Report from Battalion 15
THE NORTHRIDGE EARTHQUAKE
The epicenter of the January 17, 1994, earthquake in the Northridge area of the San Fernando Valley was located approximately in the center of Battalion 15. I was on duty as Battalion 15 commander at the time of the quake. All regularly assigned officers at that time were at their respective stations and all companies were in quarters.
The force of the earthquake tossed me out of my bed to the floor. Debris was everywhere. Power was out. We regained our senses and opened our apparatus bay doors manually. We immediately went into the department’s Earthquake Emergency Mode.
RADIO/STATUS CHECK
My first action was to assess the status of the personnel and equipment in the battalion. This was difficult because of very poor radio reception and because companies had difficulty exiting tire stations due to earthquake damage. In time, however. 1 was able to ascertain that there were no injuries to members and all companies in the battalion were fully operational.
The absence of firefighter injuries was extremely fortunate, considering the extent of the damage at the fire stations. The shock felt at Fire Station 8, for example, was so severe that the station’s cast iron stove was heaved upside down into the middle of the kitchen, breaking off the gas line.
At Fire Station 70, on N. Reseda Boulevard in Northridge. every firefighter was thrown out of bed to the floor. Bricks rained around them. They recovered and slid the pole to the apparatus bay, where they observed the two engines and the ladder truck hopping across the floor. There were gaping cracks in the walls and the apparatus floor buckled up. The front apparatus doors were jammed in the closed position. So much plaster and debris were falling that Firefighters thought the station was collapsing. They finally exited the station through the rear apparatus doors after opening them manually. As of this writing. Engine Company 70 and Truck Company 70 are housed in another location while repairs are being made to their structure.
The seven other fire stations in the battalion all received severe shocks, scattering debris everywhere. Electrical power was lost throughout the area. All companies, by the light of flashlights, were able to open their apparatus doors manually and place themselves in service.
Through the breakup on the radio I heard brief snatches of other battalion commanders attempting to conduct their radio/status checks, as per department policy for earthquake emergencies. However, I could not conclude whether other battalions had started or completed their checks. 1 made numerous attempts to contact Division III and Operations Control Dispatch (OCD) via radio and cellular phone, without success.
We pul led out onto the apron of Fire Station 28 and could see numerous large fires in every direction. Eventually, 1 pieced together fragments of radio messages from my companies, describing incredible devastation and disaster throughout the battalion. Large fires burned in many commercial buildings, at California State University at Northridge, at a large condominium complex, at mobile home parks, and in numerous dwellings. In addition, there were three grass/brush fires burning, and part of the battalion was experiencing winds of more than 20 mph.
On Balboa Boulevard, a major natural gas line had ruptured and ignited, with flames reaching more than 100 feet into the air, burning several single-family dwellings and exposing many more. Adjacent to the gas line, a large public water line had ruptured and flooded the area.
The Antelope Valley Freeway had collapsed onto the Golden State Freeway, and sections of the Simi Valley Freeway also had fallen. Numerous freeway overpasses had buckled.
Buildings at the Northridge Fashion Center shopping mall had collapsed, as had its parking structure. Several other parking structures had collapsed. A four-story medical facility, numerous commercial buildings, multistory apartment buildings, and multiplefamily and single-family dwellings had collapsed or suffered severe damage. Three collapse sites involved dozens of trapped people.
There were hazardous-materials incidents in progress: one with a building placard of 4x4x4-W and another a freight train derailment of four locomotives and 24 cars with a spill of 2,000 gallons of sulfuric acid (the latter would be handled by railroad response personnel).
(Photo by Keith D. Cullom, IFPA.)
I continued to send radio communications. Some messages eventually did get through. Battalion commanders of adjacent battalions who heard my requests and who could spare the companies provided me with additional companies on their own initiative. Some company officers from adjacent battalions, also on their own initiative, responded to incidents in Battalion 15 when it was possible for them to do so. The actions of these officers greatly assisted the operations of Battalion 15. Without their initiatives, the overall operation of the fire department in Northridge would have been vastly different.
60 MAJOR INCIDENTS
Battalion 15 covers an area of roughly 23 square miles of urban development and approximately 20 square miles of mountainous terrain covered with grass and medium to heavy brush. From this area my j command post received reports of approximately 60 separate major incidents in a short period immediately following the quake. The reports were made directly to me from company commanders performing their respective district drive-throughs, from OCD, and from “still alarms” reported by the public directly to the command post.
I decided to make on-scene assessments of those incidents that appeared, through company reconnaissance, to be the most critical. Where appropriate, I established initial strategies and directed initial operations at these incidents. I conducted at least eight such on-scene assessments.
