Have you ever been at a working structure fire with a team of just four or five firefighters and additional help 10 minutes or more away? This is a situation that is common for some departments, rare for others, and is never experienced by a lucky few. If you fall into one of the first two categories, this column is written for you.
When attempting to manage the time-pressured, chaotic, life- and property-threatening situations that are structure fires, one of the first challenges is to muster enough personnel and resources to address all of the vital functions and activities immediately required. Some departments never can do so. First-In Tactics will discuss strategies and methods for firefighters who must, by necessity, face fires and other emergency situations with small teams and yet aspire to the same goals as the better-staffed and -equipped departments–in other words, to do their best to save and protect life and property using the resources they have available.
THE STANDARDS AND “STAFFING MANDATES”
Determining the number of firefighters actually required to accomplish the many tasks screaming for completion at a fire scene is problematic, given the infinite varieties of potential circumstances that could be present–building layout and construction, occupancy, fire location and extent, and water sources, to name a few–and how they combine to create and affect the emergency at hand.
Despite this significant uncertainty, National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 1710, Standard for the Organization and Deployment of Fire Suppression Operations, Emergency Medical Operations, and Special Operations to the Public by Career Fire Departments, states that 14 firefighters is a logical and achievable number (15 if an aerial device is used.) All are expected to arrive within eight minutes of receiving an alarm 90 percent of the time. NFPA 1710 lists specific, if only initial, roles and responsibilities for each responder, forming a checklist of sorts for building a comprehensive fireground organization and will be referenced later in this and future columns.
The companion standard for volunteer fire departments, NFPA 1720, Standard for the Organization and Deployment of Fire Suppression Operations, Emergency Medical Operations, and Special Operations to the Public by Volunteer Fire Departments, provides much less guidance about the number of personnel required to effectively perform structural firefighting. It recommends, as a minimum, that four members be present prior to initiating an interior fire attack, actually merely reinforcing the Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s (OSHA) “two-in/two-out” rule. This is more likely a nod to the realities of volunteer staffing shortfalls rather than a suggestion that the employment status of firefighters makes a difference in the numbers of personnel needed for effective and safe fire control. That leaves NFPA 1710, the “career” standard, as the benchmark.
There has been much debate in the fire service regarding the appropriateness and even dangers (in the form of potential liability for failures to “measure up”) of specifying a minimum staffing level. Although I do not wish to join in the argument about “how many firefighters does it take to put out a fire?” Fifteen people is generally what a minimum response to a reported structure fire would be needed in the urban and suburban departments with which I am most familiar. A typical assignment would be two engines and a truck with three to four firefighters each; a chief, possibly with an aide; and a two-person medic unit. At least twice that amount of resources would be dispatched if a working fire were encountered.
Furthermore, approximately that contingent of resources and personnel serve as the foundation of the stereotypical structure fire attack described in virtually every fire tactic textbook and training program that I have ever read or attended. If there is anything approaching a “standard” or “recommended” arrangement for organizing firefighting personnel and apparatus at the scene of a structure fire in the United States, it would look something like this: an “engine” company that provides initial fire attack; a second crew and apparatus to ensure a water supply and backup hoselines; a “truck” or similarly-labeled team to provide such support services as forcible entry, ventilation, and search and rescue. All would function under the supervision and control of a single incident commander.
Finally, although we may disagree about the wisdom of staffing “mandates” or the “ideal” numbers and types of resources required, none in the fire service would dispute that having more personnel and apparatus on the scene, when properly managed, is a good thing. In fact, research performed on the impact of different staffing levels has consistently found that having more firefighters leads to more efficient (i.e., faster) task performance, with the added benefit of significantly reduced rates of firefighter injuries. These findings are, of course, not unexpected. As the old proverb goes,“Many hands make light work.”
THE REALITY OF FIRE RESPONSE
Despite studies showing these benefits, organizations setting minimums, and the fire service’s general acceptance of the need for more than a dozen or so firefighters to accomplish the comprehensive symphony of tasks that must be addressed at a structure fire, the fact remains that many fire departments cannot gather an “ideal” number of firefighters, at least not quickly enough to stop a fire’s relentless progress. Many departments must use the resources that are on hand. This is where research, requirements, and wishful thinking collide with reality.
No statistics exist that quantify the incidence of fire service personnel shortfalls. Although the smallest communities in the United States are overwhelmingly protected by volunteer firefighters (more than a half million volunteers are in towns with populations of less than 2,500, per NFPA 2008 statistics).
Volunteer plus small town does not necessarily equal fewer firefighters. I know some rural volunteer companies that can easily meet and even exceed the NFPA 1710 mandate for personnel at a structure fire; others that can consistently do so only on evenings and weekends when more volunteers were available; and many that routinely require mutual-aid companies so that enough resources can eventually be assembled. Lacking real “data” on the prevalence of limited staffing, the remaining evidence is anecdotal, consisting of the experiences and realities of firefighters who struggle to get even one piece of fire apparatus on the street with sufficiently trained personnel, much less several firefighters.
