INCIDENT ESTIMATION AND STRATEGIC GOALS AT HAZ-MAT INCIDENTS

INCIDENT ESTIMATION AND STRATEGIC GOALS AT HAZ-MAT INCIDENTS

DISASTER MANAGEMENT

Once critical data is gathered, the haz-mat incident management process jumps into full swing. Part 3 of a series.

DATA GATHERING is crucial in the management of a critical incident. Every ensuing step in the GEDAPER process (see “Operational Decision Making,” Fire Engineering, June ’89 and “Data Gathering at Haz-Mat Incidents,” Fire Engineering, July ’89) hinges on it. The data is used to estimate the course of the incident; determine strategic goals, tactical objectives, and methods; develop a plan of action; and evaluate and reevaluate the effectiveness of the entire operation. Let’s focus now on incident estimation and strategic goals.

INCIDENT ESTIMATION

The incident commander must assimilate the available data into a series of predictions that will determine the impact on life safety, incident stabilization, and protection of property and environment. With an accurate estimate of the probable course of the incident, the IC’s task of deploying available resources will be made much simpler and his decisions will be more appropriate. Thorough, effective incident estimation puts the IC in the enviable position of being in charge of a proactive as opposed to a reactive operation.

Estimating the probable course of an incident requires identification of possible situations. Each possible situation is the result of different conditions of incident elements. The condition of each incident element depends on the interaction between basic incident components.

The elements in a chemical incident are spill, leak, and fire. The spill is the product that has escaped its intended location (container). The leak is an opening or breach in the container through which the product was able to escape. Fire is the rapid oxidation reaction that may be the result of, cause, or concurrent event to leak and spill. The spill involves the components of product and environment; the leak involves product, container, and environment; and the fire involves product, container, its exposures, and environment.

DISASTER MANAGEMENT

INCIDENT ESTIMATION & STRATEGIC GOALS

In virtually all emergency situations there is an interrelationship between all three elements, yet each element is distinct and to some degree independent. Control of each element requires different equipment, materials, and activities. Furthermore, the degree of potential danger encountered by responders attempting stabilization can vary significantly from element to element. In any case, once the elements have been identified individually it is much easier to make an accurate estimate as to their probable impact on the incident.

The IC must understand clearly that the spill and the leak are not the same thing and therefore understand that spill control and leak control are not the same operation. They are two separate and distinct aspects of the overall operation. Spill control requires managing a product that has already escaped the container; leak control requires managing the breach through which a product has escaped.

Figure 1

In my opinion, leak control activities are by far the most potentially dangerous activities for entry team personnel for two reasons: Entry team personnel usually must be in close proximity to a compromised container that is often quite unstable, and second, the entry team is almost certain to be contaminated by the product. It is vital that the IC realize these basic life safety hazards when estimating the incident.

When fire is added to the haz-mat situation, either as the cause or result of a release, it may simplify or complicate the situation. In some situations, the fire may provide the beneficial function of controlling product spread by incineration (as in a burning flammable gas release, for example), or it may threaten to extend itself and the product to surrounding exposures.

To more fully understand the benefit of identifying and examining incident elements, let’s take each individually.

SPILL

Spill is the product that has escaped its intended location and has entered the environment. By definition, product and environment are the two components of a spill.

To estimate the spill effectively, the IC must identify the specific type of release involved in the spill. That requires identification of the physical state (solid, liquid, or gas) of the product and the environmental media (air, water, surface, or subsurface) into which the product is released. (The surface media is any solid surface, regardless of porosity, location, or size. That means a surface can be a tabletop, a floor, a street, the ground, the inside of a storm sewer, and so on. The subsurface media is the soil underneath a surface into which the product is directly escaping from the container, be it pipe, underground storage tank, storm sewer, or sanitary sewer.)

There are a maximum of 12 different releases possible (see Figure 1). Several of them will mimic or transform into another type of release. For example, a gas/surface release will immediately transform into a gas/air release, and a fine particulate solid/water release will mimic some type of liquid/water release. Furthermore, none of the subsurface media releases are manageable (by response agencies at least) until the product appears in one of the other media (air, water, or surface). The predominant types of releases, therefore, are gas/air, liquid/water, liquid/surface, and solid/surface. Remember that several or possibly all of these different releases may occur at the same time. Consider the spill of gasoline coming from a ruptured tanker. It could easily constitute:

Figure 2

  • a liquid/surface release where the product contacts the roadway;
  • a liquid/water release where the product flows into a storm sewer and then a stream; and
  • a gas/air release where the vapors (gas phase of the product) enter the air.

