The Regal Empress Fire

The Regal Empress Fire

On August 19, 1994, an incident occurred aboard the Regal Empress cruise ship while in the waters of New York City. The Regal Empress, a Bahamas registry ship, was built in 1953 (with automatic sprinklers installed) and refurbished in 1993. She is 612 feet in length and has a beam of 80 feet. She has 450 cabins and can accommodate 1,180 passengers.

INCIDENT

At approximately 0630 hours on August 19, the bridge was notified of a possible smoke condition in the vicinity of the stack trunk on the main deck. (A stack trunk is a one-hour-fire-rated rectangular bulkhead constructed of X-inch-thick steel. It extends from the engine room through all decks and terminates at the familiar “smokestack” on the uppermost deck. The interior of the stack trunk provides the space for venting the engine room with steel tubes. Other utility tubes—such as refrigeration ducts—run through this stack.)

The ship safety officer investigated. He found a fire in an old unused refrigeration duct and a smoke condition in a storage locker adjacent to the stack trunk on the main deck.

At the time, the ship’s construction was such that portions of the air-conditioning system consisted of conduits filled with brine and encased in granular cork for insulation. This unused duct ran through the stack trunk adjacent to a diesel exhaust tube, originating in the engine room. The exhaust tube was constructed in sections. w’ith an outer insulating metal cover. Over time, the outer cover separated and allowed heat to escape.

The escaping heat eventually ignited the cork in the refrigeration duct and the combustibles on the restaurant side of the stack trunk bulkhead, above and behind the automatic sprinklers. The smoke condition initially was minor, and the crew rightfully evacuated the restaurant area and started firefighting procedures. They stretched hoselines to both the main deck entrance and the stack trunk area and attempted to stretch a hoseline into the dining room on the restaurant deck above. Their attempts to locate and extinguish the fire were unsuccessful.

INITIAL FIRE DEPARTMENT OPERATIONS

At 0741 hours on August 19, the U.S. Coast Guard notified FDNY of the smoke condition aboard the Regal Empress and that the passenger ship was en route to its Manhattan terminal.

Initial response called for three engine companies, a ladder company, a tower ladder company, a battalion chief, and Marine Company 1. Within eight minutes, this response was augmented with a rescue company and an additional fireboat.

I was advised of the response and arrived at the pier at 0808 hours. Engine 40 was supplied with water via a hose manifold on the pier, in preparation for supplying a hoseline from its pumper. As soon as the ship was berthed in port and a gangway was in place. Battalion Chief Pat Foley boarded the ship with a ladder company to assess conditions.

Fortunately, the cruise ship Regal Empress was brought into its terminal shortly after the fire was discovered. This was beneficial in terms of command, logistics, access, tactics, and personnel needs. The upper gangway amidships, shown in position, was used for firefighter access. Passenger evacuation and firefighter access routes were separately maintained—an important factor when evacuating more than 1,000 people.

(Photos by Craig H. Shelley.)

Foley advised me of smoke conditions aboard, and I ordered a second alarm at OS IS hours. At that time, we had the follow-

ing problems requiring attention:

  • medium-to-heavy smoke condition in the restaurant area, w ith no visible fire:
  • possible fire on two decks, the main and restaurant decks;
  • a full complement of passengers and crew aboard ship; and
  • an undetermined smoke condition in other areas of the ship.

I established a command post adjacent to the gangway on the pier. After an initial assessment, I advised the ship’s safety officer to evacuate passengers and crew’ from the ship via bow gangways and designated a sector commander on the restaurant deck, while units were assigned to extinguishment and search and ventilation. Engines were paired for tandem pumping from the pier. I assigned a sector chief for the upper deck (above the restaurant deck) and monitored conditions there and on decks above. We stretched a hoseline; engine company personnel stood by in the area adjacent to the stack trunk. I directed Marine Unit 1 to secure copies of the ship plans.

Engine companies on the pier were supplied by the pier water supply, which is connected to the municipal water supply. Marine companies were ordered to take positions at the pier and supply the ship systems via the international connection located at the stern area. Satellite units from FDNY’s maxi water system positioned a hose manifold in proximity to the midship gangway in preparation for additional handlines. This manifold was supplied by Marine Unit I.

Battalion Chief Craig H. Shelley supervised fireboat water supply to the international connection on the stern and to the satellite manifold on the pier. Fourteen minutes after the second alarm, I called a third alarm to assemble sufficient manpower and equipment. At 0914 hours. Chief of Operations Donald Burns, now the incident commander, called a fourth alarm.

The number of units responding necessitated establishing a staging area. A chief officer was assigned to supervise this area. Three additional battalion chiefs were called to provide supervision and maintain span of control.

Certain areas required a fire department representative. A deputy chief from Special Operations command was sent to the ship’s bridge to consult with and inform the ship captain of the operation’s progress.

