By Larry Collins
The concept of LCES (establishing effective Lookouts, Communications, Escape Routes, and Safety Zones) was originally used by highly experienced firefighters who, in studying many wildland fires that resulted in firefighter deaths, recognized certain patterns that contributed to the deaths. These fire professionals developed a systematic approach to avoid four major mistakes that typically lead to death in wildland fires: absence of effective lookouts to observe fire behavior and warn of intensifying hazardous conditions hidden by terrain, smoke, weather, and other factors; failure of effective fireground communications; supervisors and firefighters failing to identify and designate escape routes in case conditions suddenly deteriorate; and the absence of safety zones that might otherwise provide protection if escape routes are cut off by unexpected deterioration of fireground conditions. This basic, firefighter-level risk management system became known by the acronym LCES, and today it’s a standard tool used to reduce firefighter injuries and deaths in wildland and interface fires.
EXPANDED USE
Since the mid-1990s, many progressive fire departments have expanded the use of LCES to interior structure fires, terrorist attacks, haz-mat emergencies, and technical search and rescue operations. LCES has proved especially effective in protecting the lives of firefighters and rescuers during structure collapse emergencies and USAR disasters dating back to the 1994 North-ridge Earthquake, when it was used by two FEMA Urban Search and Rescue Task Forces (CATF-2 from Los Angeles County and CATF-6 from Riverside, California) at the collapse of the three-story Northridge Meadows apartments.
LCES was included in the written Operational Action Plans for several FEMA USAR task forces at the 1995 Oklahoma City Bombing, a fact cited in contributing to the absence of serious injury or deaths to rescuers. To understand the role of LCES in Oklahoma, it’s helpful to consider the dangerous nature of the collapse that occurred when the Murrah Federal Building was bombed, leaving part of the nine-story building standing but capable of lethal secondary collapses or even total failure. For 16 days, local firefighters and members of 11 FEMA USAR task forces worked to stabilize the building, search void spaces, tunnel through debris, and dissect the structure to locate and recover victims while law en-forcement authorities simultaneously searched the debris for clues to the origin of the terrorist attack. Hundreds of personnel operated round-the-clock inside and around the building with the constant potential for secondary collapse, falling debris, and other hazards literally hanging over their heads—yet, none suffered a serious injury or death.
In the ensuing years, LCES has been successfully employed during the course of technical rescues ranging from trench collapses to cliff rescues, avalanches, confined space rescues, swiftwater rescues, marine emergencies, helicopter rescues, and industrial entrapments. LCES was applied in various ways and forms at the 9-11 Pentagon and World Trade Center collapse operations. And as more firefighters and officers come to understand the simplicity and effectiveness of LCES, its use is gradually expanding across the United States and other nations.
WHY LCES IS CRITICAL FOR RESCUE OPERATIONS
You can use the basic concepts of LCES at any emergency where there is a high level of risk to personnel. But these concepts are particularly suited to the unusual dangers that accompany technical rescue operations and USAR-related disasters. Every responder, from the incident commander to the line firefighter, can apply LCES if they understand the concepts and how to use them. LCES is not rocket science; it’s simply a system that allows firefighters, rescuers, and ICs to cover the most basic personnel safety needs they will likely encounter. Simplicity is important, because when conditions are deteriorating and things are starting to go wrong, simple is usually better.
Few situations are more dangerous than when there isn’t a reliable Look-out to observe what is happening, when lines of Communications have been broken, when there are no Escape Routes, and when no Safety Zones can be found. These factors are repeatedly implicated in firefighter and rescuer deaths in both wildland and interior structure firefighting situations. So it’s incumbent on the IC and the other officers to consider LCES whenever possible. There is no guarantee that LCES will prevent a tragic accident that might take the lives of firefighters and rescuers, but it can prevent many mishaps.
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(1) The view from a helicopter transporting a USAR company to help rescue two workers trapped in the bottom of a silo at the U.S. Borax processing plant. What LCES concerns can the USAR captain ascertain based on this aerial view of the rescue location? (Photos by author.)
