Operation Glen: A Disaster Exercise
The Chatham Township (NJ) Volunteer Fire Department, with 40 active members, protects a bedroom community of 9,300 people in an area of roughly 10 square miles. Frequent problems with radio transmissions during department operations led me to believe that an extensive and definitive test of our communications system was needed. We decided to incorporate such a test into an upcoming emergency management exercise, called “Operation Glen,” planned in response to a State of New Jersey Emergency Management requirement. The operation was intended to test the department’s ability to conduct a coordinated operation with the various agencies and departments an extensive haz-mat fire would inevitably involve.
Operation Glen consisted of a theoretical scenario in which a hazardous-materials spill resulted in two large condominium fires. The Baker Firestone condominium complex, a 920-unit complex that would mandate the use of aerial apparatus, was chosen for the exercise. We were seeking to accomplish the following goals:
- Test our ability to implement the incident command system and utilize it to control a major incident.
- Test the effectiveness of our commu-* nications between our emergency operations center, mobile command post, field hospital, medical helicopter operations,! police headquarters, and field apparatus and officers.
- Test our ability to coordinate efforts . with various agencies and departments, including the Morris County haz-mat team and state agencies.
- Test our ability to conduct search and’ rescue and evacuation operations for a
- large complex and handle numerous medical emergencies that would result from a large haz-mat fire incident.
- Test our ability to coordinate the use of mutual-aid aerial devices in effective roof access and ventilation. The water supply for aerial master streams also had to be tested to ensure adequate water flow.
- Test our ability to work effectively with mutual-aid response organizations from an operational point of view (bringing into play staging, logistics, scene safety, strategy and tactics, etc.).
- Devise a viable and effective prefire plan for the Baker Firestone complex.
PLANNING, LIABILITY, AND SAFETY ISSUES
The entire operation was in a state of planning for more than a year. During the final months before the exercise, Police Chief Thomas Ramsey and Office of Emergency Management (OEM) Deputy Coordinator Richard Kern were planning on an almost full-time basis. This was necessary to ensure that our plan went according to the exercise design of the Federal Emergency Management Agency.
Various costs had to be accounted for. They included overtime police costs as well as overtime costs from mutual-aid police and paid fire departments. We also had to consider food and refreshment costs for the 300 people involved. The township graciously covered the cost of the inevitable liability insurance.
Liability issues were handled by the chief and deputy coordinators. We had to proceed with extreme caution. Many plans were devised to ensure safety, security, and accountability of participants. Each participant was to report the morning of the exercise; his or her name would be recorded and a wrist band issued. The chief had a blanket of uniformed police and observers around the entire exercise to ensure continuity. Amateur radio operators were on the scene for additional security. Coordinators had portable phones and VHF radios to make sure the events went as scheduled. Extensive publicity through the press, resident associations, bulletin boards, and door-to-door contact avoided the possibility of alarm or panic when the exercise went into effect. A post-exercise walkthrough with the property manager was scheduled to ensure accountability for damage.
THE SETTING
We chose the 920-unit Baker Firestone complex as the operation’s site for various reasons, the primary one being that the complex is a firefighting challenge. Like so many cluster-housing complexes in northern New Jersey and elsewhere, Baker is of wood construction, with lightweight wood truss roofs that provide open voids over the span of each building. The twoand three-story buildings contain between eight and ten units each. Many of these units have been altered since their original construction so that they no longer meet fire and building codes.
In addition, private roads within the complex, filled with cars, make it very difficult to maneuver and stage apparatus. The design of the grounds, including in some cases dense shrubbery, makes it difficult for us to move portable ladders close to the buildings—we barely reach the gutter line on some of these buildings with a 45-foot ladder.
THE “OPERATION”
The staged incident consisted of a truck leaking gasoline on a road adjacent to the Baker Firestone complex. Product ran off into a storm drain and an explosion occurred, injuring not only the driver but numerous local boy and girl scouts who had been hiking in nearby woods and whose curiosity drew them to the scene. Burning debris from the explosion ignited a building in the Baker complex. To make matters worse, a van driver taking child victims away from the incident panicked and backed into a ditch, causing more injuries.
Our operation proceeded. The county haz-mat team was requested early in the incident by the fire department’s firstresponding units. I arrived on the scene as Chatham emergency squad units were triaging the scouts and requested that the emergency management office be opened. I also requested mutual aid from the Summit, Chatham Boro, Green Village, and New Providence fire departments.
