NANTUCKET SQUARE FIRE
VOLUNTEERS CORNER
A five-alarm fire completely destroyed a 12-unit condominium building in the Nantucket Square complex in Harris County, Texas, during the afternoon of April 22, 1993 Careless building repairs, building construction, and a failure in the municipal water main feeding the complex all had an impact in bringing about this $1.2 million loss.
The Nantucket Square condominium complex was built in the early 1980s, prior to enforcement of building and fire code requirements imposed by the City of Houston extraterritorial jurisdiction (for future annexations). The unsprinklered complex contains 17 three-story, 70by 130-foot buildings, each comprised of 12 units. The buildings are primarily of wood construction with brick veneer on parts of the exterior.
Of particular concern is the design of the interior sunroom spaces in each building. These are essentially openair chimneys, each approximately 12 feet wide and 20 feet long, that extend from the first floor through the roof Each space serves four occupancies. A thin wall covering is used to ensure privacy. This open vertical chimney effectively allows fire to bypass the fire walls and spread easily to the attic. Access doors from the sunroom to the attic are constructed of particle board and do not impede fire spread.
Photos by Mary Myers.
OPERATIONS
That afternoon, a roof was being repaired. It appears that a worker used a propane torch to speed up the application of roofing mastic. The material and combustibles with which it was in contact ignited. There was a delay of several minutes prior to a neighbor dialing 9-1-1.
The communications center received the call at 4:03 p.m., and a “heavy” assignment was automatically dispatched by the CAD system (preplanning had identified concerns about the building layout and access). The Ponderosa Volunteer Fire Department (PVFD), with four engines, a tower ladder, a heavy rescue, and a special equipment unit, and the Klein Volunteer Fire Department, with an articulating aerial master stream device, responded.
First-arriving crews observed a free-burning fire in the sunroom space and surrounding attic/roof area of one of the residential structures. PVFD Assistant Chief Jeff Doran instructed members to attack the fire using tank water and Class A foam (PVFD engines are equipped with Class A foam discharge proportioning systems) while a water supply was being established using large-diameter supply hose. Additional members were instructed to conduct a primary search and evacuate civilians still in the building.
Firelighters, with a 1 ¾-inch preconnect. attacked the fire in the sunroom area, advancing up the stairs as they knocked down fire. On the second floor, they pulled down the attic folding stairway, positioned a fire department folding ladder, and began to attack the heavy fire in the attic. They were making headway when command called for a retreat —there was delay in establishing a continuous water supply.
At the water source, a very large underground water leak had developed. I’he hydrant was tilting forward and producing almost no flow. Doran knew he had plenty of resources just arriving or en route to put a quick end to the fire, but without a water source, the safety of the interior firefighters would be compromised. Fortunately, excellent communication between the hydrant man, incident commander, and attack team officer allowed Doran to direct a prompt and safe tactical withdrawal until a water supply could be found.
Command directed incoming units to take a second and then a third hydrant from within the complex, but the flow at them was very low. The main break in the front of the complex was compromising the entire system. Doran requested water district maintenance to the scene. He then ordered a fourth hydrant taken, located about 300 feet south of the complex and supplied by a 16-inch main —to no avail.
With the fire now grown to the point where interior firefighting was not an acceptable risk and the minimal water supply eliminating deck guns as an option, Doran ordered all available water to be used for exposure protection. This action prevented the loss of more buildings. He called for a second alarm, primarily to begin the process of shuttling water. It was obvious at this time that the fire building would be lost.
All lines were directed to exposures The exposures, virtually identical to the fire building, were about 15, 25, and feet away. Class A foam was used on the most seriously exposed areas. Radiant heat melted window blinds and ignited curtains in one residence, but quick actions by firefighters prevented the fire from spreading. The Class A foam did its job, keeping exposures wet and protected and helping compensate for an extremely limited water supply.
The fire building now was 75 percent involved, and Doran radioed that the building was lost. I arrived about this time and assumed the water supply sector command. The third and fourth alarms were transmitted, and a special call was made for tankers.
We began a drafting procedure near the water main break at the entrance to the complex. Water district representatives on site estimated a 10,000gpm flow into the ditch. We plugged the ditch drain and drafted from this source, supplying the fireground pumpers so a full-scale defensive attack could be mounted. We provided a nurse tanker at this position in the event the water supply was disrupted. The fire was extinguished quickly with large-caliber devices.
LESSONS LEARNED AND REINFORCED
- In many areas of the country, unincorporated county governments are not responding to the vital need to adopt model fire and building codes for new building construction— buildings simply are not regulated. This is a dangerous condition that affects the safety of residents and firefighters. Volunteer fire departments must exercise political leverage on government officials to reverse negligence in adopting fire and building codes. It is likely that a model building code would have called for the enclosure walls of the sunroom to be of one-hour fire-rated construction. This may have limited the horizontal spread of fire into adjacent areas, slowing the progress of the fire.
- Class A foam is an effective wetting agent for exposure protection, sticking to vertical surfaces longer than water does, using less w ater. Our ability to utilize this agent at a time when our water supply w as extremely limited played a large role in confining the substantial fire damage to one building. Our experience at this and other incidents also confirms the effectiveness of Class A foam in interior attack.
- Establish collapse zones when the fire has “gotten away.” There w ere no injuries at this fire, due largely to our establishing danger zones and communicating these parameters to all
- firefighters. In this regard, proper, ongoing risk analysis allowed us to evaluate fire and personnel exposures within reasonable time frames and to act to ensure fireground safety.
- Utilize radios and a separate fireground frequency to communicate changing fireground conditions and enact the incident management system. Communication among firefighters, officers, and chief officers at this incident was excellent.
- Call for additional alarms early. We felt we should have called for additional support earlier in the incident. The amount of fire, building design, and water supply problems should have sent a strong signal that additional resources would be needed. That would have resulted in an earlier water supply shuttle.
- Develop contingency plans during the course of every operation. The fire was a major loss for our district. We very seldom experience a fire that cannot be stopped, but a fire such as this one helps reinforce that fireground officers must constantly be aware of potential problems—even major problems —and adapt quickly on the fireground. If Plan B doesn’t work, move to Plan C, and so forth.
- Preplan multifamily residential complexes for accessibility, construction, layout, hydrants, and so on.
- Work with municipal water system management personnel. Obviously, you’re severely limited in your ability to do your job without a good continuous source of water. PVFD cooperated with water district operators in an investigation into the water main following this incident. We found that two weeks prior to the fire, an automobile had struck the fire hydrant and damaged the underground piping, but the driver failed to notify authorities. The water district board of directors asked the PVFD for recommendations to improve hydrant security in key locations. The district is now in the process of installing bollards (vertical posts) to protect these hydrants. Our dialog with the water company also has led to consideration of water supply updates in other parts of the district.