RETURN TO RUNWAY 13-31

RETURN TO RUNWAY 13-31

On September 20, 1989, more than a thousand New York City rescuers— and the city’s airport emergency response plans—were tested by the crash of USAir Flight 5050 as it aborted its takeoff down LaGuardia Airport’s Runway 13-31 and crashed into the bay. Less than three years later, that city ‘s emergency responders again were called to Runway 1331 in a large-scale response to another tragic event: the crash of USAir Flight 405.

USAir Flight 405, bound for Cleveland, Ohio, departed down New York City’s I.aGuardia Airport Runway 1 331, a 7,000-foot tarmac, at approximately 2132 hours on March 22, 1992. The night was cold and snowy. There were 47 passengers and four crew members aboard the Fokker F28.

The plane crashed on takeoff. It veered off the runway, vaulted the earth berm (seawall), and came to rest in Flushing Bay, with its tail section approximately 20 feet from shore. It had twisted into an “L” shape. The fuselage rolled over, and the top of the aircraft was mostly submerged in the 40-degree water. Its midsection was ripped open, and its tail and other sections of the wreck were in flames. Debris was strewn about the runway area.

RESPONSE

At 2136 hours, LaGuardia Control Tower notified FDNY’s Queens fire alarm dispatcher of the crash. An automatic second-alarm assignment responded: eight engine companies, four ladder companies, four battalion chiefs, one deputy chief, two rescue companies, and special units, including the marine company, haz-mat unit, foam unit, Maxi Water system and accompanying satellite units (2,000gpm pumpers with satellite hose wagons that each carry approximately 1,600 feet of 4 /2-inch or five-inch hose), tactical support unit, and safety battalion chief—totaling approximately 120 firefighters. These units responded to a predesignated staging area to implement the LaGuardia Airport Emergency Flan.

While FDNY and other city emergency agencies were en route, the Fort Authority (PA) of New York airport rescue firefighting vehicles raced to the scene. Lt. Dennis Cannon, tour commander for the FA police, established a command post. FA rescuers and some civilian airport employees entered the water, amidst the smoke and flames, to pull dazed and wandering survivors to the shoreline. The FA firefighting teams applied foam from their crash truck monitors onto the burning aircraft. A member of the airport firefighting crew stood at the top of the 12-foot-high earth berm to direct the foam streams.

Fire department units lined up in convoy fashion at the staging area near the airport entrance gate (Guard Post #3) and were led to the scene by FA police escort. This follows contingency plans for the safety of responders and is necessary to control vehicle access to avoid the possibility of further incidents on remaining active runways and taxiways. The crash had occurred on the airport grounds at almost the farthest point from the entrance gate. It took the convoy about five minutes to reach the scene. Heavy snow was falling at this time.

Not far from the crash scene, a small airport pump house was in flames. Apparently, this shed had been hit by the plane’s left wing as it careened off the runway. The impact may have caused a fuel spill: A threefoot-high wall of fire, fed by jet fuel and debris, burned along the base of the earth berm for a distance of 400 feet. At the end of this wall of fire, on the water’s side of the seawall, heavy black smoke rose into the darkness. This is the spot where Flight 405 came to rest.

INITIAL FIRE DEPARTMENT OPERATIONS

The convoy split up and took positions based on immediate need. Apparatus placement was slow and difficult, due to the weather. Between the tarmac and earth berm were about 50 feet of grass, a 10-foot-wide paved road, and another section of grass about 15 feet wide. The snow made it difficult to distinguish paved from unpaved areas, and some rigs began to sink into the mud and slush.

While en route to the airport, Deputy Chief Frank Clarke instructed the dispatcher to designate a battalion chief as a water coordinator and another chief to respond to the staging area at Guard Post #3. On arrival at the crash site, Clarke reported to the incident command post to implement LaGuardia’s Airport Emergency Plan. This plan designates the Port Authority Police Department tour commander as the incident commander.

At the command post, Clarke was briefed by PA Lt. Cannon on type of aircraft, number of passengers and crew aboard, and actions already taken. He was issued a PA radio to monitor the police frequency. Cannon indicated that numerous survivors had either walked out of the water under their own power or had been escorted out by rescuers and had been removed to a temporary shelter. Many of the survivors suffered thermal burns and smoke inhalation.

Clarke transmitted a third alarm and instructed units to report to the predesignated staging area near the airport gate. Later these units would be used to carry victims to a temporary morgue site and be used for relief of first-responding units.

The fire department initially was faced with five problems:

1. Search for survivors.
2. Recovery of victims.
3. Stretch handlines to extinguish fire in and around the aircraft and to protect rescuers.
4. Delivery of large volumes of water from distant hydrants.
5. Hindered recovery operations due to the incoming tide.

Battalion Chief Richard Fleschner was assigned tactical operations chief and began assigning units to these tasks. A forward command post was established by the fire department so that Flcschner could better direct rescue/recovery operations.

