THE BOMBING OF THE WORLD TRADE CENTER

THE BOMBING OF THE WORLD TRADE CENTER

Report and Anaiysis

Photo courtesy of Pod Authority Risk Management.

Report from Chief of Department

The City of New York Fire Department has responded hundreds of times to the World Trade Center (WTC) since it was first occupied in 1970. These responses normally consist of minor fires or false alarms but have included major fires such as the one that occurred on February 13, 1975. None of these experiences could have prepared us for what was to occur on February 26, 1993.

The bombing of the WTC was an event of immense proportions, the largest incident ever handled in the City of New York Fire Department’s 128-year history—so complex that it was effectively several major multiple-alarm fires combined into one. In terms of the number of fire department units that responded, it was the equivalent of a 16-alarm fire.

As the incident commander, I can attest to the fact that it was the firefighters’ tremendous efforts and courage that brought this incident to a successful conclusion.

The statistics are staggering. Six people died and 1,042 were injured. Of those injured, 1 5 received traumatic injuries from the blast itself. Nearly 20 people complained of cardiac problems, and nearly 30 pregnant women were rescued. Eighty-eight firefighters (one requiring hospitalization), 35 police officers, and one EMS worker sustained injuries.

It is estimated that approximately 50,000 people were evacuated from the WTC complex, including nearly 25,000 from each of the two towers. Fire alarm dispatchers received more than 1,000 phone calls, most reporting victims trapped on the upper floors of the towers. Search and evacuation of the towers finally were completed some 11 hours after the incident began.

A nitrourea bomb, in excess of 1,000 pounds, with hydrogen cylinders to add impact, was detonated in the now-infamous yellow Ryder Econoline van on the B-2 level of the parking garage, causing massive destruction that spanned seven levels, six below grade. The L-shaped blast crater on B 2 at its maximum measured 130 feet wide by 150 feet long. The blast’s epicenter was under the northeast corner of the Vista Hotel.

FDNY ultimately responded to the incident with 84 engine companies, 60 truck companies, 28 battalion chiefs, nine deputy chiefs, and five rescue companies and 26 other special units (representing nearly 45 percent of the on-duty staff of FDNY). The fire department units maintained a presence at the scene for 28 days.

FEBRUARY 26, 1993

Snow was falling in lower Manhattan during the noon lunch hour on February 26. Temperatures hovered in the mid-20s. At 1218 hours, an explosion rocked the WTC complex.

Members of Engine Co. 10 and Ladder Co. 10, located in a firehouse directly across from the WTC complex on Liberty Street, felt the rumble of the blast. They responded from quarters on a “verbal” alarm, notifying FDNY Manhattan dispatchers of the incident and their response.

Simultaneously, Manhattan dispatchers received a flood of calls into their office. From initial indications, it was thought that a transformer had exploded in the vicinity of the Vista Hotel; however, from the number of phone calls received and initial reports from arriving units, the “normal” assignment response of two engines, two trucks, and a battalion chief was filled out, sending an additional engine company and Rescue Company 1 to Box 69.

First-arriving Engine Co. 10 and Didder Co. 10 were met with the classic signs of a bclow-gradc transformer explosion —heavy black smoke rolling from the WTC basement through its garage doors at their location on the West Street side of the building. One thing caught their attention, however —the basement garage doors were buckled. The lieutenant of Ladder 10 ordered the buckled garage doors to be opened with power saws for access and better ventilation.

With an apparent working fire in progress, Engine 10 transmitted the 10-75 signal (a working fire). This signal initiated the response of an additional battalion chief, the 2nd Battalion, as well as the deputy chief of the 1st Division.

Under normal standard operating procedures, first-arriving units proceed to the Fort Authority (PA) Police station/fire command station on the B-l level to determine the location of the fire. But because of the damage, this could not be done. In addition, Engine 10/Ladder 10 and the 1st Battalion are equipped with transmitting radios set to Port Authority Police frequencies. Members entered the building through the garageramps. They encountered people who were evacuating, several of whom were injured. Once inside, they immediately knew this was not a transformer fire —the damage was too great. A major explosion had occurred in the garage.

