The Passaic (NJ) Fire Department is a typical Northeast U.S. department, protecting an area of three square miles that has a population of approximately 90,000 people. It’s an urban area with a heavy fire load and plenty of potential for disaster. The department consists of 110 paid members who staff four engine and two ladder companies over four shifts of 24 hours. The department responds to more than 3,100 fire calls a year, not including first responder and EMS calls.
LINE-OF-DUTY DEATH AND ITS AFTERMATH
On May 9, 2001, the department suffered its worst tragedy in more than 25 years. At approximately 2030 hours, dispatch received a 911 call reporting a fire at 204 Market Street. The three-story building of ordinary construction was an occupied multiple dwelling with fire showing from the second floor rear B/C corner with smoke issuing from all floors. The first-alarm response was three engines, one ladder, and the deputy chief. The first-in ladder received reports that there were two children still inside the building and unaccounted for. Firefighter Al Tirado became trapped on the floor above the fire and ran out of air. His last radio transmissions were received only nine minutes after the department arrived on-scene. The missing children had left the building and had gone across the street before the fire department arrived.
After the investigations and the Monday morning quarterbacking ended, there were some hard lessons to be learned.
First, although our department could talk the rapid intervention team (RIT) talk, by no means did it walk the walk. We had counted on mutual aid to provide backup at incidents but could not reasonably expect a company to be on-scene and ready to go in nine minutes. Also, the firefighters engaged in the fire attack stopped what they were doing and made numerous attempts to save Firefighter Tirado. However well-intended these actions, they allowed the fire to spread uncontrolled and create an even more hazardous conditions.
Second, all members of the department did not really have a good understanding of what being the RIT involved. For example, our members did not truly appreciate just how labor-intensive removing a downed firefighter is and had not experienced just how much their emotions would take over and impair judgment and decision making.
Third, we needed more on-scene accountability immediately. Prior to this incident, the city eliminated the position of battalion chief, thus removing one interior supervisor from each shift. This means the deputy chief has to run the scene by himself. Passaic operates with three- and four-member companies; thus, the officer serves as a nozzleman and cannot focus on the entire interior scene.
Finally, our radio communications were pretty inadequate. We used only one channel for dispatch and fireground operations. A second radio frequency was available but was shared with the police department, which made it useless. Tirado had made two Mayday calls that were not acknowledged because the incident commander was talking to responding companies. During the incident, there were numerous fireground operational problems resulting in a high volume of radio traffic. Hence, Tirado’s final radio transmission was the first indication to the firefighters on the fireground that there was a problem.
For the next two and half years, the unofficial rule for the May 9, 2001, tragedy was, “Don’t ask, don’t tell.” This created a lot of insecurity in the department because Passaic firefighters wanted to know what happened and what they could do to prevent it from happening again. The only true honor we could pay to our fallen brother was to ensure we did not repeat history and allow anyone else to be killed or injured under the same circumstances.
RIT PROGRAM INSTITUTED
In January 2004, a new chief of department took over; he made members’ safety his number one priority. He immediately instituted a mandatory basic rapid intervention program, taught by department members who had traveled the country learning new firefighter safety techniques. The program began with 12 hours of classroom instruction covering RIT introduction, size-up, deployment, Mayday procedures, and firefighter safety and survival techniques. This was followed by 12 hours of hands-on training, including basic emergency SCBA procedures, focusing on what the individual firefighter can do to help himself in a situation. We spent a lot of time familiarizing members with their SCBA and teaching them the best methods of manipulating them when things go wrong. We covered disentanglement, the no-air maneuver, reduced- and low-profile techniques, air management, and air awareness. We then proceeded to basic RIT procedures such as basic drags and carries (photos 1, 2), converting the SCBA to a harness (photos 3, 4), RIT air pack use and packaging, hasty harnesses, large-area search and removal, high-point removal.
 Photos by author. |
We also addressed our radio communications at this point. Although we had an SOP for Maydays, the members did not have to use it much up to this point. We made all of our firefighters very much aware that the radios in their pockets were the most valuable tools on the fireground next to their heads. Drills were conducted that put members in different situations in which they had to give the proper Mayday transmissions to reach safety. Sad to say, the radio frequency situation remains the same with no sign of change. To deal with this, we make sure all radio transmissions are short and to the point. Also, two fireground safety officers monitor the radios for any developing problems, adding one more level of protection.
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After three months of training, we started revising our response and operating procedures. We now use the third-due engine company as the dedicated RIT at all working fires. Mutual-aid companies called to the scene augment our RIT but do not assume the primary role.
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We assembled a dedicated RIT tool kit, kept in the rear of the deputy chief’s car, which includes the following: a stokes basket, bolt cutters, a Denver tool (a five-in-one tool including a hook, a sledgehammer, an ax, a pry bar, a six-foot hook, and a ram), a thermal imaging camera with a spare battery attached, two large-area search ropes with two 15-foot tag lines attached, a sling link device, a tool box, webbing, life safety rope, and a RIT SCBA (a one-hour bottle with manifold and Hansen connections). All the RIT tools are packed in the stokes basket (photos 5, 6).
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With the RIT kit in place, the responding third-due company just has to bring handlights and radios, which members should already have. This is only a level 1 or primary kit. As the company completes its on-scene size-up, it can act proactively and use saws to remove bars from windows and doors or place some ground ladders for secondary and emergency egress. If the situation escalates, the primary and secondary teams can assemble more advanced tools for the developing scene.
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We also now use two safety/accountability officers immediately at the scene. They have proven invaluable in coordinating and controlling the scene by allowing the incident commander to focus on primary fire attack while they monitor the scene. These officers also coordinate the RIT’s operations until the arrival of a second deputy chief, who acts as the rescue group supervisor.
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We do not claim to have become the best in rapid intervention or any better than our surrounding departments, but we are better prepared and equipped than we were on May 9, 2001.
The firefighters of the Passaic Fire Department now have a much better understanding of what rapid intervention entails and just how difficult and staff-intensive the removal of a downed firefighter is. There is a lot to be said for having an outside department covering as the RIT. However, being able to cover our own members puts a team in place with the first-arriving companies. Moreover, since department members are familiar with each other, they know how everyone operates and where one could expect to find a missing member. Nine minutes into a fire is not a long time; the faster a RIT is in place, the safer the scene will be for everyone. No one can say if all of this training would have made a difference on May 9, 2001, but I know Al deserved a chance to see.
There is nothing new about rapid intervention. If your department is not using it to its fullest potential by now, then someone needs to speak up. A Mayday can happen anywhere at any time; give all your fellow firefighters the chance they deserve.
The Passaic Fire Department is currently following up its initial training by incorporating the basic RIT skills into the daily drills of all companies. The chief of department plans to continue with advanced rapid intervention techniques at the end of this year. ■
CHRIS FREEMAN, a 12-year veteran of the Passaic (NJ) Fire Department, is currently a lieutenant assigned to Engine Company 2 and served nine years in a ladder company. He is a New Jersey certified EMT, fire inspector, fire official, arson investigator, haz-mat tech, fire instructor 1, and safety officer.
