Managing the Disaster

Managing the Disaster

THE NORTHRIDGE EARTHQUAKE

With the shock of the Northridge Earthquake on January 17, 1994, the City of Los Angeles (CA) Fire Department (LAFD) was thrust into Disaster Response Mode. The department’s Earthquake Plan, finalized and implemented in 1973, provides for an “emergency management organization” to manage fire department resources during such a response. In current terminology, we call it the Incident Command System. The ICS serves as a tool not only for coordinating the city fire department but for managing multiple agencies from outside the jurisdiction.

DEPARTMENT COMMAND

A key element of LAFD’s disaster ICS is “Department Command.” Department Command is implemented for incidents requiring a maximum commitment of Fire department resources. It has proven to be an effective means of coordinating the overall emergency operation of the city while supporting the specific needs of most heavily impacted areas of the incident(s). Department Command coordinates mutual-aid operations; interfaces with federal, state, and city agencies; plans; documents; and provides the means for financial support to manage effectively the operations of the fire department.

Department Command is headed by the LAI D chief engineer and general manager and staffed with his top-level command personnel. Five command staff positions were created within the Department Command framework to handle the Northridge Earthquake: command staff officer, planning officer, operations officer, logistics officer, and finance officer.

Department Command for this incident was established and functioned in the LAFD Command and Control Center, located in and adjacent to the department’s Operations Control Dispatch section (communication center). This location provided a separate but functional area from which to make decisions as well as readily access department communications and other city agencies. Throughout the earthquake response, Department Command was able to keep abreast of emergency demands placed on the department, resource requirements, and situation status of significant incidents.

INITIATING DEPARTMENT COMMAND

I arrived at 0535 hours and established Department Command. While en route, I had ascertained through communications with the three on-duty division commanders that divisions I and 2 sustained minimal damage and that Division 3 appeared to be affected most severely. 1 directed Operations Control Dispatch (OCD) to dispatch 20 engine companies from the other divisions to Division 3 headquarters at Fire Station 88, where a staging area was being established.

Once at department headquarters. I directed OCD to initiate the recall of department staff officers and special-duty personnel. This would enable us to quickly establish and staff emergency disaster functions within the City of Los Angeles Emergency Operations Center, as well as LAFD’s OCD and Department Command. 1 also ordered the holdover of the off-going platoon. This partial recall effectively doubled the number of field forces available to respond to the many emergencies that resulted from the earthquake. During the course of the incident, “holdover” firefighters placed into service 23 reserve engines and fully staffed the “200 series” engines deployed in the task forces. (A “200 series” is an engine, manned by a driver/operator, whose purpose is to augment water supply for the task force. The task force includes a truck company with six members and an engine company w ith four members.)

During the early stages of the disaster response, command recalled off-duty members assigned to the Fire Prevention Bureau to conduct fire/life safety assessment inspections throughout the city. It was also early in the incident that we received a request for mutual aid from the City of Santa Monica. We were unable to fulfill this request. However, since LAFD is the “Area A” coordinator within Region I of the state master mutual-aid program-Area A consisting of Los Angeles City, Culver City, Santa Monica, and Beverly Hills-OCD contacted Region I and requested two strike teams to fill Santa Monica’s request. We also requested four strike teams from Region 1 to address the needs of Los Angeles; these units were to report to Valley Command at Fire Station 88.

At approximately 0615 hours. Chief Engineer and General Manager Donald O. Manning arrived at the Command and Control Center and relieved me as department commander. He directed me to assume the position of department operations officer. 1 briefed the chief on the known extent of the incident, current department status, requests for mutual aid, and the information received from outside agencies, including the Los Angeles County Fire Department. Department of Water and Power, and the California Highway Patrol.

The Command and Control Center is equipped with six television monitors, which provide Department Command with excellent on-site visual information of emergencies occurring throughout the city. Information received through department radio communication at OCD and augmented by the electronic media provided timely and detailed information as to the extent of incident activity and the devastation that had occurred.