Chief John Casey of the 1st Battalion also w as becoming aw are that this was not a transformer problem. The PA Police radio in his vehicle was reporting an explosion, and Engine 10 confirmed this by reporting heavy damage in the garage. Upon arrival, lienoted the heavy smoke issuing from the garage level and immediately transmitted the 10-76 signal (a working high-rise fire) at 12:24 p.m. This brought one additional engine company, two additional ladder companies, Rescue Co. 3, the Field Communications Unit (FieldCom), the Mask Service Unit (MSU ), and Engine Co. 3 as the High-Rise Unit. Ha/ Mat 1 also responded.

Two additional boxes (9031 and 9032) were transmitted in conjunction with the 10-76 signal to bring additional units to the scene because of potential (yet typical) traffic problems during the daytime. These units came from Brooklyn, bringing an additional engine, truck, and battalion chief through the Brooklyn Battery Tunnel and another engine, truck, and battalion chief over the Manhattan Bridge.

(Photo by FDNY Photo Unit.)

From all indications, the explosion and resultant fire appeared to be located under the Vista Hotel. Chief Casey assumed command and established his command post in front of the hotel on West Street. Almost immediately after his arrival, he received reports that the Tower 1 lobby was filling with smoke and that people were trapped below grade. He transmitted a second alarm for Box 69 at 12:27 p.m. (due to problems developing in the Vista Hotel) and a third alarm for Box 69 (problems developing in Tower 1) at 12:30 p.m.

FI)NY has assigned specific box numbers for specific significant buildings. In the case of the WTC, Box 8084 is assigned to Tower 1 and Box 8087 to Tower 2. Since this incident originated at the Vista Hotel, the street box was transmitted initially. As the incident grew and it became apparent that the towers were involved, the specific 8084 and 8087 boxes were transmitted. Dispatchers at the Manhattan Dispatchers Office began to receive a flood of calls regarding smoke problems and trapped people in Tower 1. Therefore, they transmitted an initial alarm for Box 8084 at 12:29 p m.

Deputy Chief Robert Beier arrived and attempted to gain access to the fire command station on the B-l level. Besides finding the garage full of smoke, he was told by PA Police that the fire command station had been badly damaged. Minute by minute, the incident escalated exponentially. He transmitted a fourth alarm for Box 69 at 12:37 p.m., realizing that a large portion of the WTC complex was involved in the incident. Beier was now receiving a constant stream of reports of trapped people in Tower 1. He dispatched companies to Tower 1 and the below-grade areas as soon as they arrived, attempting to ration them evenly. A second alarm for Box 8084 was transmitted at 12:39 p.m. by Deputy Assistant Chief Kenneth Cerreta, the Manhattan south commander, who arrived shortly after Deputy Chief Beier and assumed command.

My pager began beeping incessantly for each additional alarm —this was “the Big One.” I responded from headquarters in Brooklyn, as did several other staff officers.

By now, the battalion and deputy chiefs at the scene began to comprehend the magnitude of the incident. A major fire was burning below grade. People were injured and trapped by the explosion. Communications were lost in the WTC complex. Smoke was contaminating Tower 1 and the Vista Hotel. A major extinguishment and rescue scenario was unfolding.

Deputy Assistant Chief Cerreta was receiving numerous reports of smoke problems in Tower 1 and dispatched a fire company to investigate this specific problem. They reported a heavy smoke condition in the lobby and contamination of vertical shafts, including the stairways and elevators. Occupants were self-evacuating, and some were breaking windows on the upper floors. Assistant Chief Donald Burns, chief of operations, arrived shortly after from Fire Department Headquarters and went directly to Tower 1, establishing a sector command post at that location.

