Strategic Goals at Haz-Mat Incidents

Strategic Goals at Haz-Mat Incidents

DISASTER MANAGEMEENT

Part 4 in a series on managing large-scale chemical incidents.

THE THIRD installment of this series on managing chemical incidents ( “Incident Estimation and Strategic Goals at Haz-Mat Incidents,” Fire Engineering, August ’89) brought us midway through the third step of the GEDAPER process. (For clarification and an overview of this process, see “Operational Decision Making,” Fire Engineering, June ’89 ) Let’s turn our attention to spill control, leak control, fire control, and recovery. These, along with isolation, notification, identification, and protection measures, are the strategic goals that must be achieved during a chemical incident.

SPILL CONTROL

Spill control involves managing a product that has escaped or threatens to escape its container and has entered or will enter surrounding environmental media. The hazards created by this escape must be minimized. In a large number of instances, particularly those involving liquids and solids, the best way to minimize the hazard is to take steps to confine the material to the smallest area possible. Most commonly, product confinement involves the use of a barrier system that prevents further spread.

There are, however, a few specific circumstances in which the best way to minimize the hazard is to force product spread as rapidly as possible. One such circumstance is the release of gases or vapors (gas phase of a liquid) that have escaped inside confined areas such as structures, vaults, basements, sub-basements, and piping systems.

A second such circumstance is the release of a water-soluble product into a body of water that can’t be contained. Rapid dispersal and dilution of the contaminant may be the only alternative.

A third such circumstance that could dictate rapid forced spread is the release of a petroleum product into a large body of water. In some situations the use of a dispersant may be advantageous to speed the spread of the product — dispersing a heavy product in a flowing body of water to keep it away from the shoreline, for instance.

Be forewarned, however, that the use of tactical options that will result in a greater spread of the product must not be undertaken until a thorough assessment (estimation) of their possible impacts, both positive and negative, has been completed. Certain circumstances-, (such as the use of a dispersant on a body of water) will require the approval of local, state, or federal agencies. If such approval is not obtained when and where required, the individual authorizing the operation and the agency thatcarries it out may be breaking both civil and criminal statutes.

Unfortunately, spill control activities; are too often undertaken only as a reactionary measure to a product that has already escaped into the environ-ment. Haz-mat responders must be proactive in their spill control methods whenever possible. Overlooking or disregarding proactive methods could worsen a material’s impact on property and environment. Consider the follow-, ing types of situations:

  • A tanker has rolled over on a highway, with no visible loss of product. The area around the truck should be diked as a precaution before transfer of the product or before righting the vehicle.
  • A tank containing a corrosive liquid is emitting visible vapors, possibly from a small leak near the bottom of the tank. Diking should be performed to prevent further spread of product because the product may not be compatible with the container and greater failure of the container could occur.
  • A fire involves a structure containing chemicals. The application of water could result in contaminated runoff. If it is determined that water application is appropriate, diking should be performed to minimize runoff spread.

Spill control activities can often be performed with little or no risk of direct contact with the released product. In some situations, such as the spill of 1,000 gallons of fuel oil #2 entering a storm sewer system, personnel may not have to enter the hot zone. They may be able to locate the outflow point of the sewer line and dike or boom the area before the product ever reaches that location. On the other hand, there are situations—such as a chemical release within a structure —that require personnel to enter the hot zone.

All fire personnel are responsible, in varying degrees, for chemical incident mitigation. OSHA’s Final Rule makes that quite clear. The standard identifies the five levels of haz-mat response and explicitly delineates the responsibilities of personnel who fall within each category. All firefighters and EMS personnel are required to demonstrate proficiency at the first responder operations (FRO) level; these are the members who, according to the Final Rule, respond to releases or potential releases as part of the initial response “for the purpose of protecting nearby persons, property, or the environment from the effects of the release…. They are trained to respond in a defensive fashion without actually trying to stop the release. Their function is to contain the release from a safe distance, keep it from spreading, and prevent exposures.” Furthermore, the firefighter at the FRO level must demonstrate abilities that include the performance of “basic control, containment, and/or confinement operations within capabilities of the resources and personal protective equipment available with their unit.”

spill control by damming.leak control by patching.