Once the IC has identified the nature of the release and gathered and assimilated all other pertinent information regarding the product and the environment, he must provide an appropriate estimate regarding:

  1. the potential for further spread;
  2. the probable direction and routes of spread;
  3. the potential impacts of spread; and

any additional factors involving spread.

LEAK

The leak is the physical breach or failure in the container through which the product can escape. The product and container—specifically, the physical state of the product (again, solid, liquid, or gas) and the pressure found in the container (atmospheric, low pressure, high pressure, or ultra-high pressure)—along with the environment are the components and thus the primary considerations.

Again, a matrix can be constructed for these components (see Figure 2). With the exception of the solid forms of products, all of these types of leaks can and do occur. Other than finely divided particulates (granules, crystals, powders, etc.), solids are only found under atmospheric pressure.

This, along with other information gathered about the product and the container, will enable the IC to predict the possible duration of release, probability of further container failure, possibility of controlling the leak, potential hazards to leak control personnel, and so on.

FIRE

Fire involved in a chemical incident complicates estimates of incident course. The components of fire—product, container, exposures, and environment—must be analyzed as they exist separately and interrelatedly.

Ask yourself the following questions to analyze the components of fire: What is burning? Is this a fire that must be put out? What impact is the fire likely to produce? Is it better to allow the fire to burn itself out while you protect exposures? Is it better to withdraw and isolate the area? Will extinguishment efforts lead to contaminated runoff or smoke production? What are the life safety hazards to personnel? Would the use of alternative extinguishing agents such as low-, medium-, or high-expansion foam be prudent? Can heavy ventilation techniques (PPV, HVAC, natural, and the like) be utilized to minimize personnel exposures? Should personnel use disposable suits over turnouts to minimize the risk of contamination? Will ventilation cause unacceptable harm to exposures? What decontamination procedures will be necessary to follow after firefighting?

A major caution must be mentioned at this time: All too often, fire personnel see fire, especially if it involves a structure, and instinctively look to water application as the solution. Water application can be a major contributing factor to the life safety hazard and overall property damage in the form of contamination spread. If the contamination has spread over even a relatively small area, the cost of the cleanup may surpass the total loss of a structure and its contents.

PREINCIDENT PLANNING

Preincident planning can play a tremendously important role in the estimation process of a chemical incident. It is a basic element found in SARA Title III planning requirements, EPA Chemical Emergency Preparedness Program (CEPP), CHRIS System, CAMEO Programs, EIS/C Programs, and quite a few other programs and systems. Preincident planning for both fixed and transportation incidents is vital in making at least broad general estimates as to the probable areas that are vulnerable and at risk from a chemical release.

Predictions can be made regarding flow patterns, direction of spread, possible dispersion zones, identification of evacuation routes, key control points, access points, and unseen conduits. Key decisions can be made before the incident as to whether or not the capabilities exist to fight the fire in the first place (gpm’s, flow rates, foam-generating capacity) or if you’re faced with a situation in which exposure protection is the only appropriate goal.

It is crucial to realize that there are incidents waiting to happen in many locations involving substances of such high toxicity that traditional response mechanisms may not work. That is, the substance involved is so dangerous and the incident unfolds so rapidly that standard emergency response systems will fail to protect the community. In such situations—release of Poison A materials, or uncontrolled flame impingement on the vapor space of a flammable-liquid container or on an explosives storage, for example—preplanning is going to provide the only mechanism for managing the incident. It should be rather obvious that preincident planning, when done thoroughly and systematically, is not only an information-gathering tool but can provide us with crucial estimates, strategic goals, and even tactical objectives and methods.

DETERMINATION OF STRATEGIC GOALS

Once the probable course of the incident has been estimated, the IC must determine the specific strategic goals that are appropriate for the specific circumstances encountered. Remember, strategic goals determine the tactics needed to meet the goals. Unfortunately, all to often in practice we allow tactics to determine the strategic goals. That is incorrect: The IC must first determine what needs to be done (strategy) before determining how it needs to be done (tactical objective) and who needs to do it (tactical method).

DISASTER MANAGEMENT

INCIDENT ESTIMATION & STRATEGIC GOALS

If the IC does not determine appropriate strategic goals for the incident, the door is wide open for response personnel to “free-lance”—an improperly managed incident. Unfortunately, many experienced personnel are familiar with this operational scene.