I arrived at the command post at 12.48 hours. I could see smoke pouring out of the parking garage doors of the Vista Hotel. I also noted that the lobby windows of Tower 1 were blackened with smoke.

Cerreta briefed me on what information was known. He, Beier, and I discussed their si/e-up. Reports of a transformer explosion had been given over the department radio, but this had not yet been confirmed. The only known facts were that an explosion had occurred, people were injured, fire was burning on a lower level (or levels), and voluminous amounts of smoke were being produced, with three very large buildings affected.

Deputy Chief Steven De Rosa of the 3rd Division had been directed to establish sector command of the Vista Hotel —I was concerned about the life hazard directly above the explosion/ fire area. After my own quick size-up, 1 asked Deputy Assistant Chief Cerreta if he could try to determine the extent of the operation, exactly what was burning, and what had occurred; he left the command post with that mission.

Very shortly thereafter, Chief Burns reported to me that huge volumes of smoke were entering Tower 1 and that he believed the wall or partition separating this tower from the fire area was blown out and the smoke movement could not be stopped. It was readily apparent, even at this early stage, that a major commitment of personnel would be required. I transmitted a fifth alarm for Box 69 at 12:54 p.m.

1 contacted Chief Cerreta and directed him to abandon his reconnaissance mission and take command of fire extinguishment operations below grade. It was very clear to me that without the ability to control the smoke, the fire had to be extinguished as quickly as possible. Fire extinguishment would be the key to stabilizing the incident and protecting lives in the buildings above. As units arrived in response to the additional alarms, they were dispatched to sectors needing additional help.

A FIREFIGHTER MISSING

At about the same time that Chief Burns advised me of the missing wall in the Vista Hotel, Assistant Chief Ralph Palmer, who with Assistant Chief Eugene Dockter had assumed command of the Vista Hotel sector, reported that a firefighter was missing. It was believed that he had fallen in a large hole (this turned out to be the explosion crater).

(Photo courtesy of Port Authority Risk Management.)

This became a primary concern. Deputy Chief De Rosa, Battalion Chief Richard Rcwkowski. Squad One. one rescue company, two ladder companies. and three engine companies ultimately were devoted to this operation. Later, it was determined that Firefighter Kevin Shea of Rescue 1, attempting to reach a trapped victim, had fallen into the crater. He would require major surgery that very day to treat his injuries.

The command post was now receiving reports of smoke in Tower 2 and that people * were self-evacuating and were trapped in elevators. Deputy Chief Robert Manson and Deputy Chief Joseph Mills established sector command at Tower 2.

INCIDENT COMMAND

With Tower 2 command established, the framework for command and control was in place: The situation was divided into three primary sectors—Tower 1, Tower 2, and the Vista Hotel, and two subsectors — Firefighter Shea rescue and belowgrade extinguishment and search. Later. additional sectors would be established to ensure search of all complex buildings and the concourse area.

The sector commanders, in effect, ran their own operations. These chiefs split up their areas of responsibility into manageable parts so that subsectors and sub-subsectors were controlled by chief officers. Each sector reported its progress, problems, and needs to the command post, and the command post would provide necessary personnel and equipment, develop strategy, and implement same through sector commands. In this way, we attempted to operate with reasonable assurance that personnel accountability and safety, as well as fulfillment of operational needs, could be achieved while command strategy’ was implemented.

SIGNIFICANT ASPECTS OF COMMAND STRUCTURE

TYPICAL SECTOR COMMAND POST – FDNY

From my perspective as incident commander, keeping track of units and status was a major undertaking. I utilized the FieldCom Unit’s command board to record unit positions. Two chiefs and the officer of the FieldCom Unit assisted in this effort. Members of the FieldCom Unit established field headquarters, monitored radio and portable radio communications, transmitted progress reports, and maintained a logistics board. Logistics and staging were huge undertakings, and First Deputy Commissioner (now Acting Commissioner) William Feehan directed logistics while Deputy Assistant Chief Donald Ruland handled staging for the incredible number of units already on the scene and still arriving.

