LESSONS FROM THE P.A.S.T.
BY WILLIAM SHOULDIS
On May 13, 1985, the Philadelphia Police Department dropped an explosive satchel on a fortified rowhouse on Osage Avenue. The explosion ignited a “fast moving” fire that eventually destroyed 61 homes and killed 11 people. Exactly 11 years later in a “high-profile” civil trial, lawyers and witnesses continually searched for the right words to put a “socially acceptable” spin on the situation. “Accountability” and “responsibility” are two words that were used very creatively in the courtroom proceedings. As the district fire chief, currently working in the still “traumatized” neighborhood, I am often asked to explain in plain terms the fire department`s actions during the infamous MOVE incident described above. Unfortunately, “accountability” and “responsibility” are two words that cannot be manipulated when dealing with grassroots coalitions. Today, the public demands fiscal, ethical, and professional accountability, and the chief is always responsible.
COMMUNICATION MUST BE CLEAR
Having a single definition for words is a core ingredient in the communication process. In managing an emergency operation, clear communication is a prerequisite for scene safety.
In the fire service, our own jargon can cause much miscommunication. An example is the terminology used when explaining a challenging fire call. When the incident is referred to as a “good fire,” it often means something bad has happened. Frequently, when a life is lost, the emergency responders are placed in a position of feeling guilty.
When an industrial “taxpayer” is destroyed, there is trepidation over lost jobs. When a target hazard burns, the entire community feels the economic hardship. In all likelihood, after a major fire, there is a lot of “second guessing.” Politically, the blame can be placed on the lack of enforcement of the fire or building code. Legally, it can be on product failure or human error. Within our own ranks, debate often rages with regard to the strategy used by the chief. Ultimately, even the “troops in the trenches” are affected by the positive or negative news broadcast about the “good fire.”
When the life lost is that of a department member, the grief can be overwhelming and the criticism even greater. Normally, the department will struggle with the issues of accountability and responsibility much longer than with the handling of any of the smoldering embers.
During the five-alarm Rising Sun Baptist Church fire in which two Philadelphia firefighters were killed and many others were injured, I developed a keen insight for maintaining a manageable span of control and a greater appreciation for adhering to strict command and control practices. Working that afternoon “behind the scenes” in the Philadelphia Fire Communication Center, it was obvious that when conditions rapidly changed, a comprehensive plan was immediately needed to ensure firefighter safety. At this or any extended operation, it is extremely difficult to know exactly where individual members are working. Tracking each firefighter from staging to a sector to rehab and back to the “front line” is not a simple task, yet it is one that cannot be ignored because the operational and emotional costs of doing so are so high.
As the Rising Sun fire tragically turned from a “small-scale” interior attack to a large defensive operation with multiple casualties and a prolonged search and removal procedure, it was clearly evident that having a system to quickly verify missing members was pivotal. In addition, the importance of having trained and equipped personnel standing by at every emergency scene for rapid intervention is a contemporary concept that has quickly earned merit.
Under the National Fire Academy`s incident command system, the duty of the medical leader is to keep abreast of injured members. At the Rising Sun Church incident, the responsibility of the medical control officer was threefold:
l. to keep an accurate list of the injured members leaving the scene,
2. to dictate the destination of each vehicle, and
3. to maintain an up-to-date log of medical facilities capable of handling additional patients.
In retrospect, our simple “riding list” with each company officer and on the dashboard of each apparatus paid great dividends when the mode of the operation changed from offensive to defensive.
Meanwhile, at the Fire Communication Center, a high priority was placed on assigning a fire department liaison, equipped with a portable radio, to each hospital to relay a prompt and accurate assessment of each member`s condition. Initially, a written list was posted on an easel board to identify members who had been treated in emergency rooms, hospitalized, or killed. Biographical data were retrieved from personnel files to identify family contacts and correct home addresses. As a medical condition was confirmed by the department representative, the daunting task of notifying the next of kin and the monumental job of gathering fire department vehicles to provide a “shuttle service” for family members began.
During the entire event, time was the enemy because of the internal pressure to maintain sensitivity to the families and external pressures to release “headline” details to the media. A formal press conference was called at fire headquarters shortly after the fire was under control, and a typed document containing factual information was disseminated to the entire press corps.
History has proven that a comprehensive system addressing firefighter health, safety, and welfare issues is needed before, during, and after an emergency response. Departmental guidelines based on local resources will save time and energy as well as reduce duplication.