Years ago, when I commanded a small volunteer department with the usual staffing issues (i.e., a limited number of trained personnel, most members engaged in employment out of town weekdays, and mutual-aid companies far away), I was relieved when I had a driver and two competent firefighters show up at a structure fire and felt we could then make an effective attempt at extinguishment (obviously, this was in the pre-OSHA era.) Any additional personnel who arrived made the situation just that much better, allowing for more tasks to be performed immediately or providing backup and relief.
Even now when I ride with my combination department on the sole engine with in-station overnight staffing, it is not uncommon that we arrive at a working fire three to four minutes ahead of any other dispatched companies, leaving the few of us to take on a more comprehensive approach than if we had multiple companies to which fireground assignments could be distributed. Any otherwise well-staffed department can face an acute shortage of personnel because of circumstances that delay the arrival of additional companies (station remoteness, multiple concurrent incidents, or other factors that extend response times.)
WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?
If we accept that we should have on the scene a certain minimum number of firefighters to best address the multiple hazards present and tasks required at a structure fire, where does that leave us when we fall short, temporarily or routinely? Are we to limit our activities to such “safe” activities as reconnaissance or setting up water supplies until the arrival of the full contingent, after which a coordinated fire attack can be initiated? What, if any, other tasks can be carried out that might provide more immediate benefit? What is the likelihood that an ample number of firefighters will ever show up, at least while there is still something to save?
These were some of the questions my department and I faced so many years ago. Desiring to mount comprehensive and efficient fire attacks, but lacking the personnel necessary to do so, at least using the “standard” approaches, led to a reanalysis of fireground management strategies. We realized that if reinforcements are sufficiently delayed so that the situation will deteriorate significantly before they arrive, then efforts must be initiated to begin to control the crisis at hand using the means available. In fact, we determined that a substantial amount of benefit can still be safely accomplished with a small number of firefighters. What resulted was a prioritization of initial actions, a redistribution of tasks among available personnel to be able to address those priorities, and a flexible organizational framework that readily and efficiently accommodates later-arriving resources. Similar modifications of responses could, and should, be undertaken by any fire company that might find itself in similar situations. The term I use for these approaches is “First-In Tactics”.
Of course, being shorthanded does not affect the amount of tactics required for incident control or their complexity; the same work needs to be done regardless. Similarly, no task can be skipped, at least not without paying a penalty in regard to safety or efficiency. A significant casualty of limited staffing is the simultaneous accomplishment of multiple, potentially complex, maneuvers (ventilation, forcible entry, search and rescue, water supply, command). Only so much can be done at one time. By necessity, fireground functions must be broken down into more manageable steps, then carefully sequenced and coordinated to maximize impact and minimize risk. Determining what should, can, and will be done–and in what order is key. It is necessary to undergo that exercise prior to finding yourself in such situations. Attempting to create new strategies at an emergency scene and expecting personnel to carry them out flawlessly is a recipe for failure.
These columns are not to promote the use of a small team for firefighting or even to suggest that such a situation is acceptable. In fact, information will be presented specifying the trade-offs that must be made with regard to efficiency with such a limited contingent, essentially outlining what cannot be accomplished. It is acknowledged that decreasing the number of firefighters diminishes their effectiveness and safety. It is recognized, though, that ideal staffing numbers are unachievable for many departments, and First-In Tactics will explore approaches that work within the limitations posed by such circumstances.
The goal of this series is to assist firefighters who operate with sub-optimal staffing levels to do the best that they can with limited resources. These articles will explore the challenges faced by the crews of any fire department that might find itself at the scene of a working fire or other complex incident with insufficient personnel and suggest techniques that will allow them to operate as efficiently and as safely as possible, including interior operations with as few as five trained personnel. These columns will present a different method of organizing, equipping, and using available firefighters to best accomplish fireground objectives. Rather than looking at how to fill all of the potential tasks and roles needed (the NFPA 1710 approach), we will instead look at what the available personnel can and should safely do to initiate and maintain incident stabilization, whether or not additional personnel ever arrive.
Future columns will look at the entire gamut of emergency incident mitigation techniques from the perspective of a department with limited personnel resources. Current fireground strategies will be reviewed to identify the key attributes that can and should be copied. Applicable laws, regulatory and physical, will be reviewed and adhered to. A wide variety of First-In Tactics will be described, their potential uses explored, and a applications demonstrated.
Many fire departments must respond with small numbers of firefighters, and they need all of the help they can get. My hope is that this discussion serves that purpose.
Next: Accepted Practices – Taking the best and leaving the rest.
Mark J. Cotter has almost 40 years of experience in emergency services and is a volunteer with the Salisbury (MD) Fire Department. He can be reached at markjcotter@comcast.net.