I assigned Deputy Assistant Chief Elsworth Hughes as liaison officer. The command post was congested with representatives from many different agencies, including the city’s Office of Emergency Management (the city wide disaster task force); FA Police; New York Police Department; New York City EMS; FA management, engineering, and risk management; Consolidated Edison (Con Ed, a local power utility); the Department of Environmental Protection; and many others. Fire department members in many cases worked closely with personnel from other agencies. For example, they worked with the local power utility to conduct gas shutoffs; worked with the Interstate Transportation Department to survey PATH train tracks on B 6; worked with various agencies to establish policy and procedures for potential asbestos release; and, most notably, worked with police and FMS personnel to effect safe rescues and give medical treatment.

With a constant barrage of people trying to gain access to our command post and the snowy weather conditions, it was decided that a more secure location was needed A large tent was obtained and set up. and the command post was moved there. This tent provided shelter as well as isolation of the command post.

A major detriment to our ability to strengthen control of the incident was fire department on-scene communications. Communications were a serious problem from the outset. With 156 units and 31 chiefs operating at the height of this incident, try to imagine how difficult it was to gain control of the portable-radio operations frequency. Two command channels and one tactical channel were used. In many cases, runners were sent by a sector commander to communicate with the incident commander.

Generally, the problems were caused by one or more of the following factors:

• the number of resources using channels;
• not enough channels for operational areas;
• distance problems—lost messages;
• construction of building interrupted signals; and

(Photos by FDNY Photo Unit.)

• the inability to contact other agencies.

Fireground communications have become a major concern of FDNY, and several initiatives are underway to enhance communications.

Many workers in the twin towers had access to operating telephones. More than 1,000 calls would be made to 91 1 (an office within the police department communications center that routes fire calls to the fire department) or the FDNY Manhattan Dispatchers Office. In fact, calls were received by the four other boroughs’ dispatch offices as well as fire department headquarters in Brooklyn.

As we received these distress calls through the FieldCom Unit, they were passed to the command post. Every call had to be acted on. I and my staff at the command post determined how to prioritize the calls based on emergency/severity and available resources.

(Photo by FDNY Photo Unit.)

THE PICTURE BECOMES CLEARER

W hile 1 worked to establish command and control, reports from sector commanders started to fill out the entire picture, and 1 began to realize the full magnitude of the incident. Within a short time I knew that

• the complex’s fire alarm and public address systems were out of service.
• the PA Police Department fire command station was out of service;
• the complex’s standpipe system was damaged due to destroyed piping on the lower levels but was effective in some areas for some units;
• the automatic sprinkler system was out of service in the area of the explosion and fire;
• significant portions of the electric power to Tower 1, Tower 2, and the Vista Hotel were out of service;
• emergency generators, located on the B-6 level, had their domestic water cooling lines broken by the blast. They ran for 20 minutes, then shut down because of overheating;
• a plaster ceiling of the PATH train
• station on the B-5 level had collapsed due to the explosion;
• smoke was moving into many areas of the Vista Hotel, Tower 1, and Tower 2;
• rescuers were removing numerous injured from both above and below in the complex;
• a major evacuation had to be accomplished —once 50,000 people decided to self-evacuate, there was no turning back, not without a working communication system; and
• the potential number of people trapped in elevators was great, and my suspicion was substantiated bv the

(Photos by Arthur Knobloch.)

• number of elevator rescues that already had been achieved.

Armed with this information, 1 expanded our response to fill growing strategic needs. I transmitted a simultaneous third alarm, calling 40 additional engine and ladder companies from Brooklyn, a “borough call.” This was done to avoid stripping Manhattan of units and also was a quick way of dispatching a large number of units to a location. Over the course of the next few hours, several additional alarms and special calls would be transmitted to meet the ever-increasing demand for manpower.

