WILDLAND SAFETY FOR ENGINE COMPANIES
(Photos by author.)
Fire Dispatch has just toned out a first-alarm brush fire in your district. The daily fire weather forecast has predicted high fire danger with hot temperatures, low relative humidity, and gusty winds developing in the afternoon. From personal observation, you know that the grass has cured out and there are heavy fuels, many homes, and a limited water supply in the area of the reported fire.
If you are responding from a structure fire station, your engine company should be equipped with the personal protective gear, hand tools, and hosepacks designed for fighting wildland fires. Turnout gear and rubber boots are designed for the hazards encountered during structure firefighting; they are too hot, heavy, and restrictive for fighting wildland fires. Appropriate personal protective gear includes Nomex® shirts, pants, and hoods. Helmets, equipped with goggles for eye protection from smoke, embers, and other hazards; leather gloves; and boots are necessities. Lace-up boots with lug soles provide the safety and comfort needed for working in rough terrain. A few simple precautions will increase the effectiveness of your protective ensemble.First, use a layered method, with cotton undergarments or fire-rated uniforms, to improve thermal protection; second, remove any synthetic clothing, since it can melt, causing serious burns; third, button and tuck in shirts and roll down sleeves to help prevent burns; and finally, keep Nomex® gear clean and in good condition to better maintain its protective properties.
Every member of the engine company, including the driver/operator, should carry a fire shelter. While it may be tempting to leave the fire shelters in the engine, don’t. A firefighter battling a running brush fire in western Nevada was killed when he became separated from his engine company. The company, comprised of two trucks, was conducting a backfiring operation when fire conditions forced members to withdraw. In the confusion, one firefighter was left behind. The crew on each truck thought he was on the other truck. Unable to escape on foot, he became trapped. Sadly, he did not have his fire shelter with him.
In the future, respiratory protection may become a standard part of the wildland ensemble. After the fire sieges of the late 1980s, serious concerns were raised about the long-term health effects of exposure to smoke from wildland fires. Currently, a number of organizations are investigating this problem. The University of California’s Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, for instance, has developed a prototype air purifying respirator, consisting of a full face mask and designed not only to remove smoke particles, organic vapors, and acid gases but also to warn the firefighter when carbon monoxide levels become dangerous. The California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection field-tested this respirator, during the 1991 and 1992 fire seasons, with positive results. This coming season, the tests will continue and will be more extensive. The department hopes to supply all California firefighters with these masks by 1995.
While en route to the fire, you observe a column of smoke building. After transmitting this information to Fire Dispatch, you are advised that several mutual-aid engine companies and water tenders are responding.
This situation calls for assigning a mutual-aid radio frequency, so even -one can communicate directly. In California and Nevada, the White Fire Nets—a group of mutual-aid radio frequencies—allow for direct communication between different fire companies. The mutual-aid frequency can be utilized for tactical foreground communications, freeing the main frequency for command and dispatching. Separating radio traffic helps to reduce confusion and allows for more efficient communication, which improves safety.
Your engine company arrives on scene to find a fire burning in grass anil light brush. Spreading from Old Saw Mill Road up a hill, the fire is approximately two acres. Ahead of the fire are heavy brush and timber, and beyond that a rural subdivision. The winds are picking up, causing the fire to spread faster.
As you formulate a plan of action, keep in mind that the four common causes of firelighter entrapment are present: The first is taking small fires for granted; the second is that fires burning in light, flashy fuels can react surprisingly fast to weather changes; the third is failure to recognize changing fire behavior, often caused by shifts in wind speed or direction; the fourth is fires racing up steep slopes, saddles, or “chimneys.” Contributing causes are firefighters who are inexperienced in wildland firefighting, those who are in poor physical condition, or those who are both.
