PLANTATION, FLORIDA, TOWNE MALL FIRE
BY DAVID CASEY
On September 6, 1996, Chief Robert Pudney of the Plantation (FL) Fire Department was traveling to his office to review a report concerning the mutual-aid network of Broward County that he was going to present before a group of other fire chiefs. On the way to his office, an alarm was transmitted for a smoke detector activation (via a central station) at the Plantation Towne Mall at 6939 West Broward Boulevard.
Before long, 125 firefighters staffing five ladder companies and 17 engine companies from nine different fire departments would test the mutual-aid system`s effectiveness. The fire at the Plantation Towne Mall would consume 56,000 square feet of the 133,000-square-foot enclosed mall.
THE BUILDING`S HISTORY
The Plantation Towne Mall was initially constructed in 1968, originally as a four-building (each of concrete block and steel joists supporting a built-up metal deck roof ) open strip mall with a center courtyard. Two of the buildings were 270 feet long and ran east to west, one of them 102 feet deep and the other 53 feet deep. Both had glass storefronts facing the 54-foot open courtyard as well as glass storefronts facing the parking lots.
The other two buildings were at either end of the courtyard. On the west end was a Publix grocery store; it was separated from the courtyard and other buildings by a 20-foot breezeway. The Publix store had a blank concrete block wall (without openings) that ran above the roof and faced the breezeway. At the east end of the complex was another building–which was occupied by a theater, several stores, and a chain pharmacy–with 102 feet of frontage facing the courtyard.
In 1971, the center was renovated and converted into an enclosed mall. What had been four buildings was effectively combined into one structure. Stores were added to the center of the courtyard. A lightweight steel truss and built-up metal deck roof supported with columns was installed to cover the courtyard/new stores as well as the breezeways at the east and west ends of the complex. This roof, which played a major role in the fire, also covered a portion of the two long, existing rectangular buildings at the north and south–creating a roof over a roof (see illustration on page 70, bottom).
The new shops in the courtyard were only 14 feet wide by eight feet high, of ordinary construction using wood studs and wood joists. Since they were only eight feet high, a large open area was created above them. Twenty-foot corridors on either side of the new stores separated them from the original stores.
A steel frame mansard roof was installed above the breezeway between the Publix store and the rest of the mall, although the breezeway remained “open” at the ground level (open steel bar doors allowed this area to be secured at night). A glass wall with glass doors was installed along the “eastern” side of the breezeway at the two entry points into the former courtyard area as well as the southeastern and northeastern entrances. This allowed the courtyard area and new stores to be air-conditioned.
In 1991, considerable renovations were made to the mall again. A new facade was added to cover the walkways along the perimeter of the mall facing the parking lots. The four entries were remodeled, with mansards of a combination of plywood, polystyrene foam, stucco over metal lath, and “barrel” tile headers. The theater was gutted and expanded into a much larger two-story addition for offices and added roughly another 30 feet to the east end of the mall. A restaurant was also included in this addition. The existing pharmacy, which was absorbed into this addition, was vacant at the time of the fire.
Over the years, the existing roofs had been “reroofed” several times. A postfire investigation revealed that the “built-up” portion of the roof was six inches in some places. A cellulose underlayment material was added in the middle of them to give the roofs a pitch, improving drainage and increasing the fire problem.
At the time of the fire, the building was not equipped with an automatic sprinkler system or a standpipe system. The building did, however, have a central station-monitored fire alarm system consisting of smoke detectors in the mall and at least some of the tenant spaces as well as manual pull stations.
THE FIRE
The smoke alarm received at 7:41 a.m. was activated in C&J Pizza on the northern side of the mall. A 911 telephone call from the mall reporting smoke immediately followed.
Approaching the scene, Pudney was able to see heavy smoke and on arrival at 7:45 a.m., saw fire venting under pressure with dense, black smoke from the roof over the pizzeria. Pudney established the command post at the north side of the mall, near the pizzeria.
EMS Battalion 3 Chief Joel Gordon arrived and was assigned to the south-side sector of the mall. Gordon advised he had a light smoke condition in the mall itself, with no smoke in the southern tier of stores.
