LETTERS TO THE EDITOR
“Swiss Nanny” trial
It was with much interest that I read “ ‘Swiss Nanny’ Trial: Fire Investigation Key to the Case” (Fire Engineering, December 1992). The experts of Peter Valias Associates who investigated the arson case in the Fischer’s home appear to have done a thorough job.
However, the ensuing trial of the “Swiss Nanny” Olivia Riner was about “murder and arson” when it was found that the Fischer’s three-monthold daughter was deliberately set on fire and perished. Although Olivia Riner was acquitted by a jury, her “innocence” was never established. In fact, Prcsidingjudge Donald N. Silverman. in an interview with the press after the trial, stated that he “was not convinced of Olivia Riner’s innocence” {New York Times, July 8, 1992).
If the nanny, as she has admitted, was alone in the house on the same floor where the fires were set, it would be impossible not to have seen or heard an intruder. I should know. 1 built the house and lived in it.
Jan Mentlng New York. New York
1 read with interest about the “Swiss Nanny” trial. Serving in a public safety department that performs both fire cause and origin and police investigations, the dual aspects and alleged malfeasance performed in both disciplines were intriguing (“inexcusable incidents” and “virtually every written and unwritten rule of sound police and fire investigation procedures was broken, distorted, or ignored to make the ‘means justify’ the end’ ”).
1 found no compelling evidence in the article that shocked my conscience to determine that the accused was innocent or guilty. It seems the authors weighed very heavily the fact that “not one drop of accelerant was found on her shoes or clothing.” The presence of accelerant on the accused person would have been strong evidence that she was guilty. However, the opposite is not true; lack of accelerant does not equal innocence.
The remainder of the article dwelled on the possible access by some “other” unknown suspect. Proving that some unknown suspect had hypothetical access to the residence via an unlocked window or door doesn’t prove that anyone actually entered the premises. It may suggest the possibility that someone “could” have entered and set the fire. The defense tactic to “cloud” the issues put before a trier of fact (i.e., the jury’) is a longheld practice within the American judicial system.
After reading the article and making the above observations, my mind questions the authors’ reason for writing the article: Was it to inform the fire service or to help clear their consciences?
Jim Grigsby Deputy Chief Kalamazoo (Ml) Department of Public Safety
Peter Valias Associates’ response: Unfortunately, we could not include all the investigative information regarding the Swiss nanny case in our article. To do so would have added hundreds of pages. Peter Valias Associates Inc. accepts defense work only if, ;tfter review by the corporate officers, we believe the defendant is innocent. This is clearly spelled out when we accept any defense work.
The attorneys are told that if during our investigation we find that the defendant is implicated in any way, we will cease our investigation. Peter Valias Associates Inc. turns down more defense cases than it accepts.
With regard to your question about having a guilty conscience, at the end of the trial, the judge thanked the jury members and told them that they had made the right decision. He also went on to say that if the jury had returned a guilty verdict, he would have reversed its finding and set aside the guilty verdict. The judge also stated that the prosecution failed to prove the defendant was guilty. The jury deliberated for approximately two hours before returning a not-guilty verdict.
The prosecution’s case revolved around the fact that the Fischer home was a virtual fortress and that no one could gain access without Olivia’s realizing it. At the time of the trial, detectives working on the case testified that the window in Leah’s room was closed and secured at the time of the fire. They based their findings on examinations of the wooden window frame during their post-fire investigation.
Their own videotapes clearly showed that the window w’as in the open position at the time of the fire. This certainly could have made it possible for someone else to enter the house and set the fires. According to the jury, this was a very important piece of evidence in the trial and only one of many facts that contradicted the prosecution’s findings.
If you are interested in this case, I suggest you contact the Westchester County Court House and request a trial transcript so that you can make your own determination regarding the facts pertaining to this trial. The article was provided purely to show the importance of an unbiased investigation by the fire service to obtain the truth.
An additional ranch-house hazard
I think “Bread and Butter Operations” (Fire Engineering, January 1993) should be supplemented with a discussion of the hazards of buildings with trusses or their first cousin, the wooden I-beam. They are very common in ranch-type houses (and also multistory buildings) across the country, not only in the Sun Belt.
The Phoenix (AZ) Fire Department has produced and has available an excellent videotape showing dramatic footage of three firefighters going through the truss-supported tile roof of a ranch-type house. The ventilation operation was “by the book,” immediately on arrival and right over the fire. We must remember that venting, as necessary as it is, accelerates the fire. When the fire fuel consists of kindling-size pieces of wood, structural strength disappears in a few moments.
I understand that a Denver firefighter died recently when the collapse of a wooden I-beam floor trapped him in a barred room. New York firefighters were withdrawn from a wooden I-beam floor multiple dwelling only moments before the collapse of two floors. More recently, two Memphis, Tennessee, firefighters died in the collapse of a truss roof early in a fire.
A Fairfax County, Virginia, fire officer fell through a wooden I-beam floor of a house under construction, with no contents fire load. I would consider any basement fire of a woodtruss or I-beam floor house heavy enough to involve the floor overhead as a defensive operation: A floor collapse is almost guaranteed. An attic fire heavy enough to involve the trusses should indicate that no firefighters should be above or below the trusses. Tactics suitable for sawn joist buildings are not suitable for lightweight trusses. Note also that in “Ft. Worth Collapse: Our Continuing Lessons” (Fire Engineering, January 1993), three Ft. Worth firefighters narrowly escaped a two-story truss collapse.