Operations were conducted on a tactical portable radio channel, and transmissions were, for the most part, clear. IC Burns ordered the use of the 800-MHz radio for the command channel. I used this radio to contact the command post from what now was my operations post aboard ship. My aide monitored the tactical frequency, ensuring unit communications.

THE FIREFIGHT

The initial hoseline stretched by members was not long enough to reach the stack trunk. Foley, then incident commander, withdrew units and requested that a 2 1/2:-inch hoseline be stretched from the pier. The combined efforts of three engine companies were required to stretch and operate this line.

(Top left and center) Damage to the dining area was considerable due in part to combustible ceilings, walls, and other structural features beyond the reach of the ship's sprinklers.Firefighters used a thermal imaging camera to locate hot spots in the stack trunk.Smoke ejectors were used to rid the ship of accumulating levels of carbon monoxide and other toxic fire by-products.A hole in the forward bulkhead of the dining area, cut by firefighters to expose fire in the engine stack, expose brine pipes and remnants of cork insulation.Members worked from below, inside the engine room stack off a plank, with a Navy fog applicator to get water on the stack fires. Efforts from below proved unsuccessful.

The visible surface fire soon was extinguished, but hidden fire and heavy smoke continued to be problems. Ventilation was accomplished by removing glass from portholes in the fire area and opening doors to let fresh air flow wherever possible. FDNY’s haz-mat unit used a carbon monoxide tester to monitor conditions in the restaurant and adjacent areas. These members informed the command post of dangerously high levels in both areas and suggested portable fans for ventilation.

In response to the high carbon monoxide levels, we took the following actions:

  • provided fans for ventilation, which
  • were positioned both to remove smoke and supply fresh air;
  • relieved units frequently and ordered them off the ship;
  • maintained mask discipline; and
  • established controls to log personnel on and off the ship at the gangway entrance.

HIDDEN FIRE

Efforts now were focused on locating

OVERHAUL

At this point in the operation—when we were close to completing overhaul—the ship’s crew notified us of a developing smoke condition on the main deck in the passenger cabin area. The main deck is directly below the restaurant deck.

Units were sent to investigate. They found a mattress fire in Cabin M-18; a sprinkler head was discharging. The fire originated in the bottom bunk, allowing a medium smoke condition to develop prior to sprinkler activation. Fire units stretched a hoseline via a gangway on the restaurant deck down to the Fire and completed extinguishment. Although this fire was unrelated to the original fire, its discovery caused a few anxious moments.

Prior to leaving the scene. Chief Ed Butler and I requested, via the Coast Guard, that ship personnel maintain a firewatch for the next 24 hours. An FDNY rescue company was directed to conduct another check of the fire areas with its thermal imaging camera the next morning. The marine unit stood by.

The Regal Empress was moved to a I repair facility and was expected to be ready : to set sail within a week after the fire. hidden fire. A high heat condition was present at the stack trunk bulkhead. Units removed all combustibles from the proximity of this steel bulkhead.

Using a thermal imaging camera, firefighters located fire in at least two areas. Members attempted to gain access to these areas from the main deck below, as there was an access door into the stack trunk from the main deck. An engine and ladder company cut into the duct and applied water, but there was not enough room to operate effectively. They monitored conditions from below.

Operations continued on the restaurant deck above. Members used hydraulic cutting tools and rotary saws with aluminum oxide blades to attempt access to the stack. Finally, with a line in place to prevent further ignition. Firefighters used an acetylene torch to open a hole to the Fire burning in the cork filling the area around the brine conduits in the old refrigeration duct. Water was applied, and all the hot spots in the stack trunk were extinguished.

LESSONS REINFORCED

  • As soon as possible, secure a knowledgeable representative from the ship to be present at the fire department command post.
  • Secure copies of the ship plans.
  • Send fire department representatives to the ship’s bridge (if fire conditions permit) to maintain liaison with the captain.
  • Assess the fire protection systems on board ship, and augment them if possible.
  • Provide sufficient water supply at the scene of a ship fire— utilize fire boats, satellite units (specialized pumpers), manifolds, etc.
  • Assemble enough manpower for prolonged operations and timely relief.
  • Monitor carbon monoxide levels in the ship and provide for artificial ventilation. The ship’s ventilation system may spread smoke—carefully assess its capabilities before ordering its use.
  • Enforce the use of SCBA by fire department personnel until smoke/carbon monoxide concentrations have reached safe levels.
  • Strictly control the access of fire personnel to the ship. At this fire, Chief of Operations Burns ordered all fire department personnel to be logged on and off the ship, and access was available only via one gangway amidships.
  • A thermal imaging camera may be effective in detecting heat in interior ship areas. It helps not only to locate fire but also limits the energy and time expended on opening up numerous access holes.
  • Utility lines may be used to advantage in shipboard operations to stretch hoselines onto the ship, facilitating fire boat supply to the ship’s fire-main system.

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