Police Chief Ramsey opened an emergency operations center about a quartermile from the incident and notified county and state OEM offices. Assistant Chief Jim Heuttenmoser and I, meanwhile, established an incident command post on site to conduct fire and rescue operations. Units were aggressively attacking the apartment house fire and searching for victims.
The magnitude of the incident—from search and evacuation to medical treatment and transport to fire extinguishment to scene control—presented a big challenge to all agencies involved. At about the time the product fire was being brought under control, our field hospital became saturated with victims. Emergency squad members requested paramedics from nearby Overlook Hospital and additional ambulances. Overlook Hospital’ filled up and went into divert mode, as did Morristown Memorial Hospital. The National Burn Victim Foundation was notified. The foundation offered to land three helicopters carrying a full field team of burn doctors and nurses.
The Chatham Department of Public Works was called in to begin cleanup at the site of the truck fire. Meanwhile, police received a report of a burglary in process at the Baker Firestone complex. The burn unit helicopters arrived, and additional ambulances were requested for the overturned van. 1 reported the apartment fire under control at about the time the last victims were transported from the field hospital; we began damage assessment while the county haz-mat team coordinated cleanup of a nearby river that had been contaminated by leaking product. Ramsey met with the mayor to release a statement to the press. The entire operation was called to an end about three hours after it began.
A head count was taken of all participants, who were transported to the Chatham Township fire station for refreshments and removal of their simulated injuries. Ramsey coordinated a walkthrough with the Baker Firestone Tenants Association to check for damage. Jersey Central Power and Light checked for water damage. A final video of the scene was taken to ensure that no damage had been caused to the grounds.
All told, participants in Operation Glen included five fire departments; two municipal police departments and state police; emergency medical units from four municipalities; state, county, and township offices of emergency management; the county haz-mat team; the National Bum Victim Association; the American Red Cross; the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey Moulage Team; AT&T Helicopter Services; Overlook Hospital; Melni Bus Company; and various local organizations, including RACES amateur radio, a homeowners’ association, and local boy scouts and girl scouts.
LESSONS LEARNED AND REINFORCED
The exercise yielded various lessons. In addition, it brought our attention to some overlooked issues and provided the impetus for much-needed changes. A summary follows.
- A good communications system is essential for effective operations. Our OEC,, located one-quarter of a mile away from the complex, turned out to be in a dead spot—it was separated from the operations by a hill, so mobile and portable radios could not reach it. Luckily, the amateur radio operators were able to fill in and kept things running smoothly.
- Effective placement of the command post is an important first action in an effective incident command structure. Our command post for this mock incident was in a poor location. The drivers of incoming vehicles became confused and passed the post.
- In a multiagency operation, confusion on the fireground frequency can result. You must live through the operation to understand how true this is. We lost communication with a couple of ambulances due to confusion of fireground frequency. In addition, our second chan-
- nel could not reach the OEC and was stepped on by another department.
- Control and staging of emergency vehicles are critical. Once the aerials were set up, problems developed with two-way traffic around the complex. Traffic coordination should be performed by police, assisted by a fire department officer.
- In these days of limited budgets, mutual-aid agreements are essential for many departments. Fire departments cannot exist in a vacuum. If you have a high-lifehazard structure in your jurisdiction that presents a problem based on your available resources or training—such as being unable to get to a roof for vertical ventilation with portable ladders—form agreements with those who can help you solve the problem.
- Teamwork can be accomplished only by ongoing training. This is as true for the large mutual-aid drill as it is for company drills.
As a result of the operation, several changes were made. Our communications system was replaced. The new system has remote antennas located throughout the town. One antenna is located to cover all communications from the Baker Firestone complex. In addition, the fire department now has a cellular phone and a private line on our VHF system.
Planning something for 18 months and*’ having it take place in a mere three hours is almost anticlimatic. But training pays off in many ways. Less than 48 hours after^ Operation Glen, we responded to a major vehicle accident in town. We implement’ ed the incident command system as we. had in the drill to effect extinguishment, extrication, and medical procedures and extinguishment and coordinated the landing of the North Star Medevac, a helicopter operated by the New Jersey State Police, dispatching the Green Village Fire Department to the same landing zone we* had used the day before. All those long hours of planning pay off.