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(2) A closer view of the silo reveals a single portal in the base of the silo in which a worker has become buried in borax. We can see a vacuum hose entending into the portal. However, the IC informs the USAR company that the route between the portal and the victim is not negotiable because of the danger of “bridging” of the material, which might cause rescuers to fall into hidden void spaces. He recommends an alternative means of access. He also mentions that Edwards Air Force Base is a few miles away and fighter jets are causing sonic booms throughout the day. What LCES concerns should USAR personnel have as they prepare to enter the silo to attempt a rescue?
LCES AT THE WTC
Some extreme situations may overwhelm our ability to establish optimal LCES protocols. When disastrous earthquakes, floods, fires, or terrorist attacks occur (and especially when they are compounded by multiple simultaneous events), one or more of the basic building blocks of LCES may be denied us—often for reasons beyond our control. Some have noted that this is what happened during the 9-11 attacks.
As the rest of the world watched from multiple strategic Lookout points provided by television news cameras mounted beneath helicopters, from police helicopters, from atop adjacent high-rise buildings, and from the streets surrounding the World Trade Center, FDNY personnel worked within the towers, unable to view the worsening effects of the fires and certain subtle signs that might have indicated impending collapse.
The situation was complicated by Communications troubles, in-cluding disruptions in radio transmissions between Command and personnel making their way up the stairwells to assist trapped victims, as well as interagency communications troubles.
To make matters worse, there were few (if any) Escape Routes or Safety Zones that could possibly have saved personnel when the towers collapsed. To save as many lives as possible under extreme conditions, personnel ventured far beyond the range of any escape route, into places where there was no hope of finding safe refuge if a major collapse occurred. In short, FDNY was confronted with what was essentially a no-win situation, yet personnel saved many thousands of lives before the towers came down.
LCES in various forms also was used successfully in the aftermath of the WTC collapse, when rescuers worked alongside iron workers, engineers, and heavy equipment operators to search and dissect the massive collapse zone to locate, rescue, and recover victims.
Future disasters might find firefighters from other departments in similar predicaments. What will firefighters and command do when extreme conditions prevent them from fully implementing reliable Lookouts, ensuring effective Communications, identifying usable Escape Routes, and finding adequate Safety Zones? If lives are in danger, it’s likely that they will simply do what FDNY did: go in and do the best they can to save lives under untenable conditions, and attempt to gain better control of the scene as conditions and resources allow, understanding that many firefighter and rescuer lives may be lost in the process. It’s a Catch-22 that few of us would wish to confront, because it means we may be embarking on a mission without a reasonable likelihood of return.
Fortunately, most rescue emergencies are not “worst-case scenarios” in the sense of the WTC attacks and therefore lend themselves to the use of the principles of LCES. With that in mind, let’s review how to apply these concepts to typical rescue situations.
LCES AT RESCUE OPERATIONS
Prior to assigning firefighters and other rescuers to enter the danger zone of a high-risk rescue operation, the IC should consider em-ploying LCES as part of the strategy. In turn, the officers and supervisors should apply LCES to their tactical operations. Firefighters and rescuers should employ LCES as they do the work of locating and rescuing trapped victims. Here is how to do it, step by step.
(L): Establish one or more Lookouts. As-sign one or more officers, firefighters, or rescue team members with a good knowledge of the hazards at hand (and the ability to evaluate and anticipate the behavior of these hazards) to observe the entire scene for signs of impending collapse, secondary explosion, fire, frayed ropes, avalanches, rock slides, flash floods, mud and debris flow, and other immediate life hazards that can kill firefighters and rescuers. Assign lookouts to strategically chosen locations to ensure they observe the most critical parts of the operation while keeping track of potential dangers that may lurk nearby. It may be necessary to place a lookout in the basket of an aerial platform, on an aerial ladder, on top of an adjacent building, on a mountainside (sometimes on the opposite slope from the rescue), in a personnel basket suspended below a crane, or even in a helicopter to ensure he can view the entire rescue scene.