My first action was to stop a small grass fire near hire Station 28. If left unattended, this small fire would have threatened several homes and would have had a serious potential to develop into a major brush fire, as it was moving in the direction of an overgrown canyon. (Note that a similar fire nearby became the disastrous brush fire known as the Chatworth/Topanga fire in October 1993.) I contacted Engine Company 70 and directed them to extinguish the fire.
I then assessed the natural gas main fire on Balboa Boulevard. My greatest concern was not the gas fire itself, though that certainly was very significant, but a recently installed crude oil transmission line parallel to the gas fine. Had the oil line ruptured. burning product would have flowed downgrade, passing two medical buildings, two hospitals, and numerous apartment buildings and dwellings; involved hundreds of cars; and terminated at the front door of Fire Station 87 and an adjacent shopping complex. Fortunately, that did not occur.
What did rupture, however, was a 56inch-diameter water main adjacent to the gas main. This turned Balboa Boulevard into a raging river with water two to three feet deep, making it almost impossible to negotiate fire apparatus in the area.
I then responded to the Northridge Meadows Apartments collapse at 9565 N. Reseda Boulevard, where Light Force 70 (LF 70) reported numerous victims trapped within the rubble. There, l met with Captain Robert V. Fickett of LF 70 (editor’s note: a light force consists of one engine company and one truck company operating in tandem), who had just returned to this site with only his truck company. Fickett had assigned his engine company to extinguish a dwelling fire up the street, to prevent it from spreading to exposures. I directed Fickett to initiate search and rescue operations at the apartment complex, assuring him that 1 would send additional companies to him as soon as they became available. Fickett and his crew immediately commenced rescue operations. They rescued many victims from the upper floors over ladders and tunneled deep into the wreckage, from which they saved several lives. Dr. Gregory L. Palmer, LAFD’s medical director, arrived, and Fickett directed him to establish a medical division at the site and take charge of all medical emergencies. Soon Engine 270 returned to 9565 N. Reseda Boulevard and joined the rescue effort.
(Photo by Kevin A. Patrick.)
During this time, other companies from Battalion 15 were reporting fires in large commercial buildings and in mobile home parks. Because there were no immediate exposures at the commercial fires, I directed these companies to concentrate their operations on the fires in the mobile home parks.
I also conducted initial assessments of a well involved structure fire in a condominium complex at Lindley and Andrea Circle, partially collapsed apartment buildings on Lassen Street, partially collapsed apartment buildings on Devonshire and N. Reseda boulevards with the possibility of trapped victims, severely damaged apartment buildings on Nordhoff Street, the Northridge Fashion Center parking garage collapse with one person trapped beneath three floors of concrete, the collapsed three-story Bullocks department store, and several others in between. Units were operating at all these locations.
In addition, I directed Engine Company IS. under Captain Peter McHugh, to investigate the collapse of 1-14 onto the 1-5 freeway interchange. McHugh found an automobile on a portion of collapsed freeway. A woman who was seven months pregnant was in the vehicle; firefighters removed the woman from her crushed vehicle, and she was transported by helicopter to a hospital.
After my initial assessments, 1 proceeded to N. Reseda Boulevard and Nordhoff Street, where I established a command post and staging area. I bis site was selected because the intersection is well-known and there is a large parking lot nearby, well-suited for staging. It also was centrally located in the middle of most of the activities occurring in the battalion. Furthermore, the site has very few overhead obstructions or power lines that could further interfere with radio reception.
As companies reported various incidents or updated their status. I recorded and prioritized the information at the battalion command post. Based on this information, I then could reassign companies as needed.
PRIORITIES
During the first hour after the earthquake struck, many of the companies assigned to Battalion 15 independently handled emergencies of major proportions. As 1 gathered information from the company officers, l was able to determine the current status and location of all major incidents in the battalion. I then initiated actions to accomplish the following.
- Prevent conflagrations. The potential for one or more of the many fires throughout the battalion to grow into conflagrations was extreme. Brush fires, structure fires with exposures, and the gas line fire at Balboa-the latter in an area that was experi-
- encing wind gusts greater than 20 mph- were the greatest threats. My primary action, therefore, was for immediate containment of all major fires that were threatening exposures. All fires with immediate or potential exposures were assigned at least one fire company. Structure fires that did not pose an exposure problem were left to burn. (During the 1906 San Francisco earthquake, the major loss of life occurred two days after the initial quake, when a series of uncontained fires merged and created a major conflagration.)
- Identify all collapsed structures with people trapped and initiate maximum rescue efforts. As early as possible, each such incident was assigned a fire company whose orders were to remain on scene and commence immediate rescue operations. Although initial companies operating at the major collapses (such as the Northridge Meadows Apartments collapse and the Fashion Center parking structure collapse) were completely overwhelmed with their assigned tasks, they served several vital functions: They laid the foundation for the major rescue operations, reassured and calmed the general public, provided a sense of security and hope for trapped victims, and maintained a line of communication between the rescue operations and the command post. As resources became available, they were immediately assigned to the various rescue operations.
