The Baltimore Conflagration
A 1904 Report
The Baltimore conflagration of February 7, 1904 consumed ’80 city blocks in the principal business section, causing an estimated loss of $50 million. This loss is exceeded in the United States only by the $350 million San Francisco earthquake and fire in 1906, the Chicago fire of 1871 with $175 million loss, and the $75 million Boston conflagration of 1872. The reports of the Baltimore conflagration which are reprinted here were in the February 13 and February 20, 1904 issues of Fire and Water Engineering, one of the publications that developed into Fire Engineering.
ROUNDUP: Baltimore 1904: ‘Building After Building Fell A Prey to the Flames’
The conflagration at Baltimore, one of the most destructive that has hitherto visited this continent, is accompanied with one consolation, namely, that it has not been accompanied with a fearful sacrifice of human life, as would certainly have been the case, if it had taken place on any other day than a Sunday. That it should have spread over such a vast expanse of ground and swept away so many buildings, some of them new and costly and filled with rich merchandise, is to be set down not to any want of efficiency in the members of the fire department, but to the narrowness of the street in which the fire broke out, the high wind whose fierceness rushed the flames on with irresistible fury, the unbearable heat which compelled the firemen to abandon their positions, the lack of sufficient apparatus and firemen, and possibly, of water enough to supply such an unlooked-for and so terrible a drain upon the reservoirs.
Probably, also, should be enumerated among the causes of the spread of the fire, the obstrusive and embarrassing presence of overhead wires, many of them live, from which the current was not cut off for an appreciably long time, and the bungling work of the dynamitards who were charged with, but did not adequately perform the task of blowing up buildings in such a way as to hinder the flames from communicating with adjoining buildings. Possibly, however, owing to the force of the wind the buildings cut off (had the men done their work properly) would have driven the flames across the gaps thus made—at best, the respite would most likely have been temporary.
It may also be remarked that, if all the apparatus from outside had been supplied with coupling threads to correspond with the hose or hydrants in use at Baltimore, they could have been called into service, instead of being compelled to stand all the long hours idle and useless. It is useless to speak of what might have been; the past is irrevocable and the ruins of Baltimore tell their own sad tale.
Fire spreads rapidly
The fire broke out at 10:45 on Sunday morning in the wholesale dry goods store of John E. Hurst & Co., on Hopkins place, in the heart of the business district, with a series of what seemed to be loud explosions, which were heard in remote parts of the city. When the firemen arrived, the building was one mass of flames, which owing to the high wind, spread with fearful rapidity. In a half hour there were a dozen big warehouses in the wholesale dry goods and notions district burning fiercely. The entire city fire department was called out, but was utterly powerless to check the spread of the flames, which were aided by high winds, and by noon there were savage fires in at least 30 big warehouses, and the conflagration was steadily eating its way into successive blocks, east, north, west and south.
Building after building fell a prey to the flames and apparently there was no check to the sweep of destruction. The burned district is bounded on the west by Liberty street, on the north by Lexington street, on the east by Jones’s Falls and on the south by the basin. Within this district were the big structures in Fayette, Gay, Lombard, Charles, Balderson, Ellicot, Hollingsworth and Cheapside streets.
Passing southeast along the basin, the following large docks were destroyed: McClure’s, Patterson’s, Smith’s Frederick, Long and Union. Small thoroughfares, extending as far north as Lexington street, and which were in the path of the flames, are Commerce, Frederick and Mill streets. The district thus swept by the fire comprised 75 blocks and nearly 2500 buildings, and the burned area covered about 140 acres. The loss is variously estimated at from $100,000,000 to $125,000,000. Insurance estimates vary from $50,000,000 to $90,000000, and it is even said that the larger figure might be exceeded.
Live wire disables chief
About 50 persons were injured, of whom a dozen were policemen and firemen. Chief Horton was so badly hurt by a live wire and otherwise bruised and cut, as to be obliged to be retired from the fight, after which Mayor McLane assumed the direction of the fight, which lasted till 3 p.m. on Monday—a period of 28 hours. At Jones’s Falls, the fire was stopped. Some insist it burned itself out. Whether it did so or not, it was here that the New York firemen with their apparatus including a battery of engines and a truck, under Battalion Chief Howe, did some magnificent work which without doubt prevented the flames from spreading.