(Photos by author.)

Obviously, this leaves to the department the amount of training and equipment it makes available to its firefighters. A company that receives basic levels of confinement training and is provided with inexpensive, easy-to-use equipment and materials can give a great boost to the department in controlling spill situations. Even a wellstaffed haz-mat team may not be able to cover two concurrent chemical situations. All personnel should receive training in spill control techniques for products with limited health hazards and for non-IDLH (immediately dangerous to life and health ) situations, including those involving standard fuel-type liquids such as gasoline, diesel fuel, fuel oil, and kerosene, to name a few.

Departments must make their personnel aware that they will be called on to respond to chemical incidents and, in particular, assist in performing vital spill control activities. In terms of incident stabilization methods, spill control — when personnel have been trained in the appropriate techniques, tools, and approaches—is probably the safest type to perform. The firefighters’ functions in such situations must be clearly defined, in the form of SOPs, as part of the mandated emergency response plan.

LEAK CONTROL

Leak control involves managing container breach or failure so as to minimize or eliminate the emission of product. The process of leak control is referred to as containment because it involves attempts to keep the product within its container.

Leak control is potentially one of the most dangerous operational aspects of any chemical incident. First, personnel usually must work in close proximity if not in direct contact with a compromised container and are almost 100 percent assured of becoming contaminated by released product. Should the entry team become incapacitated, the backup team would be placed in basically the same situation. Four personnel would then be in danger.

[NOTE: OSHA 1910.120 mandates the use of the “buddy system” for all entry teams (two persons working together and maintaining direct line of sight) and also mandates the use of a backup team (two persons working together) “standing by with equipment ready to provide assistance or rescue.” Additionally, “advanced first aid support personnel, as minimum, shall also stand by with medical equipment and transportation capabilities.”)

Personnel who are or will be involved in leak control are required to have more knowledge and training and take a more aggressive role than those at the FRO level. These personnel —the hazardous-materials technicians and the more advanced hazardous-materials specialists—approach the point of release in order to plug, patch, or otherwise stop the release of a hazardous substance, according to the Final Rule. These are the members of a haz-mat response team (HMRT). Members of an HMRT are “expected to perform work. to handle and control actual or potential leaks or spills of hazardous substances requiring possible close approach to the substance.. .for the purpose of control or stabilization of the incident.”

(See “Mandatory Haz-Mat Emergency Response Training: OSHA’s Final Rule,” Fire Engineering, August ’89 for the required competencies of haz-mat technicians and specialists.)

Due to the hazards associated with leak control activities, entry team members must be equipped with the maximum level of protective equipment, needed for the specific situation and product involved. Also, because of the almost 100 percent probability of direct contact with contaminants, entry team personnel will require maximum-effort (definitive) decontamination for the product involved.

There are two categories of leak control methods: direct and indirect. Direct methods are intervention techniques that “attack” —that is to say “repair”— the breach in the container to prevent the release of product. Indirect methods involve intervention that manipulates the product—handles it in some way (transferring or displacing the product, for instance) —to prevent release. Usually the indirect method is the safest way to accomplish leak control.

FIRE CONTROL

Fire control involves the effective management of any fire associated with a chemical incident. The actual control methods can run the gamut from totally defensive to an aggressive offensive attack. However, it is vital to understand that all fire operations involving chemicals should at first begin from a defensive mode of operation. An aggressive offensive attack may be undertaken, but only after a thorough evaluation has been completed and it is I deemed appropriate for the specific situation at hand.

There are several key considerations that must be evaluated in a fire situation:

What is burning? Is it the product, the product container, or surrounding combustibles? Very often if the product itself or its container is involved in fire, it may be better to consider withdrawal or a controlled burn. Withdrawal is the only safe approach to use when the fire involves explosives, organic peroxides (in any situation other than very low concentrations), and other thermally sensitive materials or their containers.

Remember that there can be a rather long period of product burn and container exposure before an actual explosion. This time delay often has the effect of drawing companies into close proximity for an offensive attack and then exploding. Last year’s Kansas City tragedy is an example of how most fire personnel can be drawn into the attack mode because of the time delay factor.