On the morning of January 17, the Bureau of Fire Suppression and Rescue was staffed to its authorized strength of 788 personnel and the Bureau of Emergency Medical Services to its authorized strength of 1 12 personnel. This could provide for the staffing of 47 task forces, each comprised of an aerial ladder truck and a two-piece engine company and staffed with 10 personnel; 51 engine companies (II of which are paramedic-certified) staffed with four members each: 52 paramedic rescue ambulances; and 13 EMT rescue ambulances. Full-strength LAFD staffing also provides for two hazardous-materials squads, five ARFF apparatus, five fire boats, three helicopters, and a heavy utility/rescue company.

Department Command’s assessment of the city clearly indicated that Division 3 was the area of greatest impact, with between 30 and 50 major fires, freeway collapses. widespread structure collapses, natural gas leaks, broken water mains, and power outages. By 0700 hours, more than 100 active incidents were in progress in Division 3 alone. Most significant among these were the collapse of the Northridge Meadows Apartments, a three-story, 163unit apartment complex, which was to result in 16 deaths; the entrapment of a street sweeper in a collapsed three-story parking structure; separate and simultaneous fires occurring in mobile home parks; the rupture of a natural gas main that resulted in a large fire; two hazardous-materials incidents; and numerous other fires. Numerous water main breaks resulted in no firefighting water or extremely low pressure in many areas, hampering our firefighting efforts.

LAFD’s highest priority at this time, and consistent with the Earthquake Emergency Operational Plan, was to contain, control. and extinguish the fires burning throughout the city.

SITUATION/RESOURCE STATUS

Effective operational planning depends on information about existing and potential situations. To manage an emergency incident, planning objectives, such as situation status and resource status, demand immediate consideration and attention.

This was never more evident than on the morning of January 17. The very nature of the earthquake created a need for information on which to base response and resource deployment decisions. Information was generated through initial district drive-throughs, helicopter assessments, and life safety/damage assessments. In addition, the electronic media were monitored by Department Command to identify the magnitude and locations in need of immediate assistance.

Within minutes following the initial earthquake, reports generated from field resources indicated an overwhelming combination of events. Reports of fires, collapsed buildings, heavy rescue situations, collapsed or damaged freeways, a citywide loss of electrical power, water main breaks, and the staggering reports of leaking natural gas placed maximum stress on department resources.

Still, given the magnitude of the damage to the city, it was difficult to grasp the complete picture. In past incidents, LAFD’s company reconnaissance drive-throughs performed very effectively; immediately following the Northridge Earthquake, however. the operational plan for reconnaissance proved to be less than effective.

Two issues directly affected and immediately placed limitations on the ability of field resources to complete their drivethroughs: In most cases, resources were : diverted from their drive-throughs as a | result of being dispatched by OCD. As the ! overall incident escalated and the number of incidents being handled by OCD rapidly increased, the ability to complete reconnaissance drive-throughs became nearly impossible. Second, the citywide total power outage and the darkness at the time of day sig; nificantly hindered the ability of field ! resources to identify the true extent of the | damage that had occurred (though the darkness did provide the advantage of immediI ate identification of fire locations).

In some cases, the ground assessments j were not completed until hours after the ini| tial shock. In many cases, drive-throughs I were only completed when additional ! resources were staffed and those resources | were specifically directed to complete drive-throughs of identified districts.

Consideration should be given to the utilization of other city resources to assist in conducting and completing a thorough reconnaissance (for example, the police department) during major disasters. Furthermore, a complete and accurate reconnaissance is a continuing effort; a reconnaissance should not be considered complete until complete ground and air assessments are made and the conclusions are reached in the light of day.

In the first hours following the Northridge Earthquake, it was determined that a graphic display of the reported incidents would assist Department Command in identifying the most severely impacted areas and allow for more accurate deployment of resources. Each individual incident was plotted on two maps-one of the entire city and the other focusing on the San Fernando Valley. These were available at all times to Department Command. Incidents were color-coded to define the types of incidents occurring, providing Command w ith a better picture of the large-scale emergency.

Despite the difficulty in making complete company reconnaissances at the first stages of the disaster, because of proaction at the outset of the incident and continous monitoring of resource requirements throughout the incident, sufficient resources were deployed on a timely basis to deal with the many emergencies. The department’s training, preparation, and planning were evident.