Plantation Engine 19 arrived with a four-person crew at 7:48 a.m. and was directed to a hydrant near the involved restaurant. With a water supply established, Engine 19 stretched a 212-inch preconnected handline (with an automatic nozzle) through the northeast mall entrance next to the restaurant, with the intent of advancing the line to the mall entrance of the pizzeria and starting the attack from this point. Once entering the mall, the crew encountered fairly heavy smoke but little heat.
A cafe-style seating area with chairs and tables was located in the mall area next to the pizzeria entrance. An open-grate security gate covered the glass doors and windows that formed the entrance to the pizzeria. As Engine 19 prepared to force the security gate, Engine 14 also arrived at the pizzeria entrance with a 212-inch handline they had stretched from the southern mall entrance.
After forcing entry, both crews entered the pizzeria and did not find much fire in the restaurant itself. When they hydraulically removed the ceiling tiles inside the store with their handlines, they observed fire “rolling” across the underside of the roof deck. What was not apparent to them at the time was that they were viewing the underside of the original roof deck–the new roof was over the top of this roof and hidden from their view. It is likely that fire was also traveling above their heads between the two roof decks and heading for the center of the mall.
Rescue 56 arrived and evacuated the occupants in the two-story portion of the mall.
At this time, Command observed heavy fire venting from the roof over the pizzeria and ordered the two engine crews out of the restaurant. The captains of Engine 14 and Engine 19 backed their handlines into the intersection of the two corridors adjacent to C&J Pizza. Flowing 250 gpm each through their automatic nozzles, they attempted to contain the fire to the pizzeria and stop its eastward progression.
The low-air alarms began to activate on the Engine 14 and Engine 19 firefighters` SCBAs, forcing them to leave the building. The captains of both engine companies remained and, using the window frames of the pizzeria as a brace, continued to flow water on the fire they could see. Visibility decreased dramatically, but the fire appeared to darken down inside the pizzeria from their vantage point. They exited the building together and reported their observations to Command.
During this time, Assistant Chief Frank Ennist of the Broward County Fire Rescue Department arrived. Although not dispatched, he was nearby and responded. He was ordered to assume control of the accountability system and began assembling the tags of the crews already working (his accountability board did not mesh with the Plantation accountability system). In addition, he also set up the incident command board for Pudney.
THE FIRE GROWS
Division Chief Joe Harris of the Plantation Fire Department arrived and was assigned by Pudney to stop the westward progress of the fire through the northern tier of stores. Plantation Engine 12 and Ladder 5 forced entry into the Poodle Haven and found smoke but no fire in the store or ceiling. On the outside of the building, however, the fire could be seen to be spreading even more quickly in its western advance. It appears that the same problem of the double roof that plagued the crews attacking the fire at C&J Pizza also hindered these crews, as they were unable to see the fire traveling between the “new” and “old” roofs.
The rapidly spreading fire on the roof and Harris` report of smoke in the Poodle Haven prompted Pudney to make his first mutual-aid request to supplement Plantation`s two ladder and 10 engine companies called to the scene. He requested four additional engines and a ladder company to respond. A Level II staging area was set up in an adjoining shopping center`s parking lot.
Additional arriving Plantation and mutual-aid companies were directed to the Travel Center to determine the westward extent of the fire from inside the stores. These crews found heavy smoke and heat but observed no fire. Fire was, however, located in the mansard along the northern face of the mall. An engine company was directed to stop the fire in this mansard, but even after they pulled down the metal lath and stucco and applied cooling streams, the fire continued its march west.
Although the fire by this point had spread almost the entire length of the northern portion of the mall`s roof, fire was just now beginning to drop into the stores west of C&J Pizza. Personnel on the scene later said that the roof fire resembled a flammable liquid fire due to the thick, black smoke that was produced and how it spread quickly across the roof. (See “The Metal Deck Roof Debate,” by Francis L. Brannigan and John W. Mittendorf, Fire Engineering, March 1988.)
Engine 14 reentered the mall with a 134-inch “protection” handline to reach their abandoned 212-inch handline and place it back in operation. They again attempted to halt the eastward spread of fire.
The growing fire prompted Command to make another mutual-aid request at this time. Pudney requested four additional engines, two ladder companies, and four command officers.