In that fire, six firefighters were killed when a blasting agent, using ammonium nitrate as an oxidizer, detonated—20 to 30 minutes after they noticed fire.

It is sometimes possible to allow the product to burn itself off while exposures are protected —a controlled burn. This strategy can only be undertaken when there are no exposure problems or when exposures are very well-protected. Fire involving an isolated bulk petroleum storage facility, a chemicalcarrying vehicle on a lone stretch of highway, and a structure with good compartmentation that lends itself to exposure protection are examples in which a controlled burn may be the best strategy.

Fires involving pesticide storage are also generally considered to be good candidates for a controlled burn. This is due primarily to the extreme toxic potential of the combustion by-products of pesticides that form when fire temperatures fall below about 1,800°F. Another major concern of water application on a pesticide fire is the highly contaminated water runoff that is almost certain to result.

Not all chemical fires lend themselves to controlled burn. There are many situations in which the fires must be fought. It is simplistic to say categorically, “If you have a fire in a chemical lab, let it burn!” Suppose the lab happens to be on the third floor of a nine-story hospital laboratory complex. You cannot let that fire burn. On the other hand, all members must be aware that to attack the fire will place personnel in extreme risk of chemical exposure. Stringent safety precautions must be exercised. Some of these precautions include:

  1. the use of complete protective equipment, including positivepressure SCBA, hoods, pants, boots, jackets, and gloves;
  2. the possible use of disposable chemical suits, chemical gloves, and boots over the protective equipment;
  3. immediate contact with environmental and health officials to assist in assessment of potential hazard to responders;
  4. evacuation of all possibly contaminated areas;
  5. effective ventilation methods, if appropriate;
  6. the possible use of alternative extinguishing agents, including foam, dry chemical, or carbon dioxide. Halons should be avoided due to the possibility of violent reactions or even more highly toxic byproducts produced by the interaction of halon and chemicals that are present;
  7. strict measures to control scene access and limit the number of personnel who will be exposed;
  8. the use of full decontamination procedures and the impoundment of contaminated protective equipment;
  9. isolation of contamination equipment, materials, occupants, and personnel.

Precaution #7 brings up an important point: Alternative extinguishing agents are often preferable to water when chemicals are involved. The primary agent that is most often available is foam. Foams —low-, medium-, and highexpansion; haz-mat (a nonfirefighting foam that can be effective in vapor suppression); and stabilized (which polymerizes after a short time and resists breakdown, thereby holding the product in a colloidal system)—often have many advantages over water. First, because of the aeration (expansion due to air injection) of the foam solution, water is applied judiciously, which also minimizes contaminated water runoff. Second, foam allows for the most effective extinguishment of hydrocarbon and hydrocarbon-derivative liquid fires. Third, once the fire has been extinguished, the foam blanket acts to suppress flammable vapors produced by combustion of the chemical.

The use of foam should not be limited to spill fires or storage facility fires. A structural fire involving flammable liquid storage may call for a foam extinguishing agent. The common response to using foam in such situations is “Foam is too expensive to use on a structure fire.” Foam is more expensive than water; however, if a community or state has financial restitution legislation through ordinance or law, the cost of foam utilized to extinguish the fire would be borne by the owner of the facility.

If the product and the container are not involved in the fire but rather arc exposures to the fire, protection of the chemical exposure must be undertaken. Again, the decision to protect these chemical exposures will depend on the exact situation. For example, if flames impinge on the vapor space of a container of liquified compressed gas. there may not be a large enough water supply or time to prevent a BLEVE. Such a situation calls for withdrawal. However, if the same container is exposed only to radiant heat from the fire, it may be very appropriate to protect it with cooling water streams.

You may also be faced with a structural fire in which the section of the building containing chemicals is not involved with fire —it’s a threatened exposure that may call for protection. The exact approach in this particular situation would be dependent on the properties and location of the chemical. If, for instance, the chemical was waterreactive and located next to the fire wall, a very difficult situation would exist. The water, being a necessaryagent to prevent extension, could start the reaction process and threaten imminent exposure through a wall whose integrity may have been lessened by pokethroughs.

