“Let cynics and supersensible souls say what they will about American materialism and machine civilization. Beneath the surface are poetry, mysticism, and inspiration that the Empire State Building somehow symbolizes. In that giant shaft I see a groping toward beauty and spiritual vision. I am one of those who see and yet believe.” -Helen Keller
Fire in the Empire State Building
FIRE REPORT
“Manhattan Dispatcher to Division 1, respond to a second alarm for the Empire State Building Box 716. Chief be advised we are receiving reports that flames can be seen from as far away as Queens County.”
I acknowledged receipt of the alarm and was on my way. As I listened to the radio reports, a mental image of that great building was forming in my mind.
The Empire State Building, the symbol of New York City, is one of the most recognizable buildings in the world. Built in only a little more than a year during the Depression (completed in 1931), its art deco design adorns the famous city skyline. Although replaced as the tallest building in the world, its power, style, and height epitomize the term “skyscraper.” The Empire State Building’s colorful history includes an “assault” by King Kong and the real-life 1945 crash of a B-25 bomber into its 79th floor. The impact of that crash left 14 dead and caused extensive damage to the building, but the stability of this massive structure was never jeopardized. It is hard to imagine how a modern high-rise would react in a similar disaster.
Box 716 was transmitted at 1830 hours on July 16th, 1990 for a fire on the 51st floor of the Empire State Building. The 51st floor is serviced by two stairways, one a conventional stairway (designated “S”) and the other a fire tower (“T”). The fire tower was an important feature in old highrise construction because it improved the occupants’ chances of leaving combustion products behind and escaping the building. In most cases it was an exterior feature accessed by a bridge. In the Empire State Building it is an interior stairway separated from the occupied areas by a vestibule that creates a space through which smoke and fire gases are vented into a nearby air shaft, thereby preventing smoke contamination of the stairway. The vestibule is enclosed by thick masonry walls and self-closing fire doors. Tins design is excellent for evacuation purposes but, as events would later show, is a dangerous avenue of attack.
The first-arriving engine and ladder companies were directed to the “T” stairway by building personnel since firefighters requested the closest avenue to the fire occupancy. The building’s fire safety director was not present at the fire alarm control panel as required. Members found an advanced fire in Suite 5105. There was evidence that building personnel wasted precious minutes trying to fight the fire before alerting the fire department: Apparently extinguishers and a house line were applied through holes punched in the occupancy’s thick, ornamental glass doors. Suite 5105 was occupied by Japra Industries, a fence material importer, and consisted of a reception area, two offices, and a conference room.
The first engine team connected a 2 ½-inch line to the standpipe in the “T” stairway and stretched 25 feet down the corridor to the ornamental glass doors of Suite 5105. Fire was visible behind the doors. Ladder company members prepared to force the doors as soon as the line was charged.
Suddenly the doors shattered and dropped like a curtain; the fire blowtorched into the hallway and the members were engulfed in a wave of searing heat. The firefighters scrambled for the safety of the stairway. The truck company officer, convinced that some of his personnel were trapped or badly burned, transmitted a Mayday and a request for a second alarm. Deputy Chief Vincent Dunn, the incident commander (FDNY places a deputy chief on-scene for both first and second alarms at highrise fires), transmitted the alarm and assigned a rescue company to assist trapped or injured firefighters. A quick accountability check by company officers on the fire floor confirmed that all members had made it to safety; however, six members were burned, two severely enough to need hospitalization.
Meanwhile, a second engine team stretched an additional line from the “T” stairway and members attempted to advance on the fire with both hoselines. A third 2 ½-inch line was connected to the standpipe in the “S” stairway and members there awaited instructions from Battalion Chief John McDermott, commander of the operations post, to advance on the fire from that position. (The operations post is established one floor below the fire floor in most high-rise operations and is responsible for the attack, search, and evacuation of both the fire floor and the floor above.) Chief McDermott denied the third attack team’s request to move on the fire for two reasons: He wanted to avoid a situation in which lines would oppose each other, and he wanted to maintain the “S” stairway as an evacuation channel since attack operations were already committed to the “T” stairway, which meant that the door to stairway “S” had to remain closed to prevent contamination.
(Photos by Dave Cantor.)
In a few’ minutes it was evident that no progress was being made from the “T” stairway. The combination of a 6mph wind blowing through the fire area’s failed exterior windows, the failure of the suite’s glass doors, and an open pathway to the building’s air shaft created a horizontal chimney, and members at the “T” stairway were opposed by a draft of convection currents and combustion products of wind-tunnel proportions. Chief McDermott therefore decided to attack from the “S” stairway. Battalion Chief Robert Marsh was assigned attack chief and the “S” stairway team progressed to the entrance of the fire suite in a flanking maneuver via an adjoining corridor. Their attack diverted the stream of convection currents long enough for members of the “T” stairway teams to join the attack and together overwhelm the fire.
“Manhattan Dispatcher to Division I, he advised that we are receiving numerous reports of trapped occupants. We will give you specific locations as we receive them.”
“Division 1, 10-4.”
The Empire State Building, besides having 850 tenants that employ 20,000 people, is one of New York City’s most popular tourist attractions. People from all over the world come to enjoy the breathtaking view from the observation deck on the 86th floor-as many as 30,000 on weekends. It is said that on a clear day one can see for HO miles. A darker side to the observatory was its attraction to those who wanted to commit suicide. Hundreds of people have tried to Hing themselves to their deaths and 16 were successful, which prompted the erection of a seven-foot-high, mesh and steel spiked fence that now surrounds the deck.