Ennist was reassigned, along with Battalion Chief Robert Deming of the mutual-aid Sunrise Fire-Rescue Department, to keep the mall fire from entering the Publix store. It was decided that Deming would take four engine companies and attempt to stop the fire from the north side of the mall while Ennist would take three engine companies and attempt the same objective from the south. Under the cover of a 212-inch and a 134-inch handline, members set up two deluge guns at the two entrances to the breezeway adjacent to the Publix store. With another engine company operating inside a store on the northern side of the mall, it was hoped that a 2,700-gpm “wall of water” would stop the fire`s westward advance.
By this time, Plantation Engine 14 had been relieved by Plantation Engine 18 inside the mall. What fire had dropped into C&J Pizza had been extinguished, and the two 212-inch handlines brought in earlier were still in use, limiting the fire`s eastern spread. Conditions began to deteriorate rapidly; visibility dropped to zero. This occurred approximately 20 minutes after arrival. From time to time, flames could be seen occasionally running in the ceiling. However, Engine 18`s officer saw flames suddenly run across the 20-foot corridor several stores west of his position, immediately breaking the glass in the center corridor stores and igniting their contents. He later described it as a “fireball” or a backdraft without an explosion. He advised Command of the development and that he and his crew were exiting. At the same time, a fireball was visible from the apparently uninvolved mansard at the very western end of the mall, over the Nook restaurant.
Deming, supervising crews who by now had advanced their deluge guns through the breezeway to the doors into the mall, also observed this change in fire conditions in the same corridor. He noted that a sudden wave of heat and smoke rolled over them, making their positions untenable. The crews repositioned the deluge guns and left them operating into the mall corridors as the crews evacuated. Deming reported little fire was visible inside at that point; however, on exiting, they saw considerable fire on the roof ahead of the drop-down fire inside the building.
Because of massive traffic tie-ups (the mall is located on a six-lane thoroughfare) and the concern for bystanders who were getting close to the operations, Plantation took the rare step of calling for law enforcement mutual aid. Additional officers, including mounted officers, from surrounding communities as well as the county were used to control the scene. The police maintained a presence at the site for several weeks, securing the site and dealing with frustrated business owners attempting to remove stock.
THE STOP
It was becoming readily apparent that the spread of fire was not being controlled and that the fire was nearing the breezeway adjacent to the Publix store. Companies entered the Nook restaurant and the adjacent vacant store, operating handlines into the overhead. The fire spread through the interior was stopped at this vacant store; however, fire continued to spread over the roof to the mansard covering the breezeway.
Companies were removed from this portion of the structure and a ladder pipe was put into operation along the southern side of the mall at the Publix` eastern wall to attack the breezeway mansard fire. Two engine companies on the Publix store`s roof cut a hole in the breezeway mansard`s common arch over the breezeway entrance and attacked the fire with two 134-inch handlines, successfully stopping the fire`s extension into the store. This ladder pipe as well as an additional ladder pipe set up along the northern side of the mall near the breezeway, combined with deluge guns positioned along the north side and the two handlines positioned on the Publix roof, were successful in stopping the roof fire`s westward progression.
With the fire`s progression stopped in the westerly direction, all efforts were directed to stopping its eastward progression along the southern portion of the mall. The spread through the stores themselves was rapid. An amateur video recorded the following as it happened at the APS Computer School: first clear of smoke; then fire dropping from the ceiling; and finally flashover, with all the windows breaking out–all occurring in less than a minute.
Engine 18`s officer with a new crew reentered the eastern portion of the mall, hoping to cut off the fire`s southeasterly spread. Interior conditions were very hot with poor visibility; however, members could see that the fire was in fact spreading in a southeasterly direction. Command ordered two deluge guns to be positioned at the southeastern mall entrance in addition to the deluge gun operating at the northeastern entrance. A collapse occurred about this time at the intersection of the north and west interior mall corridors, and all crews were ordered out of the building.
