FLAMMABLE LIQUIDS IN TRANSIT Tanker Fire in Branson, Missouri
At approximately 0530 hours on Saturday, September 7, 1991, the driver of an 8,900-gallon MC-306 tanker truck traveling south on Route 65 toward Branson. Missouri, fell asleep, crossed the center lane, and demolished 500 feet of guardrail on the opposite side of the two-lane highway before coming to a stop. The driver’s side saddle tank was ripped from the tractor, splashing diesel fuel over the fifth wheel and trailer. The fuel ignited from the friction heat, and fire rapidly spread to the tires and cab, heating and subsequently igniting the product in the jackknifed tanker’s number-one fuel compartment.
Firefighters from the Western Taney Fire Protection District were called to respond (The district, protecting 150 square miles of Ozark Mountain Country, is administered by a career chief and supported by a career fire marshal and 60 volunteer firefighters staffing six stations.) Based on incoming reports through fire dispatch. Chief Bob Hasbrook requested additional companies while en route. Hasbrook approached the incident from the south, established a command post almost a half mile from the burning tanker, and made an initial size-up. Identification of tanker contents was hampered by darkness, distance from the scene (as a safety precaution), and difficulty in locating the driver, who had left the scene to place a call for assistance from a nearby LPG dealer s office. The height and appearance of the plume, whistling noise of the release, and interviews with truck drivers who had abandoned their vehicles on the north hill (see photo) indicated to command that the tanker fire was being fed by LPG.
Hasbrook established a risk zone and ordered the evacuation of residents of a mobile home park less than one-half mile to the northeast. Evacuation was performed by Western Taney firefighters. Fortunately, sunrise was not long in coming, and as visibility improved, the driver of the tanker truck was located, uninjured but quite shaken Command confirmed that the tanker was earning 7,800 gallons of unleaded gasoline—not LPC.
At this point, Hasbrook assigned members of his department to planning, logistics, safety, and information officer functions. Chief John B. Sachen of the Mallinckrodt Chemical Company in St. Louis, who was attending a nearby conference and responded to the incident, was designated operations/foam attack officer.
Hasbrook and Sachen then drove eight miles on lake roads to gain access to the scene from the north side. After a second size-up and further consideration of firefighter safety, type of tanker and load, location, and potential hazards, they decided to attack the fire from the uphill/north side with foam. Certain factors were of major importance in tactical decisions:
- A head failure on the end of compartment 1—or any other type of flammable liquid release—would flow downhill/south.
- Since the tanker was aluminum and not carrying LPC, there was no concern for a catastrophic BLEVE, and responders could approach the vessel at reasonably low risk; however, while side failure of compartments that are full or vapor-rich are not a high risk, compartment 2 was known to be empty and could have had a vapor-air
- mixture in the ignitable range. Had a melt-out occurred under such circumstances, a side blow-out was possible, though not a high probability.
- Head failures have in the past resulted in the sudden movement of a trailer resting on its landing gear. In this case, the trailer was still on the fifth wheel of the jackknifed tractor,
- so no movement was expected.
The fire in the tractor and tires had burned itself out during size-up, but not before melting the tanker’s rollover rails and top of compartment 1, allowing vapors to escape and ignite in a large fire plume. Command directed Engine 21 to set up on the north side of the incident as initial attack pumper; its crew laid 150 feet of three-inch hose reduced to 150 feet of 1 3/4-inch handline terminating in a 60-gpm aspirating foam nozzle and pickup tube with shutoff capability. Engine 31 was ordered to the same location and established a safety line, stretching 100 feet of three-inch line reduced to 150 feet of 1 3/4-inch hose with an in-line foam eductor and a 95gpm nozzle with shutoff capability. The three-inch supply lines would have been beneficial should an emergency have occurred: An additional handline with a 100-gpm nozzle and eductor or a 300-gpm nozzle with pickup tube (and a 150-foot reach) could be “spliced in” should it become necessary.
Tanker 15, carrying 1,700 gallons of water, and Tanker 25, with 1,600 gallons, were positioned to supply the operation. The district had 150 gallons of alcohol-resistant AFFF in resources. Additional foam was available from the City of Springfield Fire Department and neighboring departments. (Photo below illustrates a definable break in the flames. This is because vapors feeding the flames are issuing from tanker compartments 1 and 3; compartment 2 is empty. See “Flammable Liquid Releases from MC306 Tankers” on page 51. Note also that the tractor trailer to the right is an abandoned vehicle.)
The attack and safety line teams consisted of three firefighters and Chiefs Hasbrook and Sachen. All members were in full firefighter protective gear with SCBA. A preentry meeting of attack and safety teams was conducted. Protective gear was inspected, and an evacuation signal was decided on (airhorn blasts from Engine 31). The method of attack and principles of foam application were reviewed so as not to waste resources. Prior to entry, hoselines were charged and communications were checked. Extra foam was positioned near the points of attack for both attack and safety line teams. Nozzles were tested on the ground before the final approach.
Once safety checks were performed, the attack teams entered the hot zone and approached the burning tanker from a 45-degree angle, the idea of which was to approach from as far uphill and to the side while still reaching the burning compartment. They applied a three-percent solution of polar foam to the top of the tanker, working from the rear. When steaming ceased on the front tanker compartment, the attack team moved forward to that position, applying foam from a 90-degree angle for about 15 minutes, when the fire decreased in intensity by 30 to 40 percent. The foam line then was moved to the north end of the trailer and operated for another five minutes until the fire was extinguished. Thirty-five gallons of foam and 1,100 gallons of water were used on initial fire knockdown. Note in the photos the carbon deposits from the tire fire on the lower portion of compartment 1; the heavy carbon deposits outline the area of flame contact from the tires and diesel fuel involved in the initial stages of the incident.
Firefighters continued to maintain the foam blanket after the fire was under control. This prevented reignition and assisted in cooling the product and tanker so that the salvageable gasoline could be transferred to another tanker. An additional 35 gallons of foam and the necessary water were periodically reapplied. The initial attack firefighters were relieved from overhaul duties, and less-experienced firefighters rotated in to gain the experience and practical aspects of applying foam on an actual incident that was under control.
Firefighters remained on the scene for the next six hours with safety lines while the salvageable fuel was transferred to another tank truck by the vehicle owner, as agreed to by the Missouri Department of Natural Resources. No fuel was spilled during the tanker fire, but as salvage crews pumped fuel into the awaiting tanker, a cap on a fitting worked its way loose under pressure, allowing a small amount (less than 10 gallons) of fuel to spill. The fitting was wired shut to hold against the pressure, and the operation continued. More than 7,300 gallons of the fuel was salvaged.
Incident priorities—in this case, life safety, environmental safety, and property conservation—were fully observed during this incident. With initial reports and size-up indicating an LPG incident, evacuation was undertaken immediately for residents within the risk zone. The need for evacuation plans is underscored, and firefighters must be trained on how to properly initiate such plans, how to approach and deal with the public, and how to keep track of evacuation plan progress. Command also acted on the side of caution with regard to scene safety. The extra time taken to confirm product identification, determine an acceptable means of fire extinguishment, and manage the incident after the fire was brought under control paid dividends in overall success of the operation.
Incidents involving similar amounts of motor fuel that could not be extinguished have resulted in damages of $75,000 to $150,000 for roadway repair and environmental cleanup. In this case, the loss was less than $I0,000, with no environmental damage caused by fuel runoff.