LOGISTICS

The requirements of any emergency will dictate to what level the staff support for the incident commander will be implemented. Naturally, logistics is a key organizational element within the ICS and enlarges with the size of the incident. Providing adequate services and facilities to equip, supply, and feed fire department personnel throughout the entire Northridge Earthquake incident was a very large and important task. Sustaining fire department operations required coordination and prioritization of the increased demand for emergency services, personnel, apparatus, supplies, and communications. Logistical support for responding mutual-aid resources was also a priority. Logistical needs during the earthquake operations were fulfilled through LAFD resources, the Supply and Maintenance Division, outside vendors, the Emergency Operations Center, and the mutual-aid system.

DIVISION 1

Division 1 includes the metropolitan portion of Los Angeles, extending from East Los Angeles to Pacific Palisades. Six battalions cover an area of more than 100 square miles. Fire protection requirements within the division vary widely. Hazards include high-rise office buildings, heavy industrial facilities, commercial enterprises, multiunit residences, and single-family dwellings. The brush-covered Santa Monica Mountains, extending in this division from Griffith Park to the Pacific Ocean, also present a challenge to the department.

Immediately following the earthquake, Division I implemented LAFD’s Earthquake Emergency Procedures and established the Division 1 command post in the parking lot of Dodger Stadium. All battalions within the division commenced battalion status checks. These concluded that no injuries had been sustained by personnel and equipment was undamaged; there was only minimal damage to fire facilities. District surveys commenced immediately thereafter.

Division I abuts Division 3 (epicenter) to the south. Initial damage assessment reports for Division 1 indicated that a number of structures in Battalion 5, specifically Hollywood, in the vicinity of Hollywood Boulevard, suffered major structural damage and there were some collapses. Areas in battalions 9 and I 1 sustained sporadic damage ranging from moderate to heavy. All other damage throughout the division was moderate. Despite the extent of localized damage in some areas, no extensive search and rescue operations were required, and no major fires occurred. All incidents that had occurred, as well as those that would occur throughout the day, could be handled with existing division resources. Division commanders carefully monitored and conserved resources so that operational needs could be met in the division while maximizing the resources that could be redeployed to harder-hit areas in the city.

NORTHRIDGE EARTHQUAKE, JANUARY 17, 1994

1. Battalion Command Post
2. Fashion Center Shopping Mall (major collapses; one person rescued from collapsed parking structure)
3. Northridge Meadows Apartments (major collapse; many rescued, 16 fatalities)
4. Fire Station 70 (severe damage)
5. Cal State University at Northridge (major collapse and structural damage; haz-mat fires)
6. Numerous fires in commercial and residential occupancies in addition to widespread collapse
7. Balboa Boulevard Natural Gas Line Rupture (five homes completely destroyed)
8. 15/114 Interchange (one of many freeway collapses; pregnant woman rescued)
9. Tahitian Mobile Home Park (53 units destroyed by fire)
10. Oakridge Mobile Home Park (55 units destroyed by fire)
11. Los Olivos Mobile Home Park (22 units destoyed by fire)
12. alley Command Post and Staging
13. Sunswept Drive Collapse (major house collapse; one fatality)
14. Sherman Oaks Collapse (major house collapse; two fatalities
15. Large fires in office complex and condominium
16. Hollywood (moderate to heavy damage, some collapses; greatest damage of that experienced in Division 1)
17. Granada Trunkline Rupture (one of seven municipal water trunklines severely damaged)

At the height of the emergency. Division I was protected by a total of 20 engine companies, 1 1 truck companies, one light force, one squad, and two battalion chiefs. Division I redeployed a total of 46 companies and nine battalion chiefs to Valley Command in Division 3.

DIVISION 2

Division 2 is comprised of an area of approximately 90 square miles, consisting mainly of single-family and multiunit residential dwellings, with moderate-to-heavy industrial occupancies distributed throughout. It is laced with some of the busiest freeways in the country, including the Santa Monica, San Diego. Harbor, and Century freeways. Division 2 also protects the Los Angeies International Airport and the Los Angeles Harbor.

Immediately following the earthquake, the Division 2 command post was established in the parking lot behind Fire Station 33. Division 2 implemented LAFD earthquake procedures and. utilizing members of Engine 33, initiated resource and situation status. Minimal damage occurred to Division 2 fire facilities.