No mutual aid was requested or called for by FDNY. Some New Jersey as well as upstate New York units responded with equipment and assistance. but they did this on their own and were not utilized by the fire department.

OPERATIONS

Within one hour of my arrival on the scene, the rescue of Firefighter Shea was completed and the fires in the below-grade area were being brought under control. Our focus narrowed to primary search of the below-grade levels (we had reports of still-missing occupants); primary search and evacuation of the towers and the hotel; and an assessment of the damage and stability of the belowgrade areas, such as it would impact the safety of personnel still operating there.

• Damage/hazard assessment. Lights were brought into the belowgrade areas. Damage from the blast was extensive. The B-2 level surrounding ground zero was completely destroyed. Piping and conduit were snapped like twigs. Masonry walls and steel-reinforced concrete flooring were blown apart. Cars were strewn about like toys. Steel columns were shocked but held.

A chief was directed to secure and define the stability of the collapse area. He was to accomplish the assessment with Port Authority engineers. The explosion severed four of the seven operating electrical feeders. This had the effect of disrupting all fire protection systems and also causing sporadic power loss throughout the complex. For reasons too numerous to mention, pow er shutoff by the FDNY command post was never requested. All train traffic in the area was stopped, and the gas to the complex was shut down. Members were advised to operate cautiously at all below-grade areas. For reasons unknown to me, power was completely removed from the complex at around 1:30 p.m.

It was determined that operations below’ grade could continue within reasonable safety limits, but the potential for secondary collapse w’as everpresent.

• Below grade. With such extensive damage to the below’-grade levels—debris was piled several feet high about the blast area —primary and secondary searches were very difficult and dangerous. Chief Cerreta supervised the search effort. Searches were conducted under the protection of charged hoselines.

Port Authority personnel assisted by establishing a probable victim location in occupied work areas on the B-2 level under the Vista Hotel and Tower 1. The blast destroyed a dividing wall between the garage and this work area (demolished, it was later found, by a steel support beam hurled through it with the unimaginable force created by the blast). A search was concentrated in this area, and four fatalities were located and removed by FDNY to a temporary morgue established in the Vista Hotel. Five of the six fatalities in this incident were removed within the first two hours. (One victim was found by FDNY on a driveway ramp early in the incident.) The sixth victim was located in rubble by police personnel during their investigation 17 days later.

Members removed 16 civilians trapped under the debris in a locker room near the epicenter of the blast; located and rescued civilians from a demolished room suspended precariously over the crater; rescued victims who fell into the crater; and conducted very thorough, exhausting primary and secondary searches of the blast area, removing scores of injured.

In total. 71 companies were utilized for extinguishment, rescue, primary and secondary searches, recoveries, and logistics support on the belowgrade levels.

• Above grade. The large quantities of smoke that had been generated prior to the fire’s knockdown became a major operational factor. Due to the

(Photos by Steve Spak.)

• destroyed elevator shaft doors at the B-2 level, the hole in the Vista Hotel meeting room with the blown-out glass partition wall between the Vista Hotel and Tower 1, and doors being opened on all floors by people evacuating—and with the stack effect working-most floors and all stairways of Tower 1 and the Vista Hotel became charged with smoke. Tower 2 had a smoke condition but to a lesser degree. The smoke condition in Tower 1 was the worst of the three buildings above grade.

The initial commitment of abovegrade resources was devoted to the Vista Hotel. This 22-story hotel, in and of itself, would under normal firefighting operations be a major undertaking. At this incident, it would be handled in a most expedient manner (assisted by the time of day when many people had checked out and others had yet to check in) by the building’s fire safety directors and our firefighters and fire officers. The building was searched within approximately one hour. Units were directed from the Vista Hotel sector to assist in Tower 1 and Tower 2.

