately 1200 fire fighters, 105 engine companies, plus various hand crews, bulldozer crews, four helicopters and seven air tankers.
The standardization of terminology, technique, and technology, which has been greatly enhanced by the involvement of the various agencies in FIRESCOPE (Firefighting Resources of Southern California Organized for Potential Emergencies) since its inception after the catastrophic 1970 California fire season, was much in evidence. This large number of resources could not have been effectively utilized during the relatively short time without prior incident command system training. Attendance by chief officers at state fire service seminars in disaster planning and management also paid off.
The Santa Barbara County Fire Department committed 11 engines, seven brush rigs, two bulldozers, two crews, its entire services unit and fire prevention bureau. The Santa Barbara City Fire Department committed its entire department (89 men, 10 engines, three tankers, one squad) to the scene as did Montecito (four engines). The USFS committed 100 men and 14 pieces of equipment.
The governor declared a state of disaster and sent 120 specially trained law enforcement National Guardsmen to protect the area against the potential roving bands of looters.
The fire loss was estimated at $35 million. It included the destruction of 234 homes and heavy damage to 29 others. The loss estimate did not include the staggering suppression costs.
One Santa Barbara City fire engine was destroyed by fire and its crew narrowly escaped when fire overran their position. The men were saved by heat-resistant aluminized, 6X2-foot fire shelters recently. borrowed from the USFS. All USFS personnel are required to carry one.
One Forest Service fire fighter was injured when hit by an air drop. Some 200 injuries, mostly minor, were reported among both fire fighters and civilians. There were no deaths.
The fire spread stopped at 5 a.m. July 27 when decreasing winds allowed a successful direct attack and stop on the flame front. The fire was declared under control at 8 o’clock the next morning.
The last unit left the scene at 8:30 p.m. July 28, two days after the innocent flight of a box kite on a windy summer evening touched high-tension power lines and ignited the worst holocaust in Santa Barbara County’s history. Although 805 acres were burned, the fire was kept from the civic center of Santa Barbara (12 blocks away) and it was kept out of steep forest lands. Fire fighters also kept the blaze from destroying perhaps another 500 homes.
The 62 mutual aid companies from out of the county that fought the fire came from 28 fire agencies, and 27 additional engines were California OES pumpers sent by the various agencies. The value of early requests for mutual aid was reflected in the response time for companies that had to travel long distances.
The early establishment of a command post also paid off.
It’ll happen again
All companies are back in quarters now. The hose is cleaned and the lost nozzles found. But it’ll happen again. Maybe this time in your community. Why will it happen again?
High winds—hot and dry,
- Wood shingle roofs,
- Houses built in brush areas and canyons
- Narrow winding roads,
- Inadequate water for fire protection,
- Substandard fire department manning,
- Public apathy,
- Inadequate fuel management, and
- Increasing urban-wildland interface.
Until the local governments outlaw wood shingle roofs in high-hazard areas and until fire departments are allowed to impose strict fire protection requirements, fuel hazard mitigation procedures, and fight fires cooperatively on the fire prevention bureau, planning department and building department drawing boards before the bell rings, fire forces cannot adequately protect the environment from this combination of wind, terrain and fuel factors.
Santa Barbara County is taking advantage of the current fire awareness on the part of the community by asking the county legislators for several code changes. These changes have been long recognized as valuable fire protection tools but they were not acceptable because of their financial and esthetic impact.
Shortly after the fire, the boundaries of the high fire hazard area were modified to cover a greater portion of the county. The City of Santa Barbara and Montecito accomplished this also. This gives fire officials greater control over the construction of buildings.
Building code modified
The county building code was modified to limit wood roofs in this area. A proposal is currently being studied which would mandate improved water supply for fire protection and access requirements for all construction within the county. This proposal has been defeated by the Board of Supervisors several times in recent years, but it may be successful now because of the public awareness resulting from this fire.
Response patterns have been modified, making more men and equipment available in designated high probability areas. Efforts are currently under way to establish improved fuel modification programs through a combination of private and public sector resources.
Thus, the Sycamore Fire seems to be yet another chapter in the book called “Catastrophe Theory of Fire Protection,” as in earlier chapters entitled: Iroquois Theater, Bel Air, Cocoanut Grove, Triangle Shirtwaist, Winecoff Hotel, GM plant at Livonia, Mich., Our Lady of the Angeles School, ad infinitum. We seem to be able to bring about needed change only after substantial loss.
Almost 300 families displaced, countless irreplaceable personal losses, the socioeconomic pattern of the community irreparably altered, the fireflood cycle revisited, and myriad other negative impacts seem too dear a price to pay to convince policymakers that fire protection must be planned and protective measures enforced.
