RESPONDING TO THE ILLINOIS POWER PLANT
BY LARRY RINGERING
At 1809 hours on December 18, 1996, the East Alton 911 Dispatch center received an alarm from the Illinois Power Plant requesting that the fire department respond to an explosion and fire inside the plant.
The initial response for a structure fire consists of a pumper, a ladder truck, a rescue, and a full call out of paid/on-call personnel. In this particular incident, this normal response of equipment and personnel would change as more information became available to the en route Ladder 1 via radio during response from Station 1. The 911 dispatch report said that the power plant had called back and reported that one of its coal mills had exploded, resulting in a large fire in that area. The station could not give any information concerning injuries or missing employees.
On receipt of this information, Lieutenant Randall Mortland, who was responding on Ladder 1, asked the 911 dispatch center to order a mutual-aid assignment. This would automatically send Wood River Fire Department (a bordering community) with one pumper with a crew of four and an ambulance to the incident and have the Rosewood Heights Fire Department move up equipment to our vacated station. This would give us a response of two pumpers, one 75-foot ladder truck, one light rescue, one ambulance, and approximately 20 firefighters.
ON-SCENE
The East Alton Fire Department arrived at the main gate and was directed to the front (north) side of the main building. Initial size-up gave no indication of a large fire load inside the five-story steel structure; employees were seen quickly exiting the building from a large bay door located near the fire area. The first task of the assigned incident commander (IC) was to try to ascertain from someone in charge of the complex exactly what was happening and who might be trapped, injured, or unaccounted for. This information came from the plant supervisor, who met the IC at his truck and told him that he believed that all of the employees were out of the building. The IC asked the supervisor to conduct a head count and to report the results to the fire department as soon as possible.
The main complex, which houses the mills, is of steel and concrete construction and is five stories high. The interior was comprised of steel, grated stairways and walkways. All floors were of open-type steel grating that allowed heat produced in the mill process to rise and exit the building through the roof. This type of construction accounted for the fact that no smoke or heat was immediately evident when the fire units first arrived. This also became a tremendous advantage to our interior attack teams in that it served as a very efficient source of ventilation for fire by-products.
When fire crews finally entered the building, it appeared that the fire area was 25 to 30 feet above the main floor, covering approximately 1,200 square feet. During this observation, another secondary explosion occurred above the heads of fire personnel. This explosion sent flames and blue arcing back toward the front wall, prompting an immediate evacuation of the building. At this time, all electrical power in the complex failed, and fire rapidly extended to the upper floors.
We set up water supply and attack lines. Although this is usually a routine operation, at this incident, it presented us with the first of several obstacles that had to be overcome.
The plant emergency water system is made up of mains and strategically placed fire hydrants throughout the plant facilities. The emergency water system depends on a fuel-fired water pump that takes water from the river. Plant officials were unable to get this pump to operate. Our only other option was to use the nearest hydrant available outside the plant, which was on the village`s water system. This required a 2,100-foot lay of five-inch supply line from a village hydrant to the fire building, which took about 25 minutes to accomplish. This, however, did not delay our suppression efforts, since plant personnel had just advised the fire department that they could not guarantee that the fire building had been 100 percent deenergized. This information raised an important question: Do we send interior attack teams to start suppression efforts in an environment that is charged with high voltage and that would certainly compromise safety? The answer was no.
Our strategy changed from an offensive attack to a defensive mode using unmanned monitors to try to keep the fire isolated to one area until all electricity was eliminated from the building. This defensive maneuver worked well in preventing the fire from spreading outward, but it had little effect in upward extension. This maneuver in effect provided the fire department with ample time to form and coordinate an interior attack to move in for final extinguishment as soon as plant personnel could remove the electrical hazard from the fire area.
An upgrade from our previous mutual-aid assignment was ordered through the 911 dispatch center. It brought more personnel and a mobile cascade system to the scene. This cascade proved critical to the overall success of the operation.
For approximately one hour into the fire, no attempt was made to start interior operations. Electrical arcing and small explosions were occurring regularly, and there was no answer from plant personnel concerning whether they could deenergize the building. The only hope was to disable the battery backup supply that provided the building with 2,400 volts of DC power. This power supply was located near the fire area, which negated any attempts to shut down the backup system. Our only option at this time seemed to be to wait until the fire would eventually shut down the DC power supply on its own. Fire personnel could not enter such a high-hazard area. At 1901 hours, the fire breached the battery room and destroyed the battery backup; all arcing ceased.
While monitoring the fire area for approximately five minutes, four-member interior crews were assembled. At 1900 hours, attack teams entered using two 134-inch attack lines. A safety officer was assigned from the staging area to make sure that crews limited their interior operations to 15 minutes or under. Standby crews would enter and relieve the interior crews at the nozzle. This procedure provided a continuous flow of water from the nozzle. The fire could not gain headway.
In about 20 minutes, the fire was extinguished. At 0630 hours, all fire units were back in service.
LESSONS LEARNED AND REINFORCED
Annual tours of plants within your jurisdiction are a must. Not only do you become familiar with the inside of the plant, but you also cultivate a one-on-one relationship with plant supervisors and safety department members. If an incident should occur at an industrial plant of this magnitude, it`s imperative to have the plant supervisor at the command post. He has the resources and authority to help with anything the fire department might need.
During your annual tours, make sure that any in-plant system the fire department may depend on–pumps, hydrants, standpipes, and so on–are tested at least once a year.
The fire department encountered a multitude of hazards. High voltage, compressed gases, high-pressure steam lines, and coal dust–all had to be dealt with in poor visibility. You must be aware of all hazards present, not only the most obvious hazard. The hazard that is overlooked or doesn`t seem to be important at the mo-ment is the one that`s going to get you.
A rehab sector was very important at this incident. Weather conditions at the time of the fire were severe–a temperature of 127F, snow, and 20-mile-per-hour wind gusts. These conditions also increased the fall hazard. Water froze as soon as it covered the floor, steps, and handrails.
Adopt an incident command system. This will ensure a manageable span of control for the person in charge. Also, someone needs to be put in charge of overall safety on the fireground, and a separate safety officer must be designated for interior operations.
Accountability is absolutely mandatory! It`s imperative that the IC know exactly where everyone is, who they are, and what they are doing.
In a small combination department such as East Alton (seven paid and 16 paid/on-call), it`s important to maintain a good working relationship with surrounding departments. This incident went way beyond our capabilities in personnel and equipment.
Ironically, just two days after the Illinois Power Plant fire, the East Alton Fire Department again responded to the generating plant for an explosion and fire occurring in a large transformer located in the switching yard (see photo above). The first engine to arrive reported heavy fire with flames reaching approximately 60 to 70 feet into the air. Master streams were put into place, the switching yard was deenergized, and foam was applied to accomplish complete extinguishment.
 |
The East Alton (IL) Fire Department responds to the Illinois Power Plant for the second time in two days to extinguish a transformer fire. (Photo by Mike Rhodes.)