SEARCH, RECOVERY, EXTINGUISHMENT

Rescue Company 4 stopped its vehicle at the burning pump house. There, six survivors, dazed but not seriously injured, were brought into the apparatus and were administered first aid. A firefighter was instructed to stay with these survivors. Meanwhile, the rest of the crew, led by Captain Marty McTigue, donned survival suits and proceeded on foot to the crash site. Their entry wits blocked by the wall of fire along the earth berm. A PA crash unit used its foam monitor to disperse the fire and provide a path of entry for the firefighters.

Members waded through the water toward the downed craft. Its tail section was ablaze. Fuel and debris spot fires encircled the plane. Smoke billowed from the center of the fuselage, and the smell of jet fuel permeated the air. ARFF units continued foam application.

Rescue 4’s preliminary search of the area in and around the plane’s left side (closest to the shore) and tail section indicated no survivors. They reached the twisted nose section of the cockpit and found victims in the wreckage. These victims could not be removed immediately because they were pinned by the collapsed metal. While awaiting for arrival of heavy rescue equipment from incoming units, McTigue continued the search, climbing into the torn section of craft with several members while directing others to search alongside the water’s edge. The latter team recovered a body at that location.

All the other initial-arriving units were taking appropriate actions. Water supply, lighting, access considerations, and portable power equipment needs were being addressed.

Flcschner ordered that a handline be stretched over the berm to the burning plane to extinguish pockets of fire in and around the aircraft and protect rescuers in case the jet fuel ignited. Since this handline was running off booster water, several engine companies relayed their tank water as a short-term solution to ensuring an uninterrupted supply.

A considerable interagency contingent of rescuers —from PA, FDNY, and Police Department emergency services units—was now searching in the water. Because of the water temperature and because most rescuers were not equipped with survival suits, rotation of crews was essential. Accurate accountability of rescue personnel was a challenge amidst the chaos of the crash scene, the weather, and the darkness; accountability of unit members fell largely on the shoulders of each company officer.

Negotiating the 45-degree, snowcovered earth berm and 12-foot drop to the rugged rock beach at the water’s edge was difficult. Numerous portable ladders were positioned on both sides of the sea wall and from the shore to the plane to facilitate safer site access.

The victim count was climbing: Firefighters from Didder 117 wading through the water toward the plane found five dead passengers in the dark, murky water. Three of these victims were strapped to their chairs, lying sideways, just under water level. Another victim was found submerged in the bay, and a young girl was recovered from deeper water. Death by drowning would become familiar words in the account of this tragedy. Numerous victims probably drowned while pinned in their seats.

City emergency medical service units initiated triage, treatment, and transport of victims. A temporary shelter was established, where victims could receive treatment from emergency medical personnel.

The foam blanket laid dow n by PA crash rigs knocked down major areas of fire, but over time it began to break up. lliis foam breakup resulted in some rolling fire along the water. Battalion Chief Robert Williams, placed in charge of rescue efforts at water’s edge and operating from a sandbar about 20 feet from the seawall, requested a foam handline off the PA crash truck to maintain the foam blanket. This allowed search operations to continue with relative safety.

Firefighters continued to locate bodies in the water and around the shore. Two more fatalities were iocated submerged in the water and several more were recovered along the rock beach.

(Photos by Tom Buchta.)

Within 20 minutes, water supply from distant hydrants was established, under the direction of Battalion Chief l.arry Schwermmer. This was accomplished w ith 2,000 feet of large-diameter hose, three 2,000-gpm pumpers in relay, and a water manifold, positioned near the crash site, that would receive the relayed water. With this water manifold —which has a 4 1/2-inch female intake, two three-inch outlets, and four 2’/2-inch outlets—FDNY was prepared to provide a continuous water supply to Port Authority ARFF apparatus. Units stretched two handlines and one foam handline from the manifold.

Members of Didder 163, arriving at the scene, noted some units bogging down off the paved runway some 200 yards from the crash site. Lt. Charlie Zuba dismounted the apparatus and guided it along the paved road with the aid of a flashlight. Fleschner instructed them to set their tower ladder bucket on top of the slippery hill near the crash site. Planks were used for stabilization because the tormentors were sinking into the mud. Zuba led his firefighters to the top of the seawall, just opposite the plane.

Under some debris on the top of the wall, they found a crash survivor, lying facedown and semiconscious. His arms were burned and he was bleeding from the head. After basic first aid, members placed the victim on a backboard and used a stokes stretcher to move him onto a tower ladder bucket and then to awaiting EMS personnel. He was to be the last survivor of Flight -t()5.

NYPD harbor units arrived on the scene to join in the search The movement of the boats plus the incoming tide were causing the plane to shift in the water. Fleschner ordered that the aircraft be tied oft to rocks and boulders on shore. Numerous ropes were used to increase stability of the wreck and served as guidelines for the rescu – ers to walk from the shore to the craft.

Portable radio traffic was overwhelming because so many personnel were using the system. Chief Clarke instructed all chief officers to switch to the command channel (see sidebar on page 54). Furthermore, with the casualty list rising and on-scene personnel engaged, he special-called two additional battalion chiefs to serve as victim-tracking coordinators.

