Lessons for Today’s Fire Company Officer
By Tracy Kilmer
All photos courtesy Boston Historical Society
“The holocaust (that was the Cocoanut Grove Fire) was a good example of what can happen when a chain of unusual circumstances is brought into play…” Editor Fred Sheppard, Fire Engineering, January 1943
Like other major cities, the Boston (MA) Fire Department has had its share of tragic fire events. A chain of unusual circumstances began with the occurrence of the Maverick Square Fire and collapse on November 15, 1942, when Boston suffered the most line-of-duty deaths recorded in its 264-year history. Fire Chief Samuel Pope was in command when, without warning, one of the 100-year-old building walls on the upper floor collapsed. The collapse injured over 45 firefighters. By the time the All-Out was struck, six firefighters were killed under the century old brick rubble.
Just 13 days after the tragic Maverick Square fire and collapse, Chief Pope found himself in command again of what would be the largest loss of civilian life in our country since the 1903 Chicago Iroquois Theater fire that took 602 civilian lives.
- Flammable Decorations, Lack of Exits Create Tragedy at Cocoanut Grove
- Brannigan: The Cocoanut Grove Fire: A Nonmystery
- From the Archives: The Cocoanut Grove Fire
Through the annals of time, the fire service has embraced the expression “lest we forget.” One fire that has refused to leave many hearts and minds is the Cocoanut Grove night club fire, which occurred November 28, 1942, in Boston, Massachusetts.
Located in the city’s south side, the Cocoanut Grove nightclub featured an abundance of glitz and over-the-top glam. It was the place to be and be seen. “The Grove” had it all: step inside to a tropical vibe, complete with entertainment, fine dining, and three bars. Dance under the stars with the electronically controlled retractable roof. Extravagant artificial palm trees completed the island-themed décor, with coconuts and huge, flowing palm fronds surrounding the dance floor.
For Boston firefighter Johnny Rose, this would be his first glimpse into the swanky nightclub, but not as a patron.
Rose was assigned to Boston’s Engine Company 22. That night he was manning the watch desk. Around 10:15 p.m., the desk phone rang. It was for an automobile fire at Stewart and Broadway Streets. Within minutes after units arrived on scene, the vehicle fire was easily extinguished with just a booster line. Rose was securing the last of the hydrant line to Engine 22’s hose wagon when he saw a man running down the street. He was yelling: “There’s smoke coming from the building down here!”
Rose and firefighter Bill Estes jumped onto the back step of the truck running board. Quickly responding just two blocks down the narrow streets, Rose could see the smoke billowing from the building—it was the Cocoanut Grove nightclub.
Chief Pope arrived at the Grove in minutes to see flames shooting 10-15 feet out of the front doors and windows and into the street. He heard the horrifying screams of patrons emerging from the club with their bodies on fire. It was obvious that they had a fire, rescue and a mass-casualty incident on their hands, one of epic proportions.
Optimal fireground operational efficiency and success begins with a systematic process. This incident would entail a massively overwhelming simultaneous operation, including rescue, recovery, and suppression. For a successful outcome in such instances, the incident commander must first begin with gathering of information and being able to correctly process the information to develop a plan of action.
This gathering of information begins with a 360°size up. Without it, you cannot implement or measure the effectives of strategy and tactics of fireground operations. Size-up begins the time of incident notification. It is a continuous process of information gathering, continuing throughout the incident until the last personnel and piece of apparatus leave the scene.
The first five minutes of an incident can dictate the outcome of the entire incident. What was going through Chief Pope’s mind? He had to be thinking about the Maverick Square fire only 13 days prior. What would be going through your mind? It’s possible that Chief Pope used what should be a common fire acronym to aide any fire company officer or staff.
Simultaneously with size-up, Chief Pope could have used a common 13-point acronym for company officers: C.O.A.L. W.A.S. W.E.A.L.T.H (Construction, Occupancy, Area, Life Hazard – Water, Auxiliary systems, Street conditions – Weather, Exposures, Apparatus and personnel, Location, Time, Hazards).
COAL WAS WEALTH is an example of the use of one of the most popular acronyms in the fire service used when arriving on scene. There are also popular acronyms for tactics, such as RECEO-VS. Reviewing Lloyd Layman’s Five-Step Size-up Process can also be used to analyze emergency situations. His five-step process includes: Facts, Probabilities, Situation, Decision and Plan of Operation. There is nothing new about these processes, but when used with a thorough size-up it can guide you in the path of fireground success.
An acronym like COAL WAS WEALTH can be used throughout an incident. Any changes in one or more of these topics could suggest consideration of new tactics or strategy of the overall operation.
In terms of construction, the 3,600-square-foot structure was originally built in 1916. It was used first as a repair garage, then as a film storage facility in the 1930s. The original building was considered a “first-class, fireproof building,” and consisted of a single story with a partial basement. The owners then began purchasing surrounding buildings. Between 1938 and 1942, the original footprint of the building increased to more than 9,000 square feet and became a very irregular shape.
Chief Pope recognized the issues of overcrowding. The total building occupancy was set at 600. Estimates the night of the fire were projected at 1,000 and possibly more.
Due to adjacent building acquisitions and modifications throughout the years, the area became a cavernous amalgamation of pieces of buildings that defied basic construction methodology. Work was completed by unqualified contractors, without permits, and without city inspections.
