LETTERS TO THE EDITOR
Interior firefighting
As a former volunteer firefighter in Riva and Annapolis, Maryland, and a U.S. Air Force CFR for six years, I feel I speak from experience in commenting on “Line in the Hallway, or Deck Gun Through the Front Door?” by Bill Manning (Editor’s Opinion, August 1993). The strategies and tactics of firefighting developed in the United States have served as guidelines for firefighters around the world, it is up to forward-looking, progressive fire service managers to stay in the forefront. Undoubtedly, there are many interior fire situations that would preclude an interior attack, but the option always should be open to “get in.”
George H. Potter
Fire Safety Instructor IISEMAP FUEGO Madrid, Spain
1 3/4-inih hose
James Regan’s article “ 1 Vi-Inch Hose: the Booster Line of the ’90s?” in the September 1993 issue provides valuable information regarding handline selection, but it ignores the critical factor that affects fireground decisions every day-the number of firefighters available.
The full-page photo accompanying the article depicts two firefighters directing a l’/i-inch line onto an exposed three-story tenement in a city north of Boston. Since the community in the photo can be easily identified, I will make readers aware that the department had suffered serious cutbacks at a time when fire frequency was increasing. It should be noted that the hoseline in the photo is being wisely used for exposure protection. Although it wrould not be appropriate for fire attack, the 180-gpm flow it is providing is indeed adequate to protect the surface of the exposed building and is less likely to break windows.
The author makes a key point when he cites a City of New York (NY) Fire Department rule of thumb that says a single firefighter cannot adequately operate and advance a l/i-inch attack line flowing 180 gpm. He doesn’t say (but 1 assume that he would admit) that two firefighters cannot adequately operate and advance a 2‘/2-inch attack line with 250 gpm flowing.
1 serve in a community with housing characteristics similar to those illustrated in the photo. Our companies are staffed with an officer and two firefighters. With one member operating the pump, that leaves the hoseman and me to stretch and operate handlines. With an equation like this, decisions regarding handline selection are simple.
The truth is inescapable: Hose doesn’t put out fires; firefighters put out fires.
Bill Sullivan
Lieutenant Chelsea (MA) Fire Department James Regan really hit the nail on the head. Firefighters should have available to them several different sizes of hose. Their operations should not be limited because they have only one size of attack line on the apparatus. They also should be trained to use the proper size. Good job.
Alex Black
Firefighter (retired) Douglas, Arizona
Recruit training
I just had the opportunity to read “Recruit Training Logistics, Part 1” by John Pangborn (Training Notebook, October 1993). The information in the article will prove valuable in the upcoming rookie firefighter school where I will be training officer. The information and suggestions for textbooks, classroom organization, dress uniform, and class duration are just a few’ areas I will address prior to the beginning of the class.
David Dwyer
Training Officer Columbus (IN) Fire Department
Setting the record straight
In the November 1993 issue of Fire Engineering, a letter appeared that has caused this department some concern and a certain level of embarrassment. The letter, “Engine, ambulance needed,” was apparently by a Michael R. Bear at 3N992 La Fox Road in St. Charles, Illinois. WTiile I cannot actually disprove the contents of that letter, I would like to advise your readers of the following information.
The address listed is in an unincorporated area of Kane County, Illinois. It does have a St. Charles postal address but is in fact in another township, some three miles west of the city of St. Charles. Bear has no connection whatsoever with the St.
Charles Fire Department or to the best of my investigation with any other fire department in this area.
Coincidentally, the city of St. Charles recently listed for sale one Seagrave engine and one Horton Type 1 ambulance as surplus property, having replaced both with new units within the past four months. Furthermore, I know of no municipality within the entire county that is in a “bankrupt” condition. The city of St. Charles is in excellent financial condition, and our officials strongly support the fire department and all public safety services.
Larry L. Swanson Fire Chief City of St. Charles, Illinois
Air quality plays a role in SCBA confidence
The article “SCBA Competence and Confidence” by John Salka in the September 1993 issue caught my attention. It is apparent that the author is an experienced firefighter. He certainly covered most of the bases concerning safety and common sense when using SCBA. However, because of my line of work, 1 feel Salka missed one of the most commonly overlooked safety hazards in using SCBA. I am referring to the quality of the compressed air itself.
