PREPLANNING CONFIDENTIAL OR DIPLOMATIC FACILITIES
Do you have an embassy, a consulate, a high commission, or a trade mission in your jurisdiction? If so, be aware that mishandling a response to such a location could well result in an international incident. Any of these premises, known collectively as diplomatic missions, are considered foreign soil over which the host nation has virtually no control. They can range from a freestanding, residentialtype structure to a floor in a high-rise building, and security levels can range from a storefront in a mall with walkin capability to steel doors with gunports, electronic locks, and armed guards everywhere.
Although this article specifically relates to a successful diplomatic preplanning program, the concepts involved may have other applications in your jurisdiction. For instance, secure government installations (particularly those involved in defense or intelligence activities) or commercial complexes engaged in defense contract w’ork would present similar needs for confidentiality.
Most diplomatic missions have a public area with fairly open access and a secured area where the majority of the staff work. This secured area typically is entered through a “mantrap’’ interlock door system. In addition, there may be a top-secret area with access limited to only a few staff members; this area typically contains communications equipment.
OPERATIONAL ASPECTS
While the purpose of this article is not to discuss operational aspects, there are a few considerations when operating at incidents involving highsecurity occupancies. Attempts to bring hoses into these structures will be impeded by interlocked doors. You should know whether there is an override that w ill allow both doors to be open at the same time. In some cases, you will be told to let a certain area burn. You may even be told to let the whole building burn down —and if it does not compromise the safety of any people or the integrity of surrounding properties, you must do so while protecting exposures. Some areas (typically known as the archives or registry ) may contain critical documents, and the staff may want these areas protected first.
Ventilation opportunities in highsecurity buildings may be limited. Preplanning must take this into account. For example, during a major fire in an embassy located in another Canadian province, firefighters broke windows to ventilate the area, only to find behind the window drapes a concrete block wall that had been erected to thwart surveillance devices. No preplan had been done. High-security measures also could be a significant factor for interior-operating crews seeking a second means of egress.
Overhaul and salvage require a special procedure, as you cannot just remove the contents from the building, spread them out on the sidewalk, and hose them down. Consular staff should be present before any materials are removed from the mission for final extinguishment or overhaul.
A number of horror stories have been told about firefighters who were refused access to such facilities, diplomatic staff members who were killed in fires, and altercations that took place in the street in front of the burning building. All of these occurrences can be avoided through wellexecuted preplanning.
PREPLANNING
The Toronto Fire Department, in the summer of 1991, invited the 38 diplomatic missions in its jurisdiction to participate in a special version of its prefire planning and inspection program. Normally, this program is carried out by in-service fire crews and the resulting building details and floor plan drawings are sent to the Planning & Research Division for processing on its computer-aided drafting system and subsequently for microfiching. At the present time, nearly 50,000 floor and building detail sheets are carried on microfiche on all chief officers’ vehicles, on command vehicles, and at the Communications Center.
The Diplomatic Preplanning Project differed somewhat from this normal routine. The primary objective was to comply totally with the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and maintain absolute confidentiality of information. To guarantee this, control of the data collection and retention of the finished preplan were given over to the staff of the diplomatic missions. As a side benefit, the fire department gained a tremendous amount of good public relations for the city of Toronto and the “host nation,” Canada.
A firefighter on special assignment to the Planning & Research Division visited each mission to explain the objective of the project: to protect lives and property within the mission while maintaining their national security interests. A dummied-up example to be used as a guide and two blank preplan forms were left for the diplomatic staff to fill out. The choice of whether to fill out all or only some fields was left up to the diplomats, as was the decision about whether to include a floor plan. To help keep the drawing in the style with which all Toronto fire crews are familiar, a prefire planning symbol sheet was given to the mission’s staff to use as a guide for marking shutoffs, standpipes, drains, alarm panels, and other important features. If a drawing was submitted, they could leave a “gray area” for sensitive locations. The type of information requested included the following:
- Daytime and nighttime occupant load.
- Location of the building’s central alarm control facilities.
- High-security (difficult access) locations.
- Hazardous-materials locations.
- Exposures.
- Drains, utility shutoffs, stairs, hose cabinets, roof construction, etc.
- 24-hour contact numbers.
To maintain the highest level of security, only one copy (the master) of the preplan exists. It is located within the diplomatic mission, and no photocopies or microfiche versions arc in anyone elsc’s possession. The fact that the preplan is within the mission also makes it easier for the staff to update it. (Some missions in high-rise office buildings elected to give the preplan to the building’s security staff so that responders could be met at the door with the preplan folder.)
(Photos by author.)
All that the Toronto Fire Department knows is the location of the preplan. For each mission, the dispatch printout contains the exact location of the document. All preplans look identical: a black folder with a red-and-white hatched border on the front. (The folder is supplied by the fire department.)
The preplan folder will be removed from the mission only during the incident; it is brought to the incident commander. When the incident terminates, the folder is returned to a responsible consular official. Toronto Fire Department Communications also has on its computer-aided dispatch system the mission’s phone contact numbers and alerts consular staff immediately of any response to their premises. ‘IT)is is especially useful for premises that are unoccupied at night and for which access is required when trucks arrive and find no obvious signs of any problem.
When the preplan is completed, a letter of confirmation is sent to the head of the mission to advise what information concerning its facility is on record. Consular staff members have been requested to inform the Toronto Fire Department of any change in the location of the preplan or in the contact telephone numbers.
You can see how such “customer control” over a preplan can be utilized in high-security domestic applications. Any nonforeign complex or installation subject to the rigid security requirements mandated by federal law can use the methodology we have found to be successful. Some commercial locations that are reluctant to provide building details for fear of industrial espionage also could be approached with this suggested method. By maintaining control over the finished document, security stall are much more agreeable to having a preplan.
Although a fire department can build a harmonious relationship with diplomatic personnel, there have been occasions when firefighters were denied access to a burning consulate that had people trapped inside. Be aware that in such cases you have the right to access in accordance with paragraph 2 of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, which states: “The authorities of the receiving State shall not enter that part of the consular premises which is used exclusively for the purpose of the work of the consular post except with the consent of the head of consular post or of his designee or of the head of the diplomatic mission of the sending State. The consent of the head of the consular post may, however, be assumed in case of fire or other disaster requiring prompt protective action.”
An outreach preplanning program such as the one described, however, will make it most unlikely that you will be faced with this problem. Having gained the diplomats’ confidence during preplanning, you are bound to have it during operations.