The spread to the northern portion of the two-story wing was thwarted through the use of another interior deluge gun adjacent to TJ Interiors, creating a “hydraulic fire break,” but the roof fire spread over the roof of the vacant pharmacy at the south, threatening the southern end of the two-story wing. Plantation Ladder 5, an aerial tower with two monitors, had been flowing water on the roof to slow fire spread. Plantation Snorkel 15 was set up along the mall`s southern wall, at the western wall of the two-story addition. A hole was created under the roof`s void space, and the Snorkel`s stream was directed into this hole from below. This action did slow the fire`s progression and played an important role in protecting the two-story wing.
Heavy smoke did, however, begin to enter the two-story addition. Crews entered the Century 21 office and extinguished spot fires that had entered through unprotected penetrations in the concrete block wall that separated the two-story addition from the rest of the mall. Fortunately, there were no windows or any other openings in this wall at the second-floor level. The eastward spread of the fire was stopped at this point.
The fire was declared under control at 10:45 a.m.; however, most crews were there until late afternoon. Fire watch crews remained on the scene for 21 days, extinguishing numerous spot fires in the debris. A subsequent investigation revealed that the fire originated above the pizza ovens in C&J Pizza.
LESSONS LEARNED AND REINFORCED
Building renovations play a critical role in the way fires are fought–or not fought–in the structure. In this case, the addition of a new built-up roof over an existing roof created conditions in which the hidden fire was nearly impossible to reach. With a fire initiated in the roof area, this mall was doomed to destruction.
Automatic sprinkler protection in this mall, including the void spaces between the two roofs, would have minimized the extent of the fire. Unfortunately, the commonly accepted interpretation of most sprinkler system designers is that NFPA Standard 13 does not require sprinkler protection in the “noncombustible” void space between ceiling tiles and a built-up metal deck roof, let alone between two metal deck roofs.
Remember, existing buildings normally are not required to be up to today`s current building codes, including requirements for automatic sprinklers. Many buildings codes do, however, require upgrades when significant alterations/additions are made to structures.
The stretching of a 212-inch handline as the initial attack line was a “textbook” maneuver; unfortunately, the double roof problem completely negated this powerful attack. If the building instead had a single built-up roof, a “Brannigan” attack using hose streams from below to cool the metal deck and stop the spread may have been successful.
Water supply can be an issue in a fire of this magnitude; water must be used judiciously. Fortunately, the supply of water was abundant and a pumping station was nearby, providing at least 7,300 gpm at the height of the fire.
Fire walls that ran above the roof line at the Publix store and at the two-story addition saved the day at this fire. They created the “line in the sand” for firefighters to stop the fire. The walls do, however, need to be protected with hose streams to ensure fire will not pass through penetrations made in them. Unfortunately, some building codes permit the practice of terminating a fire wall underneath a built-up metal deck roof.
On the other hand, gypsum board demising walls separating tenants (that are tight to the roof deck) do provide a fire break. Prior to the fire, a fire inspector had required such walls in Uncle Lee`s Chinese restaurant. The result was that there were only minor smoke stains to the interior of Uncle Lee`s.
Close monitoring of the use of master streams in one fire area while crews are operating in another fire area is a critical safety concern. At this fire, since the building was so large, it was felt that the crews could operate safely in one part of the building without being affected by aerial streams operating in another part of the building. In most cases, aerial streams must not be used until all crews have been removed from a fire building.
A trench cut may have proved advantageous here; however, consider the size of the building. A trench cut would have had to be 200 feet if were cut north to south to protect the Publix store or 300 feet east to west to protect the southern tier of stores. With such rapid fire spread as was seen in this fire, time to complete a trench cut was not on the firefighter`s side.
Suppression crews were rotated frequently, and EMS checked them for hydration, overexertion, and hypertension. Only one reported injury was sustained–a shoulder injury to an early-arriving company officer.
Firefighters tended to “follow” the shade; a predesignated rehab area was not terribly successful. Unfortunately, crews did not remain together while at rehab; this sometimes required officers to “gather” crews for new tasks.
Broward County Transit Authority responded with buses to serve as an air-conditioned oasis during the operations, as did two canteen trucks from Broward County Fire Rescue. Since this fire, the Plantation Fire Department has purchased folding, freestanding “picnic” canopies for use as rehab shelters.