Size-up begins with the prealert and continues throughout the incident. Initial dispatch information, knowledge of local conditions, and prefire plans will give you a start. While en route, observing the smoke column can reveal clues about the fire’s development. After arriving on scene, your size-up should consider fuels, topography, fire behavior, local weather, and incident potential, among other factors. What is the location of the fire and the best access? What is the estimated size of the fire? What type of fuels are burning?
Fires in light fuels can spread quickly and erratically, while fires involving heavy fuels, especially old-age-class fuels (that is, old-growth forest and brush consisting of a lot of dead and down material), may be more difficult to control. What is the topography? Fires generally burn faster uphill and more slowly downhill. Canyons and saddles funnel fires. Southern aspects—that is, south-facing slopes— are drier, while northern ones often have heavier vegetation. Steep or broken terrain also can limit access.
The fire behavior and rate of spread will help determine your strategy and tactics. Indirect attack is required when there are adverse conditions such as crown fire, large flame fronts, fire whirls, and extensive spot fires. Local weather conditions such as strong, gusty winds; dust devils; and cumulus clouds indicate potential problems. Is there potential for a major incident? A fire threatening or involving structures or heavy fuels will require a great commitment of equipment and personnel, while a fire burning in inaccessible terrain will present other difficulties. Finally, can the fire be controlled with the responding companies, or will additional firefighting resources be needed?
Is the first-arriving engine company. you radio a size-up to Dispatch, request a second alarm, and advise that you trill be “Saw Mill Command”‘ (wildland fires are named after a nearby geographic landmark; in this case, the fire started near “Old Saw Mill Road,” so it became the “Saw Mill” incident). After determining which side of the fire poses the greatest threat, your engine company starts a flanking attack there. That side is designated Division “A ” You request that the second-arriving engine start an attack on Division “B.” the east flank
As other units arrive, they will contact “Saw Mill Command” for their assignments. Command will be transferred when a chief officer arrives, preferably after a face-to-face meeting. The chief should announce over the radio the location of the “Saw Mill” command post and staging area and that he or she is now in command.
Now that command, communications, and a plan of action have been established, it is time for a company safety briefing. The safety briefing should include emergency concerns such as the locations of escape routes and safety areas. It is important that all firefighters understand their assignments and the involved safety concerns. For safety and teamwork, the fire company should stay together for the duration of the fire mission. If the company becomes spread out on a long hoselay, for example, they should check in or regroup on a regular basis. During a fire shelter deployment or other fire line emergency, it is especially important for the company officer to account for every firefighter. A 1990 brush fire in Sedgwick County, Kansas, demonstrated the importance of teamwork and accountability. In that incident, a firefighter died of heat stroke after having been separated from his company officer for several hours. Had the company stayed together, the series of events that led to his death may have been prevented.
If the fire behavior conditions permit a direct attack, several engine tactics are available. They depend on the fuel type, the terrain, and your engine’s capabilities. Mobile attack works well on light fuels and on terrain that is easily traversed, provided your engine has off-road and “pump-and-roll” capabilities. However, if your engine is capable of only stationary pumping or if the terrain or vegetation is impassable, progressive hoselays are a common tactic. Whatever method is used, it is important to start the attack at a secure anchor point, such as a road or other clearing; establishing an anchor point on a hillside or on a switchback road with fire burning below can be very dangerous. If the fire’s behavior changes, companies working above quickly can be overrun.
A classic example of how a company working above a fire can be quickly overrun is the Loop Fire Disaster, which occurred in southern California’s Angeles National Forest in 1966. A “hot shot” crew was building a handline downhill along the fire perimeter when a flare-up occurred. The fire roared up the steep hill, trapping 22 firefighters, 12 of whom were killed. Unfortunately, this isn’t the only example of firefighters being overrun while working above a fire.
Since the fire is burning in grass and the terrain is easy to traverse, your company begins a mobile attack. Starting at the anchor point along the road, the driver!operator drives the engine slowly around the fire, while the firefighters make a continuous wet line along the edge of the fire, using ¼-inch booster lines or short 1 1/2-inch hose equipped with adjustable fog nozzles.