INCOMING TIDE

With a foam blanket established and a foam handline in operation, rescuers could concentrate on enlarging the aircraft openings and cutting away obstructions to remove victims still in the plane.

Rescue Company 2 arrived and utilized its apparatus tower lights at maximum extension to increase scene visibility. Captain Ray Downey used a portable ladder to gain access from shore to the top center of the ripped-open fuselage. He was instructed to supervise recovery from this level. Time was of the essence because the tide was rising rapidly and soon the plane would be totally submerged.

Rescuers were releasing seat belts of victims submerged underwater in the tail section. Victims that could be reached were removed. They were passed to other rescuers standing in the waist-high water.

Other victims could not be removed immediately because they were trapped in the collapsed metal. Downey ordered that a hydraulic power cutter, air gun, and air chisel be brought to the scene. These tools were loaded onto an inflatable raft and a stokes basket and then floated to the craft. Firefighters used the “O” cutter of the hydraulic cutting tool to cut around windows and sections of the metal to widen the opening to access the victims. Members used the curved cutter bit of the air gun to enlarge openings along the aluminum skin. Use of these tools in enlarging openings allowed members to reach areas that otherwise could not have been accessed.

Captain Jack Corcoran, rescue liaison officer, arrived and was put in command of all FDNY rescue companies. He directed and controlled their operations and kept the fire department command post informed. A hard-wired, sound-powered phone was deployed and used by Corcoran as a reliable backup source of communication from the fire department command post to the water’s edge.

Meanwhile, the fire department marine unit, though it could not get close enough to the aircraft because of the shallow water, searched the perimeter waters for victims or survivors in the bay. In addition, a U.S. Coast Guard boat searched for possible victims.

Chief of Department William Feehan arrived and took command of FDNY operations. He assigned Assistant Chief Edward Butler to be the liaison officer. The PA command vehicle was the point of contact where liaison officers from the various agencies (fire department, police department, Port Authority, National Transportation Safety Board) met to cooperate and assist. From this point each agency representative was kept informed of needs and progress.

At approximately 0200 hours on March 23, all rescuers were ordered out of the water because the tide had caused the water to rise near the top of the fuselage. Eight passengers had not been recovered. At 0613 hours, when the tide receded, rescuers returned to the aircraft and recovered the bodies.

Twenty-seven people died in the tragic crash of Flight 403. Twentyfour survived. A National Transportation Safety Board investigation of the crash is ongoing at the time of this writing.

LESSONS LEARNED AND REINFORCED

• Immediate implementation of the unified incident command system is absolutely essential for a disaster of this magnitude. Without it, resources cannot be used efficiently and objectives cannot be effectively accomplished. The tendency to employ a “gold rush” mentality can be eliminated if the first-arriving chief officers implement the ICS and clearly designate operational sectors.
• Officers for operations, safety, logistics, communications, water supply, and staging should be designated as soon as possible. Sector officers are the eyes and ears of the incident command officers.
• Each agency must plan its own techniques for aircraft disaster response, but coordination with all responding agencies is a must Experience, creativity, cooperation, and control by commanders and managers of the various agencies will ensure a professional operation.
• Interagency cooperation depends heavily on effective communications. All communications —whether to request assistance or report progressshould be transmitted to the incident commander. Establish an interagency command/communications vehicle. Liaison officers from the different agencies should communicate faceto-face. There should be a free channel of communications between interagency officers. Each agency should be kept informed of progress and needs. Discuss plans for extended operations. Information for press releases should be a joint effort. Designate briefing areas for city officials.
• The early transmission of a greater alarm for disasters brings numerous rcsource/access considerations: A sufficient number of chief officers should be included in the automatic response because control and sectoring tasks are monumental. Plan response routes, have contingency response routes, and have plans to get units to the vicinity of the disaster before the road jams up with media vehicles, curiosity seekers, and other nonemergency vehicles. Access routes for emergency vehicles should be kept open by police or traffic units. The best routes should be announced on department radio for all responding units. When necessary, limit critical access routes to emergency vehicles. Establish a secondary staging area near the airport to allow additional units to assemble for quick response if needed.
• The passenger/crew manifest and type of aircraft must be obtained immediately at such a disaster.
• The tides should be an early consideration if the plane lands in water.
• The disaster area should be cordoned off to prevent nonemergency workers/individuals from congesting the rescue site. The site should be secured by police units.
• Dedicate units to perimeter search in such an incident.
• Prolonged operations in cold water, fatigue, and hypothermia mandate that incident command and safety officers implement relief and rotation of crews.
• Be creative in utilization of equipment resources. For example, inflatable rafts and litter stretchers can be used to support heavy equipment necessary for extrication work at a water incident.
• Keep police units informed of survivor status so that road access can be maintained for victim transport to area hospitals.
• All SCBAs need overhaul when exposed to jet fuel.
• Jet fuel diluted the glue on the patches of buoyancy compensators on the department’s survival suits.
• The distance between the crash site and the municipal water supply at airports can be considerable. Preplan and train for long hose stretches and water relay tactics.
• At incidents involving multiple fatalities, establish a temporarymorgue and handle bodies with dignity and respect