If you don’t start out with quality air, even a properly working SCBA can be a potentially life-threatening health and safety hazard. One example is too much moisture in the air, which can freeze a high-pressure regulator, rendering properly operating equipment useless. I also have been involved in an incident where SCBA bottles were accidentally filled with nitrogen instead of air.
These are just two problems associated with compressed breathing air; there are, however, many others. My point is, when depending on SCBA in a life-threatening situation, don’t ignore the quality of the air.
Betty Wiesner Sales and Marketing Manager TRI Environmental, Inc.
Balancing the attack
“Line in the Doorway, or Deck Gun Through the Front Door?” (Editor’s Opinion, August 1993) and responding letters to the editor on aggressive firefighting need a bit of balance. To some, like Boston Fire Commissioner Martin Pierce, “aggressive firefighting” is a considered operation. Unfortunately, to others, aggressive firefighting is a headlong heedless rush into the fire building. FDNY DeputyChief Vincent Dunn, who didn’t earn his several medals for writing books (excellent though they are), repeatedly states that after occupants are removed from a building, the primaryconsideration is the safety of firefighters.
In 1974, 16 stories of a posttensioned concrete building under construction in Cleveland, Ohio, totally collapsed during a fire in the falsework, which supported a concrete floor unconnected to the columns. You never heard of this collapse because 20 or more firefighters were not crushed to death. 1 had discussed this hazard some years before with another chief, and he wisely kept his firefighters out from under tons of concrete supported on a flimsy wooden structure that was on fire, thus losing its minimal gravity resistance. To date, the posttensioned concrete building under construction remains a deadly trap if combustible falsework is permitted.
In another example, an FDNY company officer noted that wooden Ibeams had been substituted for the original sawn beams in a tenement being rehabilitated. Shortly thereafter, units responded to a heavy fire on the second floor. A typical aggressive attack W’as initiated. The officer then recognized the building type. He withdrew his company and notified command, who withdrew all units. Eight minutes after arrival, the front of the second and third floors collapsed. It was agreed that conventional tactics, if continued, would have resulted in casualties.
Lightweight steel trusses are another deadly example. Wichita, Kansas, firefighters ordered a second alarm as they responded to a fire in a car showroom that had a lightweight steel truss roof. They made an aggressive interior attack. Four firefighters died when the roof collapsed.
A Maryland masonry building with sawn joists was two stories high. It was extended to four stories but was held to 49 feet because at 50 feet the code required sprinklers. The upper floors and roof are of wooden Ibeams. Just how much “traditional” injury and death are justified to save this property, aka, death trap?
Furthermore, I continue to call for a specific change in dispatching language. Apparatus should be dispatched to a building fire. As soon as fire command determines that the fire involves the structure, as distinct from its contents, the situation is radically different. This is not the firetraining building fire, where there is no possibility of collapse or hidden fire. The gravity resistance system of the building is under attack. All units should be advised, and they should acknowledge the message, that this is a structural fire. The word “structural” should be reserved for just this situation. In the cases where trusses or wooden I-beams are involved, a department’s SOPs should provide for evacuation of the affected area as soon as it is involved in fire.
At times the term “withdraw in good order” also is used in fire tactics. This is a military term, and its meaning is not appropriate in fire operations. When a military retreat is necessary, it is important to deceive the enemy. Rear guard troops may keep up a fierce fight while all others slip out. Finally, the rear guard moves out. The operation may succeed because the human enemy can be deceived. Fire cannot be deceived or bluffed. When the time comes to get out, seconds are of the essence. In particular, firefighters should be trained to abandon hoselines. If you don’t believe this, take the following quiz:
Firefighters should always pull out their hoselines when retreating because
- hose is expensive.
- it is not macho to leave your hoseline behind.
- we’ve always done it.
- a longer report must be written for lost city property than for a burned firefighter.
Modern buildings and today’s fire loads and rate of heat release are not those for which codes were written or traditional firefighting tactics were learned. The good old reliable buildings often are more than 100 years old. We must substitute risk-benefit analysis for slogans.
Francis L. Brannigan, SFPE Port Republic, Maryland