There are eight strategic goals in a chemical incident: isolation, notifications, identification, protective measures, spill control, leak control, fire control, and recovery. These goals will help to identify exactly what the IC is trying to accomplish. Notice that rescue is not among the list of strategic goals. There is a very specific reason for this omission. Rescue during chemical incidents is very similar to rescue during a well-advanced, defensive-mode structural fire that has compromised structural integrity. It would be foolhardy to place operating crews inside the structure for search. Likewise, it would be unwise to place personnel in a haz-mat situation that posed an immediate danger to their lives and health. Unfortunately, the hazards confronting personnel during chemical incident rescue operations are usually not as obvious as those in a structure fire. There is usually no billowing smoke and flame to warn personnel of the potential dangers. Often a chemical incident will exhibit few if any signs of imminent danger other than visibly spilled liquids or solids, or wisps of vapors or gases. In either situation, the rescuers could be entering environments that are “immediately dangerous to life and health.”

(NOTE: Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health (IDLH) is defined by OSH A in CFR #29 Part 1910.120 as “an atmospheric concentration of any toxic, corrosive, or asphyxiant substance that poses an immediate threat to life or would cause irreversible or delayed adverse health effects or would interfere with an individual’s ability to escape from a dangerous atmosphere. ” If we replace the words “toxic, corrosive, or asphyxiant substance” with “any hazardous environment into which personnel may enter,” the concept of IDLH becomes much more useful in a multitude of emergency situations. This broad interpretation of the IDLH concept can be helpful when assessing the potential personnel safety hazards of any emergency situation.)

Let’s briefly examine the strategic goals for a chemical incident.

Isolation. Isolation involves just what the name implies: setting the incident apart from any and all exposure potentials. Specifically, first-arriving units start by establishing operational zones (i.e., hot, warm, cold; red, yellow, green; etc.). The zones act as a cushion or buffer between a chemical and everyone around the incident, including all response personnel, the public, the media, and government officials. Part of the isolation process would involve the initial evacuation of threatened persons. Secondary evacuations may be needed after the full extent of the incident has been determined.

Notifications. Agencies, groups, and individuals who may be needed to assist response agencies in handling the incident must be notified. Under provisions of SARA and some state requirements, response agencies are mandated to notify state and federal agencies in the event of a release of specific types and quantities of chemicals. It is vital that responders establish checklists of specific agency/group names and numbers to help speed the notification process and make sure that all who are supposed to be at the site indeed come.

As part of the notification planning process, it is helpful to predetermine various “levels” of incidents since not all chemical incidents are of the same magnitude and impact. Leveling or tiering provides a very general estimate of the size and complexity of a given incident. Tier systems are used by the nuclear industry to describe reactor situations and in the weather service to describe the magnitude of hurricanes.

DISASTER MANAGEMENT

INCIDENT ESTIMATION & STRATEGIC GOALS

The use of a tier system for chemical incidents can be of tremendous benefit to the IC and the entire emergency management system in general. There are many different systems available to determine incident levels, but some of the most helpful are NFPA, proposed Standard 471, FEMA, NRC, and other state and federal agencies involved in planning. Normally, a threeto fourlevel system is used for chemical incidents, Level I being an incident situation of the smallest magnitude and Level III or IV an incident of the highest.

Leveling can be utilized in the notifications process to establish predetermined notifications lists. For example, a Level I incident may simply require notification of local response agencies, emergency management, and the public works department. A Level III incident, on the other hand, would require notification of all those listed in Level I and Level II plus most local government agencies and personnel, activation of the emergency operations center staff and personnel, and notification of state and federal agencies. Such predetermined notifications can take a tremendous amount of stress off of the IC.

Don’t forget to notify CHEMTREC and the National Response Center for information and assistance. CHEMTREC can be invaluable in making contacts, acquiring information, and gaining assistance from the industrial side of the situation. CHEMTREC’s ability to track and cross-reference names, identification numbers, and such are quite good. The National Response Center can track down governmental assistance, resources, and information. It will act to notify other federal agencies that require notification and can help to institute the Federal Response System as outlined in the National Contingency Plan and administered through the National Response Team.

A chemical incident may well require resources and assistance from local organizations. Consider contractors for heavy equipment and materials, or the local utility companies to warn them of potential impacts or request assistance.

