Major Pesticide Fire Tests Resources of Small Town Emergency Units
FIRE REPORTS
Overwhelming cooperation among agencies kept a 12-hour hazardous materials incident from escalating into a disaster.
A report of a structural fire early last winter called the West Sayville, N.Y., Volunteer Fire Department to a major hazardous materials incident that involved large amounts of pesticides and fungicides, a BLEVE of two 100-pound liquid petroleum gas cylinders and the exposure of additional LPG tanks.
As Chief Bill Kearns responded from his home to the 4:24 a.m. alarm, he detected an orange glow in the general area of the Durk Nursery located south of a commuter rail line. The nearest hydrant from this location is 2000 feet.
Fire scene
When Kearns arrived at the scene, two masonry and wood storage structures were fully involved in fire. One of the storage buildings housed a heating plant for a large greenhouse complex being threatened by fire. The fire also had communicated to a 40-foot storage trailer.
Kearns observed LPG cylinders in the vicinity of the fast-spreading fire and determined that the other storage structures contained poisonous insecticides and fertilizers.
Kearns reported the fire to headquarters and ordered the first-arriving pumper to dump the 500 gallons of water in its booster tank on the exposed LPG cylinders.
This was the beginning of an operation that would continue for approximately 12 hours. During this time, more than 5000 feet of hose would be stretched, 80 SCBA cylinders would be refilled and more than 80 emergency personnel along with their equipment and apparatus would be decontaminated. In addition, coordination and cooperation would be established among three fire departments, the Suffolk County Department of Fire Safety, the New York State Department of Environmental Control, the Department of Health, the Police Department Patrol and Emergency Squad, the Suffolk County Arson Squad, the State University at Stonybrook’s Environmental Health Safety Team and the local community ambulance service.
Apparatus placement
Kearns ordered 1000 of 3-inch hose to be nand-stretched from the first-in engine to a relay point. The second-arriving engine hooked up to the 2000foot distant hydrant and stretched 1000 feet of 3-inch hose in a straight lay to the relay point.
By this time, the first engine had exhausted its supply of booster tank water, and fire fighters were ordered to stay behind the pumper to await the completion of the relay operation. This delay in water with its temporary abandonment of the attack on the tanks proved a blessing because two exposed cylinders exploded, sending up a fireball, shock waves and flying particles.
I he second pumper fed its own booster tank through a 3-inch hose to the pumping engine at the fire. The third engine arrived at the hydrant, hooked up and supplied hydrant water to the two relying pumpers. This inline operation kept a continuous supply of water on the threatened tanks.
Strategy
Kearns established a command post near the scene and made the following decisions based on size-up:
- There would be no attempt to extinguish the fire located in the chemical storage area as there was no appreciable wind detected at that time.
- A hot zone would be quickly established and all members would don full protective clothing and SCBA.
- The pesticide building would be vented to increase the temperature of the fire to aid in the destruction of the pesticides.
- No attempt would be made to approach the LPG tanks because the fire had already been impinging longer than the critical time allowed for control of additional BLEVEs.
- Overall strategy would be to protect exposures and prevent extension of the main body of fire. Assistant Chief Warren Horst took charge of carrying out this strategy.
Mutual aid was requested. The Sayville Fire Department dispatched one pumper and additional manpower to the fire scene; the Bohemia Fire Department relocated in West Sayville’s main fire headquarters, providing additional backup and allowing for strict control of the number of emergency personnel at the incident.
Kearns, realizing that this operation would not only be long but quite involved, ordered a fire fighter to remain at the command post with him and record all orders and results.
The Suffolk County Control’s hazardous materials coordinator, Bill Schaub, was dispatched to the scene for consultation.
An exposure problem was developing with the wind blowing a poisonous vapor cloud over private homes . 1000 feet south of the incident.
In the size-up, Kearns took into account the relative dryness of the atmosphere, the height of the vapor cloud, and the fact that the 18° morning would find most of the windows in the private dwellings closed and sealed with storm coverings.
Kearns ordered the fourth pumper to position itself flanking the vapor cloud. Hand lines with fog nozzles attached were stretched so that if the cloud lowered in stratum, it could be directed as rapidly as possible by the hand lines.
The Sayville Fire Department augmented the relay pumper with an additional 3-inch supply line, assuring maximum water flow from the supply pumper. Sayville also supplied a bus for use as a relief area for fire fighters attempting to limit exposure time to the pesticides and the extreme cold.
It was decided to allow the fire in the storage building to burn. The fire in the heating plant and trailer could now be extinguished as the LPG tanks had not BLEVEd and could be cooled sufficiently to reverse this problem.
During this time, the fire control coordinator had ordered the telephone company to set up two additional telephone lines at West Sayville’s fire headquarters. One line was hooked directly to CHEMTREC and a list of chemicals was compiled by Schaub in consultation with the foreman of the greenhouse. Among the chemicals determined to be present were Benlate fungicide wettable powder, nicotine, Ortholide 50, Cycocel, malathion fermate, meta-systox, diazinon, and Cypcell. A microfiche system (portable reference material for hazardous material identification) was also set up.