At this fire there were effectively two operating areas, “north” and “south.” The accountability function was also divided geographically. Accountability seemed to be a key item of concern for Pudney and other command officers and was the subject of the most critical review by them. Crews were broken up due to fatigue and, in some cases, the need for apparatus operators. While the staging officers could generally rapidly identify where companies were operating, overall accountability for individuals was limited. During fire operations, one firefighter was “misplaced”; after an immediate search, he was located in a rehab area within a short time.
The complexity of the building, with its several entrances, overtaxed the normal steps for accountability. It was suggested that treating a large fire such as this as a hazardous-materials incident, with access control officers limiting access and checking crews in and out, could prove useful.
The different departments did not use the same accountability system, making operations more difficult. Differing systems must be made at least compatible. Accountability systems were not in constant use by some of the departments.
Mutual-aid networks again proved their worth. Broward County`s mutual-aid system was established by the county chiefs association in response to problems encountered in a series of large fires. In the current dispatch arrangement, an agency makes a request to its own dispatch center, which in turn uses a dedicated “ring-down” telephone to the Broward County Fire Rescue dispatch center. Through the use of a predetermined response grid, the next-due apparatus is determined, and the ring-down phone is used to notify them. Initial assistance is by the nearest units, with greater alarms taking a “patchwork” approach so as not to strip any one area of all its usual companies. While this slows the response of help, it provides for much better protection of the areas from which the help is being drawn.
While there are common mutual-aid frequencies in Broward County, the frequencies are not available on all of the departments` radios due to differences in frequency bands (URF and 800 MHz). Plantation units primarily operated their own frequencies, with others grouping on the frequencies. While every crew could not talk directly to Command, they could talk to their sector officer and, in most cases, the crews with which they were operating.
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View from the south, late into the fire. The raised edifice below the ladder is the breezeway between the mall and Publix. The other raised edifice toward the right is the South Main Entrance to the mall. Note two crews operating on top of Publix. Fire traveled through the edifice and into Publix but was stopped by crews opening the roof and walls. (Photo by Ursula E. Seemann, used with permission of Fort Lauderdale Sun-Sentinel ©.)
The Plantation Fire Department
The City of Plantation Fire Department has five career chief officers (fire chief, fire marshal, training division chief, and two EMS battalion chiefs), 41 career EMS personnel, and 183 volunteer fire officers and firefighters. The volunteer officers include an assistant chief and two battalion chiefs. Each of five stations has a captain and two lieutenants. The department operates two aerial ladders, 10 engines, four paramedic ambulances, and several support trucks. n
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Crews make the stop at the Nook restaurant. Note the fire visible from the mall interior through the store next door. (Photo by Ray Bell.)
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The north side on the western end next to Publix. The roof on fire is partially over the breezeway. A ladder was positioned soon after to protect Publix. (Photo by Ray Bell.)
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Heavy smoke conditions late in the fire on the southeast corner. The one-story roof line below where the Snorkel is operating is where crews opened the wall into the roof and directed the Snorkel`s master stream, stopping further spread into the two-story wing. (Photo by Ray Bell.)
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(Left) The interior of the roof. Note the two levels of metal roof decking (channels running perpendicular). (Photo by author.) (Right) Roofing was several layers thick, with panels of composite material used to build up areas for drainage. (Photo by Douglas Davidson.)
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(Top) The south side, in front of the drug store. Note the hole in the facade where firefighters breached the roof space and directed a master stream, preventing the fire`s spread into the two-story wing. (Photo by author.) (Bottom) The north side stores and center shops. The steel I-beams are from the mall roof assembly. (Photo by Douglas Davidson.)
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The dining area of C&J Pizza. Crews entered through the propped-open door from the mall interior. Heavy charring and damage are visible on the ceiling, with relatively little interior fire in the restaurant. (Photo by Russell Accardi.)
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The destruction. (Photo by Erma Cagot, Aerial Inc. Visions © and Other Images.)
DAVID CASEY has been in the fire service for more than 20 years and has been chief of Clay County (FL) Fire Rescue for the past five years. He is vice president of Fire Service Technology, a fire and EMS training consulting group in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. He has an associate`s and a bachelor`s degree in fire science and is currently working toward an MPA. He is a graduate of the National Fire Academy`s Executive Fire Officer Program.