Hy knoc king the fire down ahead of the engine and extinguishing heavy fuels adjacent to the fire line, the firefighters create a safer working environment and create an escape path into the burn. In light fuels, the burn is commonly used as a safety area, since it cools down quickly behind the flame front. Firefighters operating the nozzles should walk off to the side of the engine, in full view of the driver/ operator, staying close to the engine and pulling off no more than 25 feet of hose.
Any additional firefighters should patrol the wet line with hand tools. Everyone should be alert for spot fires, flare-ups, or changes in fire behavior.
As more engine companies arrive, a tandem attack, where two or moreengines work together, can be started. A tandem attack is a more effective and safer tactic, since the engines are mutually supportive. ‘ITie lead engineknocks down the fire, while the second engine completes the wet line. When one engine needs to refill with water, the other engine can continue the attack. Another method of mobile attack involves the engine’s operating inside the burn, attacking the flamefront from behind. This method works well on fuels that cool down quickly and allows the driverOperator to see hazards that otherwise might be hidden.
As mentioned earlier, hoselays allow water supplies to be extended into areas that otherwise are inaccessible to engines. There are two types of hoselays, simple and progressive. A simple hoselay involves a single attack line, such as the preconnects found on a structure engine, which has to be extended before water can be applied to the fire. A progressive hoselay has one-inch hose branching off at regular intervals and allows water to be continuously applied. While they take more time to deploy than a simple hoselay, the branch lines provide good protection behind the firefighters as they advance, and they aid in the eventual mop-up. The progressive hoselay is the best for wildland fires. Hoselay evolutions take a lot of teamwork and coordination and require having the hose arranged in hosepacks. An engine company well versed in these evolutions can deploy a lot of hose. Hoselays of 1,000 feet or more are not unusual.
There are two common methods of constructing a progressive hoselay. The first utilizes rolls of 1 1/2-inch hose, often carried in canvas packs. This evolution requires a team of three or more firefighters. One firefighter is in charge of the nozzle; the second, the hose clamp; and the third, the hose. Each time the hoseline is fully extended, the team shuts off the hose with the hose clamp and adds a new length of hose. After the nozzle is reattached and the new hose is charged, they continue to wet line the fire. Gated wyes are installed every several hundred feet so the one-inch branch lines can be attached.
The second method uses Gansner packs. Developed by U.S. Forest Service firefighters from the Plumas National Forest, the Gansner pack has 100 feet of 1 1/2-inch truck line in a horseshoe load, followed by a gated wye and 10 feet of coiled one-inch attack line. All the hose and attachments are preconnected and tied together so they can be carried like a backpack. One firefighter starts the wet line using the booster hose. The second firefighter takes a Gansner pack and follows behind, allowing the 1 1/2-inch trunk line to play out. When the trunk line is fully deployed, the lines are charged. The second firefighter then takes the one-inch attack line and continues the wet line. As the firefighter advances the attack line, another firefighter attaches a second host-pack to the gated wye and follows behind. When the first attack line is fully extended, the second hosepack will be deployed and ready to be charged. The nozzle operators need to progress slowly enough to ensure the complete knockdown of the fire, being careful not to drag the hose through hot embers. It is important to frequently check behind for flare-ups, spot fires, and leaking hose. This progress may continue until the pressure loss, due to elevation or distance, becomes prohibitive. By relay pumping with a portable pump and collapsible tank, the hoselay can be extended farther.
There are some basic safety considerations for stationary pumping, such as hoselays or structure protection. Always park the engine in clearings, away from heavy fuels or power lines, and facing the direction of escape. For engine protection, keep the auxiliary pump motor running, with short 172inch preconnects available, and always leave a reserve in the water tank. Finally, keep all the windows rolled up to keep burning embers out of the cab of the engine.
After the flanks have been secured, it is time to control the head of the fire. A frontal assault, where companies are deployed ahead of the fire in an attempt to stop it, is one of the hazardous “watch out” situations. If conditions permit, the flanking attack can evolve into a pincer attack, where the engines slowly converge on the head of the fire. Air tanker retardant drops and helicopter bucket drops temporarily can cool and slow down a fire, allowing fire companies time to move in and safely control areas that otherwise would be too hot. On small fires, air tankers drop first on the head, then on the hot flank, and then on the cold flank. Air-to-ground communication is critical for safety. All fire companies must be notified of impending air drops so they can move out of the drop zone, low-level retardant drops can be very dangerous to firefighters on the ground. On a brush fire in Carson City, Nevada, an air tanker inadvertently dropped retardant directly on an engine company. The force of the heavy retardant hitting the engine shattered the windshield, injuring two firefighters and causing extensive damage to the truck. After the retardant drops arcmade, fire companies should quickly return to the drop zone to secure the retardant line while the fire is relatively cool. An indirect attack, such as backfiring from natural or man-madefuel breaks, should be used on fastmoving fires or fires that are too erratic or intense for direct-attack methods. During extreme conditions, the fire may have to run its coursewhile firefighters wait for a favorableweather change. A dramatic example of such a situation is “Black Saturday” of August 1988, when more than 150,000 acres of Yellowstone National Park burned in a single day.
In the case of most fires, wet lines must be secured with fire lines cleared to mineral soil; this normally is the job of hand crews, bulldozers, and, in some parts of the country, plows. If none are available, the engine companies need to build the necessary handlines. Final control of the fire is attained after the timeconsuming but important tasks of mop-up and patrol. Generally, water alone will not mop up a fire. It is best to use hand tools and water together to ensure that all smoldering fire is extinguished. Tool complements, which vary in different regions of the country, generally include cutting and digging tools such as shovels, Pulaskis, Mcloeds, and chain saws.
Wildland fires can be of long duration, so firefighter welfare is an important consideration, Fatigue, hunger, dehydration, and low-level carbon monoxide poisoning can decrease mental alertness and physical performance, which in turn can lead to accidents. Firefighters need regular breaks, sufficient food, and plenty of drinking water. Any medical problems, no matter how minor, need attention. Wildland engine companies typically carry enough drinking water, field rations, first-aid supplies, and personal gear to be self-sufficient until a fire camp can be established.
After the fire siege of 1985, which saw conflagrations in such diverse places as California and Florida, the National Fire Protection Association reported that wildland urban interface fires had become a nationwide threat. The report suggested that structure firefighters and wildland firefighters cross-train and prepare for the growing number of interface fires. As the devastating Oakland Hills firestorm in October 1991 demonstrated, structure firefighters can face major wildland fires in their own jurisdictions. As in any fire emergency, the first priority in wildland fires is life safety.
Bibliography
- Broan, Arthur, and Kenneth Davis. Forest Fire Control and Use. 2nd ed. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1973-
- CDF Handbook 1190. Revision 103. Sacramento: State of California, April 1981.
- Clayton, Bill, David Jay, and Jim McFadden. Wildland Firefighting. North Highlands, California: State of California, 1986.
- “The Loop Fire Disaster.” NFPA Firemen. (March 1967) (reprinted).
- “News in Brief.” Fire Engineering. 144:11, 30-32 (Nov. 1991).
- Perry, Donald. Wildland Firefighting: Fire Behavior, Tactics, and Command. Bellflower, California: Fire Publications, 1989.
- “Preliminary Report of Task Force on Study of Fatal/Near Fatal Wildland Fire Accidents,” 1980-338722, U.S. Government Printing Office, April 1980.
- Redmond Regional Training Center, National Wildfire Coordinating Group. Wildfire: Standards for Survival. VHS video.
- Weaver, Bill. “Fatal and NearFatal Forest Fires—the Common Denominators.” International Fire Chief, (reprinted).