- Resun’ey every street in the battalion. After the containment of the fires and after all physical rescue operations were underway, it was necessary to reassess the entire district. This served several purposes. Most important, it allowed us to identify any serious situations that may have been overlooked during the hectic first hour after the quake. It identified situations that would hinder fire department operations, such as water main grids with low or no water, damaged bridges, and unusable streets. And the presence of fire companies driving through these districts greatly reassured and calmed the public. As additional resources arrived at the battalion command post, they were directed to redrive Battalion 15, district by district.
(Photo by Glenn P. Corbett.)
MANY PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED
There were many significant obstacles encountered, especially during the earthquake itself and for the first 2/ hours of operation. First, the quake was extremely violent, and our personnel narrowly escaped serious injury.
Second, members could not communicate adequately over the radio. The quake was widespread, and the radio communication network became overtaxed with the numerous messages being transmitted. Either my messages to Division 3, giving status and requesting additional resources, were not received or 1 could not receive acknowledgments of the same. Eventually, some messages did get through, and Division 3 sent companies as they became available.
In addition, three of the four major water transmission lines serving the San Fernando Valley ruptured and many fire hydrants were snapped off during the quake, leaving us virtually without water. Fortunately, because of the climate in Southern California. this part of the city has many swimming pools, which firefighters used extensively to replenish the tanks on their apparatus.
The earthquake occurred at night and was followed by the loss of electrical power, which resulted in an almost total blackout in this part ot the city. This situation presented many problems, including power lines lying across streets and properties. In addition, hundreds of people were wandering dazed in the middle of the streets. This situation, along with debris and erratic drivers, made negotiating fire apparatus in the area extremely difficult.
A serious problem was the lack of resources. Normally, even with simultaneous greater-alarm fires, LAFD is capable of dispatching whatever number of companies is necessary. Because more than half of the city was affected by the quake and because communications were overtaxed, several hours passed before an adequate number of fire companies began to arrive in the Battalion 15 area.
Firefighter fatigue was an important factor. Firefighters have proven time and time again that they can perform hard work under extreme conditions for long periods of time. However, just working hard is different from working hard under extreme and dangerous conditions while under duress like that encountered at the Northridge Fashion Center parking structure and at the Northridge Meadows Apartments complex.
It was incumbent on officers to monitor firefighter safety and enforce rest/rehab periods, though this is difficult, given the magnitude of the disaster and available resources in the early stages of operations.
Refueling operations became an issue because of the complete power loss in the area. I requested that a battalion chief and a staff assistant, who is also a licensed electrician, restore power to the fuel pumps at Fire Station 70. They accomplished this with a portable generator. Fire Station 70 became the main refueling depot for companies working in the battalion.
ADDITIONAL RESOURCES
Battalion 15 began the incident with its normal working strength of two truck companies, eight engine companies, and three paramedic ambulances. At approximately j 0520 hours, the first additional companies j began arriving. Between that time and j 0650 hours. Battalion 15 was augmented j by two light forces, seven engine compaI nies, and one battalion chief. I directed nits specifically to cover the Balboa gas j explosion/fire, Lindley Avenue condominium fire, and Northridge Meadows Apartments collapse. At 0545 hours, 1 requested four special companies: two urban search and rescue (USAR) teams. Heavy Rescue 56 (HR 56), and a hazardous-materials task force.
At 0600 hours, I directed Ught Force 89 to respond to the Northridge Fashion Center ; and begin rescue operations of the man j trapped under the collapsed parking garage. ! At the same time, I directed the first additional battalion chief. Robert De Feo. to take command at the Northridge Meadows Apartments collapse. Each additional company dispatched to my command post was directed via radio to a specific incident without stopping at the command post. 1 held no companies in the staging area.
During my on-scene assessments, 1 encountered a fire involving a two-story, wood-frame, wood-sided condominium with a wood-shake shingle roof, fully involved from the ground floor and through the roof. The building was fairly large and housed three condominium units. It was located w ithin a large condominium complex of similar structures, w ith 30-foot separations between buildings. The situation was further compounded by the fact that the hydrants in the area were dry. Four engine companies were assigned to control this fire. Captain Robert Setterberg of Engine Company 70, in charge of this incident. located two swimming pools within the complex and. with this meager water supply and the judicious use of water and handlines, prevented the fire from spreading to the other structures.
All companies working in the battalion were fully engaged in fire/rescue operations. As they finished one incident. I immediately dispatched them to another. Despite the fact that resources were extremely limited relative to the emergency response demands, by 0700 hours every significant incident in Battalion 15 had been identified and assessed and emergency operations initiated with at least one company at the scene. My primary function from this point on involved supervising the incidents, achieving workable communications, reassigning units as necessary, and coordinating the assignment of additional resources to each emergency site.
