Northridge Meadows Apartments Collapse
THE NORTHRIDGE EARTHQUAKE
I realized when the Northridge Earthquake shook my home in Orange County on January 17 that this was a large earthquake that was going to cause major damage and perhaps the loss of many lives. After determining my house and family were safe. I prepared for my regularly scheduled shift as Battalion 5 commander in the Hollywood section of Los Angeles City.
During my 35-mile trip to battalion headquarters, major damage in the San Fernando Valley was reported. When I exited the freeway at Sunset Boulevard and headed west to my office, 1 passed debris in the street from collapsed structures and smoke from several fires. Hollywood also was severely damaged.
At 0515 hours. I checked in with Battalion Chief Dennis Keane, the on-duty battalion commander, and was briefed on current problems/status. All Battalion 5 companies were surveying their districts for damage or were actively involved in emergency activities. Keane informed me that LAFD Department Command had directed him to hold his shift to supplement the oncoming platoon.
My staff assistant and 1 placed the reserve battalion sedan in service and contacted the Division 1 commander. Assistant Chief Dean Cathey. He contacted OCD, and l was dispatched to Division 3 in the San Fernando Valley. On our way to Division 3 headquarters, we spotted numerous fires on both sides of the Ventura Freeway. I reported to Assistant Chief Jim Young at 0635 hours and was sent to meet with Battalion 15 Commander Larry Schneider at Reseda and Nordhoff boulevards. Schneider directed me to take command of operations at a collapsed apartment building on N. Reseda Boulevard.
THREE FLOORS TO TWO
It was just becoming light at 0655 hours when 1 arrived at 9565 N. Reseda Boulevard. From the front, the apartment building at first appeared to be a two-story building with minimal damage. Four LAFD units conducted a search of what I considered to be the first floor. I met with Captain Steve Bascom. commander of Task Force 73, w ho informed me that this was in fact a three-story building- the second and third floors had collapsed onto the first. There was no longer a first floor over large areas of the structure.
(Photos top left, right by Glenn P. Corbett; photo at bottom courtesy LAFD.)
Bascom indicated that self-evacuation and a primary search as well as active rescues were taking place. He did not know the extent of the damage or how many victims were involved. Primary search at this point in the operation consisted of banging on floors and walls, yelling into voids and listening for sounds. There were no specialized heavy rescue units/equipment on the scene.
1 assumed command of the incident and requested Bascom to remain at the command post to manage the tactical portion of the incident. 1 conducted a quick reconnaissance of the 150-foot-wide by 325-footlong building, which housed 163 units. 1 estimated that close to 40 units on the first floor had been collapsed upon. Given the type of occupancy and the time of day, the life hazard and potential life loss were great, with the possibility of more than 1 (K) victims involved. This heavy rescue operation would be extensive. I requested as many additional LAFD units as possible. Battalion 15 stated there were none available. 1 requested LA County Fire Department camp crews (organized manual labor teams comprised of volunteer youths, prisoners, etc.), which could provide assistance with exterior debris removal (outside the collapse zone) and other physical tasks. Efforts to contact building management in the unfolding chaos were unsuccessful at this time.
Soon units started to become available from other incidents, and I was able to use one engine company to search a damaged, similarly constructed three-story apartment building just north of Northridge Meadows. We later discovered that all residents in that building had self-evacuated, but at the time we couldn’t take that chance.
Because citywide communications were so difficult, 1 left the incident to meet face to face with Battalion 15 and again requested more resources. He promised to do all he could based on the number of incidents still taking place throughout the battalion.
NORTHRIDGE MEADOWS APARTMENTS 9565 N. RESEDA BLVD.
ORGANIZING CHAOS
The incident command system is the only tool that could have been used to maximize the use of the resources and gain order from this chaos. I held a planning meeting with the officers on the scene and divided the building into Divisions A. B, and C. I ordered the division supervisors to form three-member rescue teams-two rescuers and a leader equipped with a radio. 1 assigned a separate tactical radio frequency for Northridge Meadows operations. During this time, three active rescues were ongoing in Division C, the front of the building. While members worked on these,I ordered a secondary search of Divisions A and B, the north and south sections of the building.
During the searches and building surveys, we realized that the east side of the building had shifted eight to 10 feet to the north, and the west side of the building had shifted eight to 10 feet to the south. This action was attributed to the “soft-story” type of construction: The ground floor of Northridge Meadows Apartments contained a parking garage, and as such it contained fewer walls and many more openings than the floor(s) above it-which is to say it had significantly less lateral strength, or lateral stiffness, than the two above it. This abrupt change in stiffness causes “kinks” in the structure, which can lead to failure when lateral forces, such as those in an earthquake. are applied.
The information concerning the shifting of the building was very important. During the primary search, the rescuers had assumed the building was symmetrical and each unit from top to bottom was the same. The shift had actually moved the upperfloor bedrooms, and the first-floor bedrooms were not directly underneath as expected.
Searches and rescues were hindered by numerous problems. These included the following:
(Photo courtesy LAFD.)
(Photo courtesy LAFD.)
(Photo courtesy LAFD.)
- During the first stages of the incident, we had insufficient resources and equipment to shore the collapsed building. Aftershocks and shifting of the unstable structure were potential hazards. Initially, members were directed not to enter horizontal voids, if possible, until shoring equipment arrived. Rescues were to be made from the top down, searching the first-floor bedrooms from above by cutting through the floor of the second story.