The vapor cloud, although weakening, continued to lower itself in stratum. The Department of Environmental Control, the Department of Health and Schaub advised fire fighters to extinguish the burning chemicals. As very little water would be required to extinguish these remaining chemicals, runoff would not be a severe problem.
Emergency personnel donned SCBA and fully encapsulated disposable entry suits to obtain chemical samples from the storage building to determine if any other hazard was present.
The fire was fully extinguished at 10 a.m., and the tedious job of decontamination began.
Decontamination
On the surface, the decontamination procedure recommended by Schaub seemed simple—just wash down everyone and everything exposed to the fire with soap and water. However, with more than 80 fire fighters, a dozen EMS personnel and a score of advisory officials and police officers, along with apparatus, equipment and protective gear, this was to be a monumental task.
The situation was further complicated by the initial intermingling of persons and equipment prior to identifying the need to separate the y/clean” from the “contaminated.”
The overall decontamination process, headed bv Chief Gary Schaum and Chief William Leigh Manuell, was divided between the fireground and the West Sayville fire headquarters. Where feasible, apparatus and equipment were washed down with hoses while still at the scene, allowing for the contaminated runoff to collect in one location and facilitating the later environmental cleanup. However, the greater portion of the equipment had to be decontaminated at fire headquarters.
The initial step in implementing the decontamination procedure at the scene was to gain control of the movement of personnel and equipment in and out of the area suspected to be contaminated by toxic chemicals. The hazardous materials coordinator recommended that a control line be established approximately 200 feet west of the fire buildings, and personnel and equipment enter the restricted area through a 15-foot-wide driveway. Since the greenhouses, railroad tracks and a stockade fence provided an effective barrier to movement on and off the fireground, the control line was not extended any further.
A change of clothing for each fire fighter at the scene was required. The fire department radioed for additional manpower and notified the fire fighters’ families to bring a complete change of clothes to headquarters.
All equipment no longer in use within the restricted area was gathered and placed on polyethylene tarpaulins situated on the edge of the decontamination line. Equipment that was washed down at the scene was placed back in service, if possible, or segregated to be returned to clean apparatus.
Contaminated equipment was loaded on both the contaminated apparatus and the department’s utility truck for transport back to headquarters for cleanup. Every effort was made to utilize only those persons already considered to be contaminated. No food, beverages or cigarettes were permitted on the fireground to limit the potential for ingestion of toxic chemicals.
Fire fighters leaving the scene had their turnout gear removed, tagged and placed in the contaminated equipment pile .md were advised to shower thoroughly with soap and water immediately upon reaching home and to place all personal clothing in a plastic bag until it could be laundered independently of other wash. Those few people who left the fireground prior to the department advising this precautionary measure were telephoned and apprised of the procedure.
The same precaution exercised in the equipment decontamination was observed for the removal of the body of a dog that had succumbed to the fire. With full protective gear, fire fighters carried the body from the fire building on a disposable blanket and placed it in plastic bags. The Town of Islip Animal Shelter was then summoned to the scene to handle its removal.
However, a question arose as to whether the body could be disposed of in the normal fashion due to the potential contamination problem. After conferring with supervisory personnel from the shelter, a dump truck was called to remove and transport the carcass to a plastic lined landfill site.
After all equipment had been loaded or removed from the scene, the contaminated fire fighters were assembled and placed on the fire department bus for transportation back to quarters where the remainder of the decontamination process continued. The bus then returned to Sayville where it was thoroughly washed down.
Decontamination in quarters.
Emergency personnel entered the rear of the fire station’s gym that was set up as the decontamination area.
Turnout gear and personal clothing were removed and placed in marked, sealed, plastic bags. Fire fighters then showered in the basement, entering this area through the rear of the gym. After showering, personnel returned to the clean area through a network of quarters and rooms.
Used towels and soap were deposited in two separate containers, and fire fighters changed into clean clothes.
After fire fighters were decontaminated, all apparatus and equipment were scrubbed with soap and water and returned to service. Turnout gear was removed from the plastic bags and washed. The towels used by the fire fighters were returned to Southside Hospital, and hospital personnel were instructed how to wash them.
Before leaving quarters, fire fighters were told to phone quarters if they felt ill after arriving home.
Critique
Tight control of personnel at the scene eliminated serious injuries and chemical exposure incidents. Although nine people were hospitalized, they basically suffered from exhaustion and exposure to cold.
The immediate setting up of a command post and log were invaluable in coordinating and controlling the many agencies involved.
The fire chief, as incident commander, must delegate staff responsibilities to other officers. His overriding responsibility at incidents is rampant with rapid-fire decisions and strategy considerations, and he must be set free of menial decisions that will interfere with command (such as water supply, logistics, medical supervision, media control, manpower relief, etc.). A specific example of a breakdown in this management principle was evident at the scene when fire fighters approached the incident commander with questions as to the availability of extra gloves.
The use of large-diameter supply lines would have been a valuable tool in aiding water supply. An incident j control van and a countywide hazardous materials response team would have also been of tremendous assis| tance, and the possibility of providing a “shared” incident control van and countywide hazardous materials team is being looked into.