Francis L. Branningan SFPE Port Republic, Maryland
Differs on brake retarder use
After a second reading, I am compelled to respond to Fred W. Dolezal’s provocative and engaging article, “Engine Retarder and Manual Brake Limiting Value Hazards: The NTSB Report” (Fire Engineering, December 1992), which referenced an earlier NTSB report about the hazards involving engine retarders and brake-limiting devices. It is contrary to all I have learned in my experience as a fire apparatus chauffeur and motor pump operator.
Not having read the entire NTSB report, I must couch my comments accordingly. 1 take issue, however, with the conventional wisdom attested to by Dolezal in his statement: “Almost everyone agrees that retarders should be used limitedly or be turned off W’hen roads are wet and slippery.” Really? Maybe everyone at the NTSB thinks that, but the elders and veterans in the fire service who instructed us “johnnies” don’t necessarily share in that view. Perhaps that may explain why there is so little fire service instructional material to buoy the NTSB position.
In an urban setting, the typical apparatus response entails a sequence of rapid acceleration and sudden deceleration, hard braking, and cornering. Those earlier rigs with manual steering, nonsynchromesh transmissions, and drum brakes were real brutes to handle at times. The chauffeur had to listen to the engine rpms before throwing a shift, up or down. If you missed, if you started free-wheeling downgrade and into a turn—well. Fm certain there are many out there who also can remember how you had to virtually stand up on those service brakes from time to time. The advent of front brake limiters and engine retarders has enhanced safety in handling fire apparatus, especially in adverse weather conditions. But my observance is contrary to the NTSB report and other research cited in the article.
I am leery of the report’s conclusions, based on findings in a less-thanexhaustive study—a mere eight apparatus accidents. The most instructive statement in Dolezal’s article is near the beginning, which states: “Today, far too many drivers of emergency apparatus still do not fully understand that the manner in which engine brakes and engine retarders are operated affects the safety and stability of the apparatus.”
In an article from a 1984 issue of WNYF magazine, author I.t. Frank Cuozzo goes a bit further and says: “The chauffeur should be familiar with the stopping characteristics of the engine brake before operating the vehicle under wet or slippery conditions.”
Simply proscribing the use of auxiliary braking systems in adverse weather conditions because of safety concerns related to improper usage is another example of fire service expedience: veiling the underlying problem, which, in this case, amounts to inadequate chauffeur training.
Jeff Converse City of Neiv York (NY) Eire Department
Coronary disease has many warning signs
The population of this country and members of our fire service community have been well informed as to the classic symptoms of a heart attack and angina pectoris (pain caused by a lack of oxygen to the heart muscle). We are told that angina pectoris reveals itself by the classic symptom of “chest pain” or a pressure in the chest brought on by exertion. Once the individual rests, the pain normally goes away.
However, because of my recent experiences, 1 have discovered that these classic symptoms may not be the only way in which angina pectoris raises its ugly head.
Since April 1992, I have experienced after exertion or an episode of excitement a localized pain in my throat. This pain would not be extremely severe (on a scale of 1 to 10,1 would peg it at a 5), and it would subside in one to two minutes. 1 believed the cause of the pain was gastric juices being pushed into my throat after bending over. (I had gained considerable weight in my midsection since quitting smoking in December 1991.) It seemed that the only common denominator prior to an attack was bending over. The episodes became frequent to the point of interfering with my lifestyle, so in November 1992 I decided to visit my family doctor.
I described the pain and duration. My contention was that it was not heart-related because of its location and duration. This viewpoint was based on my training as an emergency medical technician and experience as a crew member on an advanced life support ambulance. Initially tests were done to determine whether the gastric juice theory was correct; in addition, my doctor also ordered a stress test to rule out the heart as the source of my problem.
I lasted less than two minutes on the treadmill before the cardiologist stopped me. As it turned out, after further tests, I was diagnosed with coronary heart disease, blocked arteries! What a shock!
Treatment has begun to correct the problem; however, I posed several questions to my cardiologist: Why did I not have a classic angina pectoris symptom? How many “sudden-death’’ heart attack patients did, in fact, have some prior warning signs of coronary heart disease but did not recognize them as such? I share his answers to my questions with you;
- Any pain from the waist up that occurs on a regular basis after exertion and then subsides after resting could be suspected angina pectoris, a warning signal that should not be ignored.
- Some possible warning signs of angina pectoris other than the classic symptoms he mentioned were pain in the throat (mine showed up here), the teeth, the abdomen, one or both elbows, the forearm, the nose, or the jaw or no pain but unexplained fatigue.
We must “get the word out” to all members of the fire service as to other possible warning signs of coronary heart disease that currently may not be recognized. It scares me to think of how many lives may have been lost in our fire fraternity because we did not know of the other warning signs of possible heart problems.
John Kriska City of Rock Hill (MO) Fire Department
Part of investigative team
As a follow-up to our article, “Swiss Nanny” Trial: Fire Investigation Key to the Case (December 1992), I would like to add the following: During the long investigation prior to the trial, our article failed to mention one of the most important people involved in the investigation, Chris Rush, a private investigator specializing in criminal investigation. He was an involved, invaluable colleague. He and investigators from Peter Valias Associates Inc. spent many, many hours going over all aspects of the case. He deserves recognition for his expert skills.
Arthur L. Jackson Chief Investigator Peter Valias Associates Inc.
In “Brake Adjustment, Within an Inch of Your Life” by William C. Peters (Apparatus: The Shops, March 1993) on page 34 it should have read, “Most apparatus manufactured before the 1991 edition of NFPA 1901 do not have this safety device .” We regret the error.