The degree of fire involvement on arrival. Incipient-stage fires with no chemical involvement can usually be fought offensively to prevent the involvement of the chemicals. Salvage procedures should be given priority to prevent water from contacting the chemicals. If water does contact the chemicals, it is vital to start cleanup operations as soon as possible. Environmental agencies must be contacted for their input. There have been cases in which incipient-stage fires were extinguished but water contacted the chemicals housed in adjacent exposures. Although the fire departments were assured that cleanups would be immediately undertaken, they were not, and second fires resulted from the exothermic reaction of the wet chemicals heating surrounding combustibles. The secondary fire is often of much greater magnitude and has led to major hazardous-materials incidents. If the incipientstage fire involves the chemicals and/or their containers, the strategic decision is not as simple.

Water reactivity of the product involved. If the product is water-reactive and on fire, it does not mean the exposure cannot be protected. Exposure protection can be a very viable approach if the water runoff can be kept from contacting the product.

In actual situations where the waterreactive product generated flammable gases that were burning, the application of water to speed the reaction proved effective so long as exposures were protected. This does not mean that water should always he applied to the product! Rather, it means that after careful assessment of the risk/benefit considerations, application of water can be appropriate. The key here is “careful assessment”

In the final analysis, fire control in chemical incidents is a very difficult strategic goal to meet. Unfortunately, all too often we see situations in which careful analysis of the situation did not occur prior to fire control efforts. The results have often been firefighter injuries and deaths and increased damage to property and environment. The bottom line is that fire control efforts must be part of the solution and not part of the problem.

RECOVERY

Recovery is the final strategic goal in managing a chemical incident and involves many individual activities, including termination; overseeing cleanup activities; release of call-back personnel, cover companies, and mutual-aid companies; and return of evacuees.

Termination involves a variety of different incident aspects, many which are the responsibility of the safety officer. One of the primary activities involved in termination is the documentation of incident activities including at least the following:

  1. location, date, weather, cause, and description of the incident situation;
  2. names of shipper, carrier, facility, (etc.) involved;
  3. product name, quantity, and source;
  4. names and functions of all personnel involved;
  5. list of injuries to personnel and the public;
  6. control methods and actions;
  7. a chronological listing of events and resource utilization;
  8. financial documentation;
  9. names and activities of all entry team personnel;
  10. entry/exit times for all entryteams;
  11. equipment utilized, including field survey equipment and personnel monitoring methods;
  12. decontamination procedures utilized;
  13. disposal of all contaminated protective clothing and equipment;
  14. updating of all personnel exposure records;
  15. all pertinent product data and information sources; and
  16. all outside agencies involved.

Oversight of cleanup activities is just what the term implies—standing by for the purpose of protecting the community and personnel involved in at least theinitial cleanup operations. This does not mean that the fire department does the cleanup.

There have been many chemical incidents that have been stabilized by response agencies only to have these efforts undermined or invalidated by the actions of cleanup crews. OSHA’s Final Rule offers some authority to the incident commander and safety officer in paragraph q(4). It states that skilled support personnel such as operators of earth-moving or digging equipment, cranes, or hoist equipment must be “briefed at the site prior to their participation. . .including instructions in the wearing of appropriate personal protective equipment, what chemical hazardsare involved and what duties are to be performed. All other appropriate safety and health precautions provided.. .shall be used to assure the safety of these personnel.”

On the other side of the coin, the incident commander and safety officer must be familiar with, or have available individuals with expertise in, accepted industry standard procedures for handling specific incident situations. One commonly encountered situation involves the off-loading of gasoline tankers that have rolled over. An accepted procedure involves the use of a holesaw in a pneumatic drill to cut a hole into each compartment. It has happened that ICs who were unfamiliar with this technique did not allow contractors to offload product in this fashion. Usually the strategic alternatives for this type of incident are in fact more dangerous than the holesaw process.

The return of evacuees is another potentially difficult situation. The decision to allow evacuees to return to their original locations should not be made without the input of appropriate authorities. Such authorities include environmental and/or public health personnel.

This ends our discussion of strategic goals. The fifth installment of this series will cover the tactical objectives for haz-mat incidents.

Paul Dansbach and Glenn Corbett

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