A review of both Philadelphia incidents–the Osage Avenue firestorm and the Rising Sun Baptist Church fire–reveals that accountability procedures and responsible planning top the list of lessons learned and reinforced. From these personal experiences and a case-study review of “antigovernment” groups at WACO, Ruby Ridge, and the Freemen ranch in Montana, coupled with the investigative reports on firefighter fatalities in Seattle, Memphis, and Pittsburgh, I believe that a memory device can help to change a fire department`s culture toward fireground accountability and ensure that supervisors are more responsible.
LEARN FROM THE P.A.S.T.
To me, the secret of improving individual and organizational performance is as easy as reviewing the P.A.S.T.
P Preparation. This means that there is a written policy in place
so that all ranks can actively make the necessary behavioral changes. Plans to enhance accountability must be thoroughly communicated so that emergency responders have an opportunity to provide input and buy into the controlled process. Previously used record keeping methods must be reevaluated if they do not provide for a quick check-in procedure that begins on the perimeter of the incident scene and continuously tightens as personnel are deployed wearing personal protective clothing in hazard zones. Point of entry control officers must be strategically placed to monitor activities, crews` movements, and situational conditions. Periodically, entry control officers will be tempted to enter interior work zones or become involved in hands-on tasks, but they must resist the temptation.
A Action. This is the means for analyzing change. Automatic
assignments authorized by the fire chief that require a designated attendant to track operating forces will reduce resistance and hasten departmental reform. Alerts (a blast on the air horn or a special tone over the radio) and warning signals (cease operations, evacuate, escape) must be understood by all members and be difficult to accidentally duplicate. Apparatus placed on each side of an incident will accommodate hardware collection (passports, identification badges, a riding list, for example). Adopting awards for safety will ingrain a positive “can-do” attitude.
S Systems approach. Start each and every incident in the same
manner–size up the scene, establish command, set the sectors, give out specific assignments, and track the resources. A system`s approach provides a predictable formula to initiate initial strategies and tactics. Shifting the fire service`s paradigm to include tighter fireground accountability is the responsibility of everyone–from the newest firefighter to the fire chief. Staffing levels will need adjustments to provide more support personnel on first-alarm assignments.
T Training. This is the foundation on which safe practices stand.
Teaching and developing quality programs take proper funding and a firm commitment from top management. Traditional programs must be upgraded to include recent case studies. Tips must include practical ways to increase individual and organizational efficiency without creating needless delays during the first few moments. The individual firefighters must be taught to work only in teams and to think of their portable radios, SCBAs, and PASS devices as integral pieces of personal safety equipment.
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The company officer sets the tone for safe operations. Taking the time to visually confirm the welfare of operating personnel is the sign of a “disciplined” professional. This periodic PAR (personnel accountability report) is required after each completed assignment or at tactical benchmarks. (A maximum of 15-minute intervals between status reports is recommended because rarely will an air cylinder last much longer while doing heavy interior firefighting.)
Technology has made available to all organizations a wide range of accountability methods ranging from disposable handwritten riding lists to inexpensive laminated all-weather resource boards to high-tech computer-generated assignment sheets. The key is to have something that is easy to handle, brightly colored, and readily available. Tags that can be easily affixed to some form of status board can be just as effective as sophisticated badges with electronic bar coding or battery-operated pagers with satellite locating devices.
In reality, we know that emergency response is not without risk. Today, there are many practical ways to improve fireground accountability and still rapidly deploy incoming resources. The incident commander will always be responsible for determining if the risks taken are worth the benefits gained, yet each emergency responder is responsible to work with common sense and good judgment–and within department guidelines.
As in all aspects of our life, a balanced view is necessary. When the aggressiveness of a fire attack crew is balanced with an effective command structure, the safety record of the fire service will improve. The “blueprint” for an effective accountability system includes crew integrity, point-of-entry control, the tracking of all personnel, and an organizational mind-set that rewards responsible responders.
At the burial service for one of the firefighters killed at Rising Sun Baptist Church, the minister stated: “We may not know why the brave firefighters were taken from us, but we know why they were among us.” As fireground decision makers, we can never be 100 percent sure of how quickly an incident will escalate. However, we do know that having an emergency service system built on accountability and responsibility will reduce the risk of turning a bright career into a horrible nightmare. Now is the time to learn the lessons from the P.A.S.T.
WILLIAM SHOULDIS is a 24-year veteran of the Philadelphia (PA) Fire Department, where he serves as deputy chief. He is an adjunct instructor in resident and field programs at the National Fire Academy in Emmitsburg, Maryland, teaching courses in fireground operations, health and safety, and fire prevention. Shouldis has a bachelor?s degree in fire science administration and a master?s degree in public safety.