There were no significant emergency incidents within the division. Structural damage consisted primarily of collapsed chimneys. As units reported the conditions of their respective districts. Division 2 recognized the lack of significant emergency incidents and redeployed available resources to Division 3. Division 2 was able to maintain an accurate situation and resources status and. if necessary, could have assumed dispatch responsibilities within the division.

DIVISION 3

Division 3 contains the entire San Fernando Valley and encompasses the largest area of the city. It is comprised of five battalions (10, 12, 14, 15, and 17), providing fire protection for a diverse cross-section of residential communities ranging from single-family dwellings to extensive apartment complexes. It also protects high-rise office buildings, industrial and commercial occupancies, and retail districts.

Immediately following the earthquake. Division 3 established operational command at division headquarters. Fire Station 88, as predetermined by I.AI D’s earthquake emergency operational procedures. Division 3 monitored and recorded the conditions of its command and the initial radio reports of damage assessments. It became apparent shortly that fire stations throughout the division had sustained considerable damage, but personnel were safe and accounted for and apparatus remained largely undamaged and operational. Resources thus could be deployed, through battalion and division commands, to incidents that were rapidly unfolding.

The normal OCD dispatching channel for the San Fernando Valley was knocked out by the earthquake. Furthermore, the department’s normal command channel was inoperable. Division 3 contacted OCD via cellular telephone and explained the radio problems. The dispatch frequency for Division 3 was changed to an operable channel; however, OCD could not provide an alternate command channel.

Reports from the field indicated that the entire San Fernando Valley had been seriously affected by the earthquake, with the heaviest concentration of destruction and emergency activities occurring in the areas of battalions 12 and 15.

VALLEY COMMAND

At 0700 hours, Chief Manning directed Deputy Chief Davis R. Parsons to report to Fire Station 88 and establish “Valley Command,’’ from which he would coordinate the overall emergency efforts in the San Fernando Valley, with the number one priority of containing, controlling, and extinguishing the many major fires, some of which appeared to have the potential to grow to conflagration proportions.

Valley Command divided Division 3 into three branches: “A”-Battalion 15; “B”-battalions 10 and 17; and “C”-battalions 12 and 14. A medical branch was established to manage all emergency medical activities in the valley. Planning, logistics, staging, and operations were established and addressed from Valley Command.

Within 11 minutes after the initial shock, OCD had implemented a Disaster Mode of degraded dispatching, which results in a major resource assignment reduction, employing a single-company response to most incidents. (See “Emergency Communications,” page 40.) To provide sufficient resources where needed and augment resources deployed under the disaster degraded mode, Valley Command increased the pool of resources staged at Fire Station 88. These fire forces at the staging area included fire suppression resources, both from LAFD and mutual-aid companies; EMS resources; and specialized resources, such as USAR teams from outside agencies.

LAFD EXPANDED EMERGENCY INCIDENT COMMAND SYSTEM NORTHRIDGE EARTHQUAKE

VALLEY COMMAND, EMS BRANCH

The EMS Branch staff officers were assigned various tasks to manage and enhance the capabilities of its operations. One officer was responsible for overall EMS branch operations, in that capacity maintaining communications with the Medical Alert Center (MAC), coordinating hospital availability, reconnaissance, overseeing telephone communications to hospitals in the most severely affected areas, etc.

LAFD contacted the MAC at County Hospital/University of Southern California Medical Center by landline. Due to the failure of the “Ready Net” communications system, the situation and resource status of most hospitals in the area of the epicenter was unknown. The “Ready Net” is a computer system that links all area base hospitals and under normal circumstances provides and updates the status of hospitals within the system. Of the 21 hospitals designated Response Group 6 and 7 within this network, 14 are located in LAFD Division 3/San Fernando Valley.

After approximately two hours into the incident, an accurate list of hospital status information was developed. This information was provided to the EMS Branch commander, as well as to the MAC. Initial information indicated that four of the 14 Group 6 and 7 hospitals were closed and trying to repair damage and/or evacuate their facilities; two West Valley hospitals were totally saturated but still receiving and treating patients; and all Group 6 and 7 hospitals were on emergency generator power and water supply.

LAFD continued to contact the Group 6 and 7 hospitals and the MAC each hour for an update on their situation and resource status. Continued communication with the affected hospital’s emergency operation centers provided valuable information for the effective communication of accurate medical information in the disaster area.

EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER

The Emergency Operations Center (EOC) was established by Los Angeles to function as the avenue for information exchange between the agencies and the Emergency Operations Board in the event of a disaster. The EOC is the main coordination point for disaster response within the City of Los Angeles. It is located on the P-4 subbasement level of City Hall East and consists of a main “war” room containing tables in a horseshoe configuration, telephones, and computers. The EOC accommodates representatives of city departments and various agencies to coordinate and direct resources toward controlling emergencies. LAFD is represented at this location.

On January 17, at 0445 hours, the EOC was activated. During the weeks that followed the Northridge Earthquake, the EOC operated as the central information conduit for the city and the location from which the city managed its personnel and logistical resources.

Cooperation with other city departments and the private sector provided effective coordination and teamwork to accomplish critical tasks. The restoration of crucial “lifelines,” building damage and life safety assessment, and personal property retrieval-in addition to the extensive emergency response effort-are examples of the service that was provided to the citizens of Los Angeles, coordinated through the EOC.

WATER SUPPLY RESTORATION/FIRE DEPARTMENT PUMPING OPERATIONS

The earthquake damaged many of the major water supply trunklines in the West Valley area; in addition, there were hundreds of breaks in distribution mains. Water stored in several large tanks and reservoirs was lost. The Granada Trunkline, which supplies water along the northern and western rim of the San Fernando Valley, sustained the most significant damage, with multiple breaks along Balboa Boulevard and Rinaldi Street. Six other trunklines also sustained damage.

With such extensive damage, it was readily apparent that several water service zones, particularly those in higher elevations, were out of water. We also recognized that in order to provide water for fire protection, the fire department and Department of Water and Power (DWP), through a cooperative effort, had to expeditiously develop and implement a plan to mitigate the problem. This plan utilized Fire department fire engines/pumps to create a system of interzone pumping and provide water throughout most of the city.

LAFD provided numerous apparatus for the intersystem pumping effortas many as 25 engines at the height of the operation. The apparatus used were equipped with Class A fire pumps capable of pumping 1,500 gpm at 300 psi. The hose used was standard LAFD-spec 3/2-inch hose, pressure-tested to 300 psi. Pumping operations were begun on January 17 and continued 24 hours a day through January 25.

At the peak of the water outage, nine zones were out of service and three zones were partially out of service. The initial attempt to accomplish cross-zone pumping utilizing fully staffed engine companies was on a smaller scale and proved ineffective due to the excessive number of leaks/breaks and the inability to isolate them from what could have become an otherwise operable grid.

On the morning of January 18, the strategy was reconsidered. We decided to staff each apparatus with a fire department engineer and a firefighter and developed a systematic plan for pumping water into inoperable zones and identifying and isolating leaks/breaks. First we identified all water supply zones that were operating at acceptable levels and those zones that had suffered damage and were known to be inoperable. Then we selected specific points from which the firefighters would pump water from an operable zone into an inoperable zone. To accomplish this, 3);-inch hose was connected from a hydrant in the lower (operable) zone to the fire apparatus. Another 3J4-inch hoseline was connected from the fire apparatus to a hydrant of the higher (inoperable) zone. The outlet pressure was predetermined based on the higher system’s maximum hydraulic gradient pressure and the elevation at the pumping location.

The pumping locations, critical to the success of the operation, were well-distributed along the periphery of the system, providing coverage to the entire zone. Optimal pumping locations were from areas with large-diameter mains and where the hydrants had minimal traffic impact, though this could not be achieved in all cases. In some locations it was necessary to lay the 3J^-inch supply hose across thoroughfares; in these cases it was important to prevent damage to the hose as well as maintain an open thoroughfare. Fire department personnel built and installed wood ramps to protect hoselines and allow traffic to cross over them. The ramps were constructed entirely of M-inch plywood sheets nailed together, forming a gradual approach and exit over the hoselines. The ramps were fixed in position-directly attached to the road surface-via power (munition)-driven pins.

Because the earthquake had placed some freeways out of service, some local thoroughfares became primary alternate vehicle routes through the city, compounding the traffic problem in areas where ramps had to be installed. However. LAFD, the Department of Transportation, and Street Maintenance. in cooperative effort, worked toward minimizing the traffic problems.

