FIRE LOSS MANAGEMENT

FIRE LOSS MANAGEMENT

A Series by

SFPE

Part 25: AUTOMATIC SPRINKLERS

After the spectacular First Interstate fire in Los Angeles in 1988, passage of a sprinkler law for new and existing high-rise buildings in California seemed a sure thing. A law passed by the state legislature was vetoed by the governor, however, and a replacement law was heavily opposed and has been in the inactive file since early 1990.

It is very likely that many of the “bottom line” types who believe that sprinklers are financially unjustifiable occupy the top “executive” floors of high-rise buildings. Direct descendants of the White Star executive who fled the sinking Titanic in an almost personal lifeboat, they probably believe that they will escape a disaster by helicopter. It might be useful if fire departments announced that all plans for helicopter rescue have been abandoned and that all must find their way to safety down toxic-smoke-choked stairways. At the least the information on stack effect provided in Chapter 11 of Building Construction for the Fire Service might be used to convince the brass that the top floors are often the most hazardous.

Many argue that the sprinkler investment is unjustified since a massive loss of life is improbable. If this is so, then it should not be unreasonable to require management to purchase an indemnity policy of SI million for each person killed in a fire that claims more than 10 lives. If the risk is so negligible, the cost of the policy, therefore, should be negligible.

Architects who are code experts often can get around sprinkler requirements. Because of the loss of firefighters’ lives in cellar fires, some cities have required sprinklers for basements in excess of a certain size, usually 2,500 square feet. The architect’s “smart” solution? Cut the basement into sections with fire walls so that no section is larger than the legal limit. Problem: The fire doors may be blocked or inoperative and may not function, so the result can be a much more difficult and dangerous fire.

Another “smart” solution? Keep a renovated building with wood I-beam floors barely below the height at which sprinklers are required.

TACTICAL SUGGESTION

When the owner demonstrates a lack of interest in firefighter safety, the situation requires creativity equal to the architect’s.

Drop phrases such as “surround and drown” and “big water show.” Firefighters also should consider creating an “improvised sprinkler system” using multiversal nozzles and other exterior devices as appropriate. Explain to reporters inquiring about sprinklers that water—not the sprinkler pipes—puts out the fire and that since the owner failed to supply the pipes, the firefighters are doing their best under the circumstances.

Many oppose sprinklers because they do not understand the threat of fire and the operation of sprinklers. The Byer Museum in Evanston, Illinois was destroyed by fire in 1985. Despite this, the curator of another Evanston museum was quoted as saying: “It is a questionable practice to have sprinklers in a museum. A sprinkler system could do more harm to an art collection than a fire, particularly if the fire were contained or the sprinkler system malfunctioned.”

The National Gallery of Art in Washington, D C. will not lend its art to sprinklered museums. The Smithsonian Institute actually was asked to return some works on permanent loan when the Gallery learned that the Smithsonian was being retrofitted with sprinklers. A highly qualified National Institute of Standards and Technology senior engineer pointed out to a curator the hazards to the artwork posed by the large accumulation of acrylic plastic in the National Gallery’s workshop and was rudely dismissed.

The valuable exhibits in a Canadian museum, on the other hand, are protected by sprinklers, although for some reason the lounge and gift shop are not. The contents of these areas could provide enough smoke to cause extensive damage to the exhibit area. The heat might operate sprinklers that would not be hitting any fire. Such “economy” or “selective placement” is penny-wise and pound-foolish.

Librarians generally have a dread of water damage and often are opposed to sprinklers. Among their typical arguments are: “The water will wash the paper classification labels off the backs of the books.” “Books are hard to burn.” “We’ve never had a fire.”

When asked what they expect the fire department to use to put out the fire, they mumble, “Chemicals, I guess.”

The major concern is not for the ordinary branch library, which has replaceable books, but for the main library that houses extensive and generally irreplaceable collections.

The Los Angeles City Library fire illustrates the reasons that libraries should be sprinklered. This massive monolithic concrete structure was built in 1926. A concrete “fort” enclosed book stacks and racks for book storage. Upward ventilation was provided throughout the stacks to prevent mildew. It would be hard to imagine a better “built-to-burn design,” but it is typical of libraries. Not only did the design of the Los Angeles library permit the fire to extend, but the open construction also caused water to flow down and wet the books below. The arsonist ignited the tops of the book stacks, and it took 1,250,000 gallons of water to extinguish the fire, which caused about $20 million in damages. The initial fire would have been controlled or extinguished by two or three sprinklers.

The only solution for libraries is full automatic sprinkler protection. Librarians should be informed that all the stack areas of the Library of Congress contain sprinklers with cycling on-off heads. Even so, because its passages and stairways are even narrower than those found on a ship and it would be difficult to vent, a fire in this library would be a tough fight.

Note also that older libraries often used marble for stack flooring. If unsupported, as in the main building of the Library of Congress, marble can look good after heat exposure but fail under a firefighter’s weight.

Library stacks are perfect mechanisms for spreading fire. These racks store combustible material; they have no fire separation between levels. In addition, ventilation is almost impossible, spaces are very constricted, and passages are tight. The heat, moreover, is extreme. Forty engine companies, used in rotation, operated two lines to keep injuries low during a fire at the Yeshiva University Library in New York City.

Libraries are very vulnerable to arson, especially by delinquents or disturbed persons with a grievance. Arson is responsible for as many as 85 percent of library fires.