It also may be necessary to post more than one lookout. This is a common tactic during wildland fire emergencies, and it should be common in some rescue situations (especially those spread across large areas of real estate, or where there are multiple levels, including subterranean).
It may be necessary to use devices and tools that can indicate a building is reaching its “max-imum criticality” or its “zero point moment” (an informal phrase indicating the instant preceding collapse). In earthquake-prone areas (es-pecially in the aftermath of an earthquake, where aftershocks are a certainty), the use of certain detectors may give sufficient warning for rescuers to get into safety zones before the arrival of the most damaging waves of an earthquake/aftershock. In Southern California, the HAZUS project (funded in part by the National Science Foundation and the Southern California Earthquake Center) is developing early warning systems to alert firefighters and others of the impending arrival of damaging seismic waves.
In some instances, it may be preferable to assign well-trained and reliable structural en-gineers or other experts as “adjunct” lookouts with the task of monitoring damaged buildings for possible secondary collapse, just as it might be a good idea to have a mine safety expert act as a lookout during a mine or tunnel rescue.
(C): Ensure clear and reliable Communications. In this sense, communications do not strictly apply to radio traffic—they are every kind of communications (including an effective ICS) that must occur for a rescue operation to be effective and reasonably safe for the rescuers.
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(3) Ropes have been lowered into the silo from a small opening in its roof so USAR members can clip into them, to prevent them from falling into void spaces hidden by “bridging” of the borax. Edwards Air Force Base graciously stopped all flights until the rescue was completed. But hundreds of tons of unsupported borax were caked to the interior diameter of the silo, with the potential of falling and burying the rescuers. What LCES concerns should you address here?
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(4) Shoring and “slough-in protection” were placed around the workers as they were gradually unburied. Tag lines were used for the firefighters and one civilian worker who refused to leave the side of the buried workers until they were rescued. As the commander, what would be your LCES concerns at this point?
Every rescue operation should have a clear communications plan that includes designated radio channels for certain functions and teams. For complex or extended operations, write and distribute the communications plan with the incident action plan (IAP). All personnel operating in and around the rescue site should be familiar with the communications plan, and each officer should ensure his firefighters are using the plan components appropriately.
The communications plan must ex-tend beyond the use of radios, which are subject to failure (and which can be lost or damaged during the course of rescue operations). Firefighters engaged in rescue should be prepared to use other forms of communications such as whistles, air horns, hand signals, cellular phones, and satellite phones. And don’t forget one of the most basic forms of communication: voice commands.
An ICS is an obvious key to the success of high-risk, large, and complicated rescue operations. This issue has been discussed and emphasized numerous times, yet some fire/rescue agencies still operate without such a system.
Clear position designations are also critical to communications. The use of command post identifiers; personnel identification vests; and properly marked helmets, armbands, or other identifiers should be mandatory. In a disaster setting when these methods may not be available to everyone (including off-duty personnel who report directly from home), the use of marker pens to hand-print designations on shirts, helmets, and even arms is preferable to the chaos that occurs when everyone looks the same and no one can identify who’s responsible for what. In disaster-prone areas, predesignated caches of armbands, helmets, and vests can assist in the communications process.
Communications also include the use of clear and concise IAPs that coincide with what’s actually happening in the rescue zone. In other words, it’s critical for the IAP to match (to a reasonable degree) the actual conditions on the scene. Too many times firefighters will look to the IAP for guidance and discover that it’s outdated, that it’s not ac-curate, that it doesn’t begin to convey the actual operations that are occurring, or that it didn’t take into account factors that will limit communications.
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(5) A two-person primary rescue team preparing to enter a tunnel. A two-person rapid intervention team, similarly equipped, is also ready to enter if necessary. What are the LCES concerns here?
For example, at the scene of a potential unexploded bomb, one of the most basic strategic and tactical objectives is to prevent accidental detonation by fire or police radio transmissions until the scene can be cleared of potential secondary devices. Once a radio exclusion zone is established, everyone in that zone must use alternative forms of communication, including runners to carry messages back and forth, until the “All clear” is given.