But even with spiked bars, the observatory is an impressive place. As one would expect on a sunny summer evening, there were many people on the observation deck, and they could see and feel the smoke drifting upward from 35 floors below. Although it was after business hours, there were still several thousand occupants in the building at the time of the fire.
The management of vast numbers of people and information is critical at a high-rise fire. Unfortunately, the building’s alarm system did not operate in all areas of the building and electrical failure of the building’s public address system took away our ability to communicate immediately with occupants above the fire. To accomplish the monumental task of searching the floors above the fire, command established a search and evacuation post on the 56th floor early into the operation. Four chiefs and 10 units were positioned there; each report of trapped or distressed occupants was checked while a systematic search of all floors was conducted. Members were sent to the observation deck to assure the tourists, many of them foreigners, that the fire department was present and that they were safe. The most time-consuming search was for a cleaning woman who was seen on the 51st floor just before the fire was reported. It took dozens of firefighters more than an hour to locate Olga, standing in the crowd-completely unaware that this five-alarm operation, which required 18 chief officers and 34 units manned by more than 175 firefighters, could not be concluded until she was accounted for. At 10:08 p.m., 3 hours and 38 minutes after it was reported, Chief of Department Joseph DeMeo placed the fire under control.
Interestingly, during the search for Olga, one of our rookie firefighters expressed his surprise that the fire could burn so long and so intensely with so few combustibles in the suite-the office appeared vacant. Of course, the ashes he was stepping on were the remnants of desks, chairs, metal filing cabinets, and other items in an active office -totally incinerated.
LESSONS LEARNED AND REINFORCED
- A fire tower should not be used as an attack stair. The attack lines block
- open the doors and the negative pressure created by the air shaft invites a severe draft that opposes advancing forces. This tactic is unwise from both an operational and a safety standpoint, and it’s especially dangerous if the fire is suddenly vented from the fire area to the outer air. Use of the fire tower for attack negates its purpose: to be the safest means of evacuation.
- When a Mayday is received the incident commander must immediately assign a unit to investigate. Progress reports are extremely important, especially an order to cancel the Mayday.
- Generally it’s necessary to evacuate only the fire floor and the floor above the fire during the initial stages
(Reprinted with permission from Fire Protection Handbook, 16th Edition, Copyright © 1986. National Fire Protection Association. Quincy, MA 02269.)
- of a high-rise fire operation. Every report of distressed occupants must be investigated and a search of floors above and several below the fire must be conducted, with special attention given to exit stairways and elevators.
- The heavy, old-style construction was a major factor in confining the fire to the area of origin. The Empire State Building, at 23 pounds per cubic foot, weighs about three times more than the typical skyscraper of today. Built on a steel skeleton, its exterior walls are constructed of eight inches of brickwork; its wall columns are eight inches of limestone backed with eight inches of brick; its floors are three inches of cinder fill on four inches of concrete topped with cement finish; and its steel beams and interior columns are protected with thick concrete fireproofing. Although the fire melted the exterior windows and there was some smoke damage to the floor above, vertical extension via autoexposure was not a serious problem because of the integrity of the outer walls and building facade.
Furthermore, horizontal extension was inhibited because the fire floor was compartmentized. Office spaces were enclosed by the solid masonry walls. Although this creates oven-like conditions within the fire area itself, it certainly is preferable to the rapid fire extension that occurs in large, open floor spaces such as are found in many of today’s high-rises. The 51st floor contained 1 1 occupancies, the largest of which was 5,205 square feet. Compartmentation is particularly important in high-rise buildings due to the limited opportunities for horizontal ventilation and the practically nonexistent opportunities for vertical ventilation.
Confinement to the fire area also was aided by the fact that each floor has its own air handling system to control climate. There is no central HVAC system in the Empire State Building; subsequently there’s less chance for a fire to spread through ducts or an air return plenum.
Modern high-rise construction methods “trade” the massiveness of old-style construction for such lighter materials as spray-on fireproofing and gypsum hoard. The effectiveness of such methods is contingent on proper automatic sprinkler systems.
- To effectively deal with a highrise fire, operations must be separated into functional sectors. T his fire was made more manageable by the establishment of a command post in the lobby, an operation post one floor below the fire, a staging area three floors below the fire, and a search and evacuation post above the fire.
- The high-rise fire is an exhausting operation that demands aggressive attack. Manpower relief and rotation are vital to success. As per standard operating procedures for FDNY high-rise operations, two engine companies were assigned to each hoseline. This paid dividends when members were injured during the initial attack. Adequate backup manpower also was available for forcible entry, search, and evacuation procedures.
- John T. O’Hagan, former commissioner of FDNY, writes in his book High Rise/Fire & Life Safety, “The primary obstacle to the fire tighter in high-rise fires is heat. … At the temperatures encountered, a tire fighter’s effective worktime is from five to ten minutes. Further exposure reduces him to a nonambulatory casualty requiring the assistance of two or more additional firemen whose services are temporarily lost for the control of the fire.”
- At high-rise operations, fire forces are almost completely dependent on the building systems; if the systems tail, firefighters w ill fail unless they are prepared to utilize contingency plans and improvise. Our ability to improvise became a factor in communications, water supply, elevator transportation, fire attack, and search and evacuation.