CONTINUED INCIDENT MANAGEMENT
By 0750 hours, the four remaining major working incidents in Battalion 15 were the Balboa gas line fire, the parking garage collapse, the Northridge Meadows Apartments collapse, and the Cal State/Northridge fires. At Balboa, the dwelling fires had been brought under control, but tire from the ruptured gas main continued. At the parking garage, firefighters were making progress but still needed a USAR team and heavy rescue to complete their task. De Feo. commanding the Meadows Apartments collapse, reported several people rescued but believed that there were more still trapped. He needed additional personnel and a USAR team. Those resources were responding at this time.
The fire at the Cal State/Northridge campus was reported early in the incident, but because there was no water supply and the fire was confined to the school laboratory- posing no immediate threat to exposures-I placed it in a “degraded” priority until adequate resources became available for the fire attack.
At 0755 hours. Tac Team 788, consisting of a truck company and three engine companies and commanded by Battalion Chief William Burmester. arrived at the Battalion 15 command post. After briefing him on the unique hazards at the Cal State campus, I directed him to take command of the incident. I informed him that a haz-mat task force had been requested. Burmester solved the water problem at Cal State by laying two water relays, 8(X) and I .(XX) feet, from swimming pools located near the incident.
Between 08(X) and 0920 hours, resources were dispatched as available to the primary incidents in the battalion. USAR teams and HR 56 now were operating at the major collapse situations. The haz-mat task force joined 12 engine companies, four truck companies, one squad company, and two battalion chiefs at the Cal State haz-mat fires. The firefighting operations at the college were extremely hazardous and difficult. Burmester consulted teachers, doctors, and students to determine the location and nature of the hazardous chemicals involved. Fires were found in three separate multistory buildings and required more than two hours to control.
By 1030 hours, all fires were extinguished. The collapsed apartment building and parking garage operations were ongoing. By the seventh hour of operations, seven battalion chiefs, eight truck companies, 33 engine companies, numerous paramedic ambulance units, one heavy rescue company, and two USAR teams were operating in Battalion 15.
At this time, I directed two strike teams to complete a resurvey, street by street, of the battalion area. Each strike team consisted of a battalion chief and five engine companies. While conducting the survey, one of the strike teams came upon a previously unreported fire involving a strip mall and extinguished it.
From January 17 through 19, LAFD responded to 1,488 incidents in Battalion 15.
The Northridge Earthquake was one of the greatest challenges in the 108year history of LAFD. The successful and expedient containment and control of the multitude of serious incidents and the prevention of a major conflagration following the Northridge Earthquake are credits to all firefighters involved.
During and after the earthquake, all members working in the Battalion 15 area displayed exemplary courage and dedication. In addition, an incredible amount of initiative, enthusiasm, and physical and mental endurance was displayed. Throughout the endeavor, cool heads and true professionalism prevailed.
It is much to their credit that the company commanders on duty maintained strict discipline and diligently followed the department’s emergency earthquake procedures. These commanders understood the importance of the company “drive-through” and “radio/status” communications with the incident commander. It was with great difficulty that they accomplished these functions. Sometimes it took great courage and discipline to drive past burning and/or collapsed buildings and frantic citizens demanding their attention. Their precise observations of conditions in their districts and their communication of these conditions allowed me to prioritize and allocate scarce resources to the proper incidents.
Had LF 70 commenced rescue operations at the first damaged building they encountered, they never would have discovered and reported the situation at the Northridge Meadows Apartments and at the Northridge Fashion Center, which would have seriously delayed these rescue operations. For those few companies unable to complete their drivethroughs, I assigned other companies to this task as soon as they became available.
Because of the media’s passion for sensationalism and the easy access for photographing the dramatic rescue operations at the Northridge Meadows Apartments collapse and the collapse of the Northridge Fashion Center parking structure, these incidents were highly publicized. We should not, however, overlook the many other fire department operations throughout the battalion that saved much more property and many more lives.
The many fires involving mobile homes in several different mobile home parks located in the battalion seriously threatened the lives of hundreds of people. Approximately 80 percent of the residents in these parks are elderly, and many are invalids. Almost all of the mobile homes were knocked from their jacks, and many of the occupants had been thrown to the floor and were unable to leave without help. On arrival, fire companies found homes fully involved and the fire spreading to others. Aggressive firefighting and judicious use of handlines and water prevented these fires from becoming major conflagrations. Other companies encountered similar conditions. Aggressive actions prevented large condominium complexes and dwellings in various neighborhoods from also becoming conflagrations.
It also must be said in conclusion that LAFD Emergency Earthquake Procedures and the training to maintain proficiency with these procedures were validated during the Northridge Earthquake disaster. Never before have the fire department’s basic operational procedures been so tested and yet performed so well.