IAPs themselves are a form of communication that can be a great help if they are accurate and well thought out. Conversely, poorly developed IAPs that don’t match the reality at the scene can sometimes make the situation worse by misdirecting tactics and strategy.
(E): Establish one or more Escape Routes. For high-risk operations, the supervisor of each company, crew, or team should identify a primary escape route and (when feasible) one or more alternate (secondary) escape routes and make sure the members get the message. Include escape routes in the safety briefing (even if it’s as basic as the officer pointing out the primary and secondary escape routes “on the fly” as they enter the danger zone). Every firefighter engaged in high-risk rescue (including every supervisor and the IC, if possible) should have a clear idea of the primary and secondary escape routes. Every officer should brief his crew or team on the chosen escape routes during each entry into an IDLH (immediately dangerous to life and health) environment. You must evaluate the escape routes as conditions change and revise them, if necessary.
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(6) Sometimes forcible entry equipment is necessary to ensure a viable escape route is always available (especially in collapse situations). It may also be necessary to create a safety zone within the collapse zone.
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(7) At the Pentagon search and rescue operations following the 9-11 attack, members of the Alexandria and Arlington County fire department technical rescue teams were assigned as rapid intervention crews. If a secondary collapse or some other mishap occurred, they would have been prepared to create escape routes to help extricate FEMA USAR task force members who may have been trapped inside. This is an extension of LCES you must consider in collapse rescue situations.
Escape routes should be the fastest, safest way out of the danger zone or (when it’s not feasible to get outside the danger zone in time) the best route to the closest safety zone. In the event of a secondary collapse, a fire, a secondary explosion, unexpected flooding, or another unplanned event, a preplanned escape route may save your life.
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(8) Personnel accountability is closely related to communications in LCES. It’s critical that company officers have the ability to clearly identify the personnel under their command—information that should be communicated to whoever is maintaining personnel accountability at the incident. Supervisors should know which units are assigned to them and maintain the ability to communicate with them (directly or through other supervisors). If an “adverse event” occurs, this kind of communication will allow supervisors to ascertain the status of personnel and units; warn them of dangerous conditions; and order head counts, rapid interventions, and operational retreats with a reasonable assurance that the message will be communicated and all personnel will be accounted for. Here, a search team manager of Virginia FEMA USAR Task Force 2 displays the accountability for personnel under his supervision at the Pentagon collapse search and rescue operations.
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(9) This photo was taken when a secondary fire suddenly erupted during USAR operations at the Pentagon collapse. A FEMA structures specialist and USAR Incident Support Team safety officer see the problem from their vantage point (Lookout) and use the radio (Communications) for “emergency traffic” to report the fire to the IC (who immediately calls for retreat and a personnel accountability report). Meanwhile, they radio the retreat message to the members conducting shoring operations inside the building, while Arlington County Fire Department apparatus operators are sounding the signal with air horns. All personnel will exit the building (Escape Routes) to predesignated assembly points (Safety Zones), where a PAR will be conducted while Arlington County firefighters attack the fire. This is an example of LCES in action.
If necessary, identify escape routes with fluorescent spray paint markings, emergency lighting, signs, fireline tape, lumber crayons, or other clearly identifiable methods. In some cases, the route may be complicated, and it may be necessary to post a firefighter or team member where the escape route meets the safety zone to ensure escaping personnel are taking the proper route to safety.
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(10) As the safety officer watches to ensure all personnel are evacuating, Arlington County firefighters extinguish the fire.
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(11) During a training session, a rescuer is suspended on a high line system to practice “pickoff rescues.” This training is conducted under controlled conditions in clean water without debris. But in a real emergency in a raging flood control channel, an “upstream safety/spotter” (Lookout) should be posted to warn the rescuer (Communications) of debris coming downstream. With that warning, the rescuer can be moved away from harm’s way (Escape Route) to the shoreline or into the air (Safety Zone).