Once the connections were made to and from the pumpers at the pumping locations, a DWP gateman opened a hydrant at the point of highest elevation in that grid. The open hydrant allowed the air in the system to escape and provide a quick and simple means of determining if the zone was filling and. in the case of leaks/breaks, a means to determine at which point the zone had stopped filling due to an excessive leak.

(Photos by Glenn P. Corbett.)

Concurrently, as the inoperable zone was filled, additional fire resources began a systematic drive-through of the zone being restored. The drive-through began at the lowest elevation in the zone and continued back and forth across the zone, moving toward the area of highest elevation. When a leak was sighted, the extent of the leak was determined and a decision made as to whether the leak/break was minor or excessive. If it was considered minor, the location was noted and no immediate action was taken. If the break was significant, the pumping operations continued while the DWP gateman. through a systematic closure of gates, isolated and shut down the water supply to that specific area. Every effort was made to minimize the number of gate closures, thus ensuring that the largest possible portion of the zone was restored. After determining that the damaged zone was restored to a minimal level of operation, the fire engine served as an aboveground, temporary pumping station.

Fueling the pumping apparatus was a logistical challenge met by utilizing a 400gallon fire department fuel tender, which dispensed approximately 5,000 gallons of diesel every 24 hours.

LAFD maintained around-the-clock pumping operations, requiring relief of fire department personnel on a 24-hour basis. All pump operators were provided with written instructions, “Hydrant Operations Guidelines.” which enhanced the reliability and continuity of the operations (see box on page 38).

Due to the numerous breaks in the water system caused by the earthquake, a significant water shortage for firefighting purposes existed in a major portion of the San Fernando Valley. To assist with firefighting operations, and concurrent with water supply restoration operations. LAFD strategically deployed 29 mutual-aid water tenders, with individual capacities ranging from 1,400 to 5,000 gallons and a combined capacity of 78,000 gallons, throughout the Valley. These water tenders responded with fire resources to ensure adequate water supplies for firefighting operations. Configurations were developed that provided individual water tenders with specified department resources, or tender strike teams were formed. Each tender strike team consisted of a battalion commander, three water tenders. and two engine companies. The team was dispatched to an incident any time there was an indication of an actual lire or the need arose for additional water.

The strike teams were deployed from two designated fire stations. Individual water tenders were deployed from 17 fire stations. In addition, four water tenders were staged at l ire Station 88, Valley Command.

To further assist with firefighting operations and provide adequate water, five fire department pickup trucks (“plug buggies”) were each loaded with 2,000 feet of 3M-inch hose and deployed to Fire Station 88. These resources provide incident commanders with additional supply lines should the need arise.

AIR OPERATIONS

As per LAFD Earthquake Emergency Mode, Air Operations activates one helicopter per division and conducts aerial reconnaissance to assess damage. Due to the magnitude and impact of the Northridge Earthquake, an immediate recall of the Air Operations commander and all 12 Air Operations pilots was issued, providing for the activation of five helicopters.

Three helicopters were dispatched between 0432 and 0500 hours to assess the damage. The darkness at this hour made a complete aerial damage assessment impossible. The most visible damage was in the north San Fernando Valley, where many structures were on fire.

After a few minutes in the air, it was determined that the majority of the damage was centered around the community of Northridge. Numerous fires were in progress, with no lire companies on scene. Water mains in the heavily affected areas were broken. Water was available on the ramp at Air Operations. This is where staging for the helicopters was eventually established. Staging operations were supported by Helitac personnel from Fire Station 90. Although it is not Air Operations SOP to perform water drops on structures, it was determined that, given the circumstances, water drops would be made on working structure fires that did not carry an immediate life hazard-that is, in cases where the fire department was not already on scene and the potential for occupants at that time of day would be nonexistent. Due to the number of emergency incidents that exceeded the department’s available resource capabilities and the magnitude and impact of the earthquake, this strategy proved extremely beneficial in mitigating the potential for conflagrations.