Tip: Contact your local construction office and fire prevention bureau for building details of new or renovated buildings in your area.
Firefighters face various life hazard obstacles in many different forms. The fire started in the northeast corner of the basement Melody Cocktail Lounge at approximately 10:15 p.m.
Presumably, a bus boy working the Melody Lounge struck a match for light to replace a light bulb into an artificial palm tree that had been removed by a patron. The lit match started a small fire in the palm tree. Close to 2,000 yards of satin fabric were suspended from the ceiling, fastened by wooden strips.
Decorative materials such as leather and fish netting were located throughout the building which accelerated the fires’ movement. “Infrequent or incomplete inspections on the part of the city gave management, through morally guilty, the implied sanctions of the authorities for continuing the use of these materials.” stated Sheppard. This is well evidenced by the Boston Fire Department inspection report, dated November 30, 1942, that stated there are “no flammable decorations were found.”
It was nearly impossible for patrons to escape the Melody Lounge because of the burning materials, which produced superheated air, acrid, heavy black smoke, and brilliant flames described as fireballs. Flames ascended the only known means of egress, a narrow single set of steps only four-feet wide.
Robert Mouton, National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Technical Secretary and Secretary of the NFPA Committee on Safety to Life, stated: “From the Melody Lounge the fire spread up the stairway and with almost incredible rapidity throughout the main first floor and through the corridor into the Broadway Cocktail Lounge.” Flames appeared on the street level main lobby within two to four minutes after they were first seen in the basement.
Fire, heat, and smoke traveled up vertically to the foyer. Fire spread was accelerated by large ventilating fans in the main floor. Flames and high-temperature toxic gases spread so rapidly that they covered approximately 225 feet, involving two levels of the building, end to end, in about five minutes.
“The victims showed definite evidence of carbon monoxide which would account for their quick collapse.” Moulton stated, “The cause of the majority of deaths was from pulmonary burns of the lungs resulting from the inhalation of toxic gases and superheated smoke estimated of over 1,800°.” Patrons were so quickly overcome by these toxic fumes that they died still seated upright at their tables.
Firefighters were met with obstacles that hampered rescue and suppression efforts. There were six ground-floor exits and three in the basement. Of the nine total exits, six exits were obstructed, blocked, locked, or swung inward. Three-inch-thick glass blocks were used to cover windows, making escape and hoseline penetration virtually impossible.
Firefighter George “Red” Graney and his crew attempted to gain access from the entrance on Broadway and Shawmut Streets. The door had five locks on one side and a solid pile of 100 bodies on the other side.
Rose and Estes quickly grabbed a handline and began to advance to the front revolving door entrance. “I need water,” Rose yelled. Pump operator Joe McNeil opened the discharge gate. Rose and Estes faced a wall of human bodies jammed into the revolving door entrance/exit and flames erupting over their heads. Bodies of men and woman were piled as high as the revolving front door entrance. Rose stated: “We played the line in and then there seemed to be a slacking off on the activity. These people now were being overcome, they were being injured, burned, eventually, we shut our line down and we went in and started to take some people out of the doorway.”
The fire department received no aid from any auxiliary systems such as a sprinkler system. There were none installed in the Grove.
TIP: Preincident preplanning includes valuable information such as occupancy, building type and layout, contents, identifies water supplies sources and their locations.
The fire department faced narrow street conditions and a large accumulation of apparatus. The weather was dry and cold, with an air temperature of 28°. The old cobblestone streets turned into a slippery, icy mess. Hoselines froze to the ground.
Ladder trucks helped to cool the exposures. The fire was extinguished approximately 12 minutes after ignition.
Chief Pope ordered apparatus and personnel to begin suppression, rescue, and ventilation operations simultaneously. In all, 18 streams were operated for the purpose of quickly cooling the interior areas to facilitate prompt rescue work. Hose used totaled more than 7,700 feet.
The facts and probabilities of the fire location were limited at the time, given the chaotic scene and such rapid-fire movement throughout the building in a matter of minutes.
The time of this fire had near perfect conditions. Special factors such as a big party night heading into the Thanksgiving weekend, a Saturday night, and the unusual attendance of armed service personnel are external factors that contributed to the occupancy load hazard.
Hazards
Fire Engineering Editor Fred Sheppard further observed “from the welter of conflicting statements made investigations following the fatal night club at Boston, certain facts contributing to the huge loss of life stand out.” They are:
- The place was seriously overcrowded.
- Inflammable decorations were used.
- Some exits were locked or otherwise unusable.
He continued that “the loss of life would have been far less had any one of the three conditions listed above been missing.” The Boston Fire Department inspection report, dated November 30, 1942, stated that there were a “sufficient number of exits” and “no inflammable decorations.” It is important to note that all three issues raised by Sheppard were already addressed in the NFPA Life Safety Code but were not enforced.
Tracy Kilmer has been the fire official in the borough of Palmyra, New Jersey, for 28 years, conducting fire inspections and investigations. She is also the Borough of Palmyra’s construction official and fire subcode official. She holds numerous New Jersey certifications. She served for 10 years as a structural firefighter and is a past instructor at the Burlington County Fire Academy. She holds an associate degree in law enforcement and is an emergency medical technician with Cinnaminson (NJ) Fire Department.