NOTE: Check with your local emergency planning committee (LEPC) to determine what lists they have compiled and the procedures that have been established regarding notifications.

Identification. The exact identity of the product or products involved in a chemical incident must be determined. This particular goal is vital to the entire operation. In some cases identification is simple; in others, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible. The ease or difficulty associated with identification is directly related to the specific incident situation and whether it is a transportation or fixed-facility location.

In general, identifying products in transportation settings can be very difficult, frustrating, and time-consuming. All of the standard tools such as placards, shipping papers, driver information, and vehicle configuration and specification need to be utilized. CHEMTREC can help trad: shipping vehicle and container numbers to determine ownership and identify products.

Remember Uiat not all chemicals that cause problems are classified at “Hazardous Material” or “Other Regulated Material” (ORM). Chemicals that are not so classified will not have the same regulatory mandates and will not require placarding or labeling and may have different shipping paper mandates. Unregulated hazardous substances can cause long, difficult, and dangerous incidents. One of the longest incidents in my experience involved an environmentally hazardous substance that was not regulated by DOT. And in California, an incident involving molten sulfur—a nonregulated material —led to the deaths of two civilians and the injury of many responders.

Fixed-facility operations are often considered to pose somewhat less of a problem to product identification. Of course, that’s not always the case. There are many locations in every community that do not meet Title III reporting requirements or other right-to-know legislation. Even when information has been provided to the LEPC and the fire department, that information must be stored in some fashion that will allow for timely and efficient retrieval. There may also be locations in your jurisdiction where chemicals are manufactured, stored, packaged, produced, or otherwise used contrary to code or ordinance. The sheer size of some facilities or the large number of chemicals found in the inventory can also make identification quite difficult, even in situations where the planning process has been utilized conscientiously and reporting has followed the mandates.

DISASTER MANAGEMENT

INCIDENT ESTIMATION & STRATEGIC GOALS

Another practice that creates identification problems for many departments is the “midnight dumping” of chemicals and wastes. Anyone who has been involved in such an incident knows that identification of the chemicals involved is often fruitless. Laboratory testing is often the only recourse. There is a relatively new testing kit on the market that can be utilized to isolate unknowns. However, personnel must be thoroughly trained in its usage and potential shortcomings.

Protective measures. Measures must be taken to ensure the safety and protection of the public and response personnel. The IC will have to make basic decisions as to appropriate protective measures for the public. Unfortunately, there aren’t a lot of options available; these are evacuation, sheltering in place, or a combination of the two. The specifics of the incident will dictate which option is best. Due to the great many variables regarding product type, toxicity, properties, behaviors, release type, duration, migration, and other conditions, there are no easy answers.

Public protective measures can be very difficult to accomplish. Many people think that evacuation is easy. Nothing can be further from the truth. In some cases, people will self-evacuate an area, while others will refuse to leave at all. Often, evacuees will try to return before the site is determined to be safe. Loved ones can be separated at different shelters, medications and pets can be left at home at the time of evacuation, and so on. Sheltering in place presents as many problems as evacuation, not the least of which is determining when it will be effective.

Protective measures for responders include the determination of appropriate types and levels of personal protective equipment (PPE) and appropriate decontamination methods. In those determinations, we are presented with a cruel paradox: It is often difficult to identify the specific product involved in the incident without making a reconnaissance entry into the site. To make that entry, appropriate types and levels of PPE must be worn. However, the specific product identity is needed to identify the appropriate level and type of PPE. It’s the same with decontamination procedures. Prior to entry of personnel, decontamination capabilities must be established, but these are based on chemical identification.

Specific standard operating procedures (SOPs) must be developed to address that problem. The SOPs must identify minimum types and levels of PPE to be utilized, along with specific approaches and methods of making the determinations. Decontamination must be addressed in a similar fashion.

When the product is known prior to the initial entry, the problems of PPE and decontamination determinations are definitely simplified. However, there are still some major questions that must be answered. What are the primary and secondary hazards of the material involved? What are the other kinds of hazards to which the entry team may be exposed? Is chemical protective (Level A, B, C) PPE appropriate to wear if a toxic and flammable product is involved? What are the alternatives? What is considered to be appropriate decontamination? Are the decontamination procedures going to address all of the hazards of the product? Again, there are no easy answers.

Next we will examine the remaining strategic goals and some tactical options available to achieve them.

Brian Zaitz, Demond Simmons, and Dave Dubowski

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