THE PUBLICS MISCONCEPTIONS

  • The sprinkler system will discharge during a trifling fire. In fact, it takes a sizable body of fire to trip a conventional sprinkler head. In some
  • cases the sprinklers should be supplemented with other fire protection measures. If the fuel for the triggering fire happens to be valuable artwork, a serious loss could occur in the first few minutes.
  • The entire building will be drowned when the sprinkler goes off. In ordinary systems, the heads go off one at a time—not all at once. (Only in deluge systems for flammable liquids do all the heads discharge at once.)
  • Water does more damage than
  • fire, this is not true. There is no “water damage” at a total loss. Wet material has been salvaged; heat-damaged or burned material is destroyed. The aircraft carrier USS Constellation in I960 suffered a devastating fire. Many computers soaked with salt water and subjected to freezing temperatures for months were recovered. The burned and heat-damaged computers were not. Actually, the major cause of damage in many of today’s fires is the greasy black smoke created by burning plastic.
  • Pulling a manual fire alarm box will set off all of the sprinklers. At times the efficiency of sprinklers can he deceiving. Consider a one-head operation that snuffs a fire. The amount of burned material is relatively small. If the sprinkler flows 15 minutes, a reasonable time, about 225 gallons of water are dumped. The observer has no idea of what the fire damage might have been had the sprinklers not intervened.

All fire department personnel should be made aware that their careless comments made to the media could cause serious damage, as could comments by uninformed occupants. The fireground commander should make it a point to explain to reporters how the sprinklers contributed to the success of the operation.

  • The pipes might leak. Sprinkler piping is tested to 175 psi after installation. No domestic piping is tested in this way. If sprinklers are undesirable
  • because they might leak, then logically all plumbing also should be eliminated. A properly installed system is supervised, which means that an alarm will sound and the fire department will respond when water flows. No such alarm is provided on domestic piping. Sprinkler leakage losses are minor and usually are due to freezing or careless use of lift trucks.
  • Smoke is the big killer, so smoke detectors are better. Detectors and sprinklers are needed. A smoke detector does nothing to suppress the fire that is generating the toxic smoke; sprinklers suppress the fire and the production of smoke. Sprinklers, however, are slow to operate on a smoldering fire that is generating toxic gas. So detectors are necessary for life safety, especially in sleeping occupancies, even though the sprinklers will control the fire as soon as it breaks out. The NFPA has no record of a multiple-death fire (a fire that kills three or more people) occurring in a completely sprinklered building where the system was properly oper-
  • ating except in the case of an explosion or flash fire, or where firefighters or plant employees were killed during fire suppression operations.

FIRE SERVICE MISCONCEPTIONS

Even we in the fire service accept to varying degrees a number of misconceptions about sprinklers. They include the following:

  • The building is sprinklered— there is no problem. Sprinklers are not the universal remedy for all fire problems. I have seen firefighters dismiss the hazards represented by ceilings of burlap and other high flame spread materials because “it’s sprinklered.” It is very doubtful whether the sprinklers would operate under these conditions in time to control the flame spread. Expert testimony at the trial following the Six Flags Great Adventure tragedy was that the sprinkler technology available at that time would not have controlled the fire and saved the lost lives. Unfortunately, the correct conclusion was ignored in the furor that followed: If a
  • life hazard cannot be controlled by sprinklers, the hazard should not be permitted to exist.
  • Sprinklers should be shut down as soon as possible—to prevent excessive water damage or to “clear the air.” Factory Mutual statistics show that premature closing of sprinkler valves by firefighters was a major factor in 23 fires occurring within a period of 10 years that produced losses of S43 million in 1986 dollars. When a sprinkler system is controlling a fire, cooled gases often are driven downward and obscure vision. Sprinklers should not be shut down as long as hot water is coming down and there is visible fire. Also, the firefighter who shuts a valve should be in full fire equipment and remain at the valve with a radio so that the valve could be opened instantly if fire breaks out.
  • Residential sprinkler systems (13R and 13D) are the same as other sprinkler systems. They are not. They are equipped with quick-response sprinklers, intended to limit flashover and to hold a contents fire until the occupants can escape. While there have been a significant number of successes with these systems, the structure is only partially sprinklered. Sprinklers are omitted from certain areas to keep costs down and to make the systems acceptable to builders. The presence of these residential systems can be particularly significant if used in a multiple dwelling that has truss floors or in a building that has interconnected voids such as occur in rehabilitated buildings with lowered ceilings.

Some object to the term “partial sprinkler system.” They argue that this term should be applied only when sprinklers are omitted from areas that are vulnerable to fire. While the 13R and 13D systems are based on data that indicate the omitted areas are not vulnerable to fire, it is possible that the data base does not contain information relative to the combustible truss void that exists in truss-floor buildings.

It is a fact that fires originate in void spaces that would be unprotected by sprinklers. Electrical fires and failures of metal fireplace flues are only two of the possibilities.

I served for several years as a consultant to the National Bureau of Standards (now NIST) to determine the reasons fires in combustible multiple dwellings extended beyond the area of origin. A number of fires started in or very early extended to void spaces, which would be unsprinklered under Standards 13R and 13D.

In years past the sprinkler industry did little or nothing to overcome the public’s negative perceptions of sprinklers. Promotion of sprinklers was left to the public fire protection forces and the insurance industry.

More recently, the sprinkler industry has supported “Operation Life Safety,” a consortium of the International Association of Fire Chiefs, the U.S. Fire Administration, and the private sector. Its purpose is to champion the increased use of quick-response sprinkler systems in all types of residential properties — from homes to high-rises.

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