EDITOR’S NOTE: This account of the Lullwater incident is excerpted from Mastering Fireground Command: Calm the Chaos!, by Anthony Kastros and Brian Brush. At the incident, David Rhodes was the battalion chief assigned to the C side of the house. He called and then managed the Mayday.
Hearing the rumble and feeling the ground shake from a structural collapse are not things you want to experience as a chief officer managing crews that are interior. As the dust settles and reality hits you square in the face, it is a nauseating feeling. There is, however, no time to waste in gathering your thoughts and moving forward with first making sense and orienting yourself to what has occurred, then requesting and assigning the appropriate resources to a strategy to mitigate the hazard, all while thinking of contingency plans if that strategy doesn’t work.
I was assigned to Battalion 3, operating as the C-side division supervisor on a very large mansion fire in Atlanta, Georgia. I was part of a three-chief command team that was managing this fire that also included Battalion 5 as IC and the shift commander assistant chief who was the A-side division supervisor. The alarm came in at 22:10. The structure was an early-1920s-era, 6,000-square-foot, two-story, L-shaped residence (photo 1).
1. An A-side view of the Lullwater incident. (Photos courtesy of David Rhodes.)
The initial alarm included three engines, three trucks, two battalion chiefs, and the heavy rescue. There was heavy fire on arrival, and we operated in the offensive mode, rescue phase for the initial strategy. A second alarm was requested due to the size of the structure and the amount of fire involved. This brought another three engines and three trucks and the addition of the shift commander.
Interior crews made progress and had the majority of the first-floor fire under control within the first 10 minutes. The heavy rescue was able to get an “All clear” on the second-floor primary search. At the 20-minute mark, some early signs of roof collapse began to present on the A side and the decision was made to switch to a defensive mode, since the primary search was completed. Exterior lines and a ladder pipe operated for approximately 45 minutes before the fire was under control. The roof on the main part of the house burned through on both the A and C sides.
Now we were faced with a large overhaul operation and numerous pockets of fire. An assessment of the structure was completed, and a decision was made to send crews back interior for overhaul. I was managing an engine and truck company working to get into the attic of the second floor in the smaller part of the L directly over the garage. The house had metal casement windows and the windows on the C-side extension had not been removed. The crew squeezed their way in the window frame in place (photo 2).
2. A C-side view of the Lullwater incident.
I did not like this and called for an additional truck company to come and cut the window frames out. Crews remained inside and a line was also advanced through the window frame. The interior crews started working to access the attic by pulling ceiling in the wire-and-lath ceiling covering.
I went inside the first floor directly under where crews were working to double check the structure and make sure there was no additional fire that had rekindled. On exiting the first floor, I returned to check the status of the window removal. A piece of the cornice fell across the ground ladder that was used to enter the second floor. The truck company assigned to remove the window had still not arrived. I had a worse feeling about the window still being in place and decided to pull the crews out until we could get the window removed. All crews acknowledged the order to exit and began the process.
Then, I heard a low-decibel rumble and felt vibration from the ground, and a burst of dust occurred. I knew I had four members working on the second floor. A large section of the roof had collapsed, pinning one firefighter against the wall and one other under the debris. Two others were able to escape the area and immediately started working to rescue the trapped members. I notified command that we had a collapse and firefighters trapped, declared a Mayday, and advised I would no longer be the C-side division supervisor and would be managing the Mayday.
The assistant chief responded to the rear of the structure and assumed the C-side division supervisor role and requested two additional engines, one truck, and a medical supervisor. A RIT was deployed consisting of an engine and a truck company. The firefighter pinned against the wall was removed quickly and continued assisting the rescue of the other firefighter. Crews continued attempting to cut the metal casement window, but the standard department abrasive blades were just disintegrating with little impact. Additional saws were requested and the captain of Truck 15 was placed in charge of the rescue.
The heavy rescue had left the scene for another fire once we were under control. They were requested back in case the air bags and other lifting equipment were needed. Chainsaws and pry bars were used interior to cut away rafters, ceiling joist, and decking. Handlines were deployed on either side of the rescue, as fire was now flaring up in the debris with the influx of oxygen and dislodged building materials.
Sixteen minutes into the Mayday, the firefighter was freed. He was pinned in a supine position and was unable to move any part of his body. He was in full PPE and on air when the collapse happened. As the rescue crews removed a critical piece of the roof, he was able to reach his regulator and disconnect. He had just run out of air the instant before the pressure and weight on his arm were lifted.
The rescued firefighter was able to get out of the structure and down the ladder on his own. He appeared to be OK and looked at me and requested another assignment. Of course, he was done for the day, and we insisted he be transported to the hospital and evaluated. He and the firefighter who was pinned against the wall were both sent for evaluation. The firefighter pinned against the wall suffered torn tendons and ligaments in his foot that required surgery to repair. His recovery was nearly six months. The trapped firefighter under the collapse sustained second and third degree burns on his legs, back, and buttocks. This occurred from the compression of his body on embers that were smoldering on the floor. He was out for nearly a year and received several skin grafts before returning to full duty.
Lessons Learned
This house had a full slate roof, which added a considerable amount of weight that was not initially considered in the risk assessment. Our department had a culture of using staffing for overhaul instead of waiting on resources from other departments with heavy equipment.
Always, always trust your intuition! I didn’t like the fact that firefighters had to squeeze through that metal casement window, but instead of stopping them, I let them go with a plan to remove the window behind them. Had I not ordered them out when I did, the trapped firefighter would have been in an area where he would have been even more difficult to remove. Since he was moving toward the window, he was only a few feet inside, which made access a little bit easier.