Search and evacuation of the towers became the greatest challenges. Stairways were massively congested. Many occupants could not make the descent under their own power. Pregnant women, older people, people with heart conditions, and people with physical disabilities all required fire department assistance. Firefighters carried people down the stairs some 60 floors or more via stokes baskets, stair chairs, wheelchairs, and office chairs. Groups of children had to be escorted to street level—one group of children from the 92nd floor. Resuscitators and first aid were required for many occupants.

Primary and secondary searches of every floor, each 40,000 square feet, were required. Forcible entry was performed to gain entry onto floors and office spaces. Adding to our difficulties was a reported “bomb scare” on the 65th floor of Tower 1, for which firefighters stretched a line off the standpipe and supported police efforts.

As challenging as stairway evacuation and floor search were, the most difficult part of this operation from the standpoint of strategy and tactics was locating and searching the 99 elevators in each of the towers and the 12 in the Vista Hotel. Many elevators were in blind shafts and between floors. Identification of car location was difficult and time-consuming. Many walls had to be breached to gain entry into elevator cars. Literally hundreds of people were trapped in elevators when the power went down. In one case, 10 elevator occupants in Tower 1 were found unconscious, lying on the car floor—they were resuscitated and safely turned over to EMS personnel. In another case, 72 schoolchildren in Tower 2 were rescued from a car stuck in a blind shaft.

Once outside the building, victims had to contend with falling glass broken by a few occupants on upper floors. This was a real problem over which the fire department had no control. Some of this glass breaking was due to erroneous information disseminated by the media, encouraging people in the towers to take such action.

An unusual aspect of this incident was that a large elevator company has offices within the WTC towers. This company had several maintenance technicians working within the building at the time of the explosion. Knowing that people were trapped in the elevators, these technicians early in the incident began the process of manually moving the stalled cabs to the tower lobbies, but not all of their well-intentioned efforts were communicated to FDNY, at least initially Had better interagency communications existed, elevator searches could have been better coordinated with the fire department.

More than eight million square feet of space were searched in Tower 1, Tower 2, and the Vista Hotel. lower 1 required the largest commitment of above-grade resources. When other sectors began reducing units, they were told to report to the command post. We would reassign them as necessary unless the members were fatigued, in which case they would be relieved. During the entire course of the incident. 55 companies operated in Tower 1, 27 in Tower 2, and 20 in the Vista Hotel.

Operations continued well into the night. At 11:45 p.m., the last elevator was located and the people removed. They had been in the elevator for more than 11 hours.

Change of tour relief would be handled by the transmission of additional alarms. Some members, due to the fact that they had climbed to the upper floors of the towers, could not be relieved. It took hours to reach the upper floors of the two 1 10-story buildings, and of necessity, these members would keep working until they could make their way down the buildings, performing secondary searches as they did so.

(Photo by Robert Knobloch.)

POWER RESTORATION

Power restoration was critical, not only for the trapped occupants and firefighters but for other reasons as well. The New York Telephone Company had a major telephone exchange at the WTC complex. Besides providing telephone service to a portion of Manhattan, it also provided service for the air traffic control of the three major regional airports.

This telephone equipment had emergency generator backup, but the generator cooling lines had also been compromised by the blast, as had the BA’s generators for the WTC complex. Fortunately, battery backup was also provided and kept the telephone system running until power could be restored.

Power began to be restored around 6 p m. and continued until midnight, when most of the branch circuits in lowers l and 2 had been restored. Power restoration concentrated on the elevator banks first, with other sections of the buildings following.

THE MORNING AFTER

FDNY met with high-level PA officials at the WTC early Monday morning after the blast. FDNY advised them and assisted them on the restoration of fire protection systems (standpipes. sprinklers, etc.). We had engine companies hooked up to fire department connections, ready to supply the system if needed.

Our assistance also included establishing what minimum level of protection would be needed before reoccupancy was permitted. Our fire prevention bureau worked very closely with the PA to get the buildings “back on line as soon as possible.