- Cutting through the concrete/wood floor system, constructed of two inches of lightweight concrete over one-inch plywood sheeting over 2-by-12-inch floor joists, was physically demanding within the confined space created by the collapse.
- Rotation and rehabilitation of rescue personnel had to be arranged: a logistical system to gather more equipment, replace the damaged saws and blades, and feed and rehydrate the crews had to be established.
- Security was needed. At this time, no police were available, and we were unable to secure the scene. Relatives, passersby, and tenants of the building were interfering with our operations.
- The media were a source of interruption. getting in the way of rescue operations while taking pictures and videos and constantly asking questions.
- Provisions had to be made for treating the injured. As soon as EMS resources arrived, we established a medical group across the street from the incident.
(Photo courtesy LAFD.)
(Photo by Glenn P. Corbett.)
LAFD long has trained for this particular situation. An earthquake response plan was in effect, and we had learned hard lessons in the civil disturbance and firestorms of the past two years. Based on these experiences and lessons learned, a central Department Command was established, and the city was further divided into three separate commands. Within these separate commands, branches were formed. The Northridge Meadows incident became part of Valley Command. Branch A.
The importance of organizing an incident into manageable divisions cannot be overstated. As incident management expanded to meet the demands of the earthquake emergency, the logistics system began to take shape and equipment became available. Members of the L.A. Police Department arrived and established security. An LAFD public information officer arrived and established a media area. More LAFD resources were arriving, and rotation and rehabilitation of the rescuers became a reality. Mutual aid in the form of a California OES strike team became part of Division A and formed rescue teams.
FIRST-FLOOR OPERATIONS
At 0940 hours, the division supervisors reported the second and third floors clear, and rescue teams continued their search of the first floor. Bodies of dead victims were being found in the voids of the first floor. Rescuers were directed to cover and leave the bodies in place, pending the arrival of the coroner.
LAFD Urban Search and Rescue Team (USAR 1) arrived with heavy rescue equipment. which was used to supplement the equipment used by first responders. In particular, 74-ton rescue bags were used to good advantage in the rescue of two victims in the southeast comer of the building (see “Meadows Rescue by Light Force 70″ on page 128).
Approximately seven hours into the operation, members had rescued more than 25 individuals trapped in the collapsed structure. By 1440 hours, we had discovered 14 bodies and were sure of one more. A third search of the building was made with LAPD K-9 units. The K-9 search validated our previous searches, but we were unable to locate the 15th victim.
All during this time, I interfaced with other agency representatives, structural engineers, state and federal representatives, media, and friends and relatives of the victims. The ICS was working well, and there was no adverse effect on the rescue efforts.
At 1530 hours, L.A. County Fire Department’s California Task Force 2, a 56-member FEMA USAR unit, arrived. After conferring with Battalion Chief Keno Devarney, the task force leader, it was agreed the task force would make a fourth search of the building working through the LAFD incident command post. The work of body removal had begun with the arrival of the coroner, and with the task force beginning its search I started releasing LAFD resources. Most of the crews had worked at the apartments collapse for 10 to 12 hours under trying conditions.
I was relieved at 2000 hours and returned to Battalion 5. During the remainder of the shift, I responded to two earthquake-caused greater-alarm fires.
At Northridge Meadows, rescue efforts continued during the night and next day. Another FEMA task force was used to supplement the first task force. During these efforts, the rescuers were faced with several small fires that occurred after the power was turned on. Two more deceased victims were found, bringing the total number of dead to 16.
During my tenure as incident commander, 0655 to 2010 hours, LAFD made numerous hard rescues, several of which were time consuming and required the use of considerable heavy rescue equipment, and assisted numerous people down ladders, out of windows, down broken stairwells, etc. We transported eight injured victims to area hospitals and gave immediate aid to countless others. A total of 15 engines, one truck, four light forces, one LAFD USAR team, one OES strike team, one FEMA task force, five rescue ambulances, and one additional battalion chief were used.
COMMAND LESSONS REINFORCED
The following actions can help add to the efficiency and safety of operations such as this one:
- Preplan and have suggested operating guidelines (SOPs) in place before the event.
- Start ICS immediately. This system supplies the framework within which to manage the incident in an orderly manner.
- Make maximum use of resources, espe-
- daily first responders. Provide for relief, rehabilitation, and rehydration early in the incident.
- Establish a strong, secure command post to handle the incident and other agency interface.
- Provide scene security using local police agencies.
- Establish a public information officer and media area as soon as possible.
- Establish an information center for vic-
- tims, friends, and relatives.
- Appoint a scene safety officer with the authority to stop unsafe acts or procedures.
- Ensure all utilities-gas, electricity, and water-to the building are shut off.
This incident showed the value of firstresponder training and preplanning as well as the dedication and hard work of all members involved.
First responders were instrumental in mitigating this disaster. The assistance of the mutual-aid companies as well as the FEMA Task Force allowed us to relieve LAFD resources to use in other hard-hit areas of the city.
Finally, the value of a viable incident command system cannot be overstated. The ability of our department to respond so positively in so short a time showed our commitment to professional incident management.