MUTUAL AID

The basis for providing mutual aid to local governments is the California Mutual Aid Agreement (CMAA). The CMAA provides for the establishment of responsibilities. procedures, and implementation by which many fire, rescue, and other agencies throughout the state receive and render aid. While it promises that all signatories to the agreement will provide or receive fire or rescue aid as needed, it provides that no fire department will be required to unreasonably deplete its own resources in furnishing mutual aid. The CMAA is administered through the California Office of Emergency Services. Interchange of resources is on a local, regional, state, and interstate basis. All jurisdictions in the County of Los Angeles are signatories to the CMAA.

LAFD requested mutual aid from outside the city through Region I. This aid was in the form of strike teams, USAR teams, and water tenders. An advisory request was also placed for six-inch portable water mains.

Mutual-aid units assisting LAFD during the Northridge Earthquake included five strike teams from Orange County, four strike teams from Los Angeles County, one strike team from the Southbay Region of Region 1. two Los Angeles County foam apparatus, three Los Angeles County USAR teams, one Orange County USAR team, one Riverside County USAR team, and 29 public and private water tenders.

PUBLIC SAFETY/DAMAGE ASSESSMENT ACTIVITIES

To provide Department Command and Valley Command with necessary information. public safety/damage assessment teams were formed and deployed within hours of the initial earthquake. Significantly damaged structures were identified and immediate life safety concerns were systematically and rapidly addressed. This rapid and thorough method of life safety and damage assessment proved its value in planning and prioritizing both emergency and nonemergency operations. Furthermore, damage assessment has proven to be a critical element to shortand long-term recovery operations.

Safety/damage assessment teams comprised of members of the fire department and the Department of Building and Safety were assembled to provide a block-by-block assessment of the impacted areas. The Bureau of Fire Prevention and Public Safety was given the responsibility of conducting these surveys using recalled bureau personnel and building department inspectors. A survey team was assigned to each fire station first-in district, focusing primarily within Division 3.

Data elements collected included the fire station first-in district, the address of the structure, the occupancy type, the size of the structure, the number of living units, and the percent of the building that was damaged. All assessments were completed within two days.

HYDRANT OPERATIONS GUIDELINES

1. Maintain proper pressure designated for your hydrant.
2. Provide the hoselay that maximizes water How.
3. Take a static hydrant pressure reading from both hydrants prior to pump operation.
4. Inform Pump Operations of discharge and suction pressure when flowing water.
5. Keep five to 10 pounds minimum on suction inlet.
6. Record all hours pumped.
7. Monitor apparatus engine oil level.
8. Traffic control: hose ramps, cones, flares, DOT. etc…. Notify Pump Operations of your needs.
9. Emergency encountered: Notify OCD on Channel 8.
10. Your needs of any type: Notify Pump Operations on Channel 5.

Pump Operations Phone

Numbers:_

RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on a preliminary analysis of fire department activities during the Northridge Earthquake, the LAFD made the following recommendations:

• At the state level, a study should be conducted to determine the feasibility and associated cost of implementing a satellite communications system capable of integrating all state fire agencies’ radio communications.
• An ordinance should be developed and approved requiring citywide installation of “earthquake shutoff valves” for natural gas supply lines in all occupancies.
• An ordinance should be developed and
• approved requiring the citywide installation of “earthquake electrical shutoff switches” in all occupancy electrical panels.
• A study should be conducted for the upgrading of underground hazardous-materials pipeline safety.
• Additional funds should be allocated for the following:
• expansion of USAR training and the purchase of heavy rescue equipment, specifically heavy rescue air bags;
• more training staff to train Community Emergency Response Teams;
• the enhancement of emergency heavy rescue vehicles;
• the purchase and installation of backup generators specifically dedicated to provide backup power to the fire department’s dispatch computers;
• the purchase and installation of fire
• station backup generators specifically dedicated to provide backup power to station fuel dispensers, apparatus doors, and lights;
• the development and implementation of a fire department EOC cadre; and
• the development and implementation of a Logistics cadre.
• A complete study and reanalysis should be conducted addressing the ability of fire stations to withstand significant seismic events, and where identified, the necessary funds should be allocated for all recommended structural upgrades.
• A study should be conducted as to the feasibility of developing/implementing a program to provide dedicated fire department hookups for the purpose of providing direct and immediate access to the water supply contained in private swimming pools.