We would maintain a presence at the scene until March 25, 1993.

LESSONS LEARNED AND REINFORCED

• As many incidents throughout history have shown, fire extinguishment is the most effective weapon against smoke generation and, therefore, smoke migration. The decision to attack the basement fires in the initial stages of the incident was the most important decision of the incident in that hundreds—maybe thousands—of lives were saved due to timely extinguishment of the fires.

Stretching handlines into the below-grade garage areas of a large public building after a bomb explosion is a challenge for firefighters. Traditional water sources may not be available or used to capacity (FDNY staged a marine unit to draft out of the Hudson River and supply engine companies, had it been necessary); standpipes may be damaged. Quick and easy routes to the seat of the fire will not be available. Units may have to knock down numerous fires (such as fires in individual burning vehicles) before they reach their objective. The volume of fire (depending on the combustibles in the explosion space) and the need to protect engine companies from possible fire dangers (such as ruptured gas tanks, secondary’ collapse and fire, etc.) dictate the use of handlines that can produce flows greater than 200 gpm.

• This was the largest building evacuation ever recorded. The “defend-in-place” strategy did not exist. Building evacuation and human behavior in this incident will be studied for years to come, hopefully yielding new lessons appropriate for inclusion in building codes.
• This incident exemplifies the classic high-rise stack effect —vertical upward movement of smoke and heated gases due to the cold temperatures outside and warm temperatures inside. I pw ard smoke movement was enhanced by the breaching of the Vista Hotel meeting room floor/glass wall as well as breaches in the bottom of elevator and stair shafts. The force of the bomb itself also helped to propel the smoke upward. Finally, people opening doors in stair shafts allowed smoke to migrate from floor
• to stair shaft or vice versa.
• The WTC is a well-constructed complex. In spite of major damage, it withstood the effects of a terrorist bomb. At the time of the explosion, it exceeded some local building and fire code requirements but did not comply with others. An effort should be made through legislation to enforce all local codes in all structures. If the fire department is to fight the fire, the fire department should enforce the codes. This will improve and allow for knowledge and standardization of fire protection features.

WTC management was very cooperative in working with FDNY’ and other agencies following the explosion and has made numerous enhancements so that code compliance has been achieved and, in some cases, exceeded. Enhancements include changes in the number of fire command stations and in the organization and training of fire safety personnel within the complex; communications upgrades, particularly a backup wireless communications system and tertiary, battery-powered emergency stairway and elevator lighting; enhanced provisions for smoke evacuation from stairways and elevators; a better means for determining the location of elevators in blind shafts; methods to prevent interruption of emergency generator power; and many others.

The importance of being able to communicate with building occupants cannot be overstressed. Many of the evacuation problems that existed at this incident would have been greatly reduced had some form of communication been available.

• Fire department communications were severely stressed at this operation. Department communications capabilities must be established so that they can handle the largest of emergencies that could occur in the jurisdiction. Our standard portable radio tactical frequency was overloaded and ineffective. The same problems w ere encountered with the command channels. A trunked 800 MHz system would have achieved much better results; FDNY currently is in the proc-
• ess of developing such a system. In addition, equipping division and battalion chiefs with cellular telephones would have made it possible to communicate with units operating on upper floors.

The FDNY incident command system depends largely on its FieldCom Unit. This unit is expected to transmit and receive critical information on the fireground. In the WTC incident, this unit experienced an overload situation. The importance of this unit requires that it be amply staffed with highly trained and experienced officers and personnel.

We must continually seek improvements to our equipment. A specifictone alert for portable radios signaling all radio transmissions to cease would be invaluable, allowing a commander or member to gain control of the network and transmit a mayday or urgent message.

Human message relays were an important method of communication at this incident.

• Controlling a large-scale incident is beyond the capabilities of any one individual. The incident command system must be utilized and expanded to ensure adequate span of control and personnel accountability/safety. The system must be flexible and
• adaptable. The incident command system was expanded in proportion to the size of the incident. The incident commander must take steps to manage the large-scale incident through well-positioned sector and subsector officers.