Although comparatively few have been rendered homeless, as the district burned over was one devoted to business, yet 50,000 have been thrown out of work, and great distress must ensue. The population of the city is about 550,000, and its fire area about 33 ½ square miles, in which are comprised buildings residential, business, manufacturing, ecclesiastical, educational, public and semi-public, of wood, brick and stone, of from two to 16 stories, some with wooden roofs covered with tar. There is an ordinance regulating the storage of combustibles.
The equipment of the fire department is as follows: steamers in commission, 26, in reserve, seven; chemical engines on wheels, three; chemical hand extinguishers, 61; hook and ladder trucks, six; aerial trucks, eight; hose carriages, reels and carts, 19; combination chemical and hose wagons, 26; fireboat; water towers, two—one in reserve; hose, cotton, rubber-lined, good, 75,000 feet, rubber, good, 3200 feet—total 78,200 feet; horses, 199; fire alarm (Gamewell), with 467 boxes.
In the 36 stations are housed 38 fire companies, with a total full paid membership of 463. The department is administered by a board of three firecommissioners; the chief is G.W. Horton; under whom are two assistant chiefs, August Emerich and L.H. Burkhardt, and six district engineers.
Water supply
The source of the water supply is Jones’s Falls and Gunpowder River, situated 6 and 10 miles respectively from the business center. The system is low and middle service by gravity, high service by pumping through mains to reservoirs, upper service, pumping through mains to standpipes; capacity of standpipes, 3300 gallons, size 25 feet in diameter, 95 feet in height, located in West Arlington district within the city limits; they are of steel with masonry towers round them, and stairs leading to belvedere at top. In the city are seven clear water storage reservoirs. There are two impounding reservoirs, one on each source of supply. The capacity of the clear water reservoirs is 1,326,375,000 gallons; of the impounding, 10,000,000 gallons. There are three pumping stations, each containing two Worthington triplex, high-duty pumps. Of these two are 17,500,000 gallons daily capacity; two of 10,000,000 gallons; and two of 4,000,000 gallons. Of cast iron, mains (48-inch to 2-inch) are laid 660 miles; of hydrants (Ludlow) are set 2300, mostly of department design. The pressure is from 30 to 100 pounds; no special fire service. The works belong to the city. The superintendent, who is also chief engineer, is Alfredus Quick; city engineer, Benjamin T. Fendall.
Some of the firemen who have returned say that there was plenty of water, but they could only get only a poor amount of pressure. The Lombard street main, which supplies the burned district, is of 42-inch diameter, and delivers water under a pressure of 45 pounds.
There seemed also to be a scarcity of ladders, and if the water towers or fireboat were used, they did not see either, only a United States gunboat, which fought a lumber blaze and kept the stuff well wet. There was dynamiting in Baltimore, of course, but as near as the visiting firemen could judge, it was neither prompt enough or plenty enough. The dynamitards seemed either to have lost their heads or to have been afraid to destroy the buildings without first asking and obtaining leave to do so.
The report of the Baltimore fire that appeared in the February 20, 1904 issue of Fire and Water Engineering gives additional information about the fire and particularly about the work of the New York City fire fighters and apparatus that went to the fire on railroad cars.
A correspondent of Fire and Water Engineering who was present at last week’s conflagration in Baltimore, and was an eyewitness of the fire from almost the beginning to the end, gives some interesting details of that terrible disaster. He states that the building in which the fire started was equipped with an automatic fire alarm system, and notwithstanding that fact, the fire must have been under way for fully 15 minutes before the firemen received the alarm. The street box was pulled, and was promptly followed by a third alarm, and then by a general alarm. During the progress of the fire 43 different alarms were sent in.
Insufficient apparatus
He states that the city was not properly equipped with a sufficient amount of apparatus; it is doubtful, however, if a greater number of engines would a have stopped the conflagration after the headway it had gained. The fact that the city hall, courthouse and the post office were not destroyed seems remarkable from the fact that the fire raged all round these buildings, and their being saved can be accounted for only from the fact that the wind shifted at that particular time.