Escape routes can take different and sometimes unique forms. During search and rescue operations following an earthquake that shook the Philippines in 1992, members of the Miami-Dade and Fairfax County USAR task forces found that rapid escape through the corridors of an overturned hotel was not feasible while they tunneled and searched for victims during aftershocks. To expedite egress from parts of the collapsed building, they decided to stack mattresses outside windows as the primary escape route. The plan was for rescuers to scramble to the designated windows and dive out, one at a time, rolling off the mattresses just in time for the next team member to land safely.
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(12) What LCES issues can you identify here? How would you address them?
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(13) FEMA USAR structures specialists assigned to observe the Pentagon (Lookout) for signs of impending collapse have several forms of Communications with the IC and all personnel, including radios, hand-held air horns, runners, and voice (face to face). The officers and supervisors operating inside are responsible for establishing Escape Routes and Safety Zones in case a collapse occurs.
Stacking mattresses as the escape route might seem comical to some who’ve never operated inside a collapsed building with aftershocks continuing to strike, but it was a simple and workable plan—one that rescuers used successfully to evacuate from the collapse zone numerous times over a period of several days. When faced with unusual conditions, it’s important for team leaders and officers to “think outside the box” when addressing the safety needs of their fellow rescuers.
(S): Safety Zones. Firefighters and officers should identify at least one safety zone—an area that’s determined to be safe from secondary collapse and other hazards, into which rescuers can retreat in case of an aftershock, an explosion, a secondary collapse, or other unplanned event. The safety zone may be outside a building (and beyond the collapse zone, usually the same distance as the height of the building), or it may be beneath a rock ledge, inside a building, or on a hillside.
If the rescue operations are occurring inside a structure and escape to the outside will take too much time or is otherwise unfeasible, designate the safety zone within a stairwell or another fortified area within a building. In some cases, it may be necessary to construct a safety zone inside a damaged structure, fortifying it through the use of shoring, cribbing, or other methods.
During the nine-hour rescue of a victim trapped beneath the collapse of a reinforced concrete parking structure after the Northridge Earthquake, L.A. City and L.A. County firefighters determined that escape to the outside through a tunnel they had made was not possible during the many aftershocks that struck the region that day. Instead, they found an area that offered some protection within the collapse, and they fortified it with cribbing and shoring and designated it as their safety zone (which was used numerous times during the rescue). Every firefighter and rescuer entering the danger zone should be clearly aware of the safety zone(s). In the case of an unplanned event, the team leaders or officers should conduct “head counts” at the safety zones to ensure that all rescuers made it to safety (and to determine if some personnel are in need of assistance).
The use of LCES for rescue is becoming a standard in many progressive fire and rescue agencies, and it has become a proven method of safeguarding personnel who risk their lives entering the danger zone to locate and rescue victims of technical rescues and disasters. As rescue emergencies and disasters (including terrorist attacks) become more complex and more lethal, the importance of providing for Lookouts, Communications, Escape Routes, and Safety Zones will increase.
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(14) An L.A. County Fire Department captain (lying on the ground) immediately after he was pulled unconscious from a burning basement during a multiple-alarm fire. This is an example of LCES and rapid intervention working hand in hand to save firefighters on the fireground.
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(15) Primary and backup (rapid intervention) teams preparing for a confined space rescue operation. Note the complications to LCES that may affect these high-risk operations if rescuers aren’t properly equipped and trained.
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(16) FEMA USAR task force members conducting shoring operations inside the Pentagon after the 9-11 attacks. What LCES issues are visible here? How would you address them?
LARRY COLLINS is a captain and a 23-year veteran of the Los Angeles County (CA) Fire Department (LACoFD). He is a USAR specialist and paramedic for USAR Task Force 103. He is a search team manager for the LACoFD’s FEMA Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) Task Force and served as assistant task force leader at the Northridge Earthquake. He serves as a USAR specialist on the Red FEMA USAR Incident Support Team and worked the Oklahoma City Bombing, the 9-11 Pentagon collapse, and the 2002 Winter Olympics. Collins sits on a number of local, state, and national committees; is a frequent instructor at FDIC and FDIC West; and is author of the upcoming Fire Engineering book Rescue: A Guide to Urban Search and Technical Rescue.