The incident commander at a major incident has a dual problem: information overload—too much information coming in and very little or not enough time to evaluate and act in a timely fashion —and too many chiefs and officials demanding attention. People will get frustrated when they feel they have important information that is not acted on immediately. This can be overcome by assigning an additional staff chief of appropriate rank to assist the incident commander. This chief should accept the reports and make the 1C aware of them in a timely fashion and in priority order.

Another position should be created to handle agencies that will report to the command post offering assistance, be it information, equipment, or other resources—and there were many such offers at the WTC incident. A high-ranking officer should be stationed at the command post to record all this information and develop a system whereby these parties could be recalled at the appropriate time. People came to the command post with generators, pumps, and offers of expert help in one trade or another, but when the time came that we could have utilized that assistance, often they had left the area and could not be found.

The portable command post (PCP) given to each division is an excellent control tool for a sector commander. However, lack of highly visible incident command post facilities proved to be a disadvantage at this incident. The fire department is currently pursuing more “operational friendly,” visible command equipment that will be the focal point for other agencies at operations where the fire department is the lead agency/incident commander.

• The fire department does not operate in a vacuum. Assistance from
• and interaction with other agencies are essential. Gaining and maintaining cooperation from and coordination with other agencies can be a problem; in this incident, interagency protocols were violated on several occasions. For example, during this incident, it had been reported that several people
• were trapped on the Tower 2 roof. A few members of the police department stepped outside the protocol of the ICS and conducted an operation to remove these people via helicopter.

To be effective, interagency protocols require routine drills. During drills, friendships will be established and maintained, and a deeper understanding of the other agencies’ roles will lead to better interaction during emergencies. A better understanding of the incident command system is required by all city emergency responders. With thorough knowledge of the benefits of the ICS, there will be less reluctance on the part of all agencies to use it.

• Firefighter rest and rehabilitation will be difficult to achieve in operations in which it can take as long as three or four hours to reach an objective. Make every effort to establish “R & R posts” at key points throughout large buildings.
• Elevator search and rescue was a major challenge in this incident. Many elevators were stuck in blind shafts when the power went down, and elevator recall to the sky lobbies (the transfer floors for other elevators serving upper floors) was a slow’ process. Identification of elevator car locations in the blind shafts was especially difficult in Tower 1 because the shafts were charged with smoke. Several lessons were learned with respect to elevator search, including

—Elevators on floors with public assembly areas (observation deck, restaurants, etc.) should be a search and evacuation priority. They may have heavy occupancy; in one case, for example, 72 schoolchildren and teachers were stuck in one elevator.

—An elevator liaison officer should be designated for coordinating/controlling elevator companies.

— Coordination with elevator personnel is essential. Interagency preplanning with respect to elevator control is called for.

• A public information officer is essential. The fire department must ensure that TV and radio reports are accurate, especially for people on the upper floors of high-rise buildings who are taking their cues from these reports. Many so-called “experts” on high-rise fire operations, safety’, evacuation procedures, etc. were sought by the media, and some of these individuals supplied erroneous information that could have resulted in
• further operational problems. One noted TV personality encouraged occupants to vent the tower windows by breaking glass; one willing viewer, it has been reported, obliged by throwing a fax machine out the window.

The primary thrust of the public information officer is to present factual information and messages to the media on a timely basis, but this officer also serves to demonstrate to the public that its lead agency in a fire/rescue emergency has the knowledge, ability, and resources to control the situation. As it was, the fire department put itself in a “react” mode concerning media communications.

• A major disaster committee or
• task force should be developed to hold hearings and investigate all facets of a major incident to determine the impact on fire department operations. The task force should include members from operations, fire prevention, support services, communications, the legal division, and any others deemed appropriate by the fire commissioner.