Chief Horton, who worked nobly, was disabled early in the fire on Sunday by a shock from a live wire. During some of the time after his retirement former Chief McAfee was in charge, but during the greater progress of the fire and up to the last Assistant Chief Emerich had full charge.
The fire seemed to work its own sweet will until it reached Jones’s Falls. Just before this point was reached, the New York fire contingent, consisting of nine engines and one truck, under the direction of Chief of Battalion John P. Howe, came upon the scene, and it is stated that they practically stayed the flames on the Baltimore side of the creek. This was very fortunate for the Baltimore department, and it is beyond doubt that, had it not been for the efforts of the New York men, the fire would probably have extended to the large wharves in that vicinity.
Chief Emerich stated that they made during the fire about 300 hydrant connections, and he estimates that the loss of fire hose will exceed 6000 feet, besides one steamer and one 85-foot Hayes truck.
The excessive heat compelled the firemen to keep constantly shifting their positions, and in this way considerable water pressure was lost from abandoning open hydrants. He also states that, so far as he could learn, there was no lack of water. During the period in which the fire raged, the men of the fire department got practically no sleep. On Monday evening, after the fire was under control, Chief Emerich asked Chief Howe if he could keep his men and companies there all night, as the Baltimore men were exhausted. Chief Howe replied, “Certainly.” Six companies of the Baltimore department then went home for their first night’s sleep.
Apparatus sent by rail
The New York contingent went to Baltimore in two sections—one over the Baltimore and Ohio and the other over the Pennsylvania railway. The time consumed in the trip was only 4½ hours. The companies returned in one section over the Pennsylvania road, and along the route from Baltimore to Jersey City, they were received with the greatest enthusiasm, especially when they were met by Commissioner Hayes and Croker at the latter city.
The territory burned was ¾ mile long and ½ mile wide. The members of the Baltimore Fire Department worked with superhuman effort to control the flames, and the colored company from Washington received considerable praise for the work it performed. The Washington companies’ couplings did not fit the hydrants, and in order to render as much service as possible, they procured barrels, which were kept filled from the hydrants and furnished suction for their engines. The Philadelphia companies could not render very much service until the fire worked its way down to Jones’s Creek, and they were enabled to take suction from the bay.
From the experience of our correspondent he states that the rapidity with which the fire spread cannot be described, as a seven or eight-story building was destroyed in about 30 minutes. He thinks that, had it not been for the number of fireproof buildings in the city, there is no stating how much farther the flames would have spread. The iron fronts of the buildings, as soon as they became heated, seemed to fall across the street, destroying those on the opposite side. This shows that some other material must be devised for the flooring of the so-called fireproof buildings, as the fire bricks seemed to disintegrate and fall apart almost as soon as the hot fire struck them. It was fortunate in one respect that the fire did not occur during one of the regular working days, as almost all of the buildings were closed for Sunday, and the employees were not present. Had these people been on duty, there is no doubt that a great loss of life would have resulted.
The district in which the fire occurred was the principal business portion of the city. People who have visited Baltimore will bear in mind that some of the large office buildings that were located at West Baltimore street, Calvert street, back of Fayette street and up through the dry goods district, including the Hurst building where the fire originated, were all destroyed. It was soon realized that with the wind blowing as it did, everything in its course would be destroyed in the direction of Jones’s Creek.
The Hurst building was a department store similar to the old Macy building at the corner of 14th street and Sixth avenue, Manhattan, New York, and it contained a full assortment of inflammable materials. It was, therefore, only a question of a fire starting in a structure of this kind to know that the firemen could not possibly cope with it, especially when the wind was blowing at the rate of 30 miles an hour in the direction of large wholesale buildings.
Saloons closed
A lesson to be learned by Baltimore from this fire is that the city must be properly equipped with fire apparatus, and that the new buildings to be constructed on the sites of the old structures must be more substantial and strictly fireproof. Our correspondent states that during the whole progress of the fire, the city was under martial law, and that all saloons were closed. He noticed only one case of intoxication during the whole time inside the fire zone. To this fact may be attributed that there was practically no loss of life.
There was only one fireman from York, Pa., seriously hurt, who had his leg broken in trying to get away from falling walls. Chief Horton had Engine Company No. 6’s house turned into a hospital, with surgeons, assistants, and nurses who attended to all the men who were overcome from the hard work. It is pleasing, however, to state that these men, to the number of 40 or 50, all recovered from the injuries they sustained. It is a remarkable fact that during all the excitement and the great number of buildings that collapsed so rapidly, so few casualties have been recorded.
Owing to the inexperience of using dynamite, the efforts to blow down the buildings were not effective. In one instance dynamite was applied to a large building with the intention of razing it; but instead of accomplishing the object, a large building almost a block away received the shock, and all the windows were demolished; and this might be said in other cases where the effort was made to use dynamite. In this connection, it might be well for a few of the firemen in ail departments to be properly drilled in the use of explosives, as a great number of large fires in the United States might have been prevented from spreading, if some of the men had been skilled in leveling buildings. In New York City there is an organization of sappers and miners; but, as it is difficult to practice with dynamite in the city, they have little experience in their work.
Mountains of burning debris
It was a dreadful sight that Chief Howe and his aides witnessed, as they traveled through the district devastated by the flames. Over small mountains of burning debris that filled the streets, crumbling walls of tall buildings threatened to fall upon the party, and in almost every collapsed building tongues of fire were leaping out, making the tour of inspection the more difficult. It took Chief Howe eight hours to ascertain the exact situation, so that he could report to the commissioner.
The large quantities of hose abandoned at the hydrants showed how quickly the firemen had to retreat from the excessive heat. In his investigation of the burned district, Battalion Chief John P. Howe, of the New York City Fire Department, was accompanied by Captain William Reilly, of Hook and Ladder Company No. 5; A.F. Volgenau, private secretary to Commissioner Hayes; Dr. H.M. Archer and S.J. Rosenthal, chief clerk of the fire department.
The following is a list of the New York fire companies that were sent to Baltimore: Battalion Chiefs John P. Howe and Joseph Shea (in charge of the department’s hospital stables). Detailed to Chief Howe as aides were Firemen Wash. Howe, Engine Company No. 17 and Frank C. Kelly. The fire companies and foremen were as follows: Engine Company No. 7, Assistant Foreman Bandrick, with 11 men; Engine Company No. 5, Foreman Walsh and Assistant Foreman Carlock, with 11 men; Engine Company No. 31, Assistant Foreman Wilkinson, with nine men; Engine Company No. 13, Assistant Foreman Tullwa, with nine men; Engine Company No. 12, Assistant Foreman McLaughlin, with 10 men; Engine Company No. 33, Foreman Behler and Assistant Foreman Teare, with 11 men; Engine Company No. 27, Foreman Doonan, with nine men; Engine Company No. 16, Assistant Foremen Regan and Mitsch, with 10 men; Engine Company No. 26, Foreman Gieger, with nine men; Hook and Ladder Truck No. 5, Captain William Reilly, with 10 men.
Electric wires at Baltimore
A correspondent writes as follows:
The streets in the burned district of Baltimore presented a network of overhead wires all live. Against these Chief Horton had over and over again vigorously protested. Outside, therefore, they formed a source of danger and handicapping to the firemen. From within they were apparently the same, and, if, at least, the fire which started in the Hurst building, where the conflagration originated, was caused by an electric light wire falling against a tank of combustible fluid and causing an explosion, the department, which is thoroughly well organized, but might be stronger manned and better equipped, was on hand at once and began a fight in every way well directed. But the overhead wires had to be reckoned with. They caused a loss of time and the fire, which had got big headway before it was discovered was burning furiously the while. Soon the wires began to fall. They came in contact with the firemen and their apparatus.
They fell across the hose which became conductors of electricity to such an extent as to drive the firemen back, owing to the shocks they inflicted upon them. It was then that Chief Horton was so badly injured and put out of the fight. Through the confusion thus caused, more time was lost, and the flames, fanned by the fierce wind, got the upper hand of the department. Probably the city authorities will now see that Chief Horton’s former warnings were not without foundation. It is hard, however, that the role he played should have been that of a Cassandra, the prophetess of Troy, on whom was placed the curse that the truth of her prophecies should never be believed till their direful fulfillment was accomplished.
