Sylmar Mobile Home Park Fires

Sylmar Mobile Home Park Fires

THE NORTHRIDGE EARTHQUAKE

The section of Los Angeles known as Sylmar is a small bedroom community located in the northeast corner of the San Fernando Valley. It was one of the last areas in the city to be developed and still contains many dirt roads. The majority of dwellings in the area are one and two-story single-family dwellings; some areas contain medium-density apartments. In addition, Sylmar has nine mobile home parks, containing a total of 1,106 units, and one tract of 600 modular homes.

On the morning of January 17, 1994. Sylmar and other neighborhoods within Battalion 12 were rocked by the Northridge Earthquake. Sylmar, however, demanded our greatest resources. In the span of a few hours, firefighters from Battalion 12 and mutual-aid companies, with limited resources and water supply, would be called on to extinguish more than 140 structure fires, most of w hich occurred in three of the aa*a‘s mobile home parks.

Members of LAFD have been preparing for the big earthquake for many years, but when the buildings begin to shake and break, it takes some real soul-searching and deep breathing to settle down and get to the business at hand-saving lives and protecting property to the best of our ability.

1 was in Battalion 12 headquarters. Fire Station 98 in Pacoima-seven miles east of the epicenter-when the earthquake hit. As we descended the stairs of the station the morning of January 17. 1994, there was no doubt in anyone’s mind that we would find a great deal of destruction. It would be necessary to survey our districts per standard procedures to determine just how’ serious the earthquake had been in our area.

My primary concerns as a battalion commander were determining the status of the battalion, based on reports from my companies; relaying this information to my supervisor; and taking appropriate actions. From our drive-throughs it soon became apparent that the majority of damage and resulting collapse and fires were in the northern areas of the battalion-Sylmar and San Fernando. Early reports indicated multiple fires in three mobile home parks among the many other structures that were burning.

TAHITIAN MOBILE HOME PARK

Engine 75. under the command of Captain Wendel Simms, reported at 0455 hours that 30 to 40 mobile homes were burning in three different locations at the Tahitian Mobile Home Park, located at San Fernando Rd. and Cobalt St. The Tahitian is a large park covering several acres and containing 210 mobile homes.

Engine 75 was at this location and began preparation to attack the fires. Aware that the water system may have been damaged, personnel checked the hydrant outside the entrance to the park. It appeared to be satisfactory, registering 60 psi. They forwardlaid a 3!^-inch supply line into the park, attacking the fires with two handlines and the wagon battery (Fixed monitor).

Within one minute, the incoming pressure from the hydrant had dropped to zero, and personnel were left with only 500 gallons of tank water. Using this water for protection. the crew quickly picked up the hose and retreated to the street. Simms realized there was nothing they could do to stop the advancing fires, not without a continuous water supply and greater resources. They could not determine where the main breaks were-no other units were working nearby-and to complicate matters, the fire had originated in the northeast corner of the park and was greatly assisted by a mild but steady wind out of the north. The only factor working in the fire department’s favor at the Tahitian location was that there were no exposure problems outside the park.

Photo by Ken Lubas/ios Angeles Times.

Simms directed personnel to perform a complete evacuation of Tahitian park occupants. He directed all residents to a large parking lot across the street and organized them so that he could account for everyone. This task accomplished. Engine 75 left the scene at 0540 hours to aid another company calling for assistance at the scene of a structure fire.

OAKRIDGE MOBILE HOME PARK

At approximately the same time-0437 hours-Engine 91. commanded by Captain Howard Kaplan, responded to a “loom up” and found a mobile home burning at 15455 Glenoaks Blvd., the Oakridge Mobile Home Park. Oakridge is about three times larger than the Tahitian and contains more than 600 mobile homes. They made an attack on that fire and. as they extinguished it. noticed two others beginning to burn. Engine 91 also experienced a loss of water at that time and was forced to retreat. With no water available, they notified OCD (fire communications center) of the situation and left the park to continue their survey of the area. It was determined that, due to the number an locations of the fires, a mass evacuation was not required at that time.

(Photo by Joe Meline.)

Approximately one hour later. Engine 81, under the command of Captain Norman Greengard, was dispatched to the Oakridge Mobile Home Park. They were soon joined by Los Angeles County Fire Department (LACFD) Engine 12. By this time, several mobile homes were fully involved.

Municipal water How at that location, for reasons unknown, had improved somewhat but still was minimal at best. The two units attacked the fires. During the next 30 minutes, additional engine companies from Los Angeles County and the U.S. Forestry Service arrived. No water tenders were available to augment water supply (water tenders would not be available to LAFD until later in the day). Relying on booster tank water and limited municipal water, they made headway on the mobile home fires. By the time I arrived at the scene at 0645 hours, the situation was well under control. 1 left the scene in the control of Greengard and returned to the Tahitian Mobile Home Park, which I now knew was the most serious of the situations in the battalion.

BACK TO THE TAHITIAN

En route to the Tahitian. I encountered four LACFD engine companies and an L.A. County strike team, under the command of Chief David Horn, in need of assignments. At that time 1 considered sending the L.A. County apparatus to the Los Olivos Mobile Home Park, which 1 had surveyed earlier and found several homes burning-and again, no resources on scene. As in the cases of the other parks, the residents had self-evacuated, and there was no external exposure hazard.

Horn advised me that L.A. County units were now on scene at the park, which was only four blocks away; based on the lack of visible smoke in the direction of the park. I made the decision to commit all remaining resources to the Tahitian. Los Olivos lost slightly more than 25 percent of the homes in the park to fire. Twenty-two of the 81 units in the park were destroyed.

1 directed Horn to follow me to the park, where crews from Engine 75 (which had returned to the Tahitian) and another L.A. County engine were attempting to initiate a drafting operation from the park’s pool. This was difficult because the pool was surrounded by dense foliage and fencing and was not readily accessible.

I assigned command of the north side of the park to Horn and the south side to the city companies. Forty-five to 50 homes were either burned or burning at this time. Fire, pushed by a five-mph wind out of the north, was moving slowly to the southwest.

Members checked the hydrants again, which now registered approximately 30 psi and seemed to have water available when flowed. The decision was made to try another attack on the fire using whatever water was available from the hydrant and possibly the pool. A pumper crew laid in to the hydrant, and the remaining apparatus were used to extend lines into the park. The water system was weak hut seemed to he improving. At its best, we were able to obtain a maximum lire flow of about 1,000 gpm. This enabled units to replenish their booster tanks and attack the fires with handlines.

TAHITIAN PARK 236 UNITS 53 BURNED

OAKRIDGE 600 UNITS 55 BURNED

LOS OLIVOS 81 UNITS 22 BURNED

(Photos by Glenn P. Corbeit.)

Ten engines companies-attacking with six or seven handlines-were now working on this very large fire front fed by combustible mobile homes and multiple natural gas leaks in the park. We were able to stop the steady progress of the fire that had been burning unchecked for more than two hours. By l 100 hours that morning, the main fires had been extinguished, and companies worked on the many hot spots within the park.

NATURAL GAS FIRES

The only fire remaining at the Tahitian Park now involved a large aboveground natural gas distribution area where high-pressure natural gas is lowered to medium pressure and then distributed to various areas within the park, where it is again reduced in pressure for use by residents. The highpressure manifold had been severely damaged during the earthquake and ignited by an adjacent mobile home fire.

Firefighters’ attempts to shut down the valves, under the protection of handlines, lowered the intensity of the flames but were nevertheless unsuccessful, since the valves had been damaged by the heat and could not be fully closed. We obtained from the manager a map of the park showing the locations of the natural gas lines that supply the park and the location of the main valves, but the map was inaccurate. We were forced to wait for the Southern California Gas Company to arrive. (We also discovered later that the main gas feeds from the street to the park were not equipped with shutoff valves.) Gas company personnel arrived at approximately 1200 hours and excavated driveways in two separate locations and shut down the flow of gas. This task was accomplished approximately one hour after their arrival.

Fire companies were assigned sections of the park to investigate all mobile homes for gas leaks and broken pipes, which were reported to command and. in turn, communicated to the gas company for action. Overhaul and investigation of the mobile homes continued until 1530 hours that afternoon, at which time all companies were released to Valley Command for reassignment.

The mobile home park incidents in Sylmar are visual proof that the greatest danger to property as a result of an earthquake comes from fire. The parks that suffered the most damage have more than 800 units combined; of these, 137 were totally destroyed by fire, and approximately 90 percent of all others suffered structural damage after falling off their supporting members.

With such property damage in two mobile home parks alone, it is indeed fortunate that the other parks in the area remained relatively free of natural gas-fed fires. Had that occurred, the disaster would have risen exponentially.

The Sylmar Mobile Home Park fires are a testimony not only to the resolve and resourcefulness of firefighters but also to the strength and lack of panic among the residents in the midst of all the calamity. Residents were willing to help with any tasks they were asked to do. I heard no criticism of the fire department, even though many of the residents lost everything they owned. In a time of crisis, the best in people shines through.

LESSONS LEARNED AND REINFORCED

• After a serious earthquake, water systems most likely will be damaged and have either low or no pressure. Prior to committing to a fire scene, flow enough water from the hydrant to determine if the pressure is just head pressure, indicated by a falling static pressure, or if the hydrant is usable.
• Anticipate the need for additional water supply. Preplan water resources such that water tenders, for example, will be available early after a serious earthquake occurs.

(Photos by author.)

• Consider the possibility of the city’s installing drafting hydrants at park swimming pools, in a location convenient to the tire department. Also consider the use of swimming pool auxiliary water systems (SPAWS)-four-inch PVC pipes with connectors and fittings that serve as a long “hard suction” from the pool to the apparatus. While developed for use in wildland interface situations, such systems may be of tactical use where water supply to the mobile home park is inadequate.
• If no water is available to stop the fires, consider removing or dropping the outside of the large awnings usually found on mobile homes. Doing this-creating a “tent” effect-will hold down the flames and heat and help prevent fire extension to adjacent mobile homes.
• If you are responsible for the fire protection of mobile homes, preplan the locations of utility shutoffs, and make sure management is aware of the degree of assistance you will need during a major emergency such as an earthquake.
• Expect gas leaks and ruptures. Shut down the systems as quickly as possible. This is accomplished most easily at the gas main, but consider the possibility that a park may be served by multiple mains. If the mains cannot be shut down, then teams must check each home for leaks or broken pipes.
• There is a need for automatic “excess flow control valves” on all gas lines into mobile homes. These shut off the gas supply when the gas line is sheared.
• Mobile home parks often are populated with many elderly people. Consider this in your evacuation preplanning and operations.
• The fire department must strongly encourage and support proactive local codes for mobile home park safety. After the earthquake, park utilities were being replaced exactly as they had been before- utilities clustered around homes, lack of emergency shutoff hardware, etc.
• Large mobile home parks carry a conflagration potential. Hazardous conditions that create this potential include the following:

-All utilities normally are situated in close proximity to each other either adjacent to or. in some cases, underneath the home. This means that natural gas (the fuel) and electricity (the ignition source) are dangerously close. Note that in the case of half the mobile homes at the Oakridge Mobile Home Park, the gas meters were set away from the homes and protected by steel posts. There w ere no fires in these homes.

• Mobile homes usually are not secured to the ground. They may fall off their supports (piers) during an earthquake, causing damage to the structure and utilities. Almost 1 (X) percent of all mobile homes with conventional supports fell off their “foundation.” Note: There is a module home park in Sylmar as well, containing 6(K) units. The foundation for these homes consists of a permanent footing around the exterior and conventional mobile home supports in the center. These homes w ithstood the effects of the earthquake, and there were no fires in these units.
• The homes are constructed of lightweight material and are extremely combustible. They not only burn quickly but with great intensity. One couple living in a mobile home that was destroyed by fire stated that the home was burning before the earth stopped shaking and that they were lucky to get out.
• Large awnings on either side of some mobile homes channel fire down and hori-
• zontally. The awning of the adjacent mobile home then channels the fire to the windows of that home, which begins burning.
• The mobile homes are situated on small parcels of land. There is a minimum of clearance between units.
• Shrubs and trees contributed in some cases to the extension of fire between units.
• Park streets generally are very narrow. With cars parked in the road, it is difficult or impossible for fire apparatus to pass through.
• The combination of earthquake destruction and utility system design can make it difficult or impossible for either the fire department or the residents to shut down utilities, particularly the natural gas.