LESSONS LEARNED AND REINFORCED
- The effective use of reverse lays maximized water supplies; monitors and pipe holders kept firefighters at a safer distance during the fire.
- Although manpower was very limited in the initial minutes of the operation, a quicker primary search of the house should have been done.
- Allowances must be made for the impact that the media will have during a major operation. A department spokesperson must be designated and made available to the media to supply them with up-to-date information.
- Use of the national ICS would have organized the fireground more efficiently. This system is currently being implemented in Baytown.
- Because of the time delay to move logistics into this area, an additional fire station was erected in the area since the incident.
- The biggest lesson learned was in dealing with the physical toll exacted on the firefighters, especially the first-due engine company. “First-in” does not mean “last-out.” The allnight standby crew should have been staffed with off-duty personnel on overtime. Many times, these costs are recoverable from the responsible party. Accurate records of unusual expenses at this type of emergency should be kept and reimbursement investigated AFTER the incident is concluded. Even if you do not get paid back, the danger of injury to exhausted firefighters is not worth the savings.
- Questions were raised about the distance to the isolation valves in this and most other pipelines. Pipeline officials indicated that the number of valves is limited not so much as a cost factor, but as a safety factor. The safest place for a pipeline is underground. Anywhere the line must be brought to the surface and external equipment installed creates another opportunity for physical damage or vandalism and more incidents involving leaking valves. Older pipelines usually have fewer isolation valves, and there is usually a valve on either side of a water crossing.
- In normal operation, a pipeline pumping station closely monitors the pressure on the line. Electronically monitored devices watch for decreases in pressure or increases in flow that might signal a leak. The leak must be of sufficient size to cause a noticeable change, however. The flow-rate alarm is generally set at ±10 percent of the flow. Another safeguard in pipeline transmission is comparison of barrels shipped with barrels received. In event of a major break, falling pressure or increased flow usually is the pumping station’s first indication of a problem.
- The cause of most pipeline failures is human error, often by an outsideparty. The cause of this failure was primarily one of poor communication. The contractor, preparing to “pig” the line from the plant in Katy, thought that the operator at the refinery in Baytown had opened the valve and was ready to proceed. When he increased the pressure of the water behind the pig to try to dislodge it, the overpressurization of the line caused the failure. When the pressure dropped on the line, the contractor simply thought the pig had been freed. This caused a delay in shut-down. Regardless of what the cause of your pipeline emergency is, you can greatly impact the result. Establish a good relationship with the companies that pump through your community before the emergency. Create maps that show your corridors, their contents, isolation valve locations, working pressures, depth, and the emergency notification procedures.
One important safety caution regarding isolation valves: Firefighters should find out from local pipeline officials their recommendations on isolation valve operation by the fire department. In our community, these valves are to be operated by pipeline officials only. Firefighters might close the wrong valve or create a greater disaster if the pumping station is not shut down before the valve is closed. We know what happens when hoselines are shut down when there is no relief valve in operation. Imagine the result on a line with 500 psi working pressure. Some pipeline companies train the fire department in the proper and safe use of isolation valves. Unless you are trained and authorized, LEAVE THEM ALONE. You can help by assisting pipeline officials in reaching valve locations.
In other pipeline emergencies in Baytown, the pumping officials were trying to locate the problem when notified by the fire department. When the leak is relatively small, the pressure drop may not be sufficient to cause an alarm. Pipeline companies use aerial survey of their rightof-ways to help detect small leaks. Dead vegetation or an oil sheen on a waterway is easily spotted from a low-flying plane.
It should also be remembered that the section of ten-inch pipeline, three miles long, contained 64,625 gallons of liquid product. It will take time to burn off this amount of product even after the flow is stopped. Venting at the isolation valves can speed this process, as will the introduction of pressurized nitrogen or similar product to purge the line. If the product is liquified, the expansion factor of vaporization will result in more fire and a